Filed 9/28/26 Rose v. Rose CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
VICTORIA D. ROSE, B347617
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV04692)
v.
JAMES D. ROSE et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kristin S. Escalante, Judge. Affirmed.
Aldesco Law and Albert Ioan Aldesco for Defendants and
Appellants.
California Land Law and Richard J. Cowles for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
__________________________________
In 2023, plaintiff Victoria Rose filed this action for quiet
title, partition, and other causes of action against her father
1
James Rose and his then-girlfriend, now wife, Regina Rose.
Victoria sought to enforce provisions in a 2016 dissolution
judgment between her mother and James, which awarded
Victoria an interest in the family residence, where she and James
lived after her parents’ divorce. At the time of trial, a recorded
deed listed only James and Regina as having an interest in the
subject property. The trial court found in favor of Victoria on the
quiet title cause of action, determining she owned 50 percent of
the subject property and James and Regina owned the other 50
percent, and ordered partition of the property by sale. James and
Regina contend the trial court erred in interpreting the
dissolution judgment. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Purchase of the Subject Property
Victoria’s parents, Delia Banuelos and James, married in
1993, and Victoria was born in 2000. In December 2003, James
and Banuelos executed a written, notarized agreement with
James’s grandfather, Raul Ybarra, stating:
“I, Raul Ybarra, hereby agree to sell my house, located at
2909 Via San Carlo, Montebello, California, to [James] and
[Banuelos] for the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($250,000). In the event that James and [Banuelos] sell the
property listed above, it is agreed that Victoria[], their daughter,
1
Because these parties share the same surname, we will
hereinafter refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.
We intend no disrespect.
2
is entitled to receive a sum of money equal to fifty percent (50%)
of the sale price of the property listed above.”
On March 3, 2004, Ybarra transferred the Property by
quitclaim deed to James and Banuelos, as joint tenants.
Banuelos recorded the quitclaim deed with the Los Angeles
County Recorder’s Office.
In May 2013, James and Banuelos separated, and James
and Victoria moved out of the Property and into another home.
The following month, Banuelos filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage. In 2014, Banuelos moved out of the Property, and it
remained vacant until in or around February 2016, when James
and Victoria moved back to the Property.
B. Relevant Provisions of the Stipulated Dissolution
Judgment
In or around March 2016, when Victoria was 16 years old,
James and Banuelos agreed to resolve the dissolution
proceedings by stipulated judgment (hereinafter, the Judgment).
At that time, James had sole physical custody of Victoria, and
that continued after the divorce.
Pursuant to the terms of the Judgment, Banuelos was
obligated to pay James $800 per month in child support, and both
parties waived spousal support. The Judgment awarded
Banuelos all interest in her CalSTRS retirement account, and
awarded James all interest in financial accounts in his name.
James and Banuelos each retained certain vehicles as well as all
furnishings and personal belongings in his or her possession at
the time of the divorce, with James maintaining possession of all
furnishings and personal belongings at the Property. The
present action turns on the interpretation of the provisions in the
Judgment relating to the Property, which is referred to in the
3
Judgment as the “former family residence.” Therefore, we quote
these provisions in full:
“C. Family Residence: It is the parties’ intent to
enforce the agreement made at time of purchase of the former
family residence and maintain a fifty percent (50%) interest in
the home for the parties’ daughter, Victoria[]. The parties shall
retain an estate planning attorney to draft documents necessary
to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family
residence. The parties shall share the cost of said estate
planning equally. Any retainer required by the estate planning
attorney shall be paid by the parties within ten days of execution
of the Judgment by the parties. [James]’s ownership interest in
the former family residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall
not encumber more than fifty percent (50%) of the equity therein.
“[James] shall have ninety (90) days to remove [Banuelos]
from the loan on the former family residence and pay [Banuelos]
an equalization payment in the amount of $13,000, as set forth
hereinbelow. In the event [James] has not refinanced the former
family residence and paid [Banuelos] the equalizing payment as
set forth herein, the former family residence shall be sold. The
parties may meet and confer to extend this deadline if agreed.
“If the former family residence is sold, fifty percent (50%) of
the proceeds will be held for Victoria as decided by the parties
and an estate planning attorney. After payment of all selling
costs and tax consequences, [Banuelos] shall receive the sum of
$13,000 from [James]’s fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds as set
forth herein, and [James] shall receive the balance.
“D. Equalization: In order to equalize the division of
property, [James] shall pay to [Banuelos] the sum of $13,000.00.
Said sum shall be payable by [James] pursuant to a Promissory
4
Note in the amount of $13,000 secured by a Deed of Trust
recorded against the former family residence.”
On or about March 22, 2016, shortly before James and
Banuelos signed the stipulation for the Judgment, James secured
a loan against the Property in the amount of $175,000.
Thereafter, he paid off the existing mortgage on the Property
(approximately $41,000), and he paid Banuelos the $13,000
equalization payment required under the terms of the Judgment.
On March 30, 2016, the date Banuelos signed the
stipulation for the Judgment, she also signed a quitclaim deed,
granting her interest in the former family residence to James.
On April 1, 2016, the title company recorded the quitclaim deed
and a deed of trust with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s
Office. James signed the stipulation for the Judgment on April 7,
2016. The Judgment was entered on June 21, 2016.
James and Banuelos did not “retain an estate planning
attorney to draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-
half (1/2) interest in the former family residence,” as required by
the Judgment.
On March 24, 2016, James created a revocable trust called
the J.D. Rose 2016 Family Trust, which includes provisions
regarding distribution of any remaining trust property to Victoria
upon James’s death. The trust document does not reference the
Property, and the Property was not placed into the trust (as of
the time the interlocutory judgment was entered in the present
quiet title action).
C. Encumbrances on the Property and Transfer of Title
to James and His Girlfriend, as Joint Tenants
In March 2020, James took out a loan of approximately
$300,000, secured by a100-percent-interest in the Property. After
5
using the proceeds from this 2020 loan to pay off the balance on
his 2016 loan, he received a cash payment of around $90,000, less
fees. In April 2021, James took out another loan secured by the
entire Property, this time for approximately $400,000. After
paying his debts, he received a cash payment of around $66,000.
James obtained these short-term, high-interest loans because he
was unemployed and on permanent disability, and he was falling
behind on tax payments for the Property.
2
In or around July 2021, James began dating Regina. On
December 16, 2022, he executed a grant deed, granting the
Property from himself, to himself and Regina as joint tenants.
Regina did not purchase her 50 percent interest in the Property;
it was listed as a gift from James on the deed. Also on December
16, 2022, James and Regina secured a $490,000 loan against the
Property. At that time, the appraised value of the Property was
$930,000. Some of the proceeds from the loan were used to pay
delinquent taxes and penalties on the Property. James and
Regina also used some of the proceeds to pay their personal
debts. On December 22, 2022, the title company recorded the
grant deed and a deed of trust with the Los Angeles County
Recorder’s Office.
After her parents’ divorce in 2016, Victoria lived at the
Property with James until in or around March 2023, when she
2
As indicated ante, Regina’s current surname is Rose, so
we will refer to her by her first name to avoid confusion with
other parties who share her surname (James and Victoria). She
was originally named in this action under her maiden name,
Regina Dabich. At trial, the court granted Victoria’s motion to
correct the record to reflect Regina’s current surname.
6
was 23 years old (except for a period of six months in 2021).
Regina did not live at the Property during this time.
D. The Present Action
1. The operative first amended complaint
On March 3, 2023, Victoria filed this action for quiet title,
slander of title, partition and accounting, and declaratory relief
against James and Regina. The same month, James and Regina
married.
On August 7, 2023, after the court sustained in part James
and Regina’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend,
Victoria filed a first amended complaint, asserting the same
causes of action, and naming Banuelos as a defendant in addition
to James and Regina.
In the operative first amended complaint, Victoria alleged,
in pertinent part, that the 2016 Judgment in her parents’
dissolution proceedings granted her a 50 percent legal interest in
the Property and prohibited James from encumbering more than
his 50 percent legal interest in the Property. She sought, among
other things, an order quieting title in accordance with the
Judgment, and an order for partition of the Property by sale.
The court overruled James and Regina’s demurrer to the
first amended complaint, denied their motion to strike and
ordered them to file an answer, which they did.
Prior to trial, Banuelos was dismissed from the action.
2. The bench trial
On November 14, 2024, the court held a one-day bench trial
in this matter. During Victoria’s opening statement, her counsel
asserted it would be improper to allow James to “relitigate” the
dissolution Judgment by arguing ambiguity and seeking to admit
extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent. The court ruled that
7
in accordance with the principles of contractual interpretation, it
would provisionally “receive the extrinsic evidence to consider
whether there’s a latent ambiguity that’s not apparent from the
face of the contract [i.e., the stipulated Judgment].” The court
added, “If the language [of the Judgment] is clear enough where
the extrinsic evidence isn’t helpful, then the court will just be
looking at the language first as with any instrument.” James and
Regina do not argue on appeal that the court precluded them
from presenting evidence.
During her testimony, Victoria stated her position that the
dissolution Judgment granted her a 50 percent ownership
interest in the Property. She testified that around the time of her
parents’ divorce, when she was 16 years old, Banuelos told her
that she owned 50 percent of the Property because Banuelos
3
“gave [Victoria] her half in the divorce Judgment.” In 2021,
during a dispute with James over whether Victoria should
continue to live at the Property, Victoria asserted her ownership
interest to James, and he remained silent on the matter. In
November 2022, James asked Victoria to cosign a loan, and she
asked him why her name was not on the title to the Property. He
responded that he owned 100 percent of the Property. She
declined to cosign the loan. She testified that she did not consent
to him encumbering more than 50 percent of the Property’s
equity with a loan. Nor did she consent to him transferring a 50
percent interest in the Property to Regina.
James acknowledged during his testimony that the
Judgment states he has a 50 percent interest in the Property,
3
Banuelos testified that this conversation occurred five
years later, in 2021.
8
and he may not encumber more than 50 percent of the Property’s
equity. He maintained, however, that “the divorce judgment is
different than what [he and Banuelos] agreed to.” He stated that
during the dissolution proceedings, Banuelos wanted to sell the
Property, but he and Victoria did not want to do that. He
testified that he “gave up certain interest in [Banuelos’s]
retirement accounts as well as spousal support in exchange for
[Banuelos’s] portion of the house, her 50 percent of the house.”
He noted that he signed the stipulation for the Judgment “after
[he] had already received 100 percent of the property” by virtue of
4
Banuelos quitclaiming her interest to him.
James testified that Victoria “has a future interest” in the
Property that “doesn’t apply unless [he] sell[s] the home.” He
stated that when he created his trust in 2016 (described ante), he
intended to leave the Property to Victoria if he died, but he
conceded that the Property was never placed into the trust.
During his testimony, he confirmed his understanding that under
the current arrangement, with he and Regina listed on the record
title as joint tenants, if he were to pass away, the entire Property
4
Similarly, in his trial brief, James stated: “James’s belief
at the time of executing the stipulation, notably on April 7, 2016,
a week after [Banuelos] had quitclaimed legal title to him, was
that he had negotiated, and been awarded, an absolute (100%)
ownership interest in the property. It was not until after he read
the dissolution [J]udgment, dated June 21, 2026, that James
noticed the [J]udgment, albeit ambiguous, seemed different from
what the parties had agreed to. Whereas James believed that his
ownership of the Property following the dissolution of his
marriage would be unqualified and absolute, the [J]udgment read
that he had ‘[a] fifty percent (50%) interest in the former family
residence.’ ”
9
would go to Regina. He testified that he added Regina to the title
because he could not qualify for the $490,000 loan on his own. He
stated that at the time of trial, the loan was current, the
outstanding taxes were paid, and the Property was not at risk of
foreclosure.
Regina testified that at the time she agreed to obtain the
$490,000 loan with James, she was aware that if the property
were ever sold, Victoria would receive half of the proceeds, and
Regina was “fine with” that arrangement. It was not until after
the present action was filed that Regina saw a copy of the
Judgment stating that James’s ownership interest in the
Property is 50 percent. Regina indicated that she “went on title
to the Property only to help get the loan and not as an actual
owner.” She acknowledged that if James passed away before her,
she would be the owner of the entire property, and she confirmed
that Victoria was not a beneficiary of her estate. Regina also
indicated that she “never intended to receive anything from being
on title to the Property.” The loan she and James took against
the Property paid off some of her and James’s personal debts that
were not secured by the Property.
Banuelos testified that when she entered into the
stipulation for the dissolution Judgment with James, her intent
was “to leave” her 50 percent interest in the Property to Victoria.
Her attorney advised her to sign the quitclaim deed, granting her
interest in the Property to James. It was her understanding that
the Judgment would “protect” Victoria’s “50 percent title interest
in the Property.” Banuelos indicated during her testimony that
James gave up his claim for spousal support in exchange for her
giving up her interest in the Property. She maintained, however,
10
that under the terms of the stipulation and Judgment, her
interest in the Property went to Victoria.
3. The court’s ruling and interlocutory judgment
After hearing oral argument, receiving further briefing,
and taking the matter under submission, the court issued its
ruling on January 29, 2025. At the outset of the 12-page minute
order, the court summarized its findings and conclusions as
follows: “The court finds in favor of plaintiff Victoria D. Rose and
against defendants James D. Rose and Regina L. Rose on the
quiet title and partition claims. The court finds that Victoria D.
Rose is a 50% owner of the property, with the other 50%
owned . . . jointly by James and Regina. The court further finds
that Victoria D. Rose is entitled to partition by sale. The court
will enter an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale. . . . [¶]
The court finds against plaintiff and in favor of defendants on the
slander of title claim. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient
argument or authority to establish entitlement to judgment on
5
that claim.”
Because our standard of review in this appeal is de novo, as
explained post, a detailed account herein of the court’s reasoning
is unnecessary. Nonetheless, we provide the following summary
of the court’s interpretation of the Judgment to provide context
for James and Regina’s arguments on appeal.
The court concluded: “[T]he language of the stipulated
judgment is clear on its face that James D. Rose was awarded
only a 50% interest in the property. The judgment explicitly
states in at least two places that James D. Rose was awarded
5
Victoria did not file a cross-appeal from the interlocutory
judgment challenging the portions of the ruling not in her favor.
11
only 50% of the property, specifically stating (1) James D. Rose is
awarded ‘[a] fifty percent (50%) interest in the former family
residence located at 2909 Via San Carlos, Montebello, CA’; and
(2) ‘Respondent’s [James D. Rose’s] ownership interest in the
former family residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall not
encumber more than fifty percent (50%) of the equity therein.’
Any claim that James D. Rose was awarded more than fifty
percent of the property or that there were somehow no
restrictions on James D. Rose’s right to encumber the property is
contrary to the express language of the stipulated judgment.”
The court further concluded: “[T]he only tenable interpretation is
that Victoria Rose was being awarded the other 50%. This is
consistent with the fact that the stipulation states that the
parties’ intent was to ‘maintain a fifty percent (50%) interest’ in
the home for Victoria and that the estate planning attorney
would draft documents necessary to ‘preserve Victoria’s one-half
(1/2) interest in the former family residence.’ ” The court stated it
was “unnecessary for the court to determine whether Victoria
must prove her interest in the [P]roperty by [a] preponderance of
the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, because even if
the clear and convincing evidence standard applies, clear and
convincing evidence established that James D. Rose (along with
Regina Rose) owns only 50% of the [P]roperty and that Victoria
D. Rose owns the other 50%.”
The court rejected James and Regina’s arguments that
provisions in the Judgment regarding a potential sale of the
Property and referencing the prior agreement with Ybarra
(James’s grandfather) demonstrate that Victoria’s only interest in
the property was a contingent right to receive 50 percent of
proceeds in the event James ever decided to sell the Property.
12
The court concluded that these provisions do not negate the
express, clear, unequivocal language in the Judgment stating
James was awarded only a 50 percent interest in the Property.
The court also rejected James and Regina’s argument that
“the fact that Banuelos quitclaimed the property to James shows
that Victoria was not awarded any interest in the [P]roperty by
the [J]udgment.” The court noted: “Victoria was a minor at the
time the stipulated [J]udgment was entered into. The parties
had agreed to jointly hire an estate planning attorney to
determine how Victoria’s interest in the [P]roperty would be held.
The parties also agreed that James would refinance the
[P]roperty in order to pay Banuelos the $13,000 equalization
payment. Under those conditions, it makes sense that the parties
would choose not to have a minor on title in the first instance, at
least until after the parties had received advice from the estate
6
planning attorney.” The court found James’s “arguments
regarding his own trust instrument,” which did not include any
reference to the Property, “to be frivolous.”
The court concluded that because the dissolution Judgment
granted Victoria a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property,
she had standing to bring a quiet title action, and she had a right
to partition.
On June 6, 2025, the court entered an interlocutory
judgment, quieting title “to an undivided 50% interest in the
[Property] to [Victoria] as of June 21, 2016 [the date the
6
As discussed ante, James and Banuelos did not “retain an
estate planning attorney to draft documents necessary to
preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family
residence,” as required by the terms of the Judgment.
13
dissolution Judgment was entered],” and ordering partition of the
Property by sale, with Victoria “entitled to 50% of the sale
proceeds after the costs of sale.” The court retained jurisdiction
pending the sale and distribution of net proceeds.
James and Regina filed a timely notice of appeal from the
interlocutory judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(9)
[“an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition
determining the rights and interests of the respective parties and
directing partition to be made” is appealable].)
DISCUSSION
James and Regina (hereinafter, referred to as appellants)
contend that “undisputed evidence” demonstrates that the
stipulated dissolution Judgment “is reasonably susceptible” to
their interpretation—that Victoria has no ownership interest in
the Property but is entitled to 50 percent of the proceeds upon
sale of the Property—and therefore, “the [J]udgment evinces a
latent ambiguity as a matter of law.” They urge us to “constru[e]
the undisputed evidence” to resolve the purported ambiguity in
7
their favor.
7
In the respondent’s brief, Victoria argues that James
forfeited his contention regarding an ambiguity in the Judgment
by not raising the issue in the dissolution proceedings. She cites
no authority supporting her argument, and we reject it. She filed
this action seeking to enforce the Judgment, and James may offer
his interpretation of the Judgment in his defense.
Victoria also argues that appellants’ opening brief does not
comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204, and suggests
that the appellate record is inadequate for meaningful review.
Victoria does not point to a specific part(s) of appellants’ brief
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
14
A. Principles of Contractual Interpretation and
Standards of Review
“ ‘ “ ‘Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a
dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules
governing the interpretations of contracts generally.’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘ “ ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation
is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.]
If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.’ ” ’
[Citations.] ‘ “ ‘The mutual intention to which the courts give
effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’
intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as
extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding
circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into
the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the
contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.’ ” ’
[Citation.] ‘The parties’ expressed objective intent, not their
unexpressed subjective intent, governs.’ ” (In re Marriage of
Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 948.)
“Where the meaning of the words used in a contract is
disputed, the trial court must provisionally receive any proffered
extrinsic evidence which is relevant to show whether the contract
is reasonably susceptible of a particular meaning.” (Wolf v.
Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1350 (Wolf).) “The
interpretation of a contract involves ‘a two-step process: “First
the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all
credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to determine
‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’
that she believes violates the rule. Nor does she explain the
purported inadequacy of the record. For these reasons, we reject
the arguments.
15
to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic
evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably
susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is
then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the
contract. [Citation.]” [Citation.] The trial court’s determination
of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law, subject to
independent review on appeal. [Citation] The trial court’s
resolution of an ambiguity is also a question of law if no parol
evidence is admitted or if the parol evidence is not in conflict.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1351.)
Here, the trial court resolved the matter at the first step,
concluding the language of the stipulated dissolution Judgment is
not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation appellants
advanced. Appellants urge us to reach the opposite conclusion on
the first step, move to the second step, and resolve the purported
ambiguity in the Judgment in their favor by independently
construing the undisputed evidence.
B. Analysis
The division of the Property in the Judgment is clear:
“Respondent’s [James’s] ownership interest in the former family
residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall not encumber more
than fifty present (50%) of the equity therein.” James and
Banuelos expressly included in the Judgment their agreement to
“maintain a fifty (50%) interest in the home for [their] daughter,
Victoria[].” They further agreed that in the event the Property
were sold, James and Victoria would each receive 50 percent of
the proceeds. Appellants contend that notwithstanding the
unequivocal language in the Judgment that James owns 50
percent of the Property and may not encumber more than 50
percent of the Property’s equity, he and Banuelos actually agreed
16
that he would own 100 percent of the Property and could
encumber 100 percent of the Property’s equity. We agree with
the trial court that none of the extrinsic evidence appellants
introduced regarding James’s and Banuelos’s intentions
demonstrates that the Judgment is reasonably susceptible to the
interpretation appellants advance. Thus, appellants have not
demonstrated a latent ambiguity in the Judgment that we should
resolve in their favor.
Appellants argue that the reference in the Judgment to the
8
prior agreement with James’s grandfather Ybarra creates an
ambiguity as to whether the Judgment grants Victoria a 50
percent ownership interest in the Property or merely a contingent
future right to receive 50 percent of the proceeds if James ever
sells the Property. We find no such ambiguity. The pertinent
paragraph of the Judgment states:
“It is the parties’ intent to enforce the agreement made at
time of purchase of the former family residence and maintain a
fifty percent (50%) interest in the home for the parties’ daughter,
Victoria[]. The parties shall retain an estate planning attorney to
draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2)
interest in the former family residence. The parties shall share
8
As discussed ante, James and Banuelos’s 2003 agreement
with Ybarra stated: “I, Raul Ybarra, hereby agree to sell my
house, located at 2909 Via San Carlo, Montebello, California, to
[James] and [Banuelos] for the amount of two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000). In the event that James and
[Banuelos] sell the property listed above, it is agreed that
Victoria[], their daughter, is entitled to receive a sum of money
equal to fifty percent (50%) of the sale price of the property listed
above.”
17
the cost of said estate planning equally. Any retainer required by
the estate planning attorney shall be paid by the parties within
ten days of execution of the Judgment by the parties. [James]’s
ownership interest in the former family residence is fifty percent
(50%), and he shall not encumber more than fifty percent (50%) of
the equity therein.” The next paragraph of the Judgment states
that if James could not refinance the loan on the Property
without Banuelos’s name on it and pay her an equalization
payment within 90 days, the Property would be sold. The
following paragraph sets forth the division of proceeds in the
event the Property is sold (50 percent for Victoria and 50 percent
for James).
Appellants’ assertion that James and Banuelos intended to
give Victoria only a contingent future right to sale proceeds and
no ownership interest in the Property cannot be reconciled with
the language in the Judgment awarding James only a 50 percent
ownership interest in the Property and restricting him from
9
encumbering more than 50 percent of the Property’s equity. Nor
can appellants’ assertion be reconciled with the language stating
that James and Banuelos intend “to maintain a fifty percent
(50%) interest in the home” for Victoria, language that appears in
9
There is no evidence indicating James encumbered more
than 50 percent of the Property’s equity when he took out the
$175,000 loan in 2016 at the time of the divorce. According to
Banuelos’s trial testimony, the Property’s value when she and
James purchased it in 2004 was between $400,000 and $450,000.
She estimated that the Property’s value in 2016 was around
$700,000. In 2022, the Property was appraised at $930,000, and
James and Regina obtained a loan for $490,000, more than half
the Property’s equity.
18
a paragraph discussing ownership of the Property, not the
paragraph discussing division of proceeds upon a sale of the
Property. The only interpretation of the Judgment that
harmonizes all of its language is that James and Banuelos
intended to honor the agreement they made with Ybarra
regarding division of proceeds in the event of a sale and secure a
50 percent ownership interest in the Property for Victoria.
In support of their interpretation of the Judgment,
appellants also rely on the quitclaim deed Banuelos executed on
the day she signed the stipulation for the Judgment. We are not
persuaded that consideration of the quitclaim deed renders the
Judgment ambiguous. James signed the stipulation for the
Judgment after Banuelos quitclaimed her 50 percent interest in
the Property to him and the title company recorded the quitclaim
deed and the deed of trust on James’s loan against the Property.
The Judgment required the parties to hire an attorney “to draft
documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest
in the former family residence,” which they failed to do. That
failure does not mean that Victoria may not enforce the
Judgment awarding her a 50 percent ownership interest in the
Property. (See Fam. Code, § 2010, subd. (e) [in a marital
dissolution action, a “court has jurisdiction to inquire into and
render any judgment and make orders that are appropriate
concerning” the “settlement of the property rights of the
parties”].) The court entered the Judgment dividing the Property
after Banuelos quitclaimed her interest to James.
Appellants have not demonstrated the Judgment is
ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to their interpretation.
Even if appellants had demonstrated an ambiguity in the
Judgment, we would resolve any ambiguity in favor of Victoria
19
based on the undisputed evidence in the record. Appellants agree
this step of the analysis is subject to our independent review,
acknowledging that “the extrinsic evidence is not in material
conflict.” (See Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [“ ‘The
trial court’s resolution of an ambiguity is also a question of law if
no parol evidence is admitted or if the parol evidence is not in
conflict’ ”].)
In this part of their analysis, appellants rely on other terms
of the dissolution settlement in their attempt to show that James
and Banuelos intended for James to own 100 percent of the
Property. They assert, “The undisputed evidence at trial was
that [Banuelos] sold her interest in the Property to James in
exchange for James surrendering the spousal support to which he
was entitled.” While it is true that Banuelos indicated during her
testimony that James gave up his claim for spousal support in
exchange for her giving up her interest in the Property, this does
not demonstrate that the parties intended the Judgment to
award James 100 percent of the Property. According to James’s
trial testimony, Banuelos wanted to sell the Property, but he and
Victoria wanted to keep it. Reaching the deal memorialized in
the stipulation for the Judgment accomplished James’s goal of
staying in the Property and avoiding a sale. That James waived
spousal support, paid off Banuelos’s share of the mortgage
(approximately $20,000), and paid her an equalization payment
of $13,000, does not mean that James was awarded a 100 percent
ownership interest in the Property. The agreement he signed
expressly states otherwise, and the trial court did not err in
interpreting it in Victoria’s favor.
Appellants invoke Evidence Code section 662, which
provides, “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to
20
be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be
rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.” They contend,
“Without a contract that unequivocally grants Victoria an
ownership interest in the property, Victoria is left without the
requisite evidence to defeat [appellants’] recorded legal title.” To
the extent Evidence Code section 662 is applicable here, Victoria
has rebutted the presumption, as we conclude the Judgment
unequivocally awarded her a 50 percent ownership interest in the
Property. As an owner of the property, Victoria has a valid claim
for quiet title. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 760.020, subd. (a) [“An
action may be brought under this chapter to establish title
against adverse claims to real or personal property or any
interest therein”] & 760.010 [“ ‘Claim’ includes a legal or
equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in property or cloud
upon title”].) Appellants have not demonstrated error.
DISPOSITION
The interlocutory judgment is affirmed. Respondent is
entitled to recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
21