Filed 8/4/26 Rodriguez v. Acuna CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, D086760
Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 25CU027520C)
MARIA CRISTINA ACUÑA,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blair Soper, Judge. Affirmed.
Miguel Rodriguez, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trial court denied Miguel Rodriguez’s request for a civil
harassment restraining order against Maria Cristina Acuña. Rodriguez
appealed on several grounds, but due to the limited record he provided us, he
fails to establish error. We therefore affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Rodriguez lives in the same apartment building as Mrs. Acuña and her
husband, Pedro Acuña. In 2025, Rodriguez filed a request for a restraining
order against Mrs. Acuña. Under a separate case number (25CU027534C),
Rodriguez also sought a restraining order against Mr. Acuña.1 The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order against Mr. Acuña.
The trial court denied both of Rodriguez’s requests at a hearing on
June 26, 2025, finding that he failed to carry his burden of proof. Rodriguez’s
timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rodriguez’s Claims
Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his
restraining order request because during the hearing, Mr. Acuña testified on
Mrs. Acuña’s behalf and admitted violating the temporary restraining order;
(2) excluding evidence submitted by Rodriguez; (3) allowing Mr. Acuña to
testify on Mrs. Acuña’s behalf and failing to conduct an individualized
hearing regarding Rodriguez’s separate claims against Mrs. Acuña; (4)
denying Rodriguez’s request for a continuance to pursue a pending subpoena
for third party records; (5) denying Rodriguez’s request for a fee waiver; and
(6) failing to extend a temporary restraining order during this appeal.
B. Standard of Review
“[A] trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
1 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the appellate record in
the case involving Mr. Acuña (case no. D086824). (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459.)
2
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment. . . . ‘ “[I]f the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, citations
omitted.) An appellant therefore has the burden of providing a reporter’s
transcript, an agreed statement, or a settled statement if the appellant
intends to raise an issue that requires consideration of oral proceedings.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).)2
C. Analysis
The record of the June 26, 2025 restraining order hearing, consists of
the trial court’s minute order. There is no restraining order petition,
reporter’s transcript, agreed statement, or settled statement. As explained
below, this limited record prevents Rodriguez from establishing any grounds
for reversal.
First, the minute order states that “[t]he court hear[d] testimony from
all parties,” but there is nothing describing for us what that testimony
entailed. Rodriguez’s claim that Mr. Acuña admitted temporary restraining
order violations is therefore unsupported.
2 As a self-represented litigant, Rodriguez is entitled to the same but no
greater consideration than other litigants, and he must therefore follow the
rules of appellate procedure. (County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861.)
3
Second, the minute order states the trial court considered “the evidence
presented.” Consequently, we have nothing saying that the trial court
excluded any of Rodriguez’s proffered evidence.3
Third, there is no requirement that Mrs. Acuña testify in her own
defense, and she may present testimony from other witnesses such as
Mr. Acuña. (See, e.g., Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 729
[“ ‘[b]oth sides may offer evidence by deposition, affidavit, or oral testimony,’ ”
and “ ‘if it is offered, relevant oral testimony must be taken from available
witnesses’ ” (italics added)].) Nor is there any indication that the trial court
failed to individually assess Rodriguez’s allegations against each of the
Acuñas. On the contrary, the minute orders from each case state that the
trial court “fully considered the arguments of all parties, both written and
oral, as well as the evidence presented,” and that Rodriguez did not meet his
burden of proof on either of his petitions.
Fourth, while the minute order confirms the trial court denied
Rodriguez’s request for a continuance, it is silent as to the basis of
Rodriguez’s motion or the trial court’s reason for denying it. We therefore
have no grounds to find that the trial court abused its discretion in this
regard. (In re Marriage of Tara & Robert D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 871, 881
[“We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion.”];
Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“ ‘In the absence of a contrary
3 Rodriguez’s motion to augment the record with the allegedly excluded
evidence is denied. There is no showing that the documents attached to
Rodriguez’s motion or his accompanying lodgment were submitted to the trial
court. Even if we assume Rodriguez presented these documents to the trial
court, as already stated, the minute order reflects the trial court did not
exclude any evidence.
4
showing in the record, . . . “[i]f any matters could have been presented to the
court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be
presumed that such matters were presented.” ’ ”].)
Fifth, when a litigant qualifies for a fee waiver, there are certain fees
that must be waived, and there are additional fees that may be waived in the
trial court’s discretion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.55 [listing “fees and costs
that must be waived” (italics added)]; rule 3.56 [listing “fees and costs that
may be waived” (italics added)]; rule 1.5(b)(1) & (2) [“ ‘[m]ust’ is mandatory”
and “ ‘[m]ay’ is permissive”].) The record shows that “[a]fter [c]areful review”
at a hearing, the trial court granted Rodriguez’s fee waiver for the mandatory
fees and then denied Rodriguez’s request to waive additional fees.4 The
record is otherwise silent about what occurred at that hearing, and is
therefore inadequate to establish that the trial court abused its discretion.
(Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 [“The absence of a record
concerning what actually occurred at the hearing precludes a determination
that the court abused its discretion.”].)
Finally, the record does not mention a temporary restraining order
against Mrs. Acuña. Even if the trial court issued such an order, it would
have been for the limited purpose of “provid[ing] protection while the parties
ready their cases for a hearing.” (D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625, 635;
see also, Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subds. (f) & (g).) Having determined that
4 The trial court subsequently granted Rodriguez’s fee waiver request
related to this appeal.
5
Rodriguez was not entitled to relief after the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court had no basis to extend any temporary restraining order.5
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Mrs. Acuña is awarded costs on appeal.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
5 Finding no error, we likewise reject Rodriguez’s claim of cumulative
error.
6