Filed 10/6/26 Roberts v. Merced County District Attorney CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DANIEL LEON ROBERTS,
F090604
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CV-02555)
v.
MERCED COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Donald J.
Proietti, Judge.
Daniel Leon Roberts, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, Jenna M. Anderson and Dusty B. Nunes,
Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff Daniel Leon Roberts sued defendant Merced County District Attorney
alleging claims of misconduct in connection with his criminal prosecution. Defendant
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and Harrell, J.
demurred to Roberts’s sixth amended complaint, which the trial court sustained as to all
causes of action without leave to amend on the ground that all of the claims “are subject
to prosecutorial and discretionary immunity under Government Code sections 820.2 and
821.6.”
Roberts appeals from the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
We affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
Roberts appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend,
which is not an appealable order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a).) “The general
rule is that ‘[a]n order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable,
and an appeal is proper only after entry of a dismissal on such an order.’ ” (Hamilton v.
Green (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 417, 422.) Appellate courts, however, have discretion to
deem an order sustaining a demurrer as incorporating a judgment of dismissal and to treat
the plaintiff’s notice of appeal as applying to that fictional judgment of dismissal. (Id. at
p. 423.)
Here, an exercise of that discretion is appropriate because all of Roberts’s causes
of action against defendant have been fully adjudicated, the respondent has not raised
appealability as an issue and has not been misled or prejudiced by the absence of a
judgment of dismissal. No purpose would be served by dismissing the appeal so a
judgment of dismissal could be entered. (See Flores v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 203–204; Estate of Dito (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 791, 800.) Consequently, in the interest of justice and to prevent delay,
we treat the trial court’s order as though it includes an appealable judgment of dismissal
and treat Roberts’s notice of appeal as taken from that judgment. (Nowlon v. Koram Ins.
Center, Inc. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1440–1441.)
II. Inadequacies of Roberts’s opening brief
2.
There are major problems with Roberts’s 57-page opening brief. The document is
unfortunately largely unintelligible. While the brief contains sentences and paragraphs,
the sentences collectively lack any logical thread. It is impossible to determine from
reading the brief what this case is about or what claims are being made.
The opening brief violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(A)–(C) for
many reasons, including because it does not state the nature of the action, explain why
the order appealed from is appealable, or provide a summary of the significant facts.
With his opening brief, Roberts fails to carry his burden as the appellant to
demonstrate reversible error with cogent argument. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 777.) For this reason, we
affirm the order appealed from.
DISPOSITION
Treating the order sustaining the demurrer as a judgment of dismissal, we affirm.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
3.