Filed 10/16/26 Reddy v. Orlosky CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
RAJASHAKER REDDY et al., D086839
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
00003923-CU-BC-CTL)
JOSEPH ORLOSKY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Judy S. Bae, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Joseph Orlosky, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
J. Turner Law Group and Jason E. Turner for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Joseph Orlosky appeals from the default judgment entered in the
lawsuit filed by Rajashaker Reddy and Sally Reddy (the Reddys), arising out
of Orlosky’s performance of a home improvement contract.
Orlosky makes two contentions on appeal. First, he contends that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside the entry of default and
default judgment, which he brought under Code of Civil Procedure1 section
473.5. Second, he contends that the default judgment in the amount of
$55,670 is void because it was in excess of the $40,000 that the Reddys
demanded in their complaint.
We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to deny the
motion that Orlosky brought under section 473.5. However, Orlosky is
correct that the default judgment impermissibly exceeds the amount of
$40,000 demanded in the complaint. Accordingly, we order that the default
judgment be modified to the amount of $40,000, plus the $637 in costs that
the Reddys identified in their request for default judgment, for a total
amount of $40,637. As so modified, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2024, the Reddys filed a lawsuit against Orlosky, who
does business as AON Engineering. The complaint alleged causes of action
for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) negligence.2
The Reddys alleged that in late 2020 and early 2021, they entered into
home improvement contracts with Orlosky for the residential installation of a
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Before filing a lawsuit, the Reddys commenced an arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association (the AAA) against Orlosky. However,
because Orlosky failed to respond to the AAA, as required, with a waiver of
the attorney fee provisions in the parties’ contract, the AAA closed the
arbitration. We note that although Orlosky contends that both parties failed
to provide a waiver to the AAA, the record shows that counsel for the Reddys
provided a waiver on January 11, 2024.
2
solar panel and battery system, and a heater. After the work was complete,
the Reddys discovered multiple problems, including water leaks in the roof,
improper heater installation, and failure of the solar batteries due to
improper installation. The Reddys were not satisfied with Orlosky’s response
to those issues.
According to a proof of service filed with the trial court, registered
process server Gabriel Bernard personally served the summons and
complaint on Orlosky on February 24, 2024, at 1:40 p.m. at a specific address
in Jamul (the Jamul address).
After Orlosky failed to respond to the summons, the Reddys sought
entry of default, which the trial court entered on March 26, 2024.
On August 23, 2024, the Reddys filed an application for default
judgment. A supporting declaration stated that the Reddys had incurred
$55,033 in expenses to address the problems created by Orlosky’s deficient
performance of the home improvement contracts. The Reddys therefore
requested that default judgment be entered in the amount of $55,033, plus
costs of $637, for a total of $55,670. The trial court issued a minute order on
September 6, 2024, stating that default judgment was entered.3
On September 19, 2024, Orlosky, representing himself, filed a motion to
set aside the entry of default and the default judgment. Orlosky’s motion was
premised solely on section 473.5. Under that provision, “[w]hen service of a
summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the
action and a default or default judgment has been entered against the party
in the action, the party may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the
default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action.” (§ 473.5,
3 Despite the September 6, 2024 minute order, the trial court did not
formally issue a written default judgment until April 4, 2025.
3
subd. (a).) As the basis for his motion, Orlosky asserted that he was “not
personally served as set forth in the proof of [s]ervice.”
In a supporting declaration, Orlosky stated that the entry of default
was based on a “dishonest proof of service executed by the process server” and
that he “was never served with a summons and complaint.” Orlosky further
stated, that his neighbor, Sara F., told him on March 1, 2024, that she had
retrieved documents that were left “stuck” into his “old gate” at the Jamul
address, but that he never obtained those documents from her. Orlosky’s
declaration did not state whether he was residing at the Jamul address on
February 24, 2024, or whether he was otherwise present on the property on
that date and had interacted with registered process server Bernard in some
manner.
Sara F. submitted a declaration in support of the motion, in which she
explained that she retrieved documents bearing Orlosky’s name that were
pushed into an opening in a chain link fence or gate at the Jamul address on
February 24, 2024, and she left Orlosky a message about them. According to
Sara F., in early August 2024, she spoke to Orlosky by phone and read to him
the first two pages of the document. Sara F. also stated that no one was
living at the Jamul address on February 24, 2024. Another neighbor, Tyler
T., also submitted a declaration. He stated that on February 24, 2024,
between 2:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., he saw a man drive up and stick papers into
the fence at the Jamul address. He also stated that he did not see anyone
living at the Jamul address at the time.
The Reddys filed an opposition, which relied in part on a declaration by
Bernard. In that declaration, Bernard stated, “On February 24, 2024, I went
to the [Jamul address], which I understood to be the residence of Defendant
Orlosky. [¶] When I arrived at said property, I met a man who identified
4
himself as Joseph Orlosky and who talked to me through the locked gate to
the property. He stood inside the gate, and I was just outside the gate. I
could see him and he could see me. [¶] I told Mr. Orlosky that I was serving
legal papers for this case to him. Mr. Orlosky refused to open the gate or to
take the legal papers. I then attempted to hand the papers to him through
the gate, and I repeated that I had a complaint and summons to serve to him.
Mr. Orlosky did not take the papers from me, and so I left the papers lodged
in the metalwork of the gate. They were visible and Mr. Orlosky could take
the papers from his position inside the gate. However, at that time, he did
not pick up the papers, but waved me off and turned to go back to his house.
[¶] When I left a few minutes later, the complaint/summons papers were still
lodged in the gate, visible and accessible for Mr. Orlosky to pick up.”
(Paragraph numbering omitted.)
In his reply memorandum, Orlosky argued that Bernard’s declaration
that “he went to Defendant’s residence, met, spoke [with] and then served
Defendant, is nothing less than an absolute lie and Mr. Bernard knows this
and deliberately lied in his Declaration.” Orlosky stated that he sought
“relief under any and all statutes that would apply in this matter to set aside
the service and the default and allow the action to be resolved in the ordinary
course of litigation under law, which has has [sic] been the policy of judicial
regulators when service of process is in doubt.”
In support of his reply memorandum, Orlosky submitted a declaration,
which stated, “I was not at [the Jamul address] on February 24th, 2024. [¶] I
was never contacted at, or saw, any person at [the Jamul address] on
February 24th, 2024. [¶] The statements alleged by Mr. Gabriel Bernard that
he saw me at the [the Jamul address] and then spoke to me and afterward
that I waived him on is absolutely false and never happened.”
5
A supplemental declaration by Tyler T. clarified that he did not see
anyone else at the Jamul address when the man approached the gate and left
papers on February 24, 2024. A supplemental declaration by Sara F., was
substantially the same as her earlier declaration, except for adding that, to
the best of her knowledge and belief, Orlosky had never lived at the Jamul
address. Finally, Orlosky submitted a declaration from Rhett R., who stated
that on February 24, 2024, Orlosky was working with him in Lakeside
between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
On February 21, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Orlosky’s
motion to set aside the default and the default judgment. Initially, the trial
court explained that there were two problems with the supporting
declarations submitted by Orlosky: (1) the declarations did not state where
they were signed, but if any were signed outside of California, they did not
state they were executed under penalty of perjury under the laws of
California4 (see § 2015.5); and (2) the declarations submitted in support of
the reply memorandum did not “fill gaps created by [the Reddys’] opposition
but consist of evidence that would support [Orlosky’s] initial burden to show
lack of actual notice and that such lack of actual notice was not caused by his
avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.”
Next, the trial court explained that Orlosky’s motion was based on
section 473.5. However, that section was not applicable because Orlosky
contended he was not properly served with the summons and the complaint,
rather than that he failed to obtain actual notice through proper service.
4 The trial court expressly identified the declarations submitted in
support of the moving papers as having these deficiencies. In fact, as we
discuss in part II.A.2, post, the declarations submitted in support of the reply
memorandum were in exactly the same form and thus were equally deficient.
6
Finally, the trial court explained that even if it were to apply section
473.5, Orlosky had not shown, as required for relief under that provision,
that his purported lack of actual notice was not the result of avoidance of
service. In making that determination, the trial court (1) relied on Bernard’s
declaration describing his interaction with Orlosky at the Jamul address on
February 24, 2024; and (2) stated that because Orlosky’s reply declaration
“was not considered for the reasons set forth above,” no admissible evidence
contradicted Bernard’s declaration.
The trial court denied Orlosky’s motion without prejudice “to file
another motion to set aside the default and default judgment under the Code
of Civil Procedure.”
Orlosky did not file a new motion for relief from default. Instead, on
March 7, 2025, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order
denying his original motion.5
5 Orlosky explained that he was seeking reconsideration instead of filing
a new motion for relief from default and default judgment, because he
believed a new motion would be untimely under what he referred to as “the
180-day rule.” We infer that Orlosky was referencing the time period set
forth in section 473.5, which states that a motion brought under that
provision “shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event
exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment
against the party; or (ii) 180 days after service on the party of a written
notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.” (§ 473.5,
subd. (a).) We note, however, that if Orlosky had filed a motion under
section 473, subdivision (d) on the ground that the judgment was void due to
improper service of the summons and complaint, the time limitations in
section 473.5, subdivision (a) would not have applied. (California Capital
Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, 225 (California Capital).) Moreover,
even under section 473.5, the 180-day period begins upon service of written
notice. (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) The record contains no indication that Orlosky
was served with written notice of the default judgment prior to his filing of
the motion for reconsideration.
7
On April 4, 2025, the trial court formally entered the default judgment
that it referenced in the September 6, 2024 minute order. The default
judgment was in the amount of $55,670, as requested by the Reddys.
On June 6, 2025, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Orlosky appeals from the default judgment.6
II. DISCUSSION
A. Orlosky’s Challenge to the Order Denying His Motion to Set Aside the
Default and the Default Judgment
We first consider Orlosky’s contention that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to set aside the default and the default judgment.
Orlosky’s motion was brought under section 473.5. “We review a trial
court’s decision to grant or deny relief under section 473.5 for abuse of
discretion.” (Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 885.) As we will
explain, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny Orlosky’s motion
for the two separate and independent reasons identified in its minute order.
1. Section 473.5 Does Not Apply
The first independent basis for the trial court’s ruling was its
determination that, although Orlosky based his motion on section 473.5, that
provision was inapplicable to his situation.
Section 473.5 states that “[w]hen service of a summons has not resulted
in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or
default judgment has been entered against [the party] in the action,” the
6 Orlosky’s notice of appeal stated that he was appealing both from the
default judgment and from the order denying his motion for reconsideration.
We subsequently issued an order stating that “[t]he trial court’s June 6, 2025,
order denying the motion for reconsideration is not appealable” but that the
default judgment was appealable. Although Orlosky could have challenged
the trial court’s ruling on his motion for reconsideration as part of his appeal
from the default judgment (§ 1008, subd. (g)), he does not advance any
argument specifically challenging that ruling in his appellate briefing.
8
party may seek, by motion, to set aside the default or default judgment.
(§ 473.5, subd. (a).) A court may grant the motion if it finds that the motion
was timely and “the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action
was not caused by the party’s avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.”
(Id., subd. (c).)
“Notwithstanding its broad language, section 473.5 has long been
understood to specifically address the situation in which a party is
constructively served and the judgment is valid—as when a summons is
served on a competent member of the defendant’s household pursuant to
section 415.20—but the defendant did not receive actual notice.” (California
Capital, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 215.) “Discretionary relief based upon a lack
of actual notice under section 473.5 empowers a court to grant relief from a
default judgment where a valid service of summons has not resulted in actual
notice to a party in time to defend the action.” (Anastos v. Lee (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1319, italics added.)
In contrast, “[s]ection 473[, subdivision] (d) addresses the situation
where the judgment is ‘void,’ such as when the defendant has not been
properly served.” (California Capital, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 215, italics
added.) That provision states that the court “may, on motion of either party
after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473,
subd. (d).)7
7 In California Capital, our Supreme Court discussed two other methods
that a party may use, in connection with extrinsic evidence, to seek relief
from a default judgment when service of the summons was improper:
(1) filing “a motion to vacate based on the ground of extrinsic fraud or
mistake,” and (2) instituting “an independent equitable action.” (California
Capital, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 215.) Moreover, effective January 1, 2027,
(§ 473.2, subd. (f) [effective date]) the Legislature has enacted a new section
in the Code of Civil Procedure stating that “[a] party that was not served
9
Here, section 473.5 does not apply because Orlosky contends that he
was not validly served with the summons. The premise of Orlosky’s motion
for relief from default was that “the process server’s proof of service [was]
false” and “dishonest.” According to Orlosky, he was not at the Jamul
address on the afternoon of February 24, 2024, and therefore, he was not
personally served with the summons as stated in the proof of service.
Because Orlosky’s theory is that service was invalid, section 473.5 was not a
proper vehicle for Orlosky to seek relief from the default and default
judgment. The trial court properly denied Orlosky’s motion on that basis.
2. The Declarations in Support of Orlosky’s Motion Were
Inadmissible
As the second ground for its ruling, the trial court explained that even
if it were to analyze Orlosky’s motion under section 473.5, Orlosky did not
meet his burden under that statute because the declarations he submitted
were not admissible.
Pursuant to section 2015.5, a declaration filed in court must be
certified or declared by the declarant to be true under penalty of perjury.
Further, “the statute requires some acknowledgement on the face of the
declaration that perjured statements might trigger prosecution under
California law.” (Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 601, 606 (Kulshrestha).) To invoke California law, the following
content must be included: “(1) if executed within this state, states the date
and place of execution, or (2), if executed at any place, within or without this
state, states the date of execution and that it is so certified or declared under
the laws of the State of California.” (§ 2015.5.) Put simply, “a declaration
with a summons and complaint . . . may file and serve a motion to set aside or
vacate the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action or to
move for dismissal. (§ 473.2, subd. (a).)
10
must either reveal a ‘place of execution’ within California, or recite that it is
made ‘under the laws of the State of California.’ ” (Kulshrestha, at p. 606.)
“[C]ourts do not find compliance with section 2015.5 to be both substantial
and sufficient unless all statutory conditions appear on the face of the
declaration in some form.” (Id. at p. 612.) “[S]uch language is necessary for
validity and admissibility purposes.” (Id. at p. 618.)
None of the declarations submitted by Orlosky in support of either his
moving papers or his reply memorandum state the place of execution.8 Also,
although each declaration states that it is made “under penalty of perjury,”
none of the declarations state that they are made “under penalty of perjury
under the laws of the State of California.” Specifically, each declaration
simply states: “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.” Therefore, all of the declarations are out of compliance with the
statutory requirements set forth in section 2015.5 and fail to establish “an
express facial link to California or its perjury laws.” (Kulshrestha, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 612.) Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the
declarations were inadmissible.
As Orlosky failed to submit any admissible evidence in support of his
motion to set aside the default and the default judgment, he failed to meet his
burden to establish any of the elements needed to obtain relief under section
473.5.9 Among other things, as the trial court specifically identified, Orlosky
8 Notably, Orlosky’s declaration filed in support of his reply
memorandum states that he currently resides at a specific address in Yuma,
Arizona, suggesting that Orlosky may, in fact, have executed one or both of
his declarations outside of California.
9 As we have noted, the trial court explained that it would not consider
the declarations filed in support of the reply memorandum because they
“[did] not fill gaps created by [the Reddys’] opposition but consist of evidence
11
failed to establish that his lack of actual notice was “not caused by [his]
avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.” (§ 473.5, subd. (c).)
In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Orlosky’s
motion to set aside the default and default judgment pursuant to section
473.5.10
B. Challenge to the Amount of the Default Judgment
We next consider Orlosky’s argument that the default judgment is void
because it awarded a monetary amount that was more than asked for in the
complaint.
Except with certain exceptions that are not applicable here, “[t]he relief
granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded
in the complaint . . . .” (§ 580, subd. (a).) “Thus, ‘in all default judgments the
demand sets a ceiling on recovery,’ and a judgment purporting to grant relief
beyond that ceiling is void for being in excess of jurisdiction.” (Sass v. Cohen
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 863 (Sass); see also Greenup v. Rodman (1986)
42 Cal.3d 822, 826 [“a default judgment greater than the amount specifically
that would support [Orlosky’s] initial burden.” However, because all of the
declarations submitted by Orlosky were inadmissible due to their
nonconformance with section 2015.5, we need not, and do not, address this
aspect of the trial court’s ruling.
10 Orlosky contends that the trial court erred because it did not grant
relief from default based on “equitable grounds,” such as “extrinsic mistake.”
However, Orlosky did not request relief on that ground in the trial court.
“ ‘[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider
claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not
presented to the trial court.’ ” (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580,
591–592.) Moreover, as Orlosky’s motion to set aside the default and default
judgment was denied without prejudice, Orlosky could have filed a new
motion seeking relief under a theory of extrinsic mistake. In so doing, he
could have attempted to cure the problem with the admissibility of his
supporting declarations. However, Orlosky elected not to seek such relief.
12
demanded is void as beyond the court’s jurisdiction”].) Applying this rule, for
example, “where a complaint sought damages ‘ “in excess of $20,000,” ’ the
Supreme Court held that a default judgment awarding $26,457.50 violated
section 580.” (Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc.
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1018 (Airs Aromatics), quoting Becker v. S.P.V.
Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 493–494). Vague phrases such as “in
excess of,” when appended to a specific monetary demand, do not serve to
increase the amount demanded in a complaint for purposes of section 580,
subdivision (a), as “this type of prayer for relief cannot give a defendant the
required notice of the damages sought.” (Behm v. Clear View Technologies
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 13 (Behm).)
“When a default judgment in excess of the amount demanded in the
complaint has been entered, the defendant generally may challenge the
judgment by: (1) filing in the trial court a motion to vacate the judgment or a
motion for new trial; or (2) appealing from the judgment.” (Julius Schifaugh
IV Consulting Services, Inc. v. Avaris Capital, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
1393, 1396.) Orlosky has properly raised his challenge in an appeal from the
judgment.
As Orlosky correctly points out, the amount of the default judgment
exceeds the amount demanded in the complaint. The default is in the
amount of $55,670. In contrast, the complaint states that the Reddys
suffered damages “in an amount of at least $40,000” or “approximately
$40,000.” Other than identifying the amount of $40,000, the complaint
demands no other specific monetary relief, and the vague phrases “at least”
and “approximately” do not operate to expand the demand beyond $40,000.
(Behm, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 13.) Because the amount of the default
judgment is greater than the amount demanded in the complaint, the default
13
judgment is void as beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction. (Sass, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 863.)
Although the default judgment is void because it exceeds the amount
demanded in the complaint, the entry of default remains undisturbed. (Van
Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1521 [“the underlying default
is valid even . . . though the default judgment is void”]; Airs Aromatics, supra,
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025.)
Ordinarily, when a default judgment exceeds the amount demanded,
“the appropriate action is to modify the judgment to the maximum amount
warranted by the complaint.’ ” (Behm, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 17.)
However, “ ‘even where it is possible to modify a default judgment to a lesser
amount warranted by the complaint, the court has discretion to instead
vacate the underlying default and allow the plaintiff to amend the
complaint’ ” to state the full amount of damages. (Airs Aromatics, supra,
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024, italics added.) In that event, if an amended
complaint is filed, a defaulted defendant is entitled “ ‘to either attack the
pleadings, or answer the amended complaint.’ ” (Id. at p. 1025.)
The Reddys do not seek to file an amended complaint to seek a greater
amount of damages. Instead, the Reddys state that if we conclude the default
judgment is void because it exceeds the amount demanded in the complaint,
the default judgment should be modified to conform to the demand of
$40,000. The Reddys also correctly observe that they are entitled to the $637
in costs they identified in their request for default judgment. (Simke,
Chodos, Silberfeld & Anteau, Inc. v. Athans (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1275,
1289 [“attorney fees and costs . . . do not fall within section 580”].)
14
An appellate court “may affirm, reverse or modify any judgment or
order appealed from.” (§ 906.) Accordingly, we conclude that the proper
remedy is to modify the default judgment to the amount of $40,637.
III. DISPOSITION
The default judgment is modified to the amount of $40,637, and as so
modified, it is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
15