Filed 7/2/26 Redd v. Tyson & Mendes CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
LATOYA S. REDD, B341915
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV31118)
TYSON & MENDES, LLP et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin Brazile, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Tyson & Mendes and William R. Johnson; Baker, Keener
& Nahra, Phillip A. Baker, and Christopher K. Berberian for
Defendants and Appellants.
LaToya S. Redd, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
LaToya S. Redd (Redd) sued Tyson & Mendes LLP (Tyson
& Mendes) and one of its attorneys William R. Johnson (Johnson)
(collectively, Defendants), as well as several other law firms and
lawyers, for failing to pay monies owed to her as part of the
settlement of a prior lawsuit (the Mezheritsky Action). Pursuant
to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16),
Defendants moved to strike Redd’s complaint. The trial court
denied the motion. We consider whether the trial court was
correct in finding that the challenged causes of action do not arise
from a statement or writing “made before a . . . judicial
proceeding” or “in connection with an issue under consideration
or review by a . . . judicial body . . . .” (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(1) &
(2).)
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Mezheritsky Action and the Dispute over How to
Distribute Settlement Funds2
In May 2018, Anna Mezheritsky (Mezheritsky) sued
Thomas Kovich (Kovich) and Dorothy Kovich Klien (Kovich
Klien), the owner of a four-unit apartment complex in Hermosa
Beach, California, for economic and noneconomic damages
arising out of her tenancy in one of the apartments. For six and a
half months in 2019, Redd represented Mezheritsky. Following
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
The summary that follows is derived from the allegations in
the operative pleading and, to some degree, the parties’ evidence
submitted in connection with Defendants’ special motion to strike
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)).
2
the conclusion of her representation, Redd filed a notice of
attorney lien for $35,489.51 in fees owed to her for professional
services. Beginning in March 2021, Defendants represented
Kovich in the Mezheritsky Action.
In August 2022, four years after Mezheritsky filed suit, the
parties settled the case for $200,000—Kovich Klien, through her
insurance carrier Liberty Mutual Insurance (Liberty Mutual),
contributed $198,500, and Kovich personally contributed $1,500.
In its September 2023 order granting the Kovichs’ motion to
enforce the settlement, the trial court presiding over the
Mezheritsky Action “encourage[d] Defendants to tender the
settlement amount in a single cashier’s check . . . .”
A dispute subsequently arose over whether Redd and five
other lienholders should be included as payees on the settlement
check in addition to Mezheritsky. After Liberty Mutual advised
it could not include Mezheritsky and the six lienholders on one
check, Kovich Klien and Kovich asked the Mezheritsky court to
order that the entire settlement amount should be tendered in a
single check made payable only to Mezheritsky. Redd filed
declarations objecting to the issuance of a single check with a
single payee, arguing that any such action would compromise her
lien. The Mezheritsky court denied Kovich and Kovich Klien’s
request.
Kovich Klien, Kovich, and Liberty Mutual then moved for
leave to allow the insurer to file a complaint in intervention,
which prompted Redd to submit a declaration in opposition
claiming that this too would infringe on her lien. In June 2024,
the Mezheritsky court granted Liberty Mutual’s request to
intervene. Liberty Mutual’s complaint in intervention sought a
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declaration from the court that a single check should be issued to
Mezheritsky alone.
B. Redd’s Complaint and Defendant’s Special Motion to
Strike
In December 2023, while the litigation concerning the
settlement funds in the Mezheritsky Action was underway, and
before Redd obtained a judgment against her former client
Mezheritsky, Redd sued Kovich Klien, Kovich, and the attorneys
who represented them in the Mezheritsky Action—including
Defendants. Redd’s complaint alleged six causes of action:
conversion; intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage; intentional interference with contractual relations;
breach of fiduciary duty; common count; money had and received;
and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.
The gist of Redd’s allegations was that Defendants had “received
money that was intended to be used for [her] benefit,” they had
not “paid [her] monies under her lien and pursuant to the
settlement in the underlying case” (which she believed should
have been paid the prior month), and Defendants’ conduct was
“wrongful” because there was no “legal or equitable reason” for
the delay in payment. Redd also alleged she requested
information from Defendants and they did “not communicat[e]”
with her as a lienholder and failed to keep her “reasonably
informed of significant developments.”
Defendants responded by filing an anti-SLAPP special
motion to strike Redd’s complaint. They maintained the alleged
wrongs were conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—
specifically, statements or writings made during a judicial
proceeding or in connection with an issue under review by a
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judicial body. Defendants also argued Redd could not prevail on
any of her causes of action because the litigation privilege (Civ.
Code, § 47) immunized their conduct and because Redd could not
establish a probability of prevailing in any event. In support of
their motion, Defendants submitted a declaration by attorney
Johnson and asked the court to judicially notice filings in the
Mezheritsky Action.
Redd opposed Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. She
contended Defendants’ failure to pay Redd her share of the
settlement was not protected conduct because “[h]ow a defendant
pays settlement funds is a collateral issue and has nothing to do
with the underlying action.” She also contended that even if
Defendants’ conduct was arguably protected, the litigation
privilege did not immunize their conduct and each of her causes
of action was supported by the requisite “minimal merit.”
In a supporting declaration, Redd stated that, from October
2022 to January 2024, Defendants “misled [her] by making
promises to interplead the [settlement] funds and then, in bad
faith, changed their mind and acted against [her] best interest.”
In addition, she declared Tyson & Mendes failed to provide her
with information or answer questions about her lien. Attached to
Redd’s declaration were, among other things, copies of email
correspondence between Redd, Defendants, and other counsel in
the Mezheritsky Action. Redd also submitted a request for
judicial notice of materials from the Mezheritsky Action.
C. The Trial Court’s Anti-SLAPP Ruling
The trial court held an unreported hearing on Defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion in September 2024. A minute order issued in
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connection with the hearing states the “matter [was] called for
hearing” and “[c]ounsel submit to the Court’s tentative ruling.”
That five-page ruling was adopted and subsequently issued
as the ruling of the court. The ruling states the court granted the
parties’ requests for judicial notice and denied Defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion because it found “Redd’s claims do not arise from
protected activity.” Elaborating, the court reasoned the
complaint did not arise from statements or writings made before
a judicial proceeding (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)) “because the claims
at issue do not target filings or statements made directly to the
Court in [the Mezheritsky Action]. Rather, all of [Redd’s] claims
generally target Defendants’ failure to disburse funds to [Redd]
after a motion to enforce settlement was granted in the
underlying matter”; the court’s orders in the Mezheritsky Action
also had not been challenged. The court further found the
complaint did not arise from statements or writings in connection
with an issue under consideration by a judicial body (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2)) because it believed “the premise of all of the claims
at issue is Defendants’ failure to pay the subject lien; these
claims do not target substantive litigation activity or
communications.”
Because it found Defendants’ alleged conduct did not arise
from protected activity, the trial court did not address whether
Redd had showed a probability of prevailing on her claims.
II. DISCUSSION
Reversal is required because Defendants made a prima
facie showing that the allegedly wrongful conduct at issue in
Redd’s lawsuit arose from protected litigation activity.
Defendants’ delay in disbursing the Mezheritsky settlement funds
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and their allegedly misleading post-settlement communications
with Redd about the same was occasioned by the Mezheritsky
court’s directive to tender the settlement amount in a single
cashier’s check. In other words, Redd’s claims arose from conduct
undertaken in the course of a pending court proceeding and in
furtherance of a judicial directive by the bench officer overseeing
that proceeding—and that qualifies as anti-SLAPP protected
activity.
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute and the Standard of Review
“[A] special motion to strike under section 425.16 involves a
two-step process. First, the moving defendant must make a
prima facie showing ‘that the act or acts of which the plaintiff
complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of
petition or free speech . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (City of Montebello v.
Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420.) If the defendant carries this
burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at
least “‘minimal merit.’” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,
384-385.)
We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP
motion de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) We consider the parties’
pleadings and affidavits describing the facts on which liability or
defenses are predicated. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); see also City of
Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79; Navellier v. Sletten
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89; San Diegans for Open Government v.
San Diego State University Research Foundation (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 76, 94.)
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B. Defendants’ Alleged Conduct Was Protected Activity
Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute
1. The anti-SLAPP statute and protection for
litigation-related communications and
communicative conduct
A party filing a special motion to strike satisfies the first
prong of the anti-SLAPP statute if he or she makes a prima facie
showing that the plaintiff’s cause of action “aris[es] from” an act
the defendant performed in furtherance of the defendant’s right
of petition or free speech. (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 78; accord,
Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1062 [“A claim arises from protected
activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the
claim”].) “In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is
whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act
in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.”
(Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 78.) A defendant moving for
protection under the anti-SLAPP statute is not required to prove
its conduct is constitutionally protected as a matter of law.
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 319.) The defendant
need show only the existence of a legitimate issue as to whether
the speech or petition activity is constitutionally protected. (Id.
at 311-320.)
Whether a claim is based on protected activity turns on
“whether the ‘“core injury-producing conduct”’ warranting relief
under that cause of action is protected.” (Mission Beverage Co. v.
Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698.) That is
because “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the
form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s
activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.”
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(Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 92; accord, Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at 1060 [“[A] claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning
activity itself is the wrong complained of . . .”].) In ruling on anti-
SLAPP motions, courts should be “attuned to and . . . respect the
distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and
those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide
evidentiary support for the claim.” (Park, supra, at 1064.)
There are four categories of “protected activity” under the
anti-SLAPP statute. The pertinent categories in this case cover
“any written or oral statement or writing made before
a . . . judicial proceeding” or “in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a . . . judicial body . . . .” (§ 425.16,
subds. (e)(1) & (2).)
“The anti-SLAPP protection for petitioning activities
applies not only to the filing of lawsuits, but extends to conduct
that relates to such litigation, including statements made in
connection with or in preparation of litigation. [Citation.]
Indeed, courts have adopted ‘a fairly expansive view of what
constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section
425.16.’ [Citation.]” (Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537; accord, Rusheen v. Cohen
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 [the anti-SLAPP statute protects
“communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and
prosecution” of a legal action]; but see Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 24, 30 [“It is well settled that not all litigation-
related conduct is protected activity”].)
Anti-SLAPP protection also extends to the settlement of
lawsuits. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 90 [defendant’s
negotiation and execution of release was protected activity
because it “involved ‘statement[s] or writing[s] made in
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connection with an issue under consideration or review by
a . . . judicial body’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2))”]; Thayer v. Kabateck
Brown Kellner LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141, 154 [“legal
advice and settlement made in connection with litigation are
within section 425.16, and may protect defendant attorneys from
suits brought by third parties on any legal theory or cause of
action ‘arising from’ those protected activities”].)
2. Redd’s causes of action arise from protected
activity
All of the alleged misconduct—Defendants’ wrongfully
withholding Redd’s purported lien share of the Mezheritsky
settlement by attempting to comply with the Mezheritsky court’s
directive to tender the settlement amount in a single cashier’s
check, misleading Redd about a possible interpleader in the
Mezheritsky Action, not communicating with Redd about post-
settlement developments in the Mezheritsky Action—arise out of
Defendants’ representation of Kovich in connection with issues
under consideration in the on-going Mezheritsky Action. (Finton
Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
200, 208-210 [holding protection under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1) & (2) was triggered because “the acts alleged in
the complaint all arise out of defendants’ representation of their
clients in the underlying case”]; Contreras v. Dowling (2016), 5
Cal.App.5th 394, 399, 409, 411 [“all communicative acts by an
attorney representing clients in pending or threatened litigation”
are “unquestionably” protected activities under the anti-SLAPP
statute]; Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer &
Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 114-115 [law firm’s
representation of client in state court litigation and federal
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forfeiture action was a “prima facie showing that Plaintiff’s
claims arise from Defendants’ constitutionally protected petition
rights”]; GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professional Corp.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 901, 908 [“An attorney’s communication
with opposing counsel on behalf of a client regarding pending
litigation directly implicates the right to petition and thus is
subject to a special motion to strike”].)
Relying on Old Republic Construction Program Group v.
The Boccardo Law Firm, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 859, Redd
counters that “any mentioning” of the Mezheritsky Action in her
complaint was “mere context” because the “root of [her] claims
center on [Defendants’] failure to pay [her] lien.” Redd’s claims
about the nonpayment of her lien, however, would not exist in the
absence of protected settlement activity undertaken by
Defendants during the course of an ongoing court proceeding.
Old Republic, by contrast, concerned the distribution of
settlement funds after the formal “dismissal of all affirmative
pleadings,” including the insurer’s complaint in intervention. (Id.
at 863-864.)
Because Redd’s claims “‘“arise from”’ and are ‘“based on”’
the settlement” of the still-pending Mezheritsky Action, they are
“subject to the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (O&C
Creditors Group, LLC v. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 546, 567; see also id. at 569 [“cross-defendants’
conduct in disbursing the settlement proceeds—i.e., carrying out
the terms of the settlement agreement—cannot be neatly cleaved
from the indisputably protected activity of negotiating and
agreeing to the settlement itself”].) We remand so that the trial
court may proceed to the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis and
determine in the first instance whether Redd has a probability of
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prevailing on the merits of her causes of action. (Hunter v. CBS
Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1527; Collier v.
Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 58; Iloh v. Regents of the
University of California (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 947, 960.)
C. Redd’s Proffered Alternative Ground for Affirmance,
Untimeliness, Fails
Redd argues the trial court’s ruling can be affirmed (even if
incorrect) because there is an alternative reason why Defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion was defective: it was untimely. Redd argues
Defendants had to file a responsive pleading or otherwise
challenge the operative complaint by June 17, 2024, but their
anti-SLAPP motion was not filed until August 7, 2024. Redd
made this same timeliness argument to the trial court, but the
court did not accept it—the court instead resolved the anti-
SLAPP motion on the merits with no discussion of the timeliness
issue. Because subdivision (f) of the anti-SLAPP statute provides
an anti-SLAPP motion may be filed “within 60 days of the service
of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time
upon terms it deems proper,” we understand the trial court to
have exercised its discretion to deem the motion timely and
resolve it on the merits.3 There is no basis on this record to hold
that decision was an abuse of the court’s discretion.
3
We are remanding the cause for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion—most obviously, a determination of
whether Redd’s complaint has “minimal merit.” Nothing in this
opinion, however, precludes the court from revisiting, on a
reasoned basis, its implied discretionary determination to find
the anti-SLAPP motion was filed at a proper time for resolution
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Defendants’ special motion to strike is
reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. All parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
on the merits. (See §§ 425.16, subd. (f), 1008; Six4Three, LLC v.
Facebook, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 635, 643-647.)
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