Filed 8/4/26 Rankin v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
EDDIE RANKIN, B329895
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV35345)
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Law Office of Lincoln W. Ellis and Lincoln W. Ellis for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, R. Lawrence Bragg, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh, Martha Ehlenbach
and Gurpreet Sandhu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants
and Respondents.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Eddie Rankin sued the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and correctional officer
Amir Kardouni, alleging civil rights violations by both
defendants, battery by Kardouni, and negligence by CDCR
relating to Kardouni during Rankin’s former incarceration.
Rankin appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to
CDCR and Kardouni. The court determined CDCR was
statutorily immune from suit, and Rankin had not demonstrated
a triable issue of material fact as to Kardouni regarding the
alleged battery and civil rights violations.
We affirm the grant of summary judgment to CDCR. But
we reverse the summary judgment for Kardouni because Rankin
established genuine issues of material fact regarding his battery
and civil rights claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Rankin’s Complaint
Rankin, through retained counsel, sued CDCR and
Kardouni in October 2019. The Office of the Attorney General
represented both defendants.
Rankin alleged that on September 29, 2018, he was
incarcerated when he requested medical assistance. At that
time, Rankin was “partially paralyzed from the waist down” and
“needed the permission and assistance of CDCR to move to obtain
medical assistance.” Rankin alleged that Kardouni responded to
2
his request, insulted Rankin, lifted Rankin “up above waist level”
and “dropped” him on the ground. Rankin alleged he “landed on
his neck and his vertebra was fractured. This fracture resulted
in [Rankin] becoming more paralyzed: losing control of his
bladder, bowel, sexual organ and legs, and experiencing
numbness in his hands.” According to Rankin, his injuries
required surgery; he “suffered damages including but not limited
to mental pain and shock to his nervous system, anxiety,
anguish, humiliation and emotional distress”; he would “continue
to be required to receive medical care and treatment, and life
assistance”; and he had lost or would “lose income, wages and
other financial benefits.”
Rankin’s third amended complaint, filed November 2021,
alleged six causes of action. As to both defendants, Rankin
alleged a violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane
Act; Civ. Code, § 52.1 et seq.1) and a violation of the Ralph Civil
Rights Act of 1976 (Ralph Act; § 51.7 et seq.). Rankin further
alleged battery by Kardouni, and negligent hiring, negligent
supervision, and negligent retention of Kardouni by CDCR. As
relevant here, the complaint requested “general damages to
compensate . . . [for] emotional distress, pain and suffering, and
loss of pleasure and enjoyment of life”; compensatory damages;
punitive damages; and statutory damages.
B. The Underlying Incident
As appropriate to our review of a grant of summary
judgment, we view and recite the facts in the light most favorable
to Rankin as the nonmoving party. (See Knapp v. Ginsberg
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
3
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 504, 509; Mackey v. Trustees of California
State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 647, fn. 3.)
Rankin was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and
incarcerated by CDCR from 2002 until 2019. Rankin was shot
during the commission of the offense, causing him to be partially
paralyzed from the waist down before he entered CDCR custody.
Rankin “could move his legs but could not stand on his legs
without support. Rankin had control of his bowel and bladder
movements and sexual functions.” Rankin used a walker to
stand and he “needed assistance to travel significant distances.”
At the time of the alleged incident, Rankin wore a yellow-green
vest identifying him as a disabled inmate.
In 2013, Rankin was convicted of violating Penal Code
section 4573.8 for possessing marijuana in prison. From 2013 to
2018, Rankin was found guilty of seven rule violations for
possession and use of controlled substances or drug
paraphernalia, including marijuana, morphine,
methamphetamine, and alcohol.
In his summary judgment opposition, Rankin provided a
declaration describing, and he was deposed regarding, the
incident at issue in this case. On September 29, 2018, Rankin
was alone in his cell and felt unwell. Rankin requested medical
care and Kardouni escorted him to see a medical provider at the
Treatment and Triage Area (TTA). Afterwards, Rankin returned
to his cell, where he requested medical care again. This time,
Rankin “called for ‘man down’ . . . indicating it was an emergency
situation.” Rankin sat on the floor of his cell to wait for care.
Several registered nurses and correctional officers responded to
Rankin’s cell to transport him for care.
4
Either before or after medical staff arrived, Kardouni
entered Rankin’s cell. Kardouni and Rankin were the only two
people in the cell. According to Rankin’s declaration, Kardouni
called him a “ ‘little bitch’ ” and said, “ ‘if you want medical, crawl
out of the cell.’ ” At his deposition, Rankin testified that
Kardouni said, “You need to crawl out of the cell if you want any
medical attention or we are going to come in and drag you out.”
Kardouni then threw a wooden stokes litter (a board used
to lift a person in a lying down position onto a wheeled gurney)
onto the ground. Rankin’s declaration described that Kardouni
lifted Rankin “above waist level and dropped [him] to the ground
in the direction of the stokes litter.” At his deposition, Rankin
stated Kardouni “grabbed me by [the] collar of my shirt and the
waist hemming of my pants. [¶] And he picked me up and
slammed me down on the [stokes litter].” Rankin landed on his
neck, and in his deposition he described that “[w]ith my legs
being so dead weight almost . . . the way he slammed me down,
my legs just went back over my head as well.” Rankin described
that “from that point, you know, I didn’t feel anything . . . as far
as my lower limbs” or “from my neck down.”
Rankin was transported to TTA and then to the hospital,
where he told hospital staff that his “injuries were due to being
dropped to the floor by a CDCR corrections officer.” Records
obtained from the hospital indicated Rankin was hospitalized
from September 29 to October 9, 2018, where he received surgery
to his spine. Rankin’s declaration attested he suffered serious
injuries as a result of Kardouni’s actions, requiring surgery and
leading to further paralysis, “losing control of [his] bladder,
bowel, sexual organ and legs, and experiencing numbness in [his]
5
hands.” At his deposition, Rankin denied that his injuries were
caused by any other events before the incident on September 29.
Another inmate, Reginald Terry, was outside Rankin’s cell
during the alleged incident. Terry heard Rankin “cry loudly for
help,” saw the gurney arrive, and saw three correctional officers,
including Kardouni, enter Rankin’s cell. Terry heard Rankin
“scream in pain.” According to Terry, “[t]hen the officers brought
Mr. Rankin out of the cell on a board . . . and they dropped him
before putting him on the stretcher. . . . He cried in pain again.
The nurse on duty stood there and did not intervene.” Terry saw
Kardouni and other officers “laughing” at Rankin. Before the
incident, Terry regularly assisted Rankin by pushing his
wheelchair, and after Rankin returned from surgery, Terry
observed Rankin “was constantly in pain,” “had less mobility,”
and needed “much more [help] with going to the bathroom.”
After this incident, Rankin reported misconduct by
Kardouni to CDCR, stating “Kardouni arrived to his cell and
instead of rendering help, he used unnecessary force that
resulted in him receiving a serious injury to his neck.” Rankin
made a similar complaint to correctional health services during a
mental health visit.
C. Summary Judgment Proceedings
Kardouni moved for summary judgment and summary
adjudication in the alternative, arguing that Rankin could not
establish the elements of his causes of action and that the
evidence precluded a finding in his favor because “Officer
Kardouni did not act violently against Plaintiff” and “Officer
6
Kardouni did not cause Plaintiff harm.”2 Specifically, he argued
Rankin’s allegations were inconsistent, unsupported, and self-
serving. Kardouni further argued “there is no evidence of a neck
fracture or any injury caused by an assault. Rather, [Rankin]
had a progressive condition which caused an infection in his
neck.”
In support, Kardouni attached an expert declaration from
Dr. P. Kaloostian, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Kaloostian stated he
reviewed Rankin’s complaint and his hospital and prison medical
records and opined that “[t]here is no evidence of a fracture or
any injury to the spine/spinal cord caused from an assault or a
fall on September 29, 2018.” Rather, Rankin’s condition and
symptoms were “consistent with an abscess compressing the
spinal cord.” Dr. Kaloostian declared:
Records indicated that [Rankin] had fallen on
two occasions (September 24 and September 29) . . .
2 On our own motion we take judicial notice of Kardouni’s
summary judgment filings, including his notice of motion. (See
Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) [judicial notice may be taken of
“[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state”], 459.) Kardouni’s notice
of motion did not use the words “summary adjudication,” but it
specifically stated the issues on which he sought judgment as a
matter of law, repeated these issues verbatim in his separate
statement, and argued them in his memorandum of points and
authorities. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1350(b).) The trial court observed that Kardouni’s
notice of motion did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), but nonetheless treated his
motion as requesting summary adjudication in the alternative.
Rankin raised no argument on appeal or in the trial court this
was improper.
7
with the fall on the 24th starting his complaints of
worsening neck and arm complaints.
Blood cultures were positive for E. Cloacae and
[the hospital surgeon] noted intraoperatively an
abscess compressing the spinal cord, with no
evidence of a fracture.
Finally, the pre-operative MRI of his cervical
spine noted anterior fluid collection at C4-5
consistent with an abscess compressing the spinal
cord, without acute pathological conditions from
trauma.
Therefore, based on the above reasons,
Mr. Rankin suffered cervical
radiculopathy/myelopathy from a progressive
expansion of this anterior epidural abscess causing
cord compression. . . .
As the epidural collection increases in size
over time, it causes further cord compression, and
thus weakness, which may relate to the patient
falling on the 24th and then again on the 29th.
There is NO traumatic basis for Mr. Rankin’s
cervical radiculopathy/myelopathy but rather all can
be explained on the basis of progressive epidural
abscess causing cord compression.
Rankin opposed Kardouni’s motion. As to the battery cause
of action, Rankin argued there was evidence, in the form of
Rankin’s declaration, that “Kardouni violently dropped or threw
[him] in the direction of the stokes litter.” He also argued that
physical harm is not required for battery. Rankin’s opposition
8
argued that Terry’s declaration “confirm[ed] the battery” because
Terry heard Rankin “scream in pain.” Citing Terry’s declaration,
Rankin argued Kardouni’s actions “caused serious harm to
plaintiff.”
As to his Bane Act cause of action, Rankin argued
Kardouni “prevented [him] from exercising two protected rights:
(1) [the] First Amendment right to free speech requesting medical
care, and (2) [the] Constitutional right to adequate healthcare
during incarceration.” Rankin further argued “Kardouni acted
with malice, ridiculing [Rankin]’s disability while battering him,”
and that Kardouni violated the Bane Act even if he did not use
“physical violence,” because he “acted with threat, intimidation,
and coercion, by calling [Rankin] ‘a little bitch’ and telling [him]
‘if you want medical, crawl out of the cell.’ ” For similar reasons,
Rankin argued he raised a triable issue of fact on the Ralph Act
cause of action because “a jury could find that Defendant
Kardouni ridiculing [Rankin’s] disability, and violently battering
[him], was motivated by animus against [his] disability.”
CDCR also moved for summary judgment or summary
adjudication in the alternative. As relevant here, it argued it was
immune from suit under Government Code section 844.6 as to all
causes of action.
Rankin opposed, arguing that Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) clarified that CDCR was not immune from liability
under the Bane Act and that CDCR was liable for Bane Act
violations under a respondeat superior theory. In a supplemental
opposition, Rankin additionally argued that Senate Bill No. 2 did
not create new law, but “clarified the original intent of the Bane
Act” to eliminate immunity for public entities like CDCR.
9
The court granted Kardouni’s motion for summary
judgment on February 1, 2023, on the ground that Rankin had
not created a triable issue of material fact regarding whether he
was harmed by Kardouni’s conduct. The trial court also granted
summary judgment to CDCR, reasoning that Government Code
section 844.6 governmental immunity barred Rankin’s claims.
The court entered a judgment of dismissal.
Rankin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
A trial court grants a motion for summary judgment if the
moving party demonstrates there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at
p. 850.) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the
pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be
resolved at summary judgment.’ ” (Conroy v. Regents of
University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment must support
the motion with evidence, such as “evidence that conclusively
negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action” or otherwise
show that “the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably
obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)
10
If the moving party makes a “prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact,” “the opposing
party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to
make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of
material fact.” (Id. at p. 850.) In ruling on a summary judgment
motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, and must view the
evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the
opposing party. (Id. at p. 843.)
A party may also move for summary adjudication “as to one
or more causes of action within an action . . . if th[at] party
contends that the cause of action has no merit.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (f)(1); see Noe v. Superior Court (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 316, 326 (Noe); Rehmani v. Superior Court
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “A motion for summary
adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a
motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural
respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (f)(2); see Noe, at p. 326; Rehmani, at p. 950.) “A
motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it
completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a
claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (f)(1); see Noe, at p. 326.)
We review a grant of summary judgment or summary
adjudication de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party. (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at
p. 327 [summary adjudication]; Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 [summary judgment].) “ ‘To the extent
issues on appeal from a summary judgment involve the
interpretation of a statute, they are issues of law subject to
11
independent review.’ ” (Smart Corner Owners Assn. v. CJUF
Smart Corner LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 439, 458; accord, City of
Malibu v. Santa Monica Mts. Conservancy (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
1379, 1383.)
B. Material Factual Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment
for Kardouni
1. Battery
Rankin first challenges the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment on his battery claim. Rankin contends that he raised a
triable issue of fact as to whether Kardouni fractured his
vertebra or exacerbated his paralysis. Rankin further argues
that even if he was “mistaken in his belief that his worsening
paralysis was caused by the Kardouni battery, [he] had also
alleged pain and suffering, [and] emotional distress.”
In the trial court, Kardouni argued Rankin could not
establish the elements of his causes of action and that the
evidence precluded a finding in Rankin’s favor because “Officer
Kardouni did not act violently against Plaintiff” and “Officer
Kardouni did not cause Plaintiff harm.” Although his argument
is not entirely clear, we understand Kardouni as arguing that his
expert’s declaration conclusively negated or “refuted” the
causation element of Rankin’s battery cause of action for
Rankin’s physical injuries. “The elements of civil battery are
(1) defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted in a
harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2)
plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or
offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to
plaintiff.” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526-
527; accord, Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495.)
12
Here, as to the last element, Rankin’s complaint alleged he
suffered a fractured vertebra because of the alleged battery,
“result[ing] in [Rankin] becoming more paralyzed.”
Based on a review of Rankin’s medical records, Dr.
Kaloostian opined that “[t]here is no evidence of a fracture or any
injury to [Rankin’s] spine/spinal cord caused from an assault or a
fall on September 29, 2018. . . . [R]ather[,] all can be explained on
the basis of progressive epidural abscess causing cord
compression.”3
The burden then shifted to Rankin to present evidence
demonstrating a triable issue of material fact that Kardouni’s
conduct caused the physical injuries Rankin alleged in his
complaint. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Rankin did
not meet this burden. In opposition to summary judgment,
Rankin relied on his declaration and Terry’s declaration to argue
that “Kardouni violently dropped or threw [Rankin].” Rankin
stated in his declaration that “Due to Kardouni’s battery of me, I
landed on my neck and suffered serious injuries[,]which required
surgery . . . . This resulted in me becoming more paralyzed:
losing control of my bladder, bowel, sexual organ and legs, and
experiencing numbness in my hands.” But Rankin did not
introduce any expert declaration rebutting that of Dr. Kaloostian,
3 Rankin asserts that “Dr. Kaloostian relied on inadmissible
hearsay” but does not make any supporting argument, and he
has forfeited any evidentiary challenge to the declaration. (See
Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52
[appellant must “support claims of error with meaningful
argument and citation to authority”]; Woods v. Horton (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 [“A court need not consider an issue
where reasoned, substantial argument and citation to supporting
authorities are lacking”].)
13
let alone any other medical evidence that would permit a trier of
fact to find he was injured in the manner alleged (i.e., “broken
vertebra”) and that such injuries were caused by Kardouni’s
conduct. “When the moving party produces a competent expert
declaration showing there is no triable issue of fact on an
essential element of the opposing party’s claims, the opposing
party’s burden is to produce a competent expert declaration to the
contrary.” (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755,
761-762; accord, Fernandez v. Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th
770, 779.)
Rankin argues that although he “did not offer an expert
opinion in opposition, no such opinion is required” due to the
factual assertions in Rankin and Terry’s declarations. Citing
Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, Rankin asserts
that “ ‘[i]f causation presents a question that is within the
common knowledge of persons of ordinary education, then expert
testimony is not required.’ ” Here, however, the issue of
causation with respect to Rankin’s physical injuries required
interpretation of Rankin’s medical records, including surgical
findings, and was outside the realm of common knowledge. (See
Webster v. Claremont Yoga (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 284, 290
[plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact
without expert testimony, where defendant’s expert opined
plaintiff’s neck injuries “ ‘were due to chronic degenerative disc
disease and arthritic changes’ as opposed to ‘an acute or
traumatic injury,’ ” because “the causation issue was complex”
and “beyond the ability of a lay juror to determine”]; cf. Cobbs v.
Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 236 [“when a doctor relates the facts
. . . in support of his decision to operate, and where the facts are
not commonly susceptible of comprehension by a lay juror,
14
medical expert opinion is necessary to enable the trier of fact to
determine [liability]”].)
Rankin further argues that Kardouni’s summary judgment
motion “only attempted to refute the physical injury category of
damages – Kardouni did not refute pain and suffering, [or]
emotional distress.” In Rankin’s view, “[n]othing in Dr.
Kaloostian’s declaration or Kardouni’s [motion for summary
judgment] foreclosed Rankin’s evidence of unlawful and
intentional battery . . . Kardouni’s [motion] only attempted to
refute the physical injury category of damages [and] did not
refute pain and suffering, [or] emotional distress.”
We agree Kardouni was not entitled to summary judgment
because he did not challenge the emotional distress or pain and
suffering allegations in Rankin’s battery claim. “Where, as here,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof [at trial] of a specific
material fact, like causation, by a preponderance of the evidence,
for the defendant to be entitled to summary judgment, the
defendant must present evidence establishing that no reasonable
trier of fact could find the underlying material fact in the
plaintiff’s favor.” (Demara v. The Raymond Corp. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 545, 555; see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851.)
Here, Rankin’s battery cause of action alleged that Rankin
“suffered damages including but not limited to mental pain and
shock to his nervous system, anxiety, anguish, humiliation and
emotional distress.” And Rankin produced evidence, through his
declaration and deposition testimony, that Kardouni “dropped” or
“slammed” him on the ground in response to Rankin’s request for
medical help. This evidence would permit a reasonable trier of
fact to find that Kardouni intentionally engaged in harmful or
offensive contact with Rankin.
15
Further, Rankin produced evidence that he experienced
pain and emotional distress because of the alleged battery.
Terry’s declaration described that Rankin “scream[ed] in pain”
during the alleged incident. Rankin’s deposition testimony
described that “[w]ith my legs being so dead weight almost . . .
the way [Kardouni] slammed me down, my legs just went back
over my head.” Rankin also produced evidence that he was
already experiencing a medical emergency at the time, which
necessitated hospitalization and surgery. From this evidence, a
reasonable trier of fact could find that Rankin suffered pain
and/or emotional distress because of Kardouni’s alleged actions in
dropping or slamming Rankin to the ground from waist height
during Rankin’s medical emergency. (See Capelouto v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d 889, 895-896 [“even in the
absence of any explicit evidence showing pain, the jury may infer
such pain, if the injury is such that the jury in its common
experience knows it is normally accompanied by pain”].) Because
Kardouni’s summary judgment motion did not address pain and
suffering and emotional distress, he was not entitled to summary
judgment on Rankin’s battery cause of action.
2. Ralph Act and Bane Act Claims
Rankin argues the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment on his Ralph Act and Bane Act claims against
Kardouni. Rankin’s contention has merit.
a. Ralph Act
The Ralph Act, section 51.7, provides: “All persons within
the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against
16
their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on
account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b)
or (e) of Section 51.” (§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1).) As relevant here,
section 51 lists “physical disability” and “medical condition” as
protected characteristics. (§ 51, subds. (c), (e)(1).) “ ‘[V]iolations
of the Ralph Civil Rights Act cannot be accidental, as liability
requires a showing that the defendant deliberately acted with “a
prohibited discriminatory motive.” ’ ” (Doe v. Kachru (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 175, 208, fn. 12.) But “[n]othing in the statute
requires that a plaintiff prove that the offending act was
motivated by hate.” (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 258, 269.)
b. Bane Act
“The Bane Act provides a civil cause of action against
anyone who ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or
attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with
the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.’
§ 52.1, subd. (a); see § 52.1, subd. (b).) . . . ‘The essence of a Bane
Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means
(i.e., “threats, intimidation or coercion”), tried to or did prevent
the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do
under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or
she was not required to do under the law.’ ” (Simmons v.
Superior Court (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1125; accord,
Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
860, 883 (Austin B.).) “ ‘[T]he statute was intended to address
only egregious interferences with constitutional rights, not just
17
any tort. The act of interference with a constitutional right must
itself be deliberate or spiteful.’ ” (Julian v. Mission Community
Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395; accord, Simmons, at
p. 1125.) “The Bane Act does not require that ‘the offending
“threat, intimidation or coercion” be “independent” from the
constitutional violation alleged.’ ” (Murchison v. County of
Tehama (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 867, 896; accord, Austin B., at
pp. 881-883.)
c. Kardouni Was Not Entitled to Summary
Judgment on Rankin’s Bane and Ralph Act
Claims
As stated, Kardouni moved for summary judgment, in part,
arguing that Rankin could not establish the elements of his
causes of action and that the evidence precluded a finding in his
favor because “Officer Kardouni did not act violently against
Plaintiff.” Even assuming Kardouni shifted the summary
judgment burden on these causes of action, Rankin’s evidence
was sufficient to raise material factual disputes on the Bane Act
and Ralph Act. Rankin argues he raised a material factual
dispute as to whether Kardouni committed violence against him
because of his disability, and whether Kardouni used threats,
intimidation or coercion to interfere with Rankin’s constitutional
rights to medical care, free speech, and freedom from
unwarranted force.
As to the Ralph Act, Rankin’s declaration and deposition
testimony stated that Kardouni picked him up off the floor and
“dropped” or “slammed” him to the ground from waist height.
That is sufficient to permit a jury to find that Kardouni
committed violence against Rankin. (See Austin B., supra,
18
149 Cal.App.4th at p. 880 [evidence that teacher “ ‘grabbed,
yanked, compressed, stepped on’ and ‘slammed down’ ” on
children supported violence within the meaning of the Ralph
Act].) Rankin’s declaration attesting that he was wearing a vest
identifying him as disabled and that Kardouni called Rankin a
“little bitch” and told him to “crawl out of the cell” for medical
help could also permit a jury to find that Kardouni’s violence was
motivated by Rankin’s physical disability and/or medical
condition as a partial paraplegic. (Cf. Gabrielle A. v. County of
Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291 [affirming grant of
summary judgment on Ralph Act claim where plaintiffs offered
“no evidence to establish defendants discriminated against them”
due to their medical conditions, “but claim . . . animus should be
inferred”].)
As to the Bane Act, Rankin’s evidence could permit a jury
to find that Kardouni interfered with or violated Rankin’s legal
rights using threats, intimidation, or coercion. The evidence that
Kardouni used force against Rankin—who was partially
paralyzed and experiencing a medical emergency—could permit
the jury to find Kardouni violated Rankin’s federal constitutional
rights to medical care while incarcerated (Estelle v. Gamble
(1976) 429 U.S. 97, 103-104) and to freedom from unnecessary
and wanton excessive force (Wilkins v. Gaddy (2010) 559 U.S. 34,
37-38). Based on the foregoing Ralph Act analysis, a jury could
also find that Kardouni interfered with Rankin’s state law right
under the Ralph Act to “ ‘be free from any violence . . . committed
against their persons . . . because of their . . . disability.’ ” (Jones
v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 337 [Bane Act violation can
be based on the state statutory rights under the Ralph Act].)
Rankin’s evidence also raised a triable issue as to whether
19
Kardouni used threats, intimidation, or coercion within the
meaning of the Bane Act against Rankin. According to Rankin’s
deposition testimony, Kardouni threatened to “drag [him] out” of
the cell, and Rankin declared that Kardouni lifted and “dropped”
him on the ground. (Cf. City and County of San Francisco v.
Ballard (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 381, 408 [affirming sustaining of
demurrer on section 52.1 claim where plaintiff alleged defendant
“threatened to impose $15 million in penalties on him” but “the
record does not establish any conduct that rises to the level of a
threat of violence or coercion”].)
The Attorney General argues that Kardouni was entitled to
summary judgment on these causes of action because “Rankin’s
inconsistent statements regarding the relevant events” means
“his variable testimony that Officer Kardouni intentionally
injured him is properly disregarded.” These inconsistent
statements include: Rankin’s statement during a CDCR
investigation that Kardouni “slammed [him] into the wall,” not
the ground; a statement in a prison medical report that Rankin
had an “unwitnessed fall” on the day of the alleged incident;
Rankin’s testimony at his deposition that a nurse brought the
stokes litter to the door of his cell; and Rankin’s varying
recollections of his medical treatment history preceding the
alleged incident.
“In reviewing motions for summary judgment . . . , courts
have long tended to treat affidavits repudiating previous
testimony as not constituting substantial evidence of the
existence of a triable issue of fact.” (Alvis v. County of Ventura
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 549; accord, Gharibian v. Wawanesa
General Ins. Co. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 730, 739.) This rule
applies only “ ‘ “[w]here . . . there is a clear and unequivocal
20
admission by the plaintiff” ’ ” which is later contradicted by a
subsequent declaration. (Ahn v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc. (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 133, 144; accord, King v. Andersen (1966)
242 Cal.App.2d 606, 610.) On our review of the entire record,
Rankin’s declaration that Kardouni insulted him, picked him up,
and dropped him was not clearly and unequivocally contradicted
by any earlier statements such that it could not establish a
triable issue of fact. (See Ahn, at p. 147 [summary judgment
should not “be granted based on what may appear, in isolation, to
be clear and unequivocal admissions, when the purported
admissions are credibly contradicted or explained by other
credible evidence in the record, and all the evidence in the record
shows there are triable issues of material fact”].) The Attorney
General’s arguments regarding any inconsistencies in Rankin’s
statements are more properly presented to a factfinder weighing
the evidence.
C. Rankin’s Claims Against CDCR are Barred by Government
Code Section 844.6
The trial court determined CDCR was entitled to summary
judgment because all of Rankin’s causes of action were barred by
statutory immunity.4 (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849
[defendant meets summary judgment burden by showing “ ‘there
is a complete defense to [a] cause of action’ ”].) According to
Rankin, effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022
4 Kardouni did not assert any grounds for immunity as a
public employee. (See Collins v. County of San Diego (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1058-1059 [Government Code section 844.6
immunity for public entities regarding injury to prisoners “does
not provide [] individual immunity” for public employees].)
21
Reg. Sess.) amended the Bane Act (section 52.1) to remove
statutory immunity for public entities. Rankin contends these
amendments clarify existing law and/or are retroactive and thus
CDCR cannot assert immunity under Government Code section
844.6 for Kardouni’s alleged Bane Act and Ralph Act violations
arising in 2018.5
1. The Bane Act, Government Code Section 844.6, and
Senate Bill No. 2
“[S]overeign immunity is the rule in California” and
“governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set
forth by statute.” (Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984)
155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409; accord, Towery v. State of California
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 226, 232 (Towery); see Gov. Code, § 815
[“Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is
not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act
or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person.”].)
Government Code section 844.6 specifically addresses
injuries to prisoners and provides that, with specific statutory
exceptions not implicated here, “a public entity is not liable
5 Rankin does not challenge the trial court’s summary
judgment ruling on his negligent hiring or negligent retention
claims relating to CDCR’s employment of Kardouni. Rankin also
does not argue, as he did in the trial court, that CDCR is liable
under the Government Code section 845.6 exception to sovereign
immunity for failure to take reasonable action to summon
medical care. Rankin has thus forfeited both arguments. (See
Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 954
[“ ‘ “ ‘Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived
or abandoned.’ ” ’ ”].)
22
for . . . [a]n injury to any prisoner.” (Gov. Code, § 844.6,
subd. (a)(2).) Our Supreme Court has explained if a specific
immunity statute applies, it “ ‘cannot be abrogated by a statute
which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability.’ ”
(Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623,
635 (Creason).)
Several courts have held that section 52.1 Bane Act claims
against public entities were barred by, among other statutes,
section 844.6. (See, e.g., Towery, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 234
[Gov. Code section 844.6 clearly “applicab[le] to a claim against a
public entity under [another] statute, such as Civil Code section
52.1, that simply creates a general legal duty”]; O’Toole v.
Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 504 [“Civil Code
section 52.1 contains no indicia reflecting an intent that public
employees may be sued despite a statutory immunity that would
otherwise apply.”], superseded by statute as stated in Wiley v.
Kern High School Dist. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 765, 778 (Wiley).)
Towery reasoned that if the Legislature had “intended to exclude
claims under Civil Code section 52.1 from the public entity
immunity provided by [Government Code] section 844.6 . . . it
could have explicitly said so when enacting the Bane Act, either
by including such a provision in that act or by amending
[Government Code] section 844.6.” (Towery, at p. 237.)
Effective 2022, Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
amended the Bane Act to add:
The state immunity provisions provided in Sections
821.6, 844.6, and 845.6 of the Government Code shall
not apply to any cause of action brought against any
peace officer or custodial officer . . . or directly
23
against a public entity that employs a peace officer or
custodial officer, under this section. (§ 52.1,
subd. (n).)
The legislative counsel’s digest for Senate Bill No. 2 states,
“Existing law [] allows an individual whose exercise or enjoyment
of rights has been interfered with to prosecute a civil action for
damages on their own behalf. [¶] The bill would eliminate
certain immunity provisions for peace officers and custodial
officers, or public entities employing peace officers or custodial
officers sued under the act.”6 (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill
No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 2021, Summary Dig. at
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_i
d=202120220SB2> [as of Aug. 4, 2026]; see Wiley, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781.) The legislative findings to the
bill state: “Civil courts provide a vital avenue for individuals
harmed by violations of the law by peace officers to find redress
and accountability. But . . . broad interpretations of California
law immunities and restrictive views on the cause of action under
the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act[] too often lead to officers escaping
accountability in civil courts, even when they have broken the
law or violated the rights of members of the public. The civil
court process should ensure that peace officers are treated fairly,
but that they can be held accountable for violations of the law
6 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the legislative
history of Senate Bill No. 2. (See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title
Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9 [court may “take
judicial notice of the legislative history of a statute in order to
ascertain the purpose of and meaning of an ambiguous statute”];
Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a)-(c), 459.)
24
that harm others, especially the use of excessive force.” (Sen. Bill
No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) § 2(f) at
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_i
d=202120220SB2> [as of Aug. 4, 2026].)
2. Applicability of Senate Bill No. 2 to Rankin’s Causes
of Action Predating the Amendment
Rankin argues that section 52.1 as amended retroactively
operates to remove public entity immunity for Bane Act and
Ralph Act violations preceding its enactment. Specifically,
Rankin argues that Senate Bill No. 2 clarified the original intent
of the Bane Act and the Ralph Act “follows the same statutory
scheme” as the Bane Act. Rankin’s argument is not persuasive.
“Generally, statutes operate prospectively only.” (Myers v.
Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840; see § 3
[“No part of [this Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.”].) “ ‘[I]t is an established canon of interpretation that
statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is
clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent.’ ”
(Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207; see
McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th
467, 475 (McClung) [noting a “strong presumption against
retroactivity”].) “[U]nless there is an ‘express retroactivity
provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is
very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must
have intended a retroactive application.’ ” (Myers, at p. 841.)
“ ‘[A] statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive
application is construed . . . to be unambiguously prospective.’ ”
(Ibid.)
25
Here, the plain text of Senate Bill No. 2 does not state the
amended immunity provisions are retroactive. (See § 52.1; Wiley,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 [concluding section 52.1 as
amended by Senate Bill No. 2 has no “expressly retroactive”
language and is “ambiguous” as to retroactivity at best].) The
legislative history of the bill also “discloses no extrinsic evidence
of intended retroactive impact. To our knowledge, no prior draft
bill included any retroactive language. The Legislature only
explained that ‘[t]he bill would eliminate certain immunity
provisions for peace officers . . . sued under the act.’ [Citation.]
This is not a clear expression of retroactive intent because it does
not expressly include preenactment conduct.” (Id. at pp. 780-781;
see Souvannarath v. Hadden (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1126,
fn. 9 [legislative counsel’s digest is “recognized as a primary
indication of legislative intent”].) Rankin presents no persuasive
argument addressing Wiley’s conclusion that Senate Bill No. 2’s
text and legislative history reflect no intent to apply its
amendments retroactively.
Rankin argues instead that “public entity immunity
against Bane Act claims was judicially[]created, [without] clear
statutory direction.” Although not entirely clear, we understand
Rankin as arguing that the intent behind Senate Bill No. 2 was
to abrogate the judicially “incorrect interpretation of the Bane
Act” and to “make express the original legislative intent of the
Bane Act.” Rankin cites Senate Bill No. 2 legislative analyses
and summaries, which state that the Bane Act “has been severely
narrowed by judicial interpretations that have created additional
hurdles,” such as Towery, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 226. (Italics
omitted.)
26
“[A] statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes,
existing law does not operate retrospectively even if applied to
transactions predating its enactment. . . . Our consideration of
the surrounding circumstances can indicate that the Legislature
made material changes in statutory language in an effort only to
clarify a statute’s true meaning. [Citations.] Such a legislative
act has no retrospective effect because the true meaning of the
statute remains the same.” (Western Security Bank v. Superior
Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western Security Bank).) “One
such circumstance is when the Legislature promptly reacts to the
emergence of a novel question of statutory interpretation: ‘ “An
amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute
must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of
the original act, where the amendment was adopted soon after
the controversy arose concerning the proper interpretation of the
statute.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
But Rankin presents no persuasive argument that Senate
Bill No. 2 was a clarification of the Bane Act’s original meaning,
whether in response to Towery or other judicial interpretations of
section 52.1. In Western Security Bank, for instance, the
amendments at issue “simply clarified and confirmed the state of
the law” as originally intended. (Western Security Bank, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 252.) This was because the bill expressly
indicated the Legislature’s “ ‘intent . . . to abrogate the holding’ ”
of a recent Court of Appeal decision, and the Legislature enacted
the bill as an urgency statute with immediate effect. (Id. at
p. 245.) Here, by contrast, the Legislature did not enact Senate
Bill No. 2 until more than five years after Towery. This is not a
case where “the Legislature act[ed] promptly to correct a
27
perceived problem with a judicial construction of a statute.” (Id.
at p. 246.)
Rankin points to legislative committee statements that
Senate Bill No. 2 would “address and clarify a number of recent
negative court decisions.” (Italics omitted.) This is not evidence
of legislative intent to clarify the Bane Act itself. Further,
“statements in the legislative history to the effect that the
proposed amendment would only ‘clarify’ the law’s original
meaning . . . may have been intended only to demonstrate that
clarification was necessary, not as positive assertions that the
law always provided for . . . liability [as amended]. We see no
indication the Legislature even thought about giving, much less
expressly intended to give, the amendment retroactive effect to
the extent the amendment did change the law. Specifically, we
see no clear and unavoidable intent to have the statute
retroactively impose liability for actions not subject to liability
when taken.” (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 476.)
As to Rankin’s Ralph Act claim, CDCR retains
governmental immunity under Government Code section 844.6.
Senate Bill No. 2 did not amend the Ralph Act (section 51.7),
section 52.1’s amended immunity provisions do not reference
section 51.7, and Rankin identifies no other basis for his
argument regarding the Ralph Act. (See Gates v. Superior Court
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 512-513 [section 51.7 liability does not
override governmental immunities such as section 844.6]; see
also Creason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 635 [“If a specific immunity
28
statute applies, it ‘cannot be abrogated by a statute which simply
imposes a general legal duty or liability’ ”].)7
Accordingly, CDCR has a complete defense, governmental
immunity, to Rankin’s causes of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of CDCR is affirmed. The judgment
in favor of Kardouni is reversed, and on remand the trial court is
directed to vacate its order granting Kardouni’s motion for
summary judgment and to enter a new order denying the motion.
The parties shall bear their costs on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
7 Rankin does not explain why CDCR does not have
governmental immunity on his negligent supervision cause of
action, and has thus forfeited the argument.
29