Filed 8/26/26 Rainey v. Taylor CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PRISCILLA RAINEY, B345426
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21SMCV01514)
v.
JAYCEON TERRELL TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Novian & Novian, Farhad Novian and Sean Raymond
Bozarth for Defendant and Appellant.
Borchard & Callahan and Janelle M. Dease for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Jayceon Terrell Taylor appeals the trial court’s order
denying his motion to vacate the default judgment against him
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).1
Taylor contends plaintiff Priscilla Rainey’s service by publication
was invalid because she did not mail the court’s order for
publication to his known address. He further asserts that service
was ineffective because the summons did not identify the
relevant court as the Superior Court of the County of Los
Angeles; it contained an error in the courthouse address; and the
published summons was inconsistent with the original summons
in several respects. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Taylor is a recording artist also known as “The Game.” In
2016, Rainey obtained a $7,130,100 judgment against Taylor in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.2 Rainey registered the judgment in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California.
The Complaint
In September 2021, Rainey filed this action against Taylor;
JTT Holdings, LLC (JTT Holdings) and F12 & Associates, LLC
(F12), of which Taylor was the sole member; Cash M. Jones,
Taylor’s manager; 5th Amendment Entertainment, Inc. (5th
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 In an opinion affirming the district court’s denial of
Taylor’s motion for a new trial or a remittitur, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals observed that Taylor “did not take the
litigation seriously” and had “evaded process, trolled Rainey on
social media, dodged a settlement conference, and did not bother
to show up at trial.” (Rainey v. Taylor (7th Cir. 2019) 941 F.3d
243, 247.)
2
Amendment), whose sole shareholder is Jones; and Pass Go 2
Win, LLC (Pass Go 2 Win), a company “ostensibly owned and
controlled by Jones.”
The complaint alleged that Rainey had collected less than
4 percent of the judgment from Taylor’s royalties prior to filing
this action. Over $6.8 million remained outstanding. According
to the complaint, Taylor used the other defendants to hide his
income and assets. While Rainey’s enforcement efforts were
ongoing, Taylor transferred to Jones his interest in JTT Holdings
and a property owned by JTT Holdings. Taylor also assigned his
trademark “The Game” to Pass Go 2 Win. Taylor boasted in
interviews and Instagram posts about flouting his payment
obligations to Rainey.
The complaint asserted causes of action for alter ego
liability against F12, JTT Holdings, and Taylor; voidable
transactions against Jones, JTT Holdings, Pass Go 2 Win, and
Taylor; and conspiracy to commit voidable transaction against
Jones, JTT Holdings, and Taylor. It sought a judgment holding
JTT Holdings and F12 liable for Taylor’s debts to Rainey,
charging liens against JTT Holdings’ and F12’s interests,
avoidance of the transfers, and a constructive trust.
Attempted Service and Publication
In September 2022, Rainey filed a motion for order
directing service of summons by publication. Rainey had been
unable to serve Taylor personally or by substitute service. Taylor
lives in a gated residence in Calabasas. A process server acting
on Rainey’s behalf approached the residence on six separate
occasions but was unable to gain access to the property and
received no response at the call box on the gate. On one occasion,
Taylor left the residence in his car and the process server
3
followed him to an office building. The process server attempted
personal service on Taylor there, but Taylor refused to accept.
The process server left the papers for Taylor at the front desk of
the building, but an employee returned them to the process
server. Rainey also mailed the summons, complaint, and a notice
and acknowledgement of receipt to Taylor’s residence.
In October 2022, the court granted Rainey’s motion and
entered her proposed order. The order instructed that Rainey
serve the defendants, including Taylor, by publication in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal. It further ordered that a copy of the
summons and complaint be mailed to the defendants “if his/its
address is ascertained before expiration of the time prescribed for
the publication of this summons.” The order required Rainey to
file a declaration stating that she had mailed the summons and
complaint, or had failed to ascertain an address, at the expiration
of the time prescribed for publication.
Rainey filed the proof of publication in November 2022.
The published version of the summons identified Taylor, 5th
Amendment, Pass Go 2 Win, and Jones as defendants. It did not
list JTT Holdings or F12, which had already been served and
defaulted. The published summons identified the name and
address of the court as “Santa Monica Courthouse, 725 Main
Street, Santa Monica CA 90401.” It provided the name, address,
and telephone number of Rainey’s current counsel, which differed
from the counsel identified in the original summons.
In January 2023, Rainey’s counsel filed a declaration
stating: “During the period of publication of the Summons
ordered by the court, no other address of defendant [Taylor] was
ascertained.” The clerk entered Taylor’s default at Rainey’s
request.
4
Default Judgment
In December 2023, the court entered a final judgment and
permanent injunction against Taylor. It declared JTT Holdings
and F12 to be Taylor’s alter egos, and therefore liable for the
judgment against Taylor entered in the Northern District of
Illinois. It voided the transfer of Taylor’s residence from JTT
Holdings to Jones, the conveyance of Taylor’s membership
interest in JTT Holdings to Jones, and the assignment of the
trademark “The Game” from Taylor to Pass Go 2 Win. The court
also enjoined Taylor, Jones, JTT Holdings, F12, and Pass Go 2
Win from transferring, encumbering, dissipating, or conveying
Taylor’s Calabasas residence or any property or accounts held by
JTT Holdings.
Motion to Quash Service and Set Aside Judgment
In January 2025, Taylor filed a motion to quash service and
set aside the judgment as void. He argued the summons was
substantially defective because it failed to properly name the
court exercising jurisdiction. He asserted the summons should
have identified the court exercising jurisdiction as the Superior
Court of the County of Los Angeles but instead it stated “Santa
Monica Courthouse” and omitted one digit from the courthouse
address.3 Taylor also argued the published summons was invalid
because it “substantially deviated from the summons issued in
this case” by omitting two of the defendants and updating the
name of Rainey’s counsel.
Rainey opposed the motion. She argued that it was not
incorrect to identify the title of the court as the Santa Monica
3 The address of the Santa Monica Courthouse is 1725 Main
Street, Santa Monica, California 90401. Both the original and
published summons omitted the leading 1.
5
Courthouse, there was no statutory requirement to provide the
courthouse address, and the file stamp and seal on the summons
mailed to Taylor identified the court as the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles. Rainey asserted the omission of two
defendants who had already been served was immaterial, and the
statute governing service by publication does not require that the
summons include the name of the plaintiff’s attorney. She also
argued that including the name and contact information of her
current counsel was accurate and “bolsters the notification” to
Taylor.
In his reply, Taylor argued for the first time that service by
publication was invalid because section 415.50, subdivision (b),
required the trial court to order Rainey to mail the order for
publication to him. The order for publication did not include this
requirement and Rainey had not mailed the order for publication
to Taylor.
The trial court denied Taylor’s motion. It found the
identification of the court as the Santa Monica Courthouse was
“an immaterial variation from the title of the court.”
Notwithstanding the typo in the address, the court found that the
summons “provide[d] sufficient information to put [Taylor] on
notice that he was being sued at the Superior Court of Los
Angeles (specifically the Santa Monica Courthouse).” The court
further found that Taylor failed to show how the omission of JTT
Holdings and F12 from the published summons rendered it
substantially noncompliant as to Taylor. The court obtained
jurisdiction over Taylor because the summons included his name
and thus “provid[ed] him with notice and due process.” The court
noted: “[T]he theories of the suit are not part of the summons. . . .
Summons are not designed to place defendant on notice of the
6
legal theories supporting the action, only notice of the action and
the timeframe to respond.” Finally, the court held the
identification of Rainey’s current attorney substantially complied
with statutory requirements. The order did not expressly
address Taylor’s argument concerning the mailing of the order for
publication, although the parties discussed it at the hearing.
Taylor timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the
Motion to Vacate the Judgment
Taylor contends the trial court erred in denying his motion
to vacate the judgment because service was invalid on several
grounds. He argues that Rainey failed to comply with
section 415.50, subdivision (b), by not mailing him the order for
publication. He further asserts that Rainey failed to comply with
the trial court’s order for publication, and thereby violated
section 415.50, because she published a summons that differed
slightly from the original summons. Finally, Taylor contends the
published summons’s incomplete identification of the court and
failure to include two of the defendants rendered it substantially
noncompliant with section 412.20.
A. Standard of review
Section 473, subdivision (d), provides: “The court may, upon
motion of the injured party, or its own motion . . . set aside any
void judgment or order.” “ ‘ “[A] judgment or order that is invalid
on the face of the record . . . may be set aside on motion, with no
limit on the time within which the motion must be made.” ’
[Citation.] This rule has also been applied when uncontested
extrinsic evidence shows that the defendant was never properly
served.” (California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th
7
207, 215.) Taylor’s arguments rely on the judgment roll and on
the undisputed fact that Rainey did not mail the order for
publication. We review the issue of whether a judgment is void
de novo. (Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961
(Calvert).)
B. Section 415.50
“ ‘Personal service remains the method of choice under the
statutes and the constitution.’ [Citation.] Consistent with the
notions of fair play and due process, substituted service by
publication is ‘a last resort’ when ‘reasonable diligence to locate a
person in order to give him notice before resorting to the fictional
notice afforded by publication’ has been exercised. [Citation.] ‘If
there is any situation in which strict compliance can reasonably
be required, it is that of service by publication.’ [Citations.] . . .
‘In order to obtain in personam jurisdiction by a form of
constructive service, there must be strict compliance with the
requisite statutory procedures.’ [Citation.]” (Calvert, supra, 29
Cal.App.5th at p. 963.) Section 415.50 sets forth those
procedures. (See also Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32,
41.)
Under section 415.50, subdivision (b), an order authorizing
service by publication “shall direct that a copy of the summons,
the complaint, and the order for publication be forthwith mailed
to the party if his or her address is ascertained before expiration
of the time prescribed for publication of the summons.” Taylor
contends the “is ascertained” language applies to an address
already known to the plaintiff. Thus, Taylor asserts Rainey was
required to mail the order for publication to the address at which
8
she had previously attempted personal and substituted service of
the summons and complaint.4
a. Section 415.50, subdivision (b), did not
require Rainey to mail the order for
publication
Relying on Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871 (Rios),
Rainey argues the obligation to mail the summons, complaint,
and order for publication under section 415.50, subdivision (b),
arises only if the plaintiff discovers an additional address for the
defendant after the order for publication is issued. The plaintiff
in Rios filed a complaint for premises liability against the trust
that owned the property at issue and its trustees. (Rios, at
p. 875.) The plaintiff’s personal investigator made multiple
attempts to personally serve the trustee defendants at an address
at which they operated a business, and also mailed the summons,
complaint, and acknowledgment of receipt to a post office box
address for the defendant trust. (Id. at pp. 876–877.) The
trustee defendants contacted the plaintiff’s attorney concerning
the action but did not cooperate with efforts to serve them.
(Ibid.) The plaintiff filed an ex parte application for service by
publication, which the court granted. (Id. at pp. 877–878.)
Defendants later moved to set the default entered against them
4 Taylor also suggests that reversal is warranted because the
trial court erred in failing to direct Rainey to mail the publication
order to Taylor. However, Taylor has conceded below and on
appeal that any omission in the order would not render service
invalid if Rainey nevertheless fully complied with the statutory
requirements. As discussed below, Rainey complied with those
requirements under the circumstances of this case. We therefore
need not separately consider the validity of the trial court’s order
for publication.
9
aside, and the trial court denied their requests. (Id. at pp. 878–
879.)
On appeal, the defendants argued, in part, that the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because the plaintiff
“should have mailed defendants a copy of the summons pursuant
to section 415.50, subdivision (b),” but failed to do so. (Rios,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 883.) The appellate court disagreed.
It concluded the defendants “fail[ed] to show what fact triggered
mail service under section 415.50, subdivision (b). Nothing in the
record shows that [the plaintiff] discovered an additional address
for [defendants] after the publication order issued.” (Ibid.)
Taylor contends the defendants’ argument in Rios only
concerned the summons and complaint, and the court therefore
did not consider a plaintiff’s obligation to mail the order for
publication under section 415.50, subdivision (b). However, the
Rios court concluded that no newly discovered facts “triggered
mail service.” (Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 883, italics
added.) Although the court did not specifically address the order
for publication, its analysis applies equally to it.
Like the Rios court, we also conclude that the mailing
requirement of section 415.50, subdivision (b), does not apply to
an address the plaintiff knew of and used to attempt service
before the order for publication issued.
“ ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording
the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and
viewing them in their statutory context, because the language
employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265 (Cornett).) Section 415.50,
subdivision (a), states that “[a] summons may be served by
10
publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the
court in which the action is pending that the party to be served
cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner
specified in this article.” The statute thus requires a plaintiff to
attempt personal and/or substitute service at any known
addresses for the defendant before seeking an order for
publication. (Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 740, 746 [§ “415.50 motion was defective as a matter
of law” where plaintiff “knew [defendant’s] post office address
and that his mail was being picked up from that box” but did not
attempt service by mail].)
Section 415.50, subdivision (b), then provides that an order
for publication “shall direct that a copy of the summons, the
complaint, and the order for publication be forthwith mailed to
the party if his or her address is ascertained before expiration of
the time prescribed for publication of the summons.” “Ascertain”
means “to find out or learn with certainty,” and implies the
discovery of new information.5 Considering subdivisions (a) and
(b) together, we conclude the only logical reading of the statute is
that the summons, complaint, and order for publication must be
mailed to any address discovered after the order for publication
was issued, not to an address where the plaintiff previously
diligently attempted service.
5 Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ascertain> (as of
Aug. 25, 2026), archived at <https://perma.cc/B3HD-N8CJ>.
11
To the extent the statutory language is ambiguous, the
legislative history supports this interpretation.6 Section 415.50
“was based upon a recommendation of the Judicial Council in its
1969 report to the Legislature.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co.
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434; see Judicial Council of Cal.,
Ann. Rep. to Gov. & Legis. (1969) (Judicial Council Report).)
“[T]he Judicial Council ‘Report was adopted by the Legislature as
a statement of legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Dill, at p. 1435,
fn. 6.) With respect to section 415.50, subdivision (b), the Judicial
Council Report stated:
“[I]f a defendant’s address is known before an order is
made for publication, service must be effectuated by
another method of service specified in this article.
However, if defendant’s address is ascertained after
such order and prior to completion of the full
publication of summons, only a copy of the summons
and a copy of the complaint must be mailed to him.
(Compare former Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 413.) The
latter requirement is designed to give defendant
actual notice of the action, since publication of
summons in a newspaper is not likely to result in
such notice.” (Judicial Council Report, supra, p. 50,
italics added.)
6 “If . . . ‘the statutory language may reasonably be given
more than one interpretation, “ ‘ “courts may consider various
extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be
remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory
scheme encompassing the statute.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Cornett,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1265.)
12
Furthermore, we presume the Legislature would have
retained the language of section 415.50, subdivision (b)’s
predecessor if it intended to require a plaintiff to mail the
summons and complaint to a previously known address of the
defendant. Former section 413 stated: “In case of publication,
where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the court . . . must direct a copy of the summons and
complaint to be forthwith deposited in the post office, directed to
the person to be served, at his place of residence.” (Stats. 1957,
ch. 1669, p. 3049, italics added.) The Legislature chose to replace
“known” with “is ascertained.” Taylor’s reading of the statute
fails to give effect to the Legislature’s rejection of the former
language. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Farley) (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 315, 332 [“ ‘Legislature’s rejection of specific
language constitutes persuasive evidence a statute should not be
interpreted to include the omitted language’ ”].)
Taylor concedes that Rainey was not required to mail the
summons and complaint again but argues she was required to
mail the order for publication because she had not previously
done so. We recognize the Judicial Council Report relates to the
original form of section 415.50, subdivision (b), which did not
require a plaintiff to mail the order for publication with the
summons and complaint. (Compare Stats. 1969, ch. 1610,
pp. 3367–3368 with Stats. 1984, ch. 352, p. 1646.) However,
when the Legislature added the requirement that a plaintiff must
also mail the order for publication, it retained the “is ascertained”
phrasing and made no other relevant changes. This suggests the
Legislature did not intend to treat orders for publication
differently than the summons and complaint under the amended
provision. We conclude a plaintiff is required to mail the order
13
for publication, along with the summons and complaint, only if
“defendant’s address is ascertained after such order and prior to
completion of the full publication of summons.”7 (Judicial
Council Report, supra, at p. 50, italics added.)
Rainey was not required to mail the order for publication.
The trial court properly found that she complied with
section 415.50.
b. Differences between the published and
original versions of the summons did not
violate section 415.50 or invalidate service
Taylor also attempts to characterize inconsistencies
between the original summons and the published version as a
failure to comply with the order for publication. He asserts this
is also a violation of section 415.50 subject to a strict compliance
analysis. We reject this argument.
7 The Conference of Delegates of the State Bar initiated the
change in the law, and “state[d] that when a summons and
complaint arrive in the mail pursuant to an order authorizing
service by publication, it is ‘frequently misinterpreted both by lay
persons and by counsel as an ineffective attempt at personal or
substituted service.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem.
Bill No. 2790 (1983–1984 Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 14, 1984,
p. 2.) The requirement of mailing the order for publication was
intended to “increase the likelihood that a defendant will
understand that service by publication has been authorized and
take appropriate steps to protect his or her interests.” (Ibid.)
The legislative history does not suggest the statute was intended
to change the circumstances under which the mailing of the
summons and complaint is required in the first place. Rather,
the amendment addressed the confusion that may
understandably arise when a defendant obtains notice of an
action for the first time from a seemingly invalid service attempt.
14
As an initial matter, Taylor’s contention that Rainey
ignored the trial court’s order and published “some completely
different document” from the original summons is unconvincing.
Apart from the omission of two defendant names and the
substitution of the contact information for Rainey’s counsel, the
published summons was the same as the original. Nonetheless,
Taylor asserts that because a plaintiff must strictly comply with
section 415.50’s requirements, the nature of the differences is
immaterial. As we understand his argument, although
section 415.50 does not address the content of the summons to be
published, Taylor asserts that the statute directs the trial court
to “order the summons to be published.” As a result, if the
plaintiff publishes anything other than the original summons, the
plaintiff has not strictly complied with the trial court order and
has, therefore, not strictly complied with section 415.50.
Yet, as Taylor concedes, courts have concluded that
discrepancies between the served copy of a summons and the
original do not invalidate service unless they are substantial and
misleading. (People v. Davis (1904) 143 Cal. 673, 677 (Davis)
[judgment not void on its face based on discrepancies between
published summons and original where discrepancies were few,
“very slight,” and “not capable of misleading the defendant as to
the nature of the proceeding”]; Sharp v. Daugney (1867) 33 Cal.
505, 513 [“purely literal, and quite microscopic” discrepancies
between original and published summons did not defeat court’s
jurisdiction over defendant]; Hershenson v. Hershenson (1962)
205 Cal.App.2d 382, 385 [“Errors or omissions in conforming a
copy of a summons to the original do not justify quashing service
15
unless the party served has been misled or his substantial rights
affected.”].)8
Here, the published summons’s omission of the two
defaulted defendants and identification of Rainey’s current
counsel was not misleading and did not affect Taylor’s
substantial rights. Those differences did not invalidate service.
A summons cannot accomplish service on a defendant who
is not named in it. (Lyman v. Milton (1872) 44 Cal. 630, 634–635,
disapproved on another ground in In re Clarke (1899) 125 Cal.
388, 392.) While the published summons was therefore
ineffective as to JTT Holdings and F12 (which had already been
served), it undisputedly identified Taylor and put him on notice
of the proceeding and the need to take action.
Taylor contends the omission of JTT Holdings and F12 was
misleading because the complaint contained alter ego allegations
concerning those defendants and “the judgment contained relief
that was only possible if parties not named in the published
summons were parties to the action.” But as the trial court aptly
8 Taylor contends in his reply brief that because the order for
publication was not part of the judgment roll under the law
applicable to the judgment in Davis, that case “could not reach
the question of whether the non-identical published summons
violated that order.” Regardless of whether Davis directly rebuts
Taylor’s claim that the substance of a published summons is
subject to the strict compliance analysis that applies to the
procedural requirements of the publication statute, it establishes
that a “summons [that] was not published as issued” does not
void a judgment unless the differences are misleading. (Davis,
supra, 143 Cal. at p. 677.) It is Taylor’s burden to establish that
a different rule applies when the order for publication is part of
the judgment roll. He cites no pertinent authority for that
proposition.
16
put it: “Summons are not designed to place defendant on notice of
the legal theories supporting the action, only notice of the action
and the timeframe to respond.” (See § 412.20 generally;
Stanquist v. Hebbard (1898) 122 Cal. 268, 269 [rejecting
argument that summons was void “because it does not state the
nature of the cause of action alleged against defendant,” since
former § 407 did not require identification of causes of action].)
That the summons did not provide insight into the relief Rainey
might obtain does not render it misleading.
Taylor does not argue that Rainey’s identification of her
current counsel in the published summons was misleading. In
his reply brief, he acknowledges: “Obviously, correcting the
attorney information would cause no prejudice . . . .” Indeed, we
fail to see how providing contact information for counsel best
positioned to respond to inquiries about the case could be adverse
to Taylor’s substantial rights.
We reject Taylor’s argument that the inconsistencies
between the two versions of the summons constituted a violation
of the trial court’s order and, as a result, Rainey failed to strictly
comply with section 415.50. The only authority Taylor relies
upon to support this argument is Calvert, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th
954, however, that reliance is misplaced. The plaintiff in Calvert
published the summons in a different and smaller newspaper
than the one the trial court identified in the order for publication.
(Id. at p. 960.) The appellate court held the subsequently entered
default judgment was void on its face. (Id. at p. 962.) It observed
that “[s]ection 415.50 states that the ‘court shall order the
summons to be published in a named newspaper, published in
this state, that is most likely to give actual notice to the party to
be served,’ ” and concluded “[p]ublication in the newspaper
17
named by the court is essential, as it ensures notice is given via
the periodical that the trial court finds most likely to give the
defendant notice.” (Ibid.) In that context, the court noted that,
“ ‘[i]n order to obtain in personam jurisdiction by a form of
constructive service, there must be strict compliance with the
requisite statutory procedures.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 963, italics
added.)
Thus, in Calvert, the trial court’s order directing
publication in a particular newspaper effectuated a specific
statutory requirement in section 415.50, subdivision (b). The
plaintiffs’ failure to comply with that order necessarily meant
they did not strictly comply with section 415.50’s procedural
requirements. Taylor has not identified any similar specific
statutory requirements in this case. He further cites no authority
to support his argument that section 415.50’s reference to “the
summons” is an indication that any difference between the
original summons and the published version is necessarily a
violation of section 415.50. We disagree that the Calvert court’s
reasoning may be so extended in this way, in conflict with other
caselaw.
C. The published summons substantially complied
with section 412.20
Taylor also contends the published summons’s
identification of the court and omission of JTT Holdings and F12
was substantially defective and noncompliant with
section 412.20. We again disagree.
Section 412.20 provides that “a summons shall be directed
to the defendant, signed by the clerk and issued under the seal of
the court in which the action is pending, and it shall contain,”
among other things, “[t]he title of the court in which the action is
18
pending,” “[t]he names of the parties to the action,” and “[a]
direction that the defendant file with the court a written pleading
in response to the complaint within 30 days after summons is
served on the defendant.” (§ 412.20, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) The
requirements of section 412.20 are “mandatory, but the rule of
liberal construction is followed and minor variations in form are
not fatal.” (Judicial Council Report, supra, p. 39.) Courts have
applied a substantial compliance standard to the contents of a
summons. (Ystrom v. Handel (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 144, 151–
152; MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 555, 557.)
In Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852
(Carol Gilbert), the court found that substantial compliance with
the statutory summons requirements requires three
preconditions: 1) “some degree of compliance with the offended
statutory requirements”; 2) “the objective nature and
circumstances of the attempted service must have made it
‘ “ ‘highly probable’ ” ’ that it would impart the same notice as full
compliance”; and 3) the summons “must in fact have imparted
such notice, or at least sufficient notice to put the defendant on
his defense.” (Id. at pp. 865–866.) The appellate court concluded
the summons served in that case was not substantially compliant
because it “contained no indication whatever that [the defendant]
was being sued by a fictitious name, or indeed that he was being
sued at all,” “did not by its terms command him to do anything,”
and did “not warn him of adverse consequences if he failed.” (Id.
at p. 866.)
Taylor relies on Carol Gilbert in his appellate briefing.
However, the problems with the summons Taylor identifies are
distinguishable from the deficiencies in Carol Gilbert. The
19
published summons here substantially complied with the
requirements of section 412.20.9
a. Identification of court
There was “some degree of compliance” in the published
summons’s identification of the relevant court as the Santa
Monica Courthouse. The Santa Monica Courthouse is a location
of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles.
Notwithstanding the typo in the address, the summons identified
the correct city, street, and zip code of the courthouse. The
summons also advised Taylor that he could locate forms to use for
his response at a county law library or his local courthouse and
that he “may want to call an attorney right away.” To the extent
the summons might have resulted in any confusion about the
court in which Rainey had filed suit against Taylor, a court clerk,
law librarian, or attorney could have promptly resolved it.
In addition, the mailed version of the summons had a
Superior Court file stamp and included the seal of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court. Rainey’s prior service attempt
by mail was to an address where Taylor undisputedly resided.
Considered in their totality, the circumstances of the “attempted
service” made it highly probable that the incomplete
identification of the court in the published summons imparted
the same notice to Taylor as he would have received had it
9 Schering Corp. v. Superior Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 737,
on which Taylor repeatedly relies, is also distinguishable.
Schering involved a summons that did not clearly disclose that
the individual served was being served on behalf of a corporation.
(Id. at p. 742.) The objective circumstances of service suggested
that he was being served as a Doe defendant. (Ibid.) The
published summons here clearly disclosed that Rainey was suing
Taylor as an individual.
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identified the court as the Superior Court of the County of Los
Angeles.
Finally, the published summons clearly gave Taylor notice
of the proceedings and the consequences if he failed to act.
b. Omission of defaulted defendants
Taylor argues the omission of the defaulted defendants
rendered the published summons substantially defective because
it did not comply with the literal terms of section 412.20, which
provide the summons shall contain “[t]he names of the parties to
the action.” (§ 412.20, subd. (a)(2).) However, the doctrine of
substantial compliance “ ‘ “ ‘excuses literal noncompliance only
when there has been “actual compliance in respect to the
substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” ’ ”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (The Chemical Toxin Working Group, Inc.
v. The Kroger Co. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 276, 290.)
Taylor does not identify any objectives of the statute or
explain how the omission of JTT Holdings and F12 frustrated
them. The published summons gave Taylor notice of the
proceedings and put him on his defense. Rainey also mailed the
original summons and complaint to Taylor’s undisputed address.
The complaint identified all defendants, causes of action, and the
relief sought.
We conclude the published summons was substantially
compliant with section 412.20.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to vacate the judgment is
affirmed. Rainey shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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