Filed 6/23/26 R.H. v. C.A. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
R.H., C103691
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. STA-FL-CUSU-
v. 2014-0003291)
C.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
This appeal arises out of a child custody dispute between plaintiff R.H. (mother)
and defendant C.A. (father) over their 10-year-old child. Although mother’s brief is short
on details, the principal thrust of her claims is that the trial court erred in issuing a three-
year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her; erred in giving father sole
legal and physical custody of the child with supervised visits by mother; and erred in
denying mother’s subsequent request to modify the child custody and visitation order.
She specifically argues that the trial court (1) violated due process by relying on unserved
and late-filed orders; (2) modified custody without adequate findings or evidence; (3)
improperly relied on the DVRO to support the change in custody; (4) ignored evidence in
her favor and improperly relied on father’s “untested” allegations; and (5) exhibited bias
against her. We conclude that mother has forfeited whatever contentions she is
attempting to raise on appeal by failing to comply with the applicable rules of appellate
procedure.
1
BACKGROUND
We omit a detailed summary of the facts as they are not relevant to our disposition
of this case. It suffices to say that mother and father were in a relationship from 2012
until about 2021. They had one child, born in 2014. Mother had sole legal and physical
custody of the child from 2015 until 2024. In June 2024, father filed a request for change
in custody, seeking both legal and physical custody. Father also requested a DVRO
against mother, primarily on the grounds that mother was harassing father by fomenting
unnecessary welfare checks. The trial court granted the DVRO and gave father sole legal
and physical custody of the child, with supervised visits for mother. Mother
subsequently filed requests to set aside the DVRO and restore her physical and legal
custody, which were denied. Mother purports to appeal from the DVRO and the custody
and visitation orders giving father sole legal and physical custody.
We pause here briefly to note that although mother’s brief refers to several orders
and rulings issued by the trial court, the notices of appeal specifically identify only three
orders that are being appealed: an October 14, 2024 order after hearing; the February 6,
2025 DVRO; and an August 5, 2025 order denying mother’s request to modify the
custody and visitation order giving father sole legal and physical custody of the child.
When a notice of appeal specifically describes the order or orders being appealed, our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the specified orders; we cannot liberally construe the
notice to apply to a different, omitted order. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75;
Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170; Morton v. Wagner (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967.) We therefore have jurisdiction to review only those three
orders, one of which—the October 14, 2024 order—is not included in the record on
appeal.1
1 We assume for purposes of this appeal that the challenged custody orders
constitute permanent custody orders. To the extent they constitute temporary custody
2
DISCUSSION
“ ‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment
is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an
error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]’ (Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) ‘This means that an appellant must do more than assert error
and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test his [or
her] claim.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619-620.) We have neither
the obligation nor the ability to search the record on our own looking for error. (Guthrey
v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115; Mansell v. Board of
Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546.)
To demonstrate error, an appellant must present “meaningful legal analysis
supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the
claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “When an appellant fails
to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles et al. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852; accord, Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956; Hernandez et al. v. First Student, Inc. et al. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).)
Mother’s brief on appeal falls far short of these standards. Among other things,
her brief omits an adequate summary of the facts relevant to her contentions; fails to
support her factual assertions with proper citations to the record; and contains only
conclusory arguments, unsupported by any meaningful analysis or citations to authority.
orders, the purported appeals would be subject to dismissal because such orders are not
appealable. (Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1089-1090; Lester v. Lennane
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 556.)
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In addition, the record is plainly inadequate. One of the orders that mother seeks to
appeal—the October 14, 2024 order—is not even included in the record on appeal.
Accordingly, while we appreciate the effect on mother of the orders she seeks to
challenge on appeal, we conclude that she has forfeited whatever contentions she may be
attempting to raise on appeal. (L.O. v. Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620; Huong
Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409-410; Blizzard Energy, Inc. v.
Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 857; Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
425, 435.)
We are mindful that mother is self-represented, but this does not exempt her from
compliance with the rules of appellate procedure. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) “ ‘A party proceeding in propria persona “is to be treated
like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other
litigants and attorneys.” ’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620; Nwosu, at
p. 1247.)
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DISPOSITION
The challenged DVRO and child custody/visitation orders are affirmed. In the
interests of justice, each party shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(5).)
\s\
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
\s\
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
\s\
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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