Filed 9/4/26 Preserve Ross Valley v. County of Marin CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
PRESERVE ROSS VALLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A174392
v.
COUNTY OF MARIN, (Marin County
Super. Ct. No. CV0005168)
Defendant and Respondent,
MARIN CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL
et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
Plaintiff Preserve Ross Valley filed a petition for writ of mandate
pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code,1
§ 21000 et seq.; CEQA) challenging the County of Marin’s (County) approval
of a project to install and use field lights at Marin Catholic High School’s
(Marin Catholic) athletic stadium. After the statute of limitations period
closed, plaintiff filed an amended petition which substituted in the
Archdiocese of San Francisco Parish and School Juridic Persons Real
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Public Resources Code.
1
Property Support Corporation (RPSC) as a real party in interest. The trial
court dismissed plaintiff’s CEQA claim for failure to join RPSC within the
statute of limitations period, concluding, as relevant here, that the
substitution did not relate back to the filing of the original petition. Plaintiff
challenges the dismissal, arguing the relation back doctrine applies and,
therefore, the naming of RPSC was timely. We agree. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for the trial court to rule on the merits of plaintiff’s
CEQA cause of action.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Project
In May 2024, Marin Catholic applied to install field lights at its athletic
stadium and associated bleacher and pedestrian pathway lighting. The
project includes four, 80-foot tall light poles installed on each side of the field
using LED technology. Field lighting would allow Marin Catholic sports
teams to practice later into the evening and to play evening games.
After reviewing the application, county staff determined the project
was exempt from CEQA under three categorical exemptions.2 In October
2024, the Planning Commission held a hearing to consider the application.
The Planning Commission determined the project was not exempt from
CEQA and directed staff to conduct an initial study. After Marin Catholic
appealed, county staff recommended the Board of Supervisors deny the
2 Categorical exemptions apply to “projects which have been
determined not to have a significant effect on the environment and which
shall, therefore, be exempt from” CEQA. (Guidelines, § 15300.) All
references to “Guideline” or “Guidelines” are to the Guidelines codified in the
California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000 et seq. They are
guidelines for the implementation of CEQA, developed by the Governor’s
Office of Planning and Research and adopted by the Secretary of the
Resources Agency. (§ 21083.)
2
appeal, uphold the Planning Commission’s determination, and require
preparation of an initial study. As an alternative, staff indicated that
because Marin Catholic had submitted a revised good neighbor plan
providing greater specificity regarding lighting usage and noise impacts, the
Board of Supervisors may decide to approve the CEQA exemption.
In December 2024, the Board of Supervisors overturned the Planning
Commission’s decision, found the project exempt from CEQA pursuant to the
Class 11 (Guidelines, § 15311) and Class 14 (Guidelines, § 15314) categorical
exemptions, and approved the project. It conditioned approval on, among
other things, Marin Catholic’s implementation and compliance of its good
neighbor plan. On December 20, 2024, the County, by its Community
Development Agency, filed a notice of exemption (NOE). The NOE identified
Marin Catholic as the entity proposing to install new field lighting at its
athletic stadium. As “project sponsor,” the NOE identified one entity:
“Archdiocese of San Francisco.” (Boldface and some capitalization omitted.)
RPSC, by its full name, was not identified in the NOE.
B. Procedural History
On January 23, 2025, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate
alleging a cause of action pursuant to CEQA.3 Plaintiff alleged the County
violated CEQA by exempting the project from environmental review,
asserting the project did not fall within the Class 11 and Class 14
exemptions. Plaintiff alleged the project will likely have significant
environmental impacts due to light and noise. Plaintiff named Marin
Catholic and the “Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco (aka
3 Plaintiff alleged two additional causes of action, to which the trial
court ultimately denied the amended petition for writ of mandate. Plaintiff
does not challenge those rulings on appeal and we do not discuss those
claims.
3
‘Archdiocese of San Francisco’)” as real parties in interest, stating that the
NOE listed the “Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco (aka
‘Archdiocese of San Francisco’)” as the project sponsor. Plaintiff also named
Roe real parties in interest.
Plaintiff then filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining
order and request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin construction of the
light poles. In opposing the application, Marin Catholic argued, as relevant
here, that plaintiff could not prevail on the merits of its CEQA claim because
it failed to join RPSC—a necessary and indispensable party—within the
statute of limitations period. Marin Catholic explained the following: The
owner of the property is “The Archdiocese of San Francisco Parish and School
Juridic Persons Real Property Support Corporation,” i.e., RPSC, a separate
corporate entity from the party that was named in the petition. (Italics
omitted.) In 2008, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco granted
the property to RPSC, who remains the sole property owner. Due to space
limitations in the electronic application form, the name of the property owner
was shortened to “ ‘Archdiocese of San Francisco’ ” in some project materials.
Based on this information, on February 18, 2025, plaintiff filed a first
amended petition where it named Marin Catholic and RPSC as real parties
in interest. The amended petition alleged that plaintiff substituted in RPSC
as a Roe party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474. The parties
then briefed Marin Catholic’s demurrer to the amended petition and
plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. The trial court subsequently
overruled the demurrer and granted a preliminary injunction. As to the
preliminary injunction, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had some
probability of prevailing on the substantive merits of its CEQA claim and
that the balance of harms weighed in favor of issuing a preliminary
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injunction. The parties then briefed the merits of the claims alleged in the
amended petition.
In June 2025, the trial court filed an order ruling on plaintiff’s
amended petition. The court dismissed the CEQA cause of action for failure
to join RPSC—who it determined was a necessary and indispensable party—
within the 35-day statute of limitations period. The court determined that
plaintiff “had imputed knowledge of the correct party’s identity” at the time it
filed its original petition so, therefore, the Roe amendment did not relate
back to the filing of the original petition. The court subsequently entered
judgment against plaintiff.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s dismissal of its CEQA cause of
action arguing, in pertinent part, that the naming of RPSC in the amended
petition relates back to the timely filing of the original petition. Therefore,
plaintiff contends, the CEQA claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.
A. CEQA Overview
“CEQA reflects the California state policy that ‘the long-term protection
of the environment, consistent with the provision of a decent home and
suitable living environment for every Californian, shall be the guiding
criterion in public decisions.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]o implement this policy,’ CEQA
and the Guidelines ‘have established a three-tiered process to ensure that
public agencies inform their decisions with environmental considerations.’ ”
(Parker Shattuck Neighbors v. Berkeley City Council (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th
768, 776.) First, the agency must determine whether the proposed activity
qualifies as a project which triggers CEQA review. (Sunflower Alliance v.
Department of Conservation (2026) 20 Cal.5th 22, 40 (Sunflower Alliance).)
“If a proposed activity qualifies as a project, the lead agency must proceed to
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the second step of the CEQA decision tree. In this step, the lead agency must
determine whether the project is exempt from CEQA ‘under either a
statutory exemption [citation] or a categorical exemption set forth in the
CEQA Guidelines.’ ” (Ibid.) The categorial exemptions were promulgated
“ ‘in response to the Legislature’s directive to develop “a list of classes of
projects that have been determined not to have a significant effect on the
environment.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 40–41.) If an exemption applies, then no further
environmental review is necessary. (Id. at p. 41.) However, there are some
exceptions to the exemptions “under which a project that might otherwise fall
within a categorical exemption must nonetheless proceed with CEQA
review.” (Ibid.) If a public agency finds that a project is exempt from CEQA,
the agency has the option of filing an NOE “which cites to the applicable
statutory or categorical exemption (Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a)(3)),
supported by a ‘brief statement of reasons to support the finding [of
exemption].’ (Id., subd. (a)(4).)” (Ibid.)
“If no exemption applies or there is an exception to the applicable
exemption, the lead agency proceeds to the third and final step, which is to
perform an environmental review. At this stage, ‘the agency must first
undertake an initial study to determine whether the project “may have a
significant effect on the environment.” [Citations.] If the initial study finds
no substantial evidence that the project may have a significant
environmental effect, the lead agency must prepare a negative declaration,
and environmental review ends. [Citations.] If the initial study identifies
potentially significant environmental effects but (1) those effects can be fully
mitigated by changes in the project and (2) the project applicant agrees to
incorporate those changes, the agency must prepare a mitigated negative
declaration. This too ends CEQA review. [Citations.] Finally, if the initial
6
study finds substantial evidence that the project may have a significant
environmental impact and a mitigated negative declaration is inappropriate,
the lead agency must prepare and certify’ an environmental impact report
(EIR) ‘before approving or proceeding with the project.’ ” (Sunflower Alliance,
supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 41.)
The standard of review in a CEQA case is prejudicial abuse of
discretion, which is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner
required by law or the determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011)
52 Cal.4th 155, 171.) The “appellate court’s review ‘is the same as the trial
court’s: [It] reviews the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that
sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.’ ” (Protecting Our
Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th
479, 495.)
B. Mootness
Respondents4 argue the appeal should be dismissed as moot because
the field lights have been installed and operating since Fall 2025.5 We reject
their contention.
A case becomes moot when by passage of time or change in
circumstances a controversy that once existed ceases to do so. (Committee for
Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
389, 405.) “ ‘The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot is therefore
whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘If
4 Respondent County filed a joinder in Marin Catholic and RPSC’s
respondents’ brief.
5 Marin Catholic and RPSC’s unopposed request for judicial notice, filed
April 1, 2026, is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459.)
7
events have made such relief impracticable,’ ” the case is “ ‘moot. . . . When
events render a case moot, the court, whether trial or appellate, should
generally dismiss it.’ ” (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County of
Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722.) “ ‘Issues of justiciability, such as
mootness, are generally reviewed de novo.’ ” (Vichy Springs Resort, Inc. v.
City of Ukiah (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 46, 53 (Vichy Springs).)
The appeal is not moot. Contrary to respondents’ assertion, this court,
or the trial court on remand, can grant plaintiff effectual relief. The amended
petition alleges the project will have potentially significant environmental
impacts on the surrounding neighborhood and the adjacent marsh preserve,
including light pollution and glare and excessive noise. In addressing the
merits of plaintiff’s CEQA cause of action, the court could set aside the
County’s determination that the project is exempt under CEQA and require
further environmental review. (See Sunflower Alliance, supra, 20 Cal.5th at
p. 41 [if a project is not exempt from CEQA, the lead agency must perform an
environmental review].) In doing so, “the County could require [Marin
Catholic] to alleviate environmental impacts by,” as suggested by plaintiff,
limiting light levels, adjusting luminaires to avoid glare, and limiting the
volume and use of the PA system and other sources of noise. (Vichy Springs,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 56.) Therefore, while the project “may be
complete, mitigation measures could still be imposed to reduce or avoid the
significant environmental impacts alleged in the [p]etition.” (Ibid.; see also
Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th
880, 888 [challenge to approval of a car wash project, which the sponsor built
despite the trial court’s order to prepare an EIR, was not moot because “a
decision upholding the court’s order directing the preparation of an EIR could
8
result in modification of the project to mitigate adverse impacts or even
removal of the project altogether”].)
Respondents assert no meaningful relief can be provided because the
project has been completed “and the County’s approvals have shown that
there will not be any significant environmental effects that need to be
addressed or mitigated.” But given our disposition, that is the issue the trial
court must address on remand—the merits of plaintiff’s challenge to the
County’s reliance on CEQA categorical exemptions. (See Sunflower Alliance,
supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 40–41 [categorical exemptions identify classes of
projects which have been determined not to have a significant environmental
effect].)
Finally, we reject respondents’ suggestion that plaintiff’s failure to seek
a stay in this court warrants a determination that the appeal is moot. In the
trial court, plaintiff requested and obtained a preliminary injunction to enjoin
construction of the light poles and operation of the field lighting. While the
trial court dissolved the injunction when it entered judgment, we will not
conclude that a failure to seek a stay of the project’s construction or operation
while this appeal was pending must necessarily lead to a conclusion that the
appeal is moot. (See Vichy Springs, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 57 [“we see
no legal basis for concluding that a petitioner’s earlier failure to seek
injunctive relief requires a court to find a CEQA claim moot in a situation in
which effective relief remains available”].)
C. Naming of RPSC
We turn, then, to plaintiff’s challenge to the dismissal of its CEQA
cause of action based on the statute of limitations.
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1. General Legal Principles
When a local agency determines that a project is not subject to CEQA
“pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 21080, and the local agency approves
or determines to carry out the project, the local agency . . . may file a notice of
exemption [(NOE)] with the county clerk of each county in which the project
will be located.” (§ 21152, subd. (b).) When, as here, a public agency files an
NOE, an action alleging that the agency improperly determined that a project
is exempt from CEQA must be commenced within 35 days from the date the
NOE was filed. (§ 21167, subd. (d); see also Stockton Citizens for Sensible
Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 499; Guidelines, §§ 15062,
subd. (d), 15112, subd. (c)(2).)
An NOE must include, among other things, a brief description of the
project, “[t]he applicant’s name, if any” and, “[i]f different from the applicant,
the identity of the person undertaking the project.” (Guidelines, § 15062,
subd. (a).) Section 21167.6.5, subdivision (a), dictates who a plaintiff must
name as a real party in interest when an NOE is filed, stating the plaintiff
“shall name, as a real party in interest, the person or persons identified by
the public agency in” the NOE.
Previously, “former section 21167.6.5, subdivision (a) required real
parties in interest to be named and served in certain actions: ‘The petitioner
or plaintiff shall name, as a real party in interest, any recipient of an
approval that is the subject of an action or proceeding brought pursuant to’ ”
CEQA. (Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods v. Regents of University of California
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 705, 715–716.) The statutory scheme did not define
the phrase “ ‘any recipient of an approval.’ ” (Id. at p. 716.) The Legislature
passed Assembly Bill No. 320 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) to remove this
ambiguity and to “ ‘clarif[y] the persons who must be named as a real party
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in interest.’ ”6 (Ibid.) Now, section 21167.6.5 requires a plaintiff name as a
real party in interest “the person or persons identified by the public agency”
in the NOE. (§ 21167.6.5, subd. (a); Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods, at
p. 716.)
Because an NOE triggers CEQA’s short statutes of limitations, “[i]t is
the responsibility of potential litigants to review these notices, and any
revisions, with care.” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County
Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 54.) “[F]ailure to include a necessary
and indispensable party as a real party in interest within the applicable
limitations period is a ground for dismissal.” (Organizacion Comunidad de
Alviso v. City of San Jose (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 783, 791 (Organizacion
Comunidad); see also § 21167.6.5, subd. (d), italics added [“Failure to name
potential persons, other than those real parties in interest described in
subdivision (a), is not grounds for dismissal pursuant to Section 389 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.”].)
Here, we consider the relation back doctrine. Code of Civil Procedure
section 474 (section 474) governs amendments as to parties initially sued by a
fictitious name.7 “The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a
new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint
and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint
6 Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial notice, filed January 23,
2026, of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 320
is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)
7 Section 474 states, in pertinent part, “When the plaintiff is ignorant of
the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and
such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any
name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must
be amended accordingly.”
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is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed. [Citation.] A recognized
exception to the general rule is the substitution under section 474 of a new
defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to
whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint. [Citation.] If
the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint
substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the
statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original
complaint was filed.” (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176
(Woo).)
There are two requirements for application of the relation back doctrine
under section 474: (1) the procedural requirement that the new defendant be
substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original
complaint; and (2) the substantive requirement that the plaintiff must have
been “genuinely ignorant” of the new defendant’s identity at the time the
original complaint was filed. (Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 176–177.)
The relevant inquiry as to whether the plaintiff was genuinely ignorant of the
new party’s identity “ ‘is what facts the plaintiff actually knew at the time the
original complaint was filed,’ ” not whether plaintiff might by the use of
reasonable diligence have discovered the facts. (Fuller v. Tucker (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170; McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
937, 942.) Section 474 must be “liberally construed” to accomplish its
purpose of enabling a plaintiff to commence a suit in time to avoid a statute
of limitations bar when they are ignorant of a defendant’s identity. (General
Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 593.)
2. Analysis
It is undisputed that the 35-day statute of limitations applies to
plaintiff’s action challenging the County’s determination that the project is
12
exempt from CEQA. (See § 21167, subd. (d); Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (d).)
The NOE was filed on December 20, 2024. While plaintiff filed its original
petition within 35 days from the date the NOE was filed, it did not name
RPSC until beyond the 35-day period. Plaintiff argues the amended petition
substituting RPSC for a Roe party relates back to the timely filing of the
original petition. We agree.
Section 21167.6.5, subdivision (a), requires a plaintiff to “name, as a
real party in interest, the person or persons identified by the public agency
in” the NOE. Here, the NOE identified one entity as project sponsor:
“Archdiocese of San Francisco.” RPSC by its full name was not identified in
the NOE. In its original petition, plaintiff named an entity which included
the title identified in the NOE: “Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco
(aka ‘Archdiocese of San Francisco’).” Respondents do not argue that plaintiff
had actual knowledge of RPSC’s identity and connection with the case when
it filed the original petition. In fact, they acknowledge that “in usual, run-of-
the-mill civil cases, the test is whether a plaintiff is ignorant of the true
names of the defendants in the action.” Instead, as did the trial court,
respondents rely on Organizacion Comunidad, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 783, to
argue that “[i]nstead of the standard rule, CEQA imposes more exacting
standards.”
In Organizacion Comunidad, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 783, the city filed
two notices of determination (NOD) after it certified an EIR and approved a
project. The first NOD, which the city sent to the plaintiff at its request,
listed the wrong project applicant—it named the prior property owner. Five
days after the city filed the first NOD, it filed a second NOD which correctly
identified the project applicant as Microsoft Corporation, who had recently
purchased the property. Even though the plaintiff had requested notices for
13
the project, the city never sent it the second NOD. Relying on the first NOD,
the plaintiff named the wrong real party in interest in its original petition for
writ of mandate, which was timely filed. After the prior property owner’s
attorney notified the plaintiff’s attorney that Microsoft had acquired the
property and the city had filed a second NOD, the plaintiff filed a first
amended petition adding Microsoft as a real party in interest.
(Id. at pp. 787–790.) The trial court sustained Microsoft’s demurrer to the
CEQA cause of action in the amended petition, concluding the claim was
untimely because Microsoft was not sued within the statute of limitations
period after the second NOD was filed. The court rejected the plaintiff’s
relation back argument. (Id. at p. 790.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (Organizacion
Comunidad, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.) The appellate court explained
that the filing of the second NOD triggered the statute of limitations period.
(Id. at p. 793.) The second NOD was filed with the county clerk, and it was
“the ‘responsibility of potential litigants to review these notices, and any
revisions, with care.’ ” (Ibid.) The court concluded the relation back doctrine
did not apply. (Id. at p. 795.) The second NOD correctly referred to Microsoft
as the project applicant. (Id. at p. 794.) Even though the city had not sent
the second NOD to the plaintiff, its filing “provided constructive notice of
Microsoft’s identity precluding plaintiff’s ability to claim genuine ignorance.”
(Id. at p. 794.) The court explained that the plaintiff had not cited any
authority applying the relation back doctrine where a party had constructive
notice of the identity of a fictitiously named defendant. (Id. at p. 795.)
Organizacion Comunidad, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 783, is inapposite.
There, the first NOD named the wrong project applicant. But the city filed a
second NOD which correctly identified Microsoft as the project applicant. (Id.
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at pp. 787, 789.) While the plaintiff did not review the second NOD within
the statute of limitations period, under section 21167.6.5, subdivision (a),
filing of the second NOD was all that was needed to require the plaintiff to
commence a timely action against Microsoft. (Organizacion Comunidad, at
pp. 791, 793, 794.) That is, based on the second NOD, the plaintiff had
constructive notice of Microsoft’s identity. (Id. at p. 794; see also
Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 502 [proper public notification of an agency’s decision is an “overt
means” which provides “constructive notice”].) Here, by contrast, the County
filed only one NOE. The NOE identified the “Archdiocese of San Francisco”
as the project sponsor; it did not identify RPSC. Therefore, the NOE did not
provide notice to plaintiff, or any other potential litigant, of RPSC’s identity.
Respondents suggest that the NOE’s identification of “The Archdiocese
of San Francisco” means plaintiff should have named “The Archdiocese of
San Francisco Parish and School Juridic Persons Real Property Support
Corporation,” that is, RPSC, and not the “Roman Catholic Archbishop of San
Francisco (aka Archdiocese of San Francisco),” the party that plaintiff named
in its original petition. But RPSC’s full name was not identified in the NOE.
In the amended petition, plaintiff alleged that the NOE did not provide the
full name of RPSC and at the time it filed its original petition, it was ignorant
of RPSC’s true name. Any suggestion that plaintiff had constructive
knowledge of RPSC’s identity is unsupported. Additionally, as plaintiff
points out, one document which was part of the administrative proceedings
indicated that the “Archdiocese of San Francisco” was the informal name for
15
the “Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco,” the entity plaintiff named
in the original petition.8
To the extent that respondents argue that plaintiff “did not do its due
diligence to identify” RPSC within the statute of limitations period, we reject
their argument. CEQA merely requires compliance with section 21167.6.5.
The amendments to this section, which respondents do not address, were
passed to remove ambiguity created by the prior version of the statute and to
“ ‘clarif[y] the persons who must be named as a real party in interest.’ ” (Save
Berkeley’s Neighborhoods v. Regents of University of California, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) Any suggestions that plaintiff needed to have done
research or conducted diligence beyond naming the persons required by
section 21167.6.5, or that plaintiff should have known which entity was
meant by the NOE’s identification of the “Archdiocese of San Francisco,” are
contrary to the statute and the rationale for the amendments. That plaintiff
accepted after the fact that the identification of “The Archdiocese of San
Francisco” in the NOE was an abbreviated form of RPSC’s full name does not
negate that the NOE did not identify RPSC.
In sum, the NOE did not identify RPSC, that is, “The Archdiocese of
San Francisco Parish and School Juridic Persons Real Property Support
Corporation.” Therefore, at the time plaintiff filed its original petition, it was
8 County staff’s report to the Planning Commission stated that Marin
Catholic was founded “by the Archdiocese of San Francisco (formally known
as the Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco).” In numerous other
documents, only the “Archdiocese of San Francisco” is identified, without
including any other information or longer name. For example, in its May
2024 application, Marin Catholic stated that it “is operated by the
Archdiocese of San Francisco.” In appealing the Planning Commission’s
decision, Marin Catholic referred to the project as the “Archdiocese of San
Francisco Design Review.” Similar titles appear in documents prepared by
county staff.
16
ignorant of RPSC’s identity. (See Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 [for
application of the relation back doctrine, the plaintiff must have been
“genuinely ignorant” of the defendant’s identity at the time the original
petition was filed].) Upon learning that RPSC was the property owner and
the correct “project sponsor” as that term is used in the NOE, plaintiff
amended the petition to substitute in RPSC pursuant to section 474. The
substitution of RPSC relates back to the filing of the original petition and,
therefore, was timely. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the
CEQA cause of action. Based on this conclusion, we need not address the
issue whether RPSC is a necessary and indispensable party.
We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s CEQA cause of
action. Because the trial court did not reach the merits, we remand for the
court to rule on the merits of plaintiff’s CEQA cause of action.9
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part. The order dismissing plaintiff’s first
cause of action pursuant to CEQA is reversed, and the order denying the
amended petition as to the second and third causes of action is affirmed. The
matter is remanded for the trial court to rule on the merits of the CEQA
cause of action. Plaintiff is awarded its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a).)
9 Both sides have briefed the substantive merits of plaintiff’s CEQA
claim, that is, whether the County violated CEQA by exempting the project
from environmental review. While our review is de novo, because the trial
court did not reach the merits of the claim, the prudent disposition is to
remand. This is especially so considering that the trial court had to analyze
the merits of plaintiff’s CEQA claim in reviewing, and ultimately granting,
plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.
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_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
Preserve Ross Valley v. County of Marin / A174392
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