Filed 7/21/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
PAUL L. PIPITONE, 2d Civ. No. B348229
(Super. Ct. No. 22CV0676)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES,
Defendant and Respondent.
Paul L. Pipitone appeals the denial of his petition for writ
of mandate challenging the Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV)
revocation of his driving privilege following a felony conviction for
drug possession. The drugs were seized from appellant’s car.
Appellant’s principal contentions are 1) there was no basis for
any finding that his crime involved the use of a motor vehicle,
and 2) the DMV failed to establish that it received the required
abstract from the superior court before revoking his license. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The criminal case
In 2020, a law enforcement officer stopped appellant as he
was driving and seized over a pound of methamphetamine and
other indicia of drug sales in appellant’s vehicle. He was charged
with two felonies: 1) possession of methamphetamine with intent
to sell (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and 2) selling, offering to
sell and transportation of a controlled substance (id., § 11379,
subd. (a)).
In 2024, appellant pled no contest to the possession for sale
charge, and the sale and transportation charge was dismissed as
part of a stipulated global resolution of this and another case
pending against him.
Vehicle Code 1 section 13350 requires the DMV to revoke an
individual’s driving privilege “upon receipt of a duly certified
abstract of the record of a court showing that the person has been
convicted of . . . A felony in the commission of which a motor
vehicle is used,” with limited exceptions not applicable here.
(§ 13350, subd. (a)(2).) The trial court specifically advised
appellant that his license could be revoked as part of his
stipulated plea. On the date he entered his plea, the court docket
includes an entry for “DMV Abstract.”
Following his conviction, the DMV received an abstract
from the superior court specifying that appellant had been
convicted of a felony in which a motor vehicle was used. The
DMV revoked appellant’s driving privilege pursuant to section
13350 and gave notice to him.
1 Statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
The writ of mandate
In the writ petition, appellant argues he was not given
proper notice of the revocation, his drug possession conviction did
not subject him to license revocation, and the criminal court erred
in finding that his crime bore any nexus to a motor vehicle. The
petition also argues double jeopardy made the license revocation
unlawful, but appellant did not allege any supporting facts or
explain why double jeopardy applies. There is no mention of
double jeopardy in any brief filed in support of appellant’s
petition or in any record of the hearings.
At the writ hearing, the trial court asked the DMV to
produce the information upon which it relied to revoke
appellant’s driving privilege. The court continued the hearing
approximately one month to allow the DMV to supplement the
record and appellant to respond.
Before the DMV filed its supplemental evidence, appellant
filed a brief in which he argued, for the first time, the DMV failed
to demonstrate that it had received a “duly certified abstract” of
record from the criminal court reflecting appellant’s use of a
motor vehicle in the commission of a felony as required by section
13350. Appellant argued without such an abstract, the DMV
could not revoke his license.
The DMV subsequently filed a copy of appellant’s DMV
driving record and the declaration of David Adams, a DMV
employee with 19 years of experience in DMV procedures
involving abstracts of criminal convictions. Adams explained
that, since 2014, the superior court does not routinely provide the
DMV with paper abstracts of judgment for purposes of section
13350. Instead, when a judicial officer determines that a motor
vehicle has been used in the commission of a felony, the superior
3
court sends an electronic transmission to the DMV that directly
updates the “Abstracts” section of the defendant’s driving record.
The update includes the name of the sentencing court, the
violation date, conviction date, statute violated, and the
disposition code “K” to indicate the criminal court’s determination
that a motor vehicle was used in the commission of the felony.
Only the court can update the Abstracts section of the record and
the DMV cannot make changes unless ordered to do so by the
court.
Adams authenticated appellant’s driving record. The
Abstracts section of appellant’s driving record lists his 2024
conviction for violating Health and Safety Code section 11378,
the violation date and the conviction date. The abstract also
includes disposition code “K.”
Appellant moved to strike his driving record and the
Adams declaration on the ground that the documents did not
constitute a “duly certified abstract.”
At the continued hearing, the trial court denied both
appellant’s motion to strike and his writ petition. The trial court
found 1) the criminal court properly determined that the
commission of appellant’s felony involved the use of a motor
vehicle pursuant to section 13350, and 2) the superior court had
communicated this finding to the DMV via an electronic
transmission that added disposition code “K” to the Abstracts
section of appellant’s driving record. The court ruled this
transmission was all that was required to trigger the DMV’s
mandatory duty to revoke appellant’s driving privilege. The
court did not address the issue of double jeopardy.
4
DISCUSSION
Standards of review
We review the record to determine whether the trial court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence, resolving all
evidentiary conflicts and drawing all legitimate and reasonable
inferences in favor of the trial court’s decision. (Roze v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1176,
1184.) We exercise de novo review of the trial court’s legal
determinations. (Ibid.) A trial court’s decisions to continue an
evidentiary hearing or admit evidence are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984
[decision to grant continuance is committed to court’s discretion];
People ex rel. Owen v. Media One Direct, LLC (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1480, 1483 [admissibility of evidence reviewed for
abuse of discretion].)
Appellant could not challenge the criminal court’s factual findings
in his writ petition against the DMV
The DMV’s act of revoking a license under section 13350 is
a mandatory, ministerial act. (Larsen v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (1995) 12 Cal.4th 278, 284 (Larsen).) Our review of the
DMV’s administrative acts in performing a mandatory function is
limited. A writ petition against the DMV is not a means to
collaterally attack the criminal court’s judgment of conviction or
findings. (Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3
Cal.3d 335, 338 (Thomas).) The DMV is required to revoke
driving privileges if it has received an abstract of judgment that
requires it to do so, and it has no corresponding duty to evaluate
the validity of the judgment or findings. (Larsen, supra, 12
Cal.4th at p. 284.)
5
Appellant argues there was no basis for the criminal court’s
determination that a motor vehicle was used in the commission of
his felony drug possession charge. This is a collateral challenge
to the criminal court’s factual finding that was not properly
asserted in appellant’s petition for writ of mandate against the
DMV. (Thomas, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 338.) One department of
the superior court generally has no jurisdiction to reverse,
restrain or otherwise interfere with findings and acts made by
another department of the superior court. (Ford v. Superior
Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737, 742; accord Pollack v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (1985) 38 Cal.3d 367, 380
[challenge to validity of prior conviction should generally be
asserted in the court that rendered judgment].) As a result, we
do not entertain appellant’s challenge to the criminal court’s
factual findings.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requesting and
considering supplemental evidence
It was appellant’s burden to establish that the DMV took
an action it was not legally authorized to take or failed to perform
an act it was required to perform. (American Liberty Bail Bonds,
Inc. v. Garamendi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1052 [petitioner
bears burden of proof in challenge to automatic license
suspension].)
Despite his burden, appellant did not produce evidence
relevant to the DMV’s exercise of its ministerial duty to revoke
appellant’s license. At the writ petition hearing, the trial court
sua sponte ordered the DMV to provide the information on which
the DMV relied to revoke appellant’s license. The court briefly
continued the hearing to allow the DMV to submit this evidence
and for appellant to respond. This was not an abuse of discretion.
6
Trial courts have inherent authority to manage the cases
before them. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.
4th 953, 967; Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a).) It is not unusual
for a trial court to continue a hearing or request additional
evidence to ensure it reaches the correct result. Appellant was
not prejudiced by the continuance or the request for
supplemental evidence. Indeed, the trial court’s actions appear to
have prompted appellant to make an argument he had not
previously made; namely, that the DMV failed to establish it had
received a duly certified abstract of judgment under Section
13350. The court gave appellant an opportunity to respond to the
supplemental evidence, and appellant responded by filing a
motion to strike. The court acted well within its discretion in
continuing the hearing and requesting evidence that was
relevant to the key issue in the case.
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the
DMV was required to revoke appellant’s license
Appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion to strike and relying on appellant’s driving record and the
Adams declaration to demonstrate the DMV’s receipt of a duly
certified abstract from the court. Appellant contends these
records do not constitute a duly certified abstract, and therefore
the DMV could not rely on the information contained therein to
revoke his license. We disagree.
Section 13350 does not define “duly certified abstract,” but
our task in construing the requirements of a statute is to
ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. (Hassan v. Mercy
American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 720.) We first
look at the words themselves and give them their ordinary and
usual meaning, construing them in the context of the statute as a
7
whole. (Ibid.) If the plain language of the statute is
unambiguous and does not involve an absurdity, the plain
meaning governs. (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166,
1172.)
An “abstract” is a summary. (People v. Hong (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 1071, 1080; Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
p. 11.) “Duly” means to do something in a proper manner.
(Robertson v. Perkins (1889) 129 U.S. 233, 236; Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) p. 632.) “Certified” refers to something
that has been authenticated, verified or attested to as being true
and correct. (Gov. Code, § 68150, subd. (f) [certified copy refers to
“true and correct copy of the original record, or a specified part of
the original record”]; Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) p.
284 [to “certify” is to authenticate or verify in writing, or to attest
as being true].) These terms are not ambiguous and giving them
their ordinary meaning does not create an absurdity in the
context of section 13350. Accordingly, we interpret section 13350
to require the DMV to be in receipt of a summary of appellant’s
conviction that has been properly provided, that has been
authenticated by the court and that accurately reflects the court
record.
Here, the DMV received a summary of specific terms of the
criminal judgment against appellant. The summary was updated
to the Abstracts section of appellant’s driving record and included
the date of appellant’s drug possession violation, the date of his
conviction, the statute that was violated, and the disposition code
“K” to reflect that appellant’s felony conviction involved the use of
a motor vehicle. The evidence supports that the DMV received
an abstract from the superior court.
8
The evidence also supports that the abstract was duly
certified. Adams testified that the superior court transmitted
appellant’s conviction information directly into the Abstracts
section of appellant’s DMV driving record, with no intermediary
and without alteration by the DMV. Adams explained that the
court alone is responsible for updating the abstract, and the DMV
has no independent ability or authority to change the abstract.
The Abstracts section of appellant’s DMV driving record
accurately reflects the information set forth in the criminal court
record. The fact that the information transmitted to the DMV
was provided by the court, unaltered, and actually and accurately
reflected the information from the court record, supports that the
abstract was certified by the court.
Additionally, the superior court had been electronically
transmitting abstracts to the DMV since 2014, and it is presumed
that the court regularly performed its duty in connection with the
transmission of these abstracts. (Evid. Code, § 664 [it is
presumed that an official duty has been regularly performed].)
Because certification was made pursuant to regular and
established procedures, the trial court could reasonably conclude
the certification of the abstract was proper and thus duly made.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that
the DMV was in receipt of a duly certified abstract from the
court, triggering the DMV’s duty to revoke appellant’s license
under section 13350.
Arguments raised for the first time on appeal or on reply are
waived
Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that the
evidence considered by the trial court was hearsay and that he
did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Adams. These
9
objections are waived because they were not made in the trial
court. (Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
606, 621; Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 133, 141, fn.3, modified (May 8, 1992).)
Appellant also argues double jeopardy prohibits his license
revocation because his license was previously suspended in
connection with the same charges. Appellant mentioned the
words “double jeopardy” in his writ petition and thereafter failed
to present any evidence or argument regarding its application to
the case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of double
jeopardy. We are persuaded that appellant effectively abandoned
his double jeopardy argument in the trial court. A litigant may
not abandon a theory of recovery in the trial court and then seek
to revive it on appeal. (Carmichael v. Reitz (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d
958, 969; Kantlehner v. Bisceglia (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 1, 6;
accord People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468
[declining to review arguments parties have not had opportunity
to litigate out of principles of fairness and efficiency].) Appellant
has waived his argument regarding double jeopardy.
Appellant’s arguments made for the first time on reply are
likewise waived. Appellant argues in his reply brief that the
DMV was required to produce a Judicial Council Form CR-290
and that appellant was not given adequate notice of the
possibility of his license revocation. We decline to consider these
arguments raised for the first time in reply. (Committee to
Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
607, 636, fn. 8 [“We do not consider arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief.”]; Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [“ ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate
10
against consideration of an issue raised initially in the reply brief
of an appellant.’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The DMV shall recover its costs
on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
MCKAIG, J. *
We concur:
BALTODANO, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
* Judge of the Ventura Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
11
Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Paul L. Pipitone, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Katharine A. Tremblay, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Rhea G. Mariano, Deputy
Attorney General for Defendant and Respondent.