Filed 9/30/26 Phan v. County of Orange CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
TIN QUOC PHAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G066192
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2025-
01496640)
COUNTY OF ORANGE,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lindsey E. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed. Motion for leave to file supplemental
brief. Denied. Motion to strike reply brief and for leave to file a revised reply
brief. Denied. Motions to augment. Denied. Requests for judicial notice.
Denied.
Tin Quoc Phan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lynberg & Watkins, Shannon L. Gustafson and Garros Chan for
Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
In this action, Tin Quoc Phan filed a petition to confirm an
arbitration award against County of Orange (the County). The trial court
dismissed the petition, concluding it was barred by res judicata because “the
evidence establishes that Phan brought essentially the same claim against
[the] County in a prior action, which was finally determined against Phan” in
October 2021 in Orange County Superior Court, case No. 30-2021-01207545.
The court also granted the County’s motion to declare Phan a vexatious
litigant and entered a prefiling order against him. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391,
391.7.)1 On appeal, Phan has not shown the trial court erred. We therefore
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2021, Phan filed a petition to confirm an arbitration
award in Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2021-01207545.2 Among
other things, the petition asserted, “[t]he Respondent took my child in Fraud,
this injustice required the Respondent to explain the legality of their action
in a [proof] of claim contractual agreement which was non-responsive and in
default after 72 hrs. The Respondent was certainly personally served yet I
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
The petition named the respondent as “County of Orange Social
Services Agency [¶] Children and Family Services.” The trial court in that
case subsequently noted the respondent was the County, which had been
erroneously sued as County of Orange Social Services Agency.
2
gave another two days but no answers.” The petition had attachments,
including the purported arbitration agreement and arbitration award.
The purported arbitration agreement was set forth in a document
that stated it was an “affidavit of show of cause proof of claim demand and
contract.” (Capitalization omitted.) Among other things, the document stated,
“this contract contains a binding arbitration provision which may be
enforceable by the parties. There is no signature needed on this contract from
the respondent. Only your action or non-action is needed.” (Capitalization
omitted.) The document appears to have been signed by Phan but not by the
County.
The purported arbitration award indicated it was by an
arbitrator named David Crabtree and was dated June 17, 2021. Among other
things, it stated the agency must withdraw the juvenile case with prejudice
and return the child to Phan, Phan should recover “actual compensatory
damages to include $10,000 per/day beginning from the day the contract was
breached and going forward until all stipulations in the contract have been
fulfilled,” and Phan should “recover punitive damages from the respondent
equivalent to 4 times (4X) the amount of compensatory damages conditioned
upon the Respondent’s failing to voluntarily comply with this award
immediately, and the claimant is forced to petition any competent court for
confirmation and enforcement of this award.”
In October 2021, the trial court (Judge Layne H. Melzer)
dismissed Phan’s petition in case No. 30-2021-01207545 with prejudice. The
court found Phan had “not met his initial burden of showing that a valid
arbitration agreement exists.” The court explained: “To the extent the
‘affidavit’ could be construed to encompass some form of agreement, ‘[t]he
mutual intention to be bound by an agreement is the sine qua non of legally
3
enforceable contracts and recognition of this requirement is nearly universal.’
[Citation.] ‘[U]nder the common law, “[s]ilence in the face of an offer is not an
acceptance, unless there is a relationship between the parties or a previous
course of dealing pursuant to which silence would be understood as
acceptance.” [Citation].’ [Citation.] Petitioner fails to present any evidence of
a relationship between the parties or a previous course of dealing where
Respondent’s silence was understood as acceptance.” Additionally, the court
noted “the ‘affidavit’ and any arbitration agreement therein, would be void
and unenforceable, because the Respondent could not have entered a contract
without approval of the governing body.”3
Phan then filed multiple actions in federal court. In January
2022, Phan filed an action against the County and others in the Central
District of California (case No. 8:22-cv-00105). In February 2022, Magistrate
Judge Paul L. Abrams dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, noting,
among other things, Phan “appears to seek only the enforcement of an
arbitration ruling regarding custody of his child” but the court “does not have
jurisdiction over the enforcement of an arbitration order that appears to
pertain to a state court juvenile dependency proceeding.” Judge Stanley
3
The County asserts Phan served a document that was entitled,
“notice request of appeal” (capitalization omitted), but he never “actually filed
an appeal before the California Court of Appeals [sic] with respect to Judge
Melzer’s dismissal order” and “the time to do so has long expired.” Phan does
not dispute that he did not timely appeal Judge Melzer’s order. (§ 1294, subd.
(b) [permitting an aggrieved party to appeal from “[a]n order dismissing a
petition to confirm, correct or vacate an award”].)
4
Blumenfeld, Jr. subsequently dismissed Phan’s second amended complaint in
that action.4
In March 2023, Phan filed a petition to confirm an arbitration
award against the County in the Central District of California (case No. 8:23-
cv-00374). The federal district court (Judge John W. Holcomb) dismissed the
petition, and after Phan appealed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.
In February 2025, Phan filed yet another complaint in the
Central District of California (case No. 8:25-cv-00279), naming as the
defendant Orange County Social Services. Among other things, the prayer for
relief requested the court to “[a]cknowledge the arbitration order that was
unlawfully disregarded by the agency,” and “[t]he arbitration was a binding
contract.” Judge Blumenfeld dismissed Phan’s claims and denied a motion for
reconsideration.
In July 2025, Phan filed the petition to confirm an arbitration
award against the County in the current action. Phan sought, among other
things, an order confirming the purported June 17, 2021 arbitration award.
In August 2025, Phan also filed a “memorandum of points and authorities in
support of motion to vacate with prejudice dismissal as ultra vires and to
confirm final arbitration award; request for order shortening time.”
(Capitalization omitted.) The County opposed and moved to have Phan
declared a vexatious litigant. Both parties also filed additional briefs.
4
The record on appeal reflects Phan also filed a separate action
against the County and others in the Central District of California in August
2023 (case No. 8:23-cv-01609), which was stayed in 2023 and remained
stayed at least as of July 2024. The record does not indicate the current
status of that case.
5
On October 27, 2025, the trial court (Judge Lindsey E. Martinez)
denied Phan’s motion to vacate and dismissed the petition with prejudice.5
The court found res judicata applied and barred Phan’s current action
because “the evidence establishes that Phan brought essentially the same
claim against [the] County in a prior action, which was finally determined
against Phan” in October 2021 in case No. 30-2021-01207545. The court also
determined Phan is a vexatious litigant under section 391, subdivisions (b)(1)
and (b)(2). The court entered a prefiling order on October 29, 2025, which
prohibits Phan from filing, unless represented by an attorney, “any new
litigation in the courts of California without approval of the presiding justice
or presiding judge of the court in which the action is to be filed.”
Phan appeals from the trial court’s October 27, 2025 order and
the October 29, 2025 prefiling order.6
DISCUSSION
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not
only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply
the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis
5
The trial court also granted the County’s requests for judicial
notice.
6
Appellant submitted a supplemental brief two months after the
appeal was argued and submitted, which was “received on demand” by the
clerk’s office. We decline to vacate submission on our own motion to consider
this untimely and uninvited brief.
6
and citation to the record. Rather than scour the record unguided, we may
decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not
supported by accurate citations to the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894.) “‘When an appellant
fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’” (Nelson v.
Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862; see also In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“The absence of
cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the
contentions as waived”].)
“Although [Phan] is representing himself in propria persona, he
is not exempt from the rules governing appeals. A self-represented party is to
be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater,
consideration than other litigants having attorneys.” (Elena S. v. Kroutik
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574.)
I.
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION TO CONFIRM
AND DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO VACATE
As discussed above, the trial court found res judicata applied and
barred the current action because “the evidence establishes that Phan
brought essentially the same claim against [the] County in a prior action,
which was finally determined against Phan” in October 2021 in case No. 30-
2021-01207545. Phan’s opening and reply briefs on appeal do not address the
elements of res judicata. Nor do they provide any developed argument, with
citations to applicable legal authority, demonstrating that res judicata does
not apply here. Thus, Phan has waived any challenge to the court’s
conclusion.
7
Although his briefing is unclear at times,7 Phan appears to be
arguing that Judge Melzer’s October 2021 order was ultra vires and should
be vacated, and that Judge Martinez’s order applying res judicata based on
the October 2021 order improperly “preserve[d] an ultra vires disposition.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Phan similarly has waived that argument by failing
to provide developed argument, with citations to applicable legal authority,
regarding how Judge Melzer’s order can be vacated years later. To the extent
Phan is attempting to argue section 473, subdivision (d), should apply, Phan
has provided no developed argument, with citations to applicable legal
authority, showing that, even if it were erroneous, Judge Melzer’s order was
void, and not voidable. (See W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [noting, “[i]f the court has fundamental
jurisdiction but exceeds its jurisdiction by acting contrary to its statutory
duties, the judgment is merely voidable, not void,” and a voidable judgment
“is not subject to section 473, subdivision (d)”].)8
7
Phan makes many assertions in his appellate briefing without
adequate record citations, including certain assertions regarding purported
wrongdoing in child welfare proceedings generally. We have disregarded
Phan’s factual assertions that do not have adequate record citations. (See
Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1079 [“An
appellate court is entitled to disregard unsupported factual assertions”].)
Moreover, Phan’s assertions regarding child welfare proceedings in general
do not provide any basis to reverse the orders at issue on this appeal.
8
Phan argues he has not improperly delayed bringing his new
state court action because he turned to the federal courts and only filed the
current action after “[t]he federal rulings restarted the path back to state
court.” Even if Phan believed he had an excuse for waiting years to file this
action, he has not provided developed argument showing Judge Melzer’s
October 2021 order can be vacated now.
8
In any event, Phan’s argument is unavailing. Phan argues that,
because the County did not timely move to vacate the purported arbitration
award, the trial court was required to confirm it. In his opening brief on
appeal, Phan asserts, “[s]ection 1286 states: ‘If a petition or response under
this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as
made . . . unless in accordance with this chapter the court corrects the award
and confirms it as corrected or vacates the award.’” According to Phan, “[t]he
statute provides three—and only three—options: Confirm the award. Correct
and confirm the award (§ 1286.6). Vacate the award (§ 1286.2). There is no
statutory authority to dismiss a confirmation petition—let alone dismiss it
‘with prejudice.’”
Phan is not correct that the trial court could not dismiss his
petition. Phan does not accurately quote section 1286 in his opening brief; he
omits the end of the statute, which expressly recognizes the court may
dismiss the proceeding. (§ 1286.) The full text of section 1286 states: “If a
petition or response under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court
shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or another
state, unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and
confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding.”
(Ibid., italics added.) Moreover, section 1287.2 states, “[t]he court shall
dismiss the proceeding under this chapter as to any person named as a
respondent if the court determines that such person was not bound by the
arbitration award and was not a party to the arbitration.”9 (§ 1287.2.) Thus, a
9
Moreover, section 1285.2 states, “[a] response to a petition
under this chapter may request the court to dismiss the petition or to confirm,
correct or vacate the award.” (Ibid., italics added.)
9
trial court is expressly authorized to dismiss a petition to confirm an
arbitration award.
II.
VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
“‘The vexatious litigant statute (§ 391 et seq.) was enacted “‘to
curb misuse of the court system’” by “‘persistent and obsessive’ litigants.”’” (In
re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 618.) Section 391, subdivision
(b), provides five definitions for a vexatious litigant. Relevant here, under
section 391, subdivision (b)(2), a vexatious litigant is a person who, “[a]fter a
litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly
relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity
of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom
the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim,
controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by
the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to
whom the litigation was finally determined.” (Ibid.) Additionally, “[a]
vexatious litigant may be prohibited from filing new litigation unless he or
she obtains leave to do so from the presiding justice or judge of the court
where he or she intends to file. [Citations.] This prefiling requirement ‘does
not deny the vexatious litigant access to the courts, but operates solely to
preclude the initiation of meritless lawsuits and their attendant expenditures
of time and costs.’” (In re Marriage of Deal, at p. 618; see § 391.7.)
“‘A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person
is a vexatious litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court’s ruling if it is
supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the
order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to
support the judgment.’” (Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 129
10
Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498–1499 (Holcomb).) Phan, “as the appellant, has the
burden to provide an adequate record on appeal and to affirmatively show
error.” (In re Marriage of Deal, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 622.)
Here, Phan has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its
discretion in finding him to be a vexatious litigant under section 391,
subdivision (b)(2).10 On appeal, Phan has not provided developed argument
regarding section 391, subdivision (b)(2); indeed, he does not even specifically
mention subdivision (b)(2) in either his opening brief or reply brief on appeal.
Notably, Phan does not dispute that case No. 30-2021-01207545 regarding his
2021 petition to confirm was a finally determined litigation for purposes of
section 391, subdivision (b)(2); nor does he dispute that he subsequently filed
multiple actions against the County that sought to relitigate issues related to
the enforceability of the purported arbitration award. Instead, Phan asserts
he “was never given a proper post-award review” and “[h]e continued filing
because no court ever applied the law.” But even if Phan believes Judge
Melzer’s October 2021 decision was incorrect, that does not mean Phan
cannot be deemed a vexatious litigant. The record before us shows that, after
Judge Melzer’s October 2021 order, Phan filed no fewer than four separate
actions—three actions in the Central District of California (case Nos. 8:22-cv-
00105, 8:23-cv-00374, and 8:25-cv-00279) and the current action in the
Orange County Superior Court—that, in one way or another, sought to
enforce his purported arbitration award. Those three actions in the Central
District of California were dismissed (and in one, the dismissal was affirmed
10
Given our conclusion regarding subdivision (b)(2) of section
391, we need not address the trial court’s alternative ground under
subdivision (b)(1).
11
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).11 On these facts, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Phan was a vexatious litigant
under section 391, subdivision (b)(2), given Phan’s repeated attempts to
relitigate the same issues.12
III.
MOTIONS ON APPEAL
During this appeal, Phan also filed numerous motions with this
court. We address below Phan’s motions that have not yet been ruled upon by
this court.
11
As discussed above, Phan also filed another action in the
Central District of California that appears to have been stayed.
12
Phan asserts this case is analogous to Holcomb, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th 1494. We disagree. In Holcomb, when considering whether
section 391, subdivision (b)(2), applied, the appellate court noted the party
had previously filed a motion to vacate an arbitration award in federal
district court that was denied, a motion to reconsider in that federal case that
was denied, and a separate complaint in superior court that was dismissed.
(Holcomb, at pp. 1502–1503.) The appellate court determined “the motion to
vacate was not an attempt to relitigate a litigation that was ‘finally
determined,’” but the party’s motion for reconsideration and separate
complaint were. (Id. at p. 1503–1504.) On the record in that case, the
appellate court concluded the party’s “previous motion for reconsideration of
the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate the arbitration award,
and superior court action to collaterally attack the district court’s rulings, do
not constitute evidence sufficient to sustain a finding [the party] ‘repeatedly’
relitigated matters as required in subdivision (b)(2) of section 391.” (Id. at
pp. 1505–1506.) The four separate actions filed by Phan that sought to
relitigate issues related to the enforceability of the purported arbitration
award go well beyond the motion for reconsideration and the separate action
found in Holcomb to be insufficient to constitute repeated relitigation of the
same issue.
12
A. Briefs
On February 19, 2026, after this appeal was fully briefed, Phan
filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief, which the County
opposed. On March 9, 2026, Phan filed a motion to strike his reply brief and
for leave to file a revised reply brief, which the County opposed. Phan’s
February 19, 2026 motion and his March 9, 2026 motion are denied.
B. Motions to Augment and Requests for Judicial Notice
On December 29, 2025, Phan filed a motion to augment the
record with an email that he asserts “was lodged and submitted” to the trial
court in case No. 30-2021-01207545. This motion to augment is denied. Phan
has not demonstrated that this document was before the trial court in this
action when it issued the orders that are the subject of this appeal. (See
Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC. v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161,
1172–1173, fn. 4.)
On February 3, 2026, Phan filed a motion to augment the record
with numerous documents.13 This motion to augment is denied. The
documents at issue are already in the record on appeal, were not before the
trial court in this action when it issued the orders that are the subject of this
appeal, or are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (See Mission
Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 696, fn. 4
[denying motion to augment the record because the information was “not
relevant to our resolution of the issues in this appeal”].)
13
On February 3, 2026, Phan also filed a “notice to clarify the
purpose and scope of his recently filed Motion to Augment the Record.” To the
extent this was intended, or could be construed, as another motion to
augment the record, it is denied.
13
On February 3, 2026, Phan also filed a request for judicial notice
of declarations that appear to have been executed in January 2026, after the
orders Phan appeals from were filed and after the appeal was filed. The
County opposed. This request for judicial notice is denied. Phan has not
demonstrated that these documents are the proper subject of judicial notice.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452, 459, subd. (a); see also People ex rel. Schlesinger
v. Sachs (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 800, 812 [denying “request for judicial notice
because absent exceptional circumstances not present here, we do not take
judicial notice of matters that were not before the trial court”].)
On February 6, 2026, Phan filed another request for judicial
notice of a declaration that appears to have been executed in February 2026
and what he asserts are materials from a website. The County opposed. This
request for judicial notice is denied. Phan has not demonstrated that these
documents are the proper subject of judicial notice.
On February 17, 2026, Phan filed a motion to augment the record
with a purported recording of the arbitration. The County opposed. Phan has
not demonstrated the recording was before the trial court when it issued the
orders that are the subject of this appeal. This motion to augment is denied.
14
DISPOSITION
The October 27, 2025 order and the October 29, 2025 prefiling
order are affirmed. Phan’s February 19, 2026 motion for leave to file a
supplemental brief and his March 9, 2026 motion to strike his reply brief and
for leave to file a revised reply brief are denied. Phan’s December 29, 2025,
February 3, 2026, and February 17, 2026 motions to augment are denied.
Phan’s February 3, 2026 and February 6, 2026 requests for judicial notice are
denied. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
GOODING, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
15