Filed 6/23/26 Patterson v. Digital Federal Credit Union CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TRINA R. PATTERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E085332
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVCO2403624)
DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Trina R. Patterson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Katten Muchin Rosenman, Stuart M. Richter, and Ashley Taylor Brines for
Defendant and Respondent.
Trina Patterson appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order
sustaining with leave to amend a demurrer filed by Digital Federal Credit Union (Digital
Federal). Patterson did not file an amended pleading. We affirm the judgment.
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BACKGROUND
In June 2024, Patterson filed a pro se “petition for entry of default administrative
judgment, satisfaction of lien, damages, and injunctive relief” against Digital Federal.
(Capitalization omitted.) The pleading was accompanied by 44 pages of exhibits.
We assume the truth of the material allegations in the operative pleading for
present purposes, because this case is on appeal at the demurrer stage. (Roe v. Hesperia
Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 18 (Roe).)
According to the petition and attachments, in June 2019 Patterson signed three
loan agreements with Digital Federal, concerning an auto loan, a personal loan, and a
credit card. In 2023, Digital Federal sent Patterson past due notices on all three accounts.
In September 2023, Patterson had (1) a past due balance of $799.69 on her auto loan,
which had a principal balance of $7,605.35, (2) a past due balance of $376.54 on her
personal loan, which had a principal balance of $2,774.04, and (3) a past due balance of
$9,500.85 on her credit card. Each notice contained a section with the heading “PLEASE
DETACH AND SEND BOTTOM PORTION WITH YOUR REMITTANCE,” including
a statement of the amount due and a blank space for Patterson to fill in the “AMOUNT
ENCLOSED.”
On October 10, 2023, Patterson sent Digital Federal “Non-Negotiable Notices of
Acceptance, for each account … with the accepted presentments attached to the Notices
….” The notices were signed by Patterson. Patterson stated that she had received Digital
Federal’s “[p]resentment” of the past due notices and “return[ed] [Digital Federal’s] offer
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herein attached to you.” She attached Digital Federal’s past due notices, on which she
had written the full outstanding balance for each loan in the blank “AMOUNT
ENCLOSED” box. Underneath that box on each notice, she wrote, “‘Accepted’ October
7, 2023,” followed by her signature. Patterson “request[ed] discharge,” advised Digital
Federal to “[p]lease respond within three (5) days from the date you receive this non-
negotiable notice of acceptance,” and warned that “[d]ishonor may result if you fail to
respond and comply.” Digital Federal did not respond to those notices.
Over the next several months, Patterson sent Digital Federal numerous additional
notices. Those notices advised Digital Federal that it was in default because it did not
respond to Patterson’s previous notices, and the subsequent notices gave Digital Federal
an opportunity to cure that default. Digital Federal did not respond to those notices.
Patterson then notified Digital Federal that by failing to respond to notices of acceptance,
Digital Federal had tacitly agreed to the terms of those notices. In early December 2023,
Patterson sent Digital Federal final statements and a notarized affidavit. In the final
statements, Patterson advised Digital Federal that its “letter [was] not in compliance with
U.C.C. §9-208(2)” and that each of her accounts consequently had a balance of zero.
Patterson directed Digital Federal to remove “all negative reporting to all credit bureaus.”
In January 2024, a notary public sent Digital Federal a “notice of protest and
opportunity to cure,” along with a notarized affidavit from Patterson. (Capitalization,
boldfacing, and underscoring omitted.) Later that month, the same notary public signed a
“certificate of dishonor,” which she also notarized. (Boldfacing and capitalization
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omitted.) On the basis of information provided by Patterson, the notary states in the
certificate that Digital Federal had “dishonored Trina R. Patterson’s three presentments
by non-acceptance and/or non-performance and have therefore assented to the Terms and
Conditions of said non-negotiable notice of acceptance contract.” (Capitalization
omitted.)
In April 2024, Patterson filed a form entitled “UCC Financing Statement (UCC-
1)” with the California Secretary of State. It identifies Digital Federal as the debtor and
Patterson as the secured party. In the form, Patterson asserted that she had “exhausted
her Administrative Process in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code” and that
“[d]ue to Debtor’s default, non-response and failure to rebut Secured Party’s Affidavit,
Debtor has tacitly agreed to the terms and conditions of Secured Party’s Non-Negotiable
Notice of Acceptance and have agreed to pay Secured Party damages” totaling $128,625.
Patterson filed her petition in the superior court two months later. The petition
alleges a single cause of action for “judgment for satisfaction of lien and damages.”
Patterson petitioned the court “to render a Judgment that directs [Digital Federal] to
release all claims on [her] Subject Personal Property and pay [Patterson] damages in the
amount requested on the filed UCC.-1 Financing Statement.” Patterson alleged that
Digital Federal had “lost their right to contest this Petition via estoppel through
acquiescence” and had “abandoned their right to answer, oppose and appeal.” She
alleged that the matter had been resolved by the “private administrative process” that she
initiated, apparently via the various notices that she sent to Digital Federal.
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The petition’s prayer for relief sought a judgment stating that all three loan
accounts were paid in full, requiring removal of all “derogatory reporting with the credit
bureaus” in relation to all three loans, awarding damages in the amount of $128,625, and
directing Digital Federal to take no further action against Patterson.
Digital Federal demurred to the single cause of action in the petition on several
grounds. Digital Federal argued that the cause of action and the entire pleading were
uncertain. Digital Federal also argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action
because “judgment for satisfaction of lien and damages” is not a cognizable claim.
Digital Federal additionally argued that even if it were a cognizable claim, the petition
still failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because Patterson did not
allege that she had repaid the loans, and she could not unilaterally modify the loan
agreements to discharge her obligation to pay the outstanding balances. Patterson
opposed the demurrer.
The trial court held a combined hearing in August 2024 on Patterson’s request for
entry of default judgment and on Digital Federal’s demurrer. No court reporter was
present. According to the minute order on the demurrer, the court had issued a tentative
ruling, and neither party requested oral argument. The court ordered the tentative ruling
to become its final ruling and sustained the demurrer with 30 days leave to amend.
After 30 days had passed since the court sustained the demurrer, Digital Federal
filed an ex parte application to dismiss the action because Patterson did not file an
amended pleading. The court deemed the filing a motion and gave Patterson an
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opportunity to file written opposition, which she did not do. At a later hearing on the
motion, the court adopted its tentative ruling, granted the motion, and dismissed the
action with prejudice for failure to amend the pleading after the demurrer was sustained.
The tentative ruling is not included in the record on appeal. The court entered judgment
in favor of Digital Federal.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing principles of appellate law
We presume that an appealed judgment is correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant
bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error and providing an adequate record
on appeal. (Jameson, at p. 609.) To carry that burden, the appellant must provide “the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to
the record.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) The appellant cannot carry that burden by
citing broad ranges of pages in the record, rather than the specific pages on which
particular facts can be found, because we are “unable to adequately evaluate which facts
the parties believe support their positions when nothing more than a block page reference
is offered in the briefs.” (Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203,
1204-1205; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) All
of those principles apply to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
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Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
956, 958, fn. 1.)
II. Failure to state a claim
Patterson contends that the trial court erred by sustaining Digital Federal’s
demurrer.1 We are not persuaded.
We independently review a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer. (Roe, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 23.) We accept the truth of properly pleaded material facts and
consider any matters that may be judicially noticed. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v.
Arkopharma, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 824, 827; Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State
Water Resources Control Bd. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 230, 264.) We determine whether
the facts are sufficient as a matter of law “to state a cause of action under any legal
theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
“In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant
must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts
pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all
legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.” (Scott v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 752 (Scott).) “We will affirm the ruling if
there is any ground on which the demurrer could have been properly sustained.” (Ibid.)
If a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend the pleading and elects not to, then
we presume that the plaintiff stated “as strong a case as” they could. (Le Mere v. Los
1 Patterson states that the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
That is incorrect.
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Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 243 (Le Mere).) Under those
circumstances, “‘we will affirm the judgment if the complaint is objectionable on any
ground raised in the demurrer.’” (Ibid.)
The single cause of action alleged in the pleading is “judgment for satisfaction of
lien and damages.” Patterson has not carried her burden of demonstrating what facts are
sufficient to establish every element of that purported cause of action. (Scott, supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) Digital Federal argued in its demurrer that the cause of action
does not exist. In her opening brief, Patterson has not provided any legal authority for the
proposition that such a cause of action does exist. We are aware of none. Moreover,
even if we were to assume that such a cause of action does exist, Patterson has not
identified the elements of the cause of action, so she has not carried her burden of
showing that her pleading alleged sufficient facts as to each element. (Ibid.)
In her opening brief, Patterson asserts that she sufficiently pled a claim for
declaratory relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) Patterson’s entire argument on the point
reads as follows: “Additionally, Civil Code § 1060 [sic] allows a party to seek
declaratory relief to determine rights and duties under law. Appellant sufficiently stated
in her Petition facts establishing a real and substantial controversy. Her claims were not
only adequately pleaded—they were proven by unrebutted evidence. The trial court’s
denial constituted legal error.” The argument fails. Patterson does not identify the
elements of a claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 and
does not identify the factual allegations in her pleading that correspond to those elements.
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(Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) We will not develop Patterson’s argument for
her. (Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 634, 640
(Pacific Bell).)
More generally, Patterson’s opening brief does not cite any specific factual
allegations in her pleading. The only citations to the clerk’s transcript are in the
introduction and statement of the case. The statement of the case contains two citations
to her pleading: One citation is to the entire 62-page petition, including exhibits, and the
other is to the 44 pages of exhibits. Similarly, the introduction cites all 44 pages of
exhibits and then separately cites one exhibit, the “certificate of dishonor.” (Boldfacing
and capitalization omitted.) The brief never cites any specific factual allegations that
could state a claim under any legal theory. Again, we will not develop Patterson’s
arguments for her. (Pacific Bell, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)
III. Remaining arguments
Patterson makes numerous additional arguments challenging the trial court’s
ruling. None is meritorious.
First, many of the arguments Patterson makes are not supported by citation to any
legal authority or supported by any legal analysis. For example, Patterson contends that
the demurrer was procedurally and substantively improper because she filed a petition
and not a complaint. Patterson’s explanation of the allegedly material differences
between the two types of pleadings is not supported by citation to legal authority or legal
analysis. Arguments that are not supported by citation to legal authority and analysis are
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forfeited. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066
(Tellez).) Again, we will not develop an appellant’s arguments for them. (Pacific Bell,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)
Second, Patterson’s opening brief contains citations to cases that do not exist,
citations to cases that do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited, and
quotations that do not appear in the authorities cited.2 For example, Patterson
erroneously cites People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 518 for the
proposition that both the Uniform Commercial Code and the California Uniform
Commercial Code are binding statutory authority, so “[o]nce invoked, courts are
obligated to enforce their provisions.” (Emphasis omitted.) Romero is a criminal case
that has nothing to do with either the Uniform Commercial Code or the California
Uniform Commercial Code. (Romero, at pp. 504-532.) In addition, Patterson cited
numerous cases that do not exist, including: Hagood v. Sony Corp. of America (7th Cir.
1988) 846 F.2d 1145; Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc.
2 Patterson’s citations to nonexistent or inapposite cases and her use of nonexistent
quotations bear the hallmarks of fabricated legal authority created by generative artificial
intelligence (AI), commonly referred to as AI hallucinations. (Schlichter v. Kennedy
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 24, 27.) As is true for attorneys, pro se litigants are free to use
generative AI to assist in drafting briefs, but, like attorneys, pro se litigants must check
and verify every citation to ensure that the cited case exists and that any proposition cited
or quoted material is accurate. (Sheerer v. Panas (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 367, 371;
Schlichter, at p. 33; People v. Alvarez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119.) Attorneys
who have filed briefs containing AI hallucinated citations have been sanctioned
(Schlichter, at p. 33; Alvarez, at p. 1120; Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 426, 449 (Noland)), a pro se litigant has been warned of the same possible
outcome (Sheerer, at p. 371), and extensive reliance on nonexistent legal authority may
justify striking a party’s briefs or dismissing the appeal (Noland, at p. 436).
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(5th Cir. 2004) 116 Fed.App’x 632; In re White (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) 287 B.R. 577; In
re Prevo’s Market, Inc. (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1177; In re
Clark (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001) 2001 WL 1806036; West Covina Healthcare v. Superior
Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1241; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. French (1901) 94 F. 600;
People v. Casas (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 599; Zack v. Board of Pension Commissioners
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 195; Moulton Nigel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th
1201; and Rappaport v. Gelfand (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 611. Finally, by way of
example, Patterson erroneously cites Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d
720, 725 as the source of the following quotation: “‘Where a party has, with knowledge
of the facts, acquiesced in a transaction or has remained silent when he ought to have
spoken, equity will estop him from later asserting a claim.’” Strong does not contain that
quotation. Nonexistent cases and nonexistent quotations do not support the propositions
and arguments for which they are cited (Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 447), so we
consider those arguments forfeited too (Tellez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066).
Third, Patterson contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant summary
judgment in her favor, because the facts were undisputed. Patterson did not move for
summary judgment, so the argument fails.
Fourth, Patterson contends that the trial judge acted with bias against her at the
August 7, 2024, hearing and thus deprived her of her right to due process. Even if we
were to assume for the sake of argument that Patterson has shown error, the argument
would still fail because she has failed to show that the error was not harmless. Again,
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Patterson’s petition alleged a single cause of action. She declined to file an amended
pleading, so we must presume that her petition alleges the strongest case that she can
allege. (Le Mere, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) Patterson has provided no legal
authority for the proposition that the single cause of action alleged in her petition exists,
and we are aware of none. Because the only cause of action alleged in the petition does
not exist, it was impossible for Patterson to prevail on Digital Federal’s demurrer.
Patterson has therefore failed to show that it is reasonably probable that she would have
obtained a more favorable result in the absence of any putative error relating to alleged
judicial bias. (Myrick v. Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1092.)
IV. Vexatious litigant
A “vexatious litigant” is a person who “[i]n the immediately preceding seven-year
period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five
litigations other than in a small claims court that have been … finally determined
adversely to the person ….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 391, subd. (b)(1).) “‘Litigation’”
includes “any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state
or federal court.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 391, subd. (a).) “A litigation includes an appeal or
civil writ proceeding filed in an appellate court.” (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 402, 406.) “A litigation is finally determined adversely to a plaintiff if he
[or she] does not win the action or proceeding he [or she] began, including cases that are
voluntarily dismissed by a plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
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At oral argument, Patterson represented that she has been involved in litigation for
16 years. Given the frivolous nature of Patterson’s litigation in this case, and given
Patterson’s claim that she has a 16-year litigation history, we direct the trial court on
remand to consider whether to declare Patterson to be a vexatious litigant within the
meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b), and whether to enter a
prefiling order against her under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7. (In re Marriage
of Kouvabina & Veltman (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 293, 296.) In making its determination,
the trial court may wish to consider our opinion in this case (which will be final upon
issuance of the remittitur), as well as the following matters: (1) Patterson v. U.S. Bank
N.A. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County, 2022, CIVSB2203518) [judgment entered on
September 28, 2022, after order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend]; (2)
Patterson v. Sunova Energy Corp. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County, 2022,
CIVSB2125388) [voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on March 8, 2022, by
Patterson]; (3) Patterson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Mar. 9, 2021, E072068)
[nonpub. opn.]; and (4) Patterson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Ct.,
2020, No. 19-734), cert. denied [petition for writ of certiorari in federal litigation denied
on February 24, 2020]. The trial court must conduct a noticed hearing and must give
Patterson the opportunity to present evidence and argument. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 211, 225.) We express no opinion on how the trial court should rule.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Digital Federal shall recover its costs of appeal. The
trial court is directed to conduct a noticed hearing to consider whether to declare
Patterson a vexatious litigant and whether to enter a prefiling order against her.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
LEE
J.
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