Filed 9/3/26 Patel v. Vaghashia CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
VIKPULKUMAR PATEL, B346281
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. EC064357)
GOVIND VAGHASHIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, Judge. Affirmed.
Lal Harris & Edwards Law Group, Hari S. Lal, and Jack
W. Rippy for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Mandeep S. Rupal, Mandeep S. Rupal, and
Alex W. Richter for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Govind Vaghashia (Defendant)
prevailed on a Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 motion to
strike abuse of process claims in a complaint filed by Vipulkumar
Patel (Plaintiff).1 Defendant later moved for an anti-SLAPP
attorney fees award in excess of $230,000, but the trial court
denied the motion because it found two prior settlement
agreements, taken together, barred Defendant from recovering
attorney fees. We are asked to decide an issue Defendant did not
raise in the trial court: whether Defendant could and did bargain
away his right to seek attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP
statute.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against two of his
former employers, Defendant and his brother Prashant
Vaghashia (Prashant), alleging wage and hour violations.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit became part of a series of legal proceedings in
state and federal court involving Defendant, Prashant, members
of their families, related entities, and other parties.2
Plaintiff ultimately filed a second amended complaint (the
operative pleading) that included (among other things) two new
claims predicated on allegations Defendant directed a
subordinate to file a false police report: harassment/retaliation
and abuse of process (respectively, the ninth and tenth causes of
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
Defendant and Prashant collaborated on various business
and real estate ventures before their relationship deteriorated
and litigation ensued.
2
action). Defendant then moved to strike these two causes of
action pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.
The trial court denied the motion as to the
harassment/retaliation cause of action but granted the motion as
to the abuse of process cause of action and struck that claim. In
an unpublished decision, a different panel of this court reversed
the trial court’s decision on the harassment/retaliation cause of
action, held that the conduct at issue was protected activity, and
remanded the matter for the trial court to determine in the first
instance whether Plaintiff could demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits of his harassment/retaliation claim.
(Patel v. Vaghashia (March 26, 2024, B316395) [nonpub. opn.]
(Patel I).) Patel I also awarded Defendant his costs on appeal.
In June 2022, after the anti-SLAPP motion had been heard
but while the appeal in Patel I was still pending, Defendant and
his brother Prashant agreed in writing to settle other pending
litigation by releasing all claims and dismissing all actions (the
2022 Agreement). In partial exchange for a settlement payment
of $35 million, Prashant agreed in paragraph 10 to “indemnify,
defend, pay the attorneys’ fees and costs for, and hold harmless
[Defendant] from and against any and all claims, debts,
liabilities, demands, damages[,] or obligations of every nature
whatsoever, in law or in equity, that are based upon or arise out
of [Plaintiff’s] Case.” Paragraph 10 provided further: “To the
extent the cooperation of any of the Govind Parties is needed for
the defense of [Plaintiff’s] Case, the Govind Parties shall
reasonably cooperate, including providing documents and/or their
availability to testify and/or execute settlement documents. The
Prashant Parties will choose counsel for the Govind Parties.”
3
Paragraph 31 of the 2022 Agreement provided that the
parties could not assign any of their “released claims” to any
other party.3 Plaintiff was not a signatory to the 2022
Agreement.4
Within days of the remittitur in Patel I, Defendant moved
to recover his attorney fees. He maintained that because the trial
court had struck the tenth cause of action and because Patel I
had awarded him his costs on appeal, he was “apparently” the
prevailing party under the anti-SLAPP statute and thereby
entitled to his attorney fees. Defendant sought to recover a total
of $234,664.30 in fees for legal work related to the anti-SLAPP
motion and the related appeal.
Before Defendant’s attorney fee motion was heard, and
pursuant to the stipulation in the 2022 Agreement that Prashant
would indemnify and defend Defendant in the lawsuit filed by
Plaintiff, Prashant settled Plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to a
written settlement agreement executed in 2024 (the 2024
Agreement). The 2024 Agreement was signed by Plaintiff and
Prashant, but not Defendant, and it repeatedly made reference to
3
In pertinent part, paragraph 31 provides as follows: “The
Parties hereby warrant and represent that they are the owners of
all the released claims, and that they have not assigned or
transferred, or attempted or purported to assign or transfer, any
of the claims released herein to any other person or entity.”
4
Defendant, after first successfully moving to enforce the
2022 Agreement, later sought to vacate it. The trial court in that
proceeding ruled Defendant was judicially estopped from
vacating the agreement and a different division of this court
affirmed. (Vaghashia v. Vaghashia (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 188,
191.)
4
the earlier 2022 Agreement between Prashant and Defendant.
Under the terms of the 2024 Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to
dismiss his lawsuit against Defendant and Prashant in exchange
for $500,000—though that contemplated payment was made
contingent on Prashant receiving the money he was due under
the 2022 Agreement. The settlement agreement further provided
that the parties would “bear their own attorney’s fees and costs.”
Upon execution of the 2024 Agreement, Defendant did not contest
the settlement of Plaintiff’s lawsuit or Prashant’s authority to
enter into the 2024 Agreement.
Pursuant to the 2024 Agreement, Plaintiff filed, and the
trial court entered, a request for dismissal with prejudice of the
entire action. The trial court also vacated the upcoming hearing
date on Defendant’s earlier-filed motion for anti-SLAPP attorney
fees.
Defendant, however, filed another motion for anti-SLAPP
attorney fees that sought the same amount of fees as before. He
continued to argue he was the prevailing party on the anti-
SLAPP motion because the trial court struck the abuse of process
cause of action and he “prevailed on the appeal with an award of
costs” as to the harassment/retaliation claim.
Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s renewed motion for attorney
fees. Plaintiff argued the 2024 Agreement made the parties each
responsible for their own attorney fees. Plaintiff acknowledged
Defendant did not sign the 2024 Agreement but he argued
Defendant was nonetheless bound by that agreement because
Defendant, in the 2022 Agreement, gave “all rights and liabilities
with respect to the instant lawsuit to Prashant . . . , including the
right to settle the instant lawsuit.” In addition, Plaintiff
contended Defendant’s fee request was excessive because it
5
included “numerous” time entries for work unrelated to the anti-
SLAPP motion.
The trial court held a hearing on Defendant’s renewed
motion for anti-SLAPP attorney fees in December 2024, but the
record includes no reporter’s transcript or settled statement
memorializing the proceedings. A minute order issued in
connection with the hearing states the trial court denied the
motion and found, pursuant to the 2022 and 2024 Agreements,
that Defendant was “contractually barred” from obtaining an
award of attorney fees. Specifically, the court’s minute order
states Defendant in the 2022 Agreement had “assigned” his
“rights and liabilities” in Plaintiff’s lawsuit to Prashant and
Prashant had validly settled Plaintiff’s lawsuit with an attorney
fee waiver in the 2024 Agreement.5
Defendant moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s
ruling and maintained reconsideration was required because
Plaintiff’s opposition, which raised new facts (the designation of
Prashant to handle defense of Plaintiff’s lawsuit in paragraph 10
of the 2022 Agreement), was never served on Defendant and he
should be allowed to file a reply. Without addressing the
language of paragraph 10 of the 2022 Agreement, Defendant
argued that because Plaintiff was neither a party to nor a third-
party beneficiary of the 2022 Agreement, Plaintiff had no right to
enforce that agreement. The trial court agreed to grant
reconsideration and vacated its earlier order denying fees so that
Defendant could file a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition papers.
5
In its minute order, the trial court also expressed “grave
concerns” about representations made by Defendant’s counsel
that Plaintiff did not oppose the fee motion.
6
Defendant then filed the contemplated reply brief and
argued he was not bound by the attorney fee waiver provision of
the 2024 Agreement because he was not a party to or a third-
party beneficiary of that agreement. Although the 2022
Agreement was a basis for both Plaintiff’s opposition to the fee
motion and the vacated ruling on that motion by the trial court,
Defendant did not discuss the terms of that agreement—
including paragraph 10 making Prashant responsible for his
defense—or the effect of that agreement on his attorney fee
claim.
With Defendant’s reply on file, the trial court held another
attorney fees hearing (for which we again have no reporter’s
transcript or suitable substitute) and denied Defendant’s motion
for anti-SLAPP attorney fees. A minute order issued in
connection with the hearing explains the court again relied on
the 2022 and 2024 Agreements to find Defendant was
“contractually barred from receiving an award of attorney’s fees”
as a result of the “assignment” of Defendant’s rights and
liabilities in Plaintiff’s lawsuit to Prashant, who settled Plaintiff’s
lawsuit with an agreement that each party bear their own
attorney fees. Elaborating, the court’s minute order noted the
2022 Agreement had been “upheld” on appeal (in Vaghashia,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th 188) and expressly authorized Prashant
to resolve Plaintiff’s lawsuit: “[W]ith the authority given [to
Prashant] in the . . . 2022 . . . Agreement, [Prashant] negotiated a
7
resolution to this matter, including the provisions regarding ‘each
party to bear their own attorney’s fees and costs.’”6
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s principal argument on appeal is that
paragraph 10 of the 2022 Agreement was not an express
assignment of his right to seek attorney fees as a prevailing party
in Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Defendant forfeited this argument by
failing to advance it in trial court, and regardless, the argument
fails on the merits. The express terms of the 2022 Agreement
make Prashant responsible for handling the defense of Plaintiff’s
lawsuit, give Prashant authority to choose counsel who would
handle the defense, and contemplate that the lawsuit would be
settled. Prashant was therefore properly empowered to settle the
lawsuit and did so on terms that preclude an award of attorney
fees. Even assuming Defendant were right that the 2022
Agreement must constitute a legal assignment of his rights in
connection with Plaintiff’s lawsuit, the law does not require an
6
The trial court’s minute order also identified other
independent grounds warranting denial of Defendant’s fees
motion. First, the court observed that the 2022 Agreement
authorized Prashant to choose Defendant’s counsel in Plaintiff’s
lawsuit and “as far as the Court is aware,” defense counsel was
not “chosen by [Prashant] to represent anyone in this action.”
Second, the court found the amount of fees requested by
Defendant was “simply not credible.” Third, the court found the
motion was “deficient on its face,” because the billing statements
“made it unclear whether the work done was on this case or on
the other cases in the constellation of cases involving
[D]efendant.”
8
assignment to be express; only a manifestation of an intent to
transfer a party’s rights is required and the trial court did not err
in finding such intent was shown.7
A. The Argument Challenging the 2022 Agreement’s
Designation of Prashant to Handle Defense of
Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Is Forfeited Because It Was Not
Made in the Trial Court
“Appellate courts generally will not consider matters
presented for the first time on appeal. [Citations.]” (Franz v.
Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 31 Cal.3d 124, 143.)
Such arguments are generally deemed forfeited. (Kaufman &
Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006)
136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226; see also Vallejo Police Officers Assn. v.
City of Vallejo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 601, 621 [explaining that
“‘theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the
first time on appeal’” because “‘it would be unfair, both to the
trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of
theory on appeal’”].)
The issue of whether Defendant in the 2022 Agreement
gave Prashant the right to settle Plaintiff’s lawsuit under any
terms, including an attorney fee waiver, was raised by Plaintiff in
7
In light of our rationale for resolving the appeal, we have
no need to discuss the remaining arguments Defendant makes on
appeal, i.e., that the trial court should not have denied his fees
request in its entirety because the anti-SLAPP statute makes an
award of fees “mandatory, not discretionary”; that the court
improperly questioned his attorney’s authority to represent
Defendant; and that Plaintiff purportedly failed to make “any
specific objection” to his fees request.
9
his opposition to the fee motion and accepted by the trial court in
its initial (and later vacated) ruling. Defendant nonetheless did
not discuss the meaning and effect of paragraph 10 of the 2022
Agreement in his motion for reconsideration or in his reply brief
after reconsideration was granted. (Defendant instead addressed
only whether Plaintiff was a party to or a third-party beneficiary
of the settlement agreements.) That means the issue is forfeited.
B. Prashant Had Authority to Settle Plaintiff’s Lawsuit
and the Settlement Precludes an Award of Attorney
Fees
Even putting aside the forfeiture, Defendant’s argument
challenging the trial court’s settlement agreements-based
rationale for denying fees fails on the merits. Defendant is
focused on whether the 2022 Agreement effected a formal
“assignment” of rights (perhaps owing to the trial court’s diction
in its minute order). That, however, introduces an unnecessary
legal theory into the analysis. The question is not whether there
has been an assignment of rights per se, the question is whether
the 2022 Agreement made Prashant responsible for defense of
Plaintiff’s lawsuit and granted him authority to settle that
lawsuit. It obviously did.
Paragraph 10 designated Prashant as the person who
would “defend” against Plaintiff’s lawsuit. The same paragraph
gave Prashant authority to choose the attorney who would handle
the defense. And perhaps most important, the same paragraph
obligated Defendant to reasonably cooperate in “execut[ing]
settlement documents,” but only “[t]o the extent the cooperation
of any of the Govind Parties is needed.” That gave Prashant all
the authority he needed to settle Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and he did so
10
pursuant to an agreement (that Defendant did not
contemporaneously contest) making all parties responsible for
their own attorney fees.8
Furthermore, even if Defendant were right that the
question of an entitlement to fees does turn on the legal concept
of an “assignment,” Defendant is still wrong that the 2022
Agreement cannot be such an assignment. Defendant believes,
for instance, that paragraph 31 of the 2022 Agreement
“conclusively disproves” the 2022 Agreement effected an
assignment, but the anti-assignment provision of that paragraph
is expressly limited to the claims Defendant, Prashant, their
families, and their related entities had against each other; it does
not bear on the question of whether Defendant assigned away his
rights to anti-SLAPP attorney fees from Plaintiff. Defendant also
believes that “[u]nder settled California law, an assignment must
be express, clear, and unequivocal, and ‘will not be presumed’
from silence or implication.” That is just wrong on the law. “[A]n
effective assignment . . . may be expressed orally as well as in
writing; may be the product of inference; and where the parties to
a transaction . . . by their conduct indicate an intention to [make
an assignment], the courts will imply an assignment thereof. In
making such a determination, substance and not form controls.”
8
Tellingly, Defendant to this day still does not contest the
2024 Agreement insofar as it resulted in the dismissal with
prejudice of Plaintiff’s claims against him. He just wants the
sweet without the bitter (see generally Bailey v. United States
(2013) 568 U.S. 186, 206 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.)): an invalidation
of the agreement only insofar as it precludes him from recouping
anti-SLAPP attorney fees. That selective approach to the
agreement is untenable.
11
(Greco v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 674,
683, internal citations omitted; accord, Sunburst Bank v.
Executive Life Ins. Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1164;
McCown v. Spencer (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 216, 225.) Pursuant to
the settlement agreements and his conduct, Defendant showed he
assigned his rights in connection with Plaintiff’s lawsuit—
including any settlement thereof—to Prashant.
Defendant additionally maintains a prevailing defendant
on an anti-SLAPP motion cannot bargain away his or her
statutory right to attorney fees unless he or she does so expressly.
He repeatedly cites Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
763, 775, for the proposition that “‘any waiver of anti-SLAPP
rights must be “clear and unmistakable.”’” The quoted language
does not appear anywhere in Navellier and that opinion does not
support the proposition for which he cites it.9 Insofar as
Defendant contends a party can never bargain away an
entitlement to anti-SLAPP fees as part of a global settlement of
litigation because doing so would violate Civil Code section 3513
(“a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a
private agreement”), the argument is unavailing. The 2024
Agreement’s stipulation that all parties would bear their own
attorney fees and costs does not “contravene” the anti-SLAPP
statute. At most, the 2024 Agreement incorporated the prospect
of an award for some amount of anti-SLAPP fees as part of the
9
Defendant also purports to quote Ketchum v. Moses (2001)
24 Cal.4th 1122 as stating an anti-SLAPP fee award “is
mandatory and ‘not subject to equitable defenses or private
contractual limitations.’” Again, the purportedly quoted
language appears nowhere in the Ketchum opinion.
12
calculus of mutually agreeable terms that would end the
litigation.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s attorney fees order is affirmed. Plaintiff is
awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
13