Filed 6/22/26 Patel v. Patel CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ABDUL PATEL and ZARIN PATEL, A173079
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (San Francisco County
NASIR PATEL, Super. Ct. No. CGC23608427)
Defendant and Appellant.
This matter arises from a dispute over profit distributions in a hotel
business run by husband and wife Abdul Rashid Patel and Zarin Patel
(collectively, “respondents”) and Abdul’s nephew Nasir Patel.1 Respondents
filed an action against Nasir, which included direct and derivative claims for
violation of Penal Code section 496 and breach of fiduciary duty, and a direct
claim for elder abuse, among others. After a 14-day bench trial, the trial
court ruled in respondents’ favor on most of their claims. Nasir challenges
the exclusion of certain evidence at trial and the sufficiency of evidence to
support several of the court’s rulings and findings. We affirm.
1 In light of their identical last names, we refer to Nasir Patel, Abdul
Patel, Zarin Patel, and respondents’ daughter May Patel by their first names
for brevity and to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondents filed their action against Nasir in August 2023. The trial
included testimony from various individuals, including Abdul (then 86 years
old), Zarin (then 77 years old), respondents’ daughter May, accountants and
bookkeepers who had done work for the hotel business, a forensics
accountant, and a damages expert. Nasir and his financial expert also
testified. The relevant testimony and evidence included the following.
As a youth, Nasir and his siblings lived with respondents in the Baker
Hotel, a single residency occupancy (“SRO”) hotel respondents operated.
Respondents also owned the Valley Motel in Concord. In 1985 or 1986, Nasir
started working for the Baker Hotel and, over the next few years, learned
from respondents how to run an SRO business.
In 1994, an opportunity arose to purchase a sublease in the Broadway
Hotel, an 81-unit SRO hotel, from Abdul’s friend Harry Ming. Ming was
seeking $40,000 or $50,000 for the sublease but did not want to sell it to
Nasir, who was only 21 years old at the time. Ming ultimately agreed to do
so after Abdul contributed $40,000 toward the purchase and agreed to be
Nasir’s business partner. Abdul agreed to this arrangement because he
wanted to help Nasir, who was his brother’s son. Nasir borrowed $22,000 for
this transaction, giving $10,000 of this amount for the purchase of the
sublease and $12,000 to his uncle as reimbursement.
Abdul and Nasir agreed to a 50-50 partnership in the business and an
equal division of the hotel earnings, with Nasir agreeing to handle
management of the hotel because of Abdul’s health issues. Both individuals’
names were on the hotel bank account, but Nasir was responsible for the
financial records which included handwritten rent revenue receipt books,
2
hotel registration cards, and a cash journal documenting hotel expenses, all
of which Nasir kept at the hotel.
After assuming the lease, Nasir and his siblings moved into the
Broadway Hotel. Nasir lived in the manager’s apartment for about 10 years,
but moved out of the hotel after starting a family.
In 2004, Nasir and Abdul incorporated the Broadway Hotel as
Broadway Hotel, Inc. (“BHI”). Nasir was appointed as the Chief Executive
Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), and Abdul was
appointed Secretary of the Board of Directors. Respondents’ daughter May
understood that the parties agreed to have Nasir serve as CEO and CFO
because he was “operating the property” and “in control of the finances,” and
that Abdul would be available to assist Nasir if needed. Nasir and
respondents’ living trust (the “Patel Trust”) each received one million shares
of BHI. As trustees of the Patel Trust, respondents are authorized to use its
assets in whatever manner they want during their lifetimes.
Notwithstanding BHI’s incorporation, the parties’ dealings remained largely
informal and did not include participation in formalities such as director or
shareholder meetings.
Around 2005 or 2006, Abdul was diagnosed with lymphoma. He also
had other health conditions that rendered him unable to work. In 2012,
Abdul underwent a major surgery after which his health began to further
decline. Zarin spent most of her time caring for Abdul, despite having her
own health issues. May also helped care for Abdul in addition to working 10
to 15 hours a week to help her parents with their businesses.
Between 1994 and 2014, Nasir provided Abdul with sporadic hotel
profit distribution payments, including payments of approximately $50,000 in
1999 and approximately $100,000 in 2001. But there was a period of around
3
five to seven years when, according to May, Nasir paid no distributions to
Abdul. This occurred during the time when Abdul was experiencing more
limitations due to his health issues. According to May, Abdul expressed
confusion as to why he was not receiving profit distributions even though
Nasir was able to purchase other properties around this same time. Abdul
and May ultimately met with Nasir, which resulted in Nasir paying Abdul
$182,272 in 2011, around $50,000 in 2012, and around $50,000 in 2013.
Respondents, however, were not satisfied with the ongoing
inconsistency of the profit distributions. In 2014, they verbally agreed with
Nasir that Nasir would provide them with steady, monthly payments (“the
2014 Agreement”). These monthly payments were initially set at $2,500 but
eventually increased to $4,000. Zarin testified these payments would be
made against BHI profits but did not comprise the entirety of respondents’
share of the profits. Nasir, on the other hand, testified the monthly amount
represented the entirety of Abdul’s share of the profits because Nasir was
managing the hotel operations and absorbing the expenses for building
upkeep.2
After the parties entered into the 2014 Agreement, Nasir made
monthly deposits to respondents’ account until December 2020. While
making such monthly distributions, Nasir also wrote monthly checks in the
same amount to himself. Nasir also took additional profit distributions for
himself, even though one of his former accountants (Charles Sterck) advised
him in 2017 not to take more distributions than other shareholders. Sterck
testified that Nasir’s excess withdrawals for himself were recharacterized as
2 There was additional inconsistency in the trial testimony regarding the
2014 Agreement, with Nasir’s accounting expert testifying that Nasir told her
there had never been an agreement between him and respondents.
4
shareholder loans so the distributions to Nasir and Abdul would be equal for
accounting purposes.
From 2014 to 2020, Zarin occasionally tried to obtain information
regarding BHI’s financial situation but received little or no response. Abdul
also requested financial information for BHI, such as information regarding
the hotel’s cash earnings, but Nasir never provided it.
In December 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Nasir stopped
making monthly distributions to respondents. In a text, Nasir told Zarin that
business was “really slow,” that he hoped it would “pick up next month,” and
that he had to loan $9,900 to the BHI account. The following month, Zarin
texted Nasir to follow up about the lack of BHI deposits because she and
Abdul needed money due to losses they were suffering in another property
they managed. Nasir responded the “[s]ituation [was] very bad,” but
promised to resume payments when things improved.
Around this time, May stepped in to help her parents with financial
matters given their health issues. May began corresponding with Nasir
about BHI because she and Nasir had a good relationship. May also testified
that her father told her at one point he “wanted to do something for [her],”
that he wanted her and Nasir to work together because they “respect each
other,” and that he “absolutely” wanted the BHI profits to go to her.
Notwithstanding Nasir’s representations that business at BHI was
slow, May noticed in 2021 that BHI’s Schedule K-1s3 for the 2020 tax year
indicated BHI actually had a higher net business income in 2020 than in
2019. In October, May emailed Nasir about the large discrepancy between
the income reported on the 2020 K-1s, on which the parties were paying
3 Schedule K-1 is a tax document used to report a shareholder’s share of
business income, deductions, and credits.
5
taxes, and the disbursements her parents received for that year. Specifically,
May noted her parents were paying taxes on $78,622 (i.e., their 50 percent
share of the BHI income) but had received only $40,000 in disbursements.
May asked Nasir to clarify with his accountant that the 2020 K-1 figures
were correct.
May received no response from Nasir over the next two months. In
December 2021, she asked Nasir to speak with his accountant because she
wanted to ensure that Nasir and her parents were not paying more taxes
than they should for BHI. May inquired about how business at BHI was
doing given that business had picked up relative to her parents’ other
properties. May additionally asked Nasir how much money he had put into
BHI and mentioned Nasir could always ask Abdul for financial help given
that BHI was a partnership. Nasir, however, became increasingly defensive
when May asked for information regarding BHI. May made more attempts
in January and February of 2022 to get BHI’s financial information, but was
unsuccessful. At most, Nasir expressed hope that business would pick up
soon so he could restart the monthly distributions to respondents.
Around June 2022, May’s name was added to the BHI bank account
with paperwork indicating she was a Vice President of Broadway Hotel.
However, May stated she never actually had a role in the corporation, never
managed it, and never took a “single penny” from the hotel as the hotel
needed that money.
In September 2022, May reached out to Nasir after he told her he had
lent $150,000 to BHI. Because May was unable to confirm that loan based on
her review of the BHI bank account transactions, she and Abdul wanted to
take a look at the BHI finances together with Nasir. At this time, May
requested that Nasir send her BHI’s financial information for the past ten
6
years so she could make sure “the recordkeeping was clear” and “done
properly,” and could determine the amounts Nasir had distributed to her
parents. Nasir, however, claimed he was very busy and would respond later.
The following year, respondents filed this action.
According to respondents’ damages expert Frank Wisehart, Nasir had
undeposited cash receipts which showed that $833,950 in cash should have
been deposited in the BHI bank account between 2019 and 2023 (consisting of
$846,482 in undeposited cash less BHI’s cash payments totaling $12,533).
Wisehart arrived at this figure by using two years of cash receipt information
obtained from the handwritten receipt books Nasir kept stored at the
Broadway Hotel and by making reasonable estimates for the two years for
which there were no receipt books.4 Further, in reviewing the Broadway
Hotel rent checks, Wisehart observed there were 47 checks totaling $65,906
from Brilliant Corners, a community group that paid rent for some tenants;
these checks had been written out to Nasir personally and were never
deposited into the BHI account. None of this income information was
available to the accountants who prepared BHI’s tax returns because the
funds had never been deposited in the BHI account.
Upon reviewing BHI bank statements from 2019 to 2023, respondents’
forensics accountant Suzanne Eikel-Pawlawski concluded Nasir used the BHI
account for a “substantial amount” of personal expenses. Such expenses
included annual charges for a Ring doorbell (which is typically for residential
and not hotel use), personal Apple products, bank overdraft charges that
should not have been incurred if the hotel revenue listed in the revenue logs
4 Wisehart used information from the cash receipt books from April 2021
to April 2023. As for the financial records from before April 2021, Nasir
claimed they had been destroyed by a flood from the room above the place
where the records were kept.
7
had been deposited in the BHI account, personal Amazon Prime and Prime
Video subscription fees and gym memberships, $16,000 in meals and
entertainment expenses, $1,000 in a cryptocurrency transaction, and
$449,057.24 in unexplained credit card payments.
Nasir admitted at trial that some of the hotel’s rent revenue was not
deposited in the BHI bank account but was, instead, deposited in other bank
accounts under his name, purportedly as repayment for money he had loaned
to BHI. Nasir did not deny he used BHI funds for personal expenses. But he
believed the BHI account was his own account with funds he was entitled to
use as he wished. His counsel also elicited testimony from Abdul that
respondents had a number of other financial assets, including properties in
San Francisco, Concord, and India.
At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court issued a statement of decision
in which it ruled in favor of respondents’ direct claims for violation of Penal
Code section 496, subdivision (c), breach of fiduciary duty, and financial elder
abuse. Finding that respondents suffered $372,564.65 in damages, the court
ordered Nasir to pay respondents a total of $1,117,693.95 pursuant to the
treble damages provision under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c).5 The
court also ordered Nasir to deposit all cash, checks, and other receipts
derived from BHI operations into the BHI account; to maintain all receipts;
and to properly account for all business income and expenses.
5 The trial court additionally found clear and convincing evidence that
Nasir acted with malice and fraud, thus warranting an award of punitive
damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294. At a second phase of the trial
that addressed the amount of punitive damages to which respondents were
entitled, the court fixed punitive damages in the amount of $745,129.30 but
explained that “[t]he punitive damages award is substantially based on the
same conduct as the civil penalties award,” thus respondents could collect
either punitive damages or the civil penalties, but not both.
8
DISCUSSION
Nasir contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain text
messages between him and May, and that the evidence was insufficient to
support liability and recovery on any of respondents’ claims and the award of
treble damages.
Many of Nasir’s contentions, however, are impossible to evaluate
because his briefing and presentation of the issues are lacking.6 Nasir
frequently fails to include, discuss, or cite key portions of the record and
relevant evidence, and instead presents an incomplete and one-sided
presentation of the evidence. For example, Nasir claims on appeal that at
trial, respondents “mainly relied” on their own testimony and that of their
daughter May, while omitting any mention of the testimony provided by
respondents’ experts regarding Nasir’s appropriation of BHI funds and his
use of these funds for his own personal expenses. Nasir also neglects to
provide cogent legal arguments supporting a number of his challenges on
appeal.
As will be evident, post, these deficiencies are consequential. It is a
cardinal rule of appellate review that a “trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v.
6 Respondents also contend Nasir’s challenges should be forfeited due to
his failure to include the operative pleading and answer in the record on
appeal. We note that though there are other deficiencies in Nasir’s
presentation which amount to an effective forfeiture of some of his
challenges, his failure to include the operative pleading and answer, by itself,
does not prevent a meaningful review of his contentions. (See Gee v.
American Realty & Contruction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 [an
appellant defaults when the record provided is “ ‘inadequate for meaningful
review’ ”].)
9
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) For challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence, an appellant must “set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence
on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218, italics added.)
An appellant must also supply the reviewing court with a cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citations to the record. (County of Los
Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 463 (County of Los Angeles).)
Failures to fairly discuss the evidence presented or to provide a reasoned
argument supported by relevant legal authority effectively amount to a
forfeiture of any claims of error. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1246–1247; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
814, 830.)
Mindful of these principles, we proceed to Nasir’s contentions.
A. Exclusion of Text Messages
Nasir claims that at trial he sought the admission of two texts May
sent him. In one text, May supposedly stated that “ ‘[g]oing forward [Nasir
should] just consider that Daddy [i.e., Abdul] had given [her] Broadway
shares instead of [sic] Naeem.’ ”7 In another text, May reportedly said,
“ ‘Daddy told me he beta [sic] I could not do anything for you so you can have
my share from Broadway because he knows we get along.’ ”8 Nasir contends
the trial court erroneously excluded these texts as inadmissible hearsay when
they should have been admitted as party admissions under Evidence Code
7 Naeem is May’s brother.
8 The meaning of the second text, where May apparently offers Nasir her
“share” of Broadway Hotel, is unclear to us. Nasir also does not explain the
import of this text but, based on the remainder of his argument, we presume
he is construing the text to mean that May had some type of ownership
interest in the Broadway Hotel.
10
section 1222. In asserting this error was prejudicial, Nasir contends the text
evidence was critical to his defense that respondents lacked standing to bring
their elder abuse and other claims because they no longer owned their shares
in BHI but had, instead, transferred them to May. Nasir’s argument is
deficient and flawed.
At the outset, we observe Nasir does not provide any transcript
citations showing either that he sought to admit the above-referenced text
messages or that the trial court made rulings on the matter. Instead, Nasir
cites a portion of the trial transcript where his counsel sought to introduce a
different text message from May asking Nasir about an outstanding bill for
the Broadway Hotel, to which respondents objected on hearsay grounds. In
the context of the discussion around this text message, Nasir’s counsel
contended that May’s statements were a party admission. Though the court
found May was not a party to the case, it ultimately overruled the hearsay
objection to this particular text message since the statement was being
offered for its effect on the listener. But nowhere in the cited exchange was
there any mention of the text messages Nasir now claims were improperly
excluded or mention of a related ruling. Nasir’s failure to provide adequate
citations to the record precludes any meaningful review. (See County of Los
Angeles, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)
In any event, Nasir offers no cogent argument or legal authority for his
belief that text messages such as the ones May supposedly sent him can
trigger a transfer of share ownership in a corporation. Indeed, the record
otherwise reflects that the Patel Trust owns the BHI shares and that
respondents, as trustees, are authorized to use these shares in whatever
manner they wish during their lifetime. Given the absence of any factual and
legal substantiation of Nasir’s argument, we see no basis for relief.
11
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
Nasir argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial
court’s rulings that he had violated Penal Code section 496, had engaged in
financial elder abuse, had breached his fiduciary duty towards respondents,
and had acted with malice, oppression, and fraud as required for the
alternative punitive damages award (see ante, fn. 5). We disagree.
On appeal, we review a trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Ctr., LLC (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 1010, 1016.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is of
ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value, and substantial proof of the essentials which the law requires in a
particular case. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1006.) “We
view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing
every reasonable inference and resolving every conflict to the [sic] support the
judgment.” (Jonkey v. Carignan Construction Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 20,
24 (Jonkey).) We do not weigh conflicts or disputes in the evidence.
(Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582, 596.) Instead, “[o]ur
authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire
record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in
support of the judgment.” (Ibid.) “If substantial evidence supports the
judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a
contrary finding.” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).)
The burden of demonstrating the absence of substantial evidence rests
squarely on the appellant. (Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of
Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598 (Symons).) To this end, an
appellant must “ ‘fairly summarize the facts in the light favorable to the
judgment,’ ” and set forth all the material evidence on a point and not merely
12
his or her own evidence. (Ibid.) Without a fair summary of the evidence, the
error is deemed forfeited. (Ibid.)
1. Penal Code Section 496
As relevant here, Penal Code section 496 (“section 496”) defines the
crime of theft and makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly receive,
conceal, sell, or withhold stolen property. (Id., subd. (a).) Any person injured
by a violation of this statute may bring an action for three times the amount
of actual damages and may also recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(Id., subd. (c).) To prove a theft under section 496, a plaintiff must establish
criminal intent on the part of the defendant beyond “ ‘mere proof of
nonperformance or actual falsity.’ ” (Siry Inv., L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022)
13 Cal.5th 333, 361–362.) Innocent or inadvertent misrepresentations are
insufficient to establish the requisite criminal intent. (Ibid.) However,
evidence that a defendant acted with “careful planning and deliberation” is
sufficient. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court found the “great weight of the evidence”
demonstrated that, “through planning and deliberation,” Nasir obtained
BHI’s corporate assets in a manner constituting theft under section 496.
Among other things, the court observed that Nasir took checks tendered as
payment for the rental of Broadway Hotel rooms and repeatedly directed the
funds to his own accounts, failed to report or account for them, and spent
them on his own personal expenses, all while knowing the funds were
intended for corporate purposes.
The court also rejected as “unsupported by the weight of the evidence”
Nasir’s claim that he had a right to these funds because the parties agreed in
2014 that respondents would receive a monthly $4,000 draw and Nasir would
keep the rest of the profits. Instead, the court found ample evidence that the
13
parties agreed each shareholder would receive equal monthly distributions.
The court further stated that in the absence of an agreement regarding the
handling of profits in excess of the distributions, the profits should be split
among the shareholders in proportion to their ownership interest in the
corporation. Had Nasir actually believed the parties’ agreement was as he
claimed, the court deduced, then he would not have ceased making monthly
payments to respondents in December 2020 because the purported agreement
would have required these payments regardless of corporate profits.
Nasir contends the evidence was insufficient to establish criminal
intent under section 496 because there were “ambiguities” regarding the
handling of BHI profits that exceeded the $4,000 per month distribution
agreement. On this point, Nasir asserts that until respondents stopped
receiving the monthly distributions, they never sought a true up of the
Broadway Hotel profits despite knowing from their experience as SRO
operators that the net profits from the hotel could not have been identical
every month. Nasir contends this fact weighs heavily in favor of a finding
that respondents had agreed to receive only the fixed $4,000 per month and
no more. He also contends the damages should have been limited to treble
the damages of $152,000 that respondents suffered through the missed
monthly payments, instead of the $372,564.65 damages figure used by the
court. Nasir’s arguments are not well taken.
Among other things, Zarin testified her understanding of the 2014
Agreement was that the monthly distribution payments would be made
against BHI profits but would not comprise the entirety of respondents’ share
of the profits. And contrary to Nasir’s contention that respondents never
sought a true up until he stopped making monthly distribution payments in
December 2020, Zarin testified she tried to inquire about the BHI profits both
14
in December 2017 and a few months before the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
Nasir’s former accountant also testified that he had advised Nasir in 2017 to
not take more distributions than other shareholders, and that the excess
distributions to Nasir were recharacterized as repayment of shareholder
loans.
Taken together, the above evidence amply supports the trial court’s
finding that Nasir was not entitled to BHI’s excess monthly profits over
$4,000. (See Jonkey, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 24 [viewing all evidence in
the light most favorable to the judgment and drawing every reasonable
inference to support it].) Thus, even if there were some “ambiguities” in the
2014 Agreement and/or some testimony supporting Nasir’s version of the
facts, reversal is not warranted. (See Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 12.)9
2. Financial Elder Abuse
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, subdivision (a),
provides in relevant part that “financial abuse” of an elder occurs when an
individual “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains” or “[a]ssists in
taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal
property of an elder . . . for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both”
or “by undue influence.” For purposes of the statute, “a person or entity
takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property
when an elder or dependent adult is deprived of any property right, including
by means of an agreement.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (c).)
9 Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
parties were entitled to equal profit distributions, there appears no basis for
reversing the court’s finding that respondents were entitled to damages
beyond the mere $152,000 they suffered through missed monthly payments.
15
Nasir contends the trial court erred in finding he acted with an intent
to defraud respondents because the court “ignored” the fact that the COVID-
19 pandemic had impacted BHI’s finances just as it had impacted
respondents’ other hotel businesses. Nasir asserts this “critical factor”
undercuts the court’s finding that his failure to make distributions to
respondents was intentional as opposed to out of necessity.
Nasir’s showing on this claim is deficient. He fails in his burden to
provide a fair summary of the record and to include all the material evidence
relative to his challenge. (See Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) For
example, in concluding in its statement of decision that Nasir acted with the
intent to defraud, the trial court relied on evidence that Nasir took
“substantial unauthorized distributions without providing equal distributions
to the [Patel Trust as the] other 50% shareholder,” and that he hid the fact
that funds were available while falsely representing to respondents that
“times were tough and no funds were available for distribution.” Nasir
makes no reference to these trial court findings; nor does he discuss the
evidence that his appropriation of BHI funds occurred not only during the
pandemic but also before and after it. Specifically, the record evidence
indicates that from 2019 to 2023, Nasir obtained $846,482 in cash receipts for
BHI but did not deposit the sums into the BHI account; at the same time,
Nasir was spending substantial sums of money on what appeared to be his
own personal expenses. Nasir’s failure to fairly address the evidence forfeits
his claims of error. (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.)
In any event, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Nasir acted with the intent to defraud respondents. As recounted above,
Wisehart testified that from 2021 to 2023 there was approximately $846,482
in cash that Nasir never deposited into the BHI account. Likewise, there
16
were 47 undeposited rental checks totaling $65,906 that had been written out
to Nasir personally from the nonprofit organization Brilliant Corners.
Notwithstanding these facts, Nasir repeatedly represented to respondents
that business was slow and he was unable to make their distribution
payments. Additionally, from October 2021 to September 2022, Nasir
repeatedly rebuffed May’s attempts to obtain information regarding BHI’s
finances when she began to investigate the discrepancies between the 2020
income reported for BHI and the distributions made to her parents, as well as
the discrepancies between Nasir’s claimed loans to BHI and what he had
actually deposited into the BHI account. All this evidence more than amply
established the requisite intent.
Nasir next argues that, even if his intent to defraud was proved, the
trial court should have found his criminal intent extended only to the unpaid
monthly distributions. We cannot agree, as substantial evidence supports
the court’s finding that respondents never agreed to forgo profits in excess of
the monthly distributions.
Lastly, Nasir asserts respondents lacked standing to bring their
financial elder abuse claim. He also contends respondents failed to establish
harm from his failure to provide equal distributions of the BHI profits as
evidence was presented at trial that respondents had “vast assets across the
world.” Nasir devotes one paragraph to each of these contentions with
minimal analysis. Nasir’s standing contention fails for the reasons discussed,
ante. And he offers no cogent argument or legal support for his proposition
that a plaintiff alleging elder abuse cannot establish harm if there is evidence
that the plaintiff has other financial assets. As such, we deem these
contentions of error forfeited. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 116
Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)
17
3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Nasir contends the trial court erred in finding he owed respondents a
fiduciary duty because he was not a majority shareholder in BHI. Citing
inapposite case law, Nasir suggests that only majority shareholders owe
fiduciary duties to other shareholders. That is not the case. As the trial
court recognized in its ruling on this claim, it is well established that: “ ‘A
director is a fiduciary. . . . So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or
group of stockholders.’ ” (Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93,
108, italics added.) Here, Nasir focuses only on asserting he was not a
controlling shareholder while ignoring the circumstance that, as a director,
he owed a fiduciary duty to respondents as shareholders of BHI. (Ibid.) As
such, Nasir’s challenge to this finding fails.
4. Punitive Damages
Nasir argues the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that
he acted with malice and fraud for purposes of respondents’ request for
punitive damages. Nasir, however, provides no legal authority or analysis
but merely contends there was little evidence of the requisite intent. He also
reasserts his belief there were “significant ambiguities” regarding the
monthly payment agreement and points out that respondents received a
significant windfall from their initial $40,000 investment in the Broadway
Hotel. These bald assertions do not amount to a cogent legal argument that
legally undermines the court’s finding he acted with malice and fraud; thus,
we deem this assertion forfeited. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 116
Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).
18
_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Petrou, J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
Patel v. Patel (A173079)
19