Filed 8/25/26 Pardo v. Burt CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MARY JANE PARDO, B344708
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV35881)
v.
JASON EUGENE BURT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Fransen and Molinaro and Nathan Fransen for Defendant
and Appellant.
Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger, Ricardo
P. Cestero, and Vera Serova for Plaintiff and Appellant.
__________________________________
Defendant and appellant Jason Eugene Burt arranged two
loans for plaintiff and appellant Mary Jane Pardo and suggested
to defendant Alex Camacho—not a party to this appeal—how he
might “get more money from” her. Both Burt and Pardo agree
that Camacho defrauded Pardo and absconded with much of the
proceeds from these financial transactions.
In the proceedings below, the trial court found Burt liable
to Pardo for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. For breach of
fiduciary duty, the court awarded Pardo most of the losses she
suffered due to these transactions. For fraud, all the damages
the court awarded were also included in the damages awarded for
breach of fiduciary duty. However, the trial court found Pardo
failed to prove Burt was liable for elder abuse. Had the court
found otherwise, Pardo asserts she would have been entitled to
recover her attorneys’ fees under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 15657.5.1
On appeal, Burt contends the trial court erred in holding
him responsible for losses he argues he did not cause. He also
contends the court erred in awarding prejudgment interest.
Pardo disagrees and additionally argues the trial court erred in
failing to find Burt liable for elder abuse. We conclude that: (a)
Burt has failed to demonstrate the court erred in finding him
liable for breach of fiduciary duty; (b) the court did not err in
awarding prejudgment interest; and (c) the court erred in failing
1 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5, subd. (a) [“Where it is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is
liable for financial abuse, . . . in addition to compensatory
damages and all other remedies otherwise provided by law, the
court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs”].)
2
to find Burt liable for elder abuse. Because the damages awarded
for fraud are subsumed within the damages we find properly
awarded for breach of fiduciary duty, we need not consider Burt’s
arguments regarding whether the court erred in finding him
liable for fraud. We therefore reverse the portion of the judgment
finding Burt not liable for elder abuse and affirm the remainder.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Pardo Files Suit
In September 2020, Pardo filed a complaint against several
individuals and entities including Burt, Ladera Lending LLC,
Coast 2 Coast Funding Group, Inc., Camacho, and AMC
Construction Inc. She filed a first amended complaint (FAC) in
January 2021. As relevant to this appeal, the FAC alleged:
1.
The Parties Relevant to This Appeal
Pardo was a 68-year-old widow who owned her home
outright. Camacho was an agent or employee of AMC
Construction. Burt was an agent or employee of Coast 2 Coast,
and the sole owner and manager of Ladera Lending.
2.
Pardo Enters Into Two PACE Contracts
In late 2018, Pardo met Camacho, who solicited from her a
$63,730 home improvement contract, which would be financed
through the PACE Program.2 Camacho failed to sufficiently
2 The FAC alleged the PACE Program “is a California state
initiative intended to enable homeowners to finance energy-
efficient improvements to their homes. The homeowners repay
the PACE financing through special assessments on their
property tax bills. PACE programs are administered by private
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
3
disclose to her: “(a) the itemized cost AMC was charging for its
services under the PACE contract; (b) that PACE financing would
result in a special tax assessment, which would substantially
increase the property tax bill for Ms. Pardo’s house; (c) that
PACE financing would subject the house to a lien and a risk of
immediate foreclosure; and (d) that [the lender] E3 would pay
AMC directly for the improvements.” Instead, Camacho informed
her that “PACE financing was a special program that would be
paid off via ‘rebates’ and she would not have to make any
payments.”
As a result of Camacho’s statements and actions, on
September 27, 2018, Pardo entered into a PACE contract,
borrowing $46,900. Less than a week later, Camacho induced
her to enter into a second PACE contract, borrowing $49,875.
Both PACE contracts “inflated the cost of AMC’s services to over
1.5 times their price” under the home improvement contract (i.e.,
the home improvement contract was for $63,730 but the two
PACE loans totaled $96,775). The two PACE contracts also
caused “a combined annual supplemental property tax
assessment of $8,985.94 secured by two super-priority liens” on
Pardo’s home. There was no “change order” to the home
improvement contract because of the second PACE contract.
lending companies, called ‘program administrators,’ each of
which acts under the auspices of a government agency. A
program administrator solicits financing deals from homeowners
through a network of home improvement contractors who act as
the program administrator’s sales force.” The FAC additionally
alleged “PACE has become a breeding ground for fraud.
Unscrupulous and incompetent contractors target the most
vulnerable, elderly homeowners, often engaging in fraudulent
practices and forgery to secure lucrative PACE deals.”
4
3. Pardo Repays the Original Two PACE
Loans from the Proceeds of a New Loan
“Despite being aware of Ms. Pardo’s modest income, in
early 2019 Camacho, on behalf of AMC, solicited more PACE-
eligible improvements from Ms. Pardo.” Because Pardo “was not
eligible for more than $110,000 in PACE loans,” Camacho
arranged for the original loans to be repaid with $110,553.83 of
the proceeds from a mortgage loan, and Pardo “was left with a
$198,125 mortgage loan from Coast 2 Coast.”
Specifically, Camacho “induced” Pardo “to take out two
additional loans with help from Camacho’s cohort Burt. Burt
visited Ms. Pardo at her home and eventually extended two
simultaneous loans to her: the $198,125 Coast 2 Coast Loan and
a $36,500 loan from Ladera (‘the Ladera Loan’). When Ms. Pardo
hesitated to sign the Coast 2 Coast Loan note resulting in an
obligation this substantial, Camacho promised Ms. Pardo in front
of Burt that Camacho and/or AMC, not Ms. Pardo, would be
responsible for paying off the Coast 2 Coast Loan. Burt did not
contradict Camacho’s representation. Burt nevertheless put Ms.
Pardo as the sole obligor on the Coast 2 Coast Loan. Both loans
were secured by Ms. Pardo’s house, and Camacho induced Ms.
Pardo to provide him with substantially all of the proceeds from
these loans.” Camacho then induced Pardo to enter a third PACE
contract for $97,040. Again, there was no change order to the
home improvement contract “to reflect any additional
improvements allegedly financed by the third PACE contract.”
However, the “third PACE contract resulted in [an] annual
supplemental property tax assessment of $9,214.49 secured by a
super-priority lien on Ms. Pardo’s house.”
5
4.
Pardo Enters an “Option Agreement”
“In June 2019, Camacho induced Ms. Pardo to sell an
option in her house to Point Digital Finance, Inc for $165,000
(‘the PDF Option Agreement’). The PDF Option Agreement
refinanced the Ladera Loan, resulting in [a] $36,918.36 payout to
Burt and Ladera. To convince Ms. Pardo to give away the
remaining proceeds from the option sale, Camacho falsely
represented to Ms. Pardo in a change order to the H[ome]
I[mprovement] C[ontract] dated July 1, 2019 that Camacho
and/or AMC would be responsible for paying off Ms. Pardo’s
remaining loans. Camacho then induced Ms. Pardo to give away
to him the entire amount remaining from the option sale.”
Neither Camacho nor AMC made any payments. When Pardo
spoke with Camacho, he made empty promises until finally
admitting he had no money. Camacho then changed his phone
number, making it impossible for Pardo to contact him.3 In
August 2019, AMC ceased operations.
Based on these allegations, Pardo brought causes of action
against Burt, Coast 2 Coast, Ladera Lending, Camacho, and
AMC, for fraud, elder abuse, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,
and unfair competition.4 She also alleged a cause of action for
3 In a trial brief Burt filed, he claimed Pardo never
personally served a summons on Camacho “because he
disappeared, skipped town, so she served him by substitution and
subsequently defaulted him, where he currently remains at large
as a defaulted defendant in this lawsuit.”
4 Coast 2 Coast was not a defendant in the negligence cause
of action. Pardo also alleged causes of action against Camacho
and AMC for violating various provisions of the Business and
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
6
breach of fiduciary duty against Burt. In June 2022, Burt and
Ladera answered the complaint.5
B. The Trial
A four-day bench trial took place in July 2024. Six
witnesses testified. The relevant testimony of five of the
witnesses is summarized below:6
1. Pardo
(a) Background
Pardo testified that she completed eleventh grade but did
not graduate high school or attend college. Instead, she went to a
trade school for office skills for about six months. When she met
Camacho, Pardo was retired and owned her home outright. She
Professions Code (because Camacho was not licensed with the
Contractors State License Board) and the Home Solicitation Act.
5 On the same day they filed an answer, Burt and Ladera
filed a verified cross-complaint against Pardo for fraud. Burt
alleged he was a loan officer of Coast 2 Coast and the owner and
operator of Ladera. Burt claimed that, at Pardo’s request, he
arranged for Coast 2 Coast to loan her $198,125 as a refinancing
of two of Pardo’s existing loans, and for Ladera to loan her
$36,500 as a second mortgage. Pardo repaid both loans. Burt
alleged that when he made these loans, Pardo knowingly
misrepresented that she “was the only obligor to pay back the
Two Mortgage Loans” and “was taking out the Two Mortgage
Loans for a legitimate purpose.” Burt claimed Pardo “planned to
set up Mr. Burt for a lawsuit.” Pardo demurred to this complaint,
and the court dismissed it with prejudice.
6 Pardo’s grandson also testified, but his testimony has no
relevance to this appeal.
7
received a passive monthly income of $3,133 from three sources:
$533 from her and her husband’s pensions, $1,100 from Social
Security, and $1,500 from a promissory note Pardo was carrying
from the sale of a vacant lot left to her by her father-in-law. The
promissory note was for an amount over $300,000.
(b)
Meeting Camacho
Pardo met Camacho in August 2018, when she was 66
years old. Camacho stated he was licensed to perform home
improvement work and handed Pardo a business card with a
contractor’s license number printed on it; in reality, the license
number belonged to someone else. Pardo hired Camacho to
remodel her bathroom, paying him with a check for around
$3,500. Camacho also did other work for Pardo, for which she
paid him. Camacho would give Pardo tickets to Dodger games
and Rams games and would give her and her family Christmas
presents. Pardo testified he “seem[ed] like a friend.”
In September 2018, Pardo entered a home improvement
contract with Camacho. Although the “contract price” was
$63,730, Camacho told Pardo that she would be responsible only
for $54,000, that he “was taking care of the rest,” and that Pardo
“had nothing to worry about.” Camacho also told Pardo she
would receive “a rebate for the work that was done for the energy
efficiency” from a company called E3.7
7 E3—Energy Efficient Equity—was a defendant in the
FAC. Pardo alleged E3 was “a private financial lender who
administers CMFA’s residential PACE program.” CMFA—
California Municipal Finance Authority—was also a defendant,
alleged to be “a joint powers authority that engages in financing
of economic development throughout California, including by
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
8
(c) PACE Loans
In September 2018, Pardo entered into a contract with E3,
borrowing $46,900. This money was wired to AMC Construction.
She entered into a second contract with E3 around the same
time, borrowing $49,875. This money was also wired to AMC
Construction.
(d) Coast 2 Coast Loan
In November 2018, Pardo signed a loan contract with Coast
2 Coast, borrowing $198,125. Pardo understood the purpose of
the loan to be to repay two other loans. Burt was the Coast 2
Coast representative who met with Pardo at her house; Camacho
told her Burt “was with the lender.” The three met for
approximately an hour, during which Pardo told Burt about her
social security income, and discussed her monthly expenses. She
did not give Burt permission to discuss her loan with Camacho.
Burt did not discuss with her whether she would be able to afford
the monthly payments on the loan.
In front of Burt, Pardo told Camacho, “I don’t need all that
money. What do I need all that money for? . . . I already paid
you.” Camacho responded, “Oh, don’t worry about it. Don’t
worry about it. I’m going to pay for it.” Burt did not contradict
him. Camacho decided on the loan amount; Pardo thought the
purpose of the loan was for Camacho to “get money for himself”
because she did not need the loan proceeds.
From the $198,125 Pardo borrowed, $50,023.25 repaid an
existing loan Pardo had with Citibank, prior to meeting
Camacho. $110,553.83 repaid the two PACE loans. $850 repaid
running a residential PACE program.” Pardo settled her claims
against E3 and CMFA before trial.
9
balances Pardo owed on three credit cards. After deducting other
fees and lender charges, Pardo received $26,779.29, which she
gave to Camacho at his request.8 Pardo testified she was still
repaying this loan.
(e) Ladera Loan
In December 2018, Pardo borrowed $36,500 from Ladera
Lending. The proceeds went to Camacho, who decided the loan
amount, and who told her the money was for home
improvements. He also said not to “worry about it because he
was going to take care of everything.” Burt never told Pardo she
might have issues repaying this loan because she was already
paying the Coast 2 Coast loan. After various fees were deducted,
Pardo received $30,476.25. She subsequently wrote three checks
to Camacho totaling $30,200. Pardo made five payments on this
loan of $414.63 each, or $2,073.15 total.
(f) Third PACE Loan
Pardo entered into a third contract with E3, borrowing
$97,040.9 When she entered the contract, she did not understand
she would be responsible for repaying the loan. Camacho told her
he would “take care” of the payments for this loan.
8 Exhibits admitted into evidence show Pardo wrote three
checks to Camacho over three consecutive days: one for $7,356,
and two for $7,806, for a total of $22,968.
9 In the FAC, Pardo alleged E3 changed its name to Fortifi
Financial. In her appellate brief, Pardo states this third loan was
from Fortifi Financial. Burt does not dispute this.
10
(g) Point Digital Finance
In mid-2019, Pardo entered into a contract with Point
Digital Finance. The closing statement Pardo received for this
transaction stated that Point Digital would pay Pardo $165,000
to purchase an “Option” in her property. Although the appraised
value of Pardo’s home was listed as $750,000, the parties agreed
the home would be valued at $600,000 “for purposes of
calculating the Option Investment Payment and other amounts
under the Option Agreement.” For the next 30 years, Pardo could
repurchase this “Option” by repaying Point Digital the $165,000,
plus 68.8 percent of any appreciation to the home at the time of
repurchase, subject to an 18 percent cap (presumably per
annum).
Part of the proceeds from the Point Digital transaction
($36,918.36) repaid the Ladera loan. After that payoff and other
fees, Pardo received $122,371.64. Pardo made no payments to
Point Digital, and Point Digital placed a lien on her home. Less
than two weeks after the Point Digital transaction closed, Pardo
wrote two checks to Camacho, totaling $122,371.64.
In April 2020, the buyer of the vacant lot that Pardo sold
asked Pardo if she could extend the promissory note she was
carrying (from which she was earning $1,500 a month). Pardo
declined, telling the buyer she would need “the final balance to be
paid off” because she needed to “payoff [sic] these loans that I
have.” The buyer paid the note off and, in January 2021, Pardo
used the repayment to repurchase Point Digital’s option, sending
it a cashier’s check for $218,665.58.
11
2. Burt
(a) Background
Burt testified he was a loan officer for Coast 2 Coast, which
is a mortgage lender and broker. He originated loans for Coast 2
Coast and would explain all the details of the loans to the
borrowers. Coast 2 Coast paid him commission for loans he
originated. Burt was also the sole owner, manager, and employee
of Ladera Lending.
Burt agreed that, as a loan officer, he could not disclose
loan information to a home improvement contractor without the
borrower’s consent, including when the loan would fund. He
additionally agreed he was required to take direction on the loan
amount from the borrower, not the contractor.
(b) Pardo
Burt testified Camacho referred Pardo to him in October
2018, when she was 66 years old. Burt arranged two loans for
Pardo: a $198,125 loan from Coast 2 Coast and a $36,500 from
Ladera Lending.
(i) Coast 2 Coast Loan
The amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan was the “maximum
amount of a government-backed loan that [Pardo] could qualify
[for] based on her income.” The loan was secured by Pardo’s
home.
Burt did not recall if Pardo requested the amount of the
Coast 2 Coast loan. At the time he was arranging the Coast 2
Coast loan, Burt knew Pardo already had over $100,000 in debt
for financing home improvement projects.
12
Pardo’s Coast 2 Coast loan application stated two sources of
monthly income: “Social Security/Disability Income” at $1,761.25
and “Notes Receivable/Installment” at $1,046.33, for a total of
$2,807.58. If her loan were approved, her monthly expenses were
estimated at $1,403.66, placing her debt-to-income ratio at
approximately 50 percent, which Burt testified was the maximum
debt-to-income ratio allowed for government-backed loans. The
Coast 2 Coast loan funded in mid-November 2018. Before the
loan funded, Burt had already started working on the Ladera
loan for Pardo.
(ii) Ladera Loan
For the Ladera loan application, Pardo’s income was again
listed as $2,807.58 and, if her loan were approved, her proposed
monthly expenses would be $1,818.29, a debt-to-income ratio of
over 50 percent.
Burt did not recall if he advised Pardo not to take the
Ladera loan, or that the Ladera loan could be difficult for her to
repay. He did not provide her with a written disclosure that
Ladera Lending was his company. The Ladera loan application
bore a date of October 19, 2018, next to Pardo’s signature. The
Ladera loan funded on December 7, 2018, and was secured by
Pardo’s home.
(c) Camacho
Burt testified he had known Camacho since at least 2010.
Burt admitted he saw that Camacho wanted Pardo’s loans to
fund as soon as possible for “as high [amounts] . . . as was
possible.” At Burt’s deposition, he testified, “I know she [Pardo]
relied on him [Camacho].” Burt never advised Pardo that
Camacho was taking advantage of her. Burt agreed Camacho
13
was a “fraudster” but maintained he saw no “red flags or
warnings anywhere from Mr. Camacho that he was going to scam
Mrs. Pardo.”
(d) Text Messages with Camacho
Burt and Camacho exchanged numerous text messages,
which were admitted as exhibits at trial. Pardo was not a party
to these text messages, and Burt did not tell Pardo that Camacho
was texting him about her loans. However, Burt testified it was
“normal to have text messages between loan officers and
contractors,” and it was something he did “[a]ll the time.”
On November 7, 2018, Burt texted Camacho to inform him
when Burt’s notary would be at Pardo’s house to “get the loan
docs signed.” That same evening, Burt texted Camacho: “What’s
the max payment you [want P]ardo to have on the 2nd loan?
That way I figure out the amount.” Camacho responded:
“Anywhere from 300–500.” Burt replied: “I would keep [i]t high
300’s. 500 will put her over the edge.”10 Camacho answered:
“Ok sounds good.” Burt admitted he lacked written authorization
from Pardo for Camacho to decide the terms of her loan or to
release any loan information to Camacho but claimed he had her
verbal consent.
On November 12, 2018, Camacho asked Burt in a text
message “when will the money be deposited into [P]ardo[’]s
account?” Burt responded: “I think it will fund tomorrow. I
would expect the money to hit her account Thursday or Friday
because of the holiday today.” Camacho replied: “Oh ok ty let me
know once you find out it’s in her account.” Two days later, Burt
10 Burt explained he meant Pardo could not repay $500 a
month.
14
texted Camacho: “Pardo funded. She will have money wired to
her account on Friday.” Camacho responded: “Good morning and
ty brother and also lmk when we will be ready to get started on
the line of credit.” The next day, Burt informed Camacho: “I’m
going to submit [P]ardo Monday for the 2nd loan. Money will be
in her account tomorrow for the first loan.”11 Camacho then
asked: “how much are we going for?” Burt replied: “I’m thinking
30 but I will let you know.”
On November 26, 2018, Camacho checked in with Burt
whether there was any “word as to when we will get this going
bro?”12 Burt responded he thought they “will get loan docs this
week.” Camacho replied: “Ok ty give me at least a couple days[’]
notice[,] that way I have her ready and the amount ty.” Burt
answered: “Will do!”
On December 5, 2018, Burt informed Camacho: “Pardo is
funded.” Camacho again asked Burt to “let me know if you hear
[the money]’s there.” Five days later, upon inquiry from
Camacho, Burt informed him: “Funds are there now.”
On December 27, 2018, Camacho asked Burt to send him
something to show Pardo’s initial two PACE loans had been
repaid. Burt offered to send him the loan closing statement.
On February 9, 2019, Burt texted Camacho: “I was
thinking if you want to get more money from Mary Pardo, she
would qualify for a reverse mortgage. Just a thought.”13
11 Burt testified that “2nd loan” referred to the Ladera loan.
12 Burt testified “this” referred to the Ladera loan.
13 Burt explained that “a reverse mortgage is a government-
backed loan that’s made for people that are above 62 years of age,
and it gives you the option of whether you want to make a
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
15
Camacho responded: “Afternoon bro ok ty I will put it out there.”
Burt replied: “Cool.”
The text messages also included another referral for Burt
from Camacho; Burt asked Camacho for the amount of the
referral’s monthly income, and asked Camacho to tell Burt “the
amount of the loan he wants for the homeowner.” This referral
consisted of a couple who were both 82 years old.
3.
Franco Tamburrino
Tamburrino testified he was one of the two cofounders of
Coast 2 Coast. Coast 2 Coast’s agreement with Burt paid Burt a
percentage of the loan amounts he generated as commission.
Specifically, Burt would receive 0.75 commission on monthly loan
amounts up to $2,500,000, 0.8 percent commission on any loan
amounts generated between $2,500,000 and $5,000,000, and 0.85
percent commission on loan amounts generated about $5,000,000.
This structure incentivized Coast 2 Coast’s salesperson to
originate higher loan values.
4.
Jordan Must
Burt called Must as an expert in the mortgage industry.
Must testified the Coast 2 Coast loan “was done according to
Fannie Mae guidelines.”14
payment or not. [¶] If you don’t make a payment, the interest is
going to get tacked onto the loan and the balance will go higher.
You can make an interest-only payment and it will stay the same,
or you can make a full payment and the balance will go down.
But it gives people an option to make a payment or not.”
14 Must explained companies had an incentive to make
loans “by the book” because otherwise the loan was uninsurable,
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
16
As for the Ladera loan, Must opined the origination fee was
high, and the interest rate was over 10 percent and therefore
usurious. Must claimed that, using Pardo’s “correct note
receivable income,” the debt-to-income ratio was just under 55
percent. Must had no opinion on whether Burt provided
sufficient verbal counseling to Pardo. He agreed a loan officer
had a duty to act in the best interest of the borrower and put her
interest above the loan officer’s. If a borrower was
unsophisticated in financial affairs, the loan officer had a duty to
verbally advise the borrower about the loan terms. If the loan
officer saw the borrower being taken advantage of, or there was
apparent fraud, the loan officer would be obligated to tell the
borrower. If a loan officer offered a borrower a loan from his own
company, the loan officer was required to disclose this to the
borrower. It would also be improper for a loan officer to discuss
loan details with a contractor without consent or authorization.
Must opined the text messages between Burt and Camacho were
“unusual.” Must agreed that if, in Burt’s presence, Pardo had
stated she did not need the proceeds from a loan, and Camacho
had told her not to worry about it and that he would take care of
the loan payments, then Burt was obligated to inform Pardo she
was the obligor on the loan, and that failure to repay the loan
would put her home at risk.
5. Michael Wippler
Pardo called Wippler as an expert in the mortgage
industry. Wippler testified that a mortgage salesperson owes the
borrower duties of loyalty (requiring them “to act in the best
and a company would have to “sell it for less on the secondary
market.”
17
interest of the client at all times”), disclosure (requiring them “to
tell the client everything about a transaction to make sure that
they’re fully informed and understand everything that’s going
on”), and confidentiality (requiring them not to disclose specifics
about a loan to another party, especially if doing so would place
the client in a detrimental position. When the client was elderly,
the salesperson must consider an “elderly person’s ability to
understand what is happening” and an “elderly person’s ability to
pay.”
In terms of Burt’s dealings with Pardo, Wippler opined that
Burt breached the duty of loyalty by “looking out for himself” and
“looking out for Mr. Camacho” and by “putting [Pardo in] loans
that she couldn’t afford.” He also “put her in a loan from his own
company” with “usurious rates.”
Burt breached the duty of confidentiality by “working with
Mr. Camacho and disclosing information to Mr. Camacho to help
Mr. Camacho . . . better be able to convince Ms. Pardo to use
Camacho’s services and, therefore, use Mr. Burt’s loans.” He also
“colluded with Mr. Camacho to try to take out additional funds
from Ms. Pardo.” Burt breached the duty of disclosure by failing
to disclose to Pardo his relationship and communications with
Camacho, as well as the fact that Ladera Lending was his
company.
Wippler based his opinion partially on the text messages
between Burt and Camacho, which he characterized as
“outrageous.” The two text exchanges that “really struck”
Wippler were: (1) the suggestion Burt made to Camacho
regarding Pardo qualifying for a reverse mortgage, even though
Burt admitted at his deposition that he knew prior to sending the
text “that Mrs. Pardo did not want to do . . . a reverse mortgage”;
18
and (2) the messages where Burt and Camacho discuss the dollar
amount at which to set Pardo’s monthly payments, because that
discussion should have occurred between Burt and Pardo. He
recounted the numerous text exchanges in which Burt discussed
loan and funding details with Camacho, stating these
conversations “should not be happening.”
Wippler opined Burt also breached his fiduciary duty to
Pardo by arranging the Ladera loan for her. He estimated the
Ladera loan “overage” was between $5,000 and $6,000.15
As for the Coast 2 Coast loan, Wippler concluded that the
“interest rate is fair” and “there’s not that many issues with that
loan.” But when considering Pardo’s ability to pay, and whether
she needed to borrow so much money, “[t]hat starts tainting it.”
Wippler confirmed Burt could have arranged for a loan to
refinance Pardo’s existing loans, without a “cash-out component.”
After the witnesses testified, Pardo moved certain
deposition excerpts into evidence, and then both sides rested.
The court ordered closing arguments to be done by written brief.
C. Statement of Decision
In December 2024, the court provided the parties with a
“Tentative Decision on Trial.” No parties objected to the
tentative decision. In January 2025, the court issued its
Statement of Decision.
15 While the term “overage” was never precisely defined,
Wippler appeared to be testifying about how much more Pardo
had to pay due to the improperly high fees and rates associated
with the Ladera loan.
19
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The court found Burt owed Pardo a fiduciary duty because
“Burt was acting as Plaintiff’s mortgage broker when he was
originating loans for Plaintiff.” The court found Burt breached
his fiduciary duty to Pardo in eight ways:
(a) Arranging Two Simultaneous Loans
Burt “arranged two simultaneous loans for Plaintiff, behind
her back, with Alex Camacho . . . and at his direction.” Pardo
presented evidence that “(1) Camacho called Burt regarding a
home improvement project for Plaintiff in late 2018; (2) Burt
arranged two loans for Plaintiff: (i) the Coast 2 Coast loan of
$198,125 and secured by Plaintiff’s home, and (ii) the Ladera loan
of $36,500 and secured by Plaintiff’s home; and (3) Camacho and
Burt communicated about Plaintiff’s loans without her
authorization.”
(i) Coast 2 Coast Loan
As for the Coast 2 Coast loan, the court noted “Burt
originated the Coast 2 Coast loan for the maximum amount for
which Plaintiff could qualify despite the fact that Pardo, in front
of Burt, told Camacho she did not ‘need all that money.’ ”
Although Burt “saw that Camacho wanted the loans to fund as
soon as possible” and “was interested in getting as high as loans
as was possible [sic] for” Pardo, Burt did not advise Pardo
“Camacho was taking advantage of her and continued to discuss
the details or her loans with him.”
The court found that “Burt aided and abetted Camacho in
maximizing the amount of the loans originated in Plaintiff’s
name based on Burt’s conduct in giving Camacho substantial
assistance in accomplishing a tortious result and breaching
20
Burt’s own fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.” Specifically, “(1) Burt
knew that Plaintiff did not need to obtain a loan in a high
amount, (2) Burt knew that it was Camacho who desired the
highest loan possible, (3) despite those facts, Burt originated the
highest possible loan for Plaintiff, and (4) Burt and Camacho
communicated about the funding of the Coast 2 Coast loan
without Plaintiff’s knowledge and in communications to which
she was not a party. The court finds, after considering the
totality of the circumstances, that this evidence shows that Burt
arranged the amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan pursuant to
Camacho’s desires and not Plaintiff’s, and therefore breached his
fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.”
(ii) Ladera Loan
Burt also communicated with Camacho about the Ladera
loan without Pardo’s authorization. In November 2018, “Burt
sent a message to Camacho asking Camacho how high he wanted
Plaintiff’s monthly payments to be on the Ladera loan.” He also
discussed with Camacho the amount of the loan.
The court concluded “that Burt (1) began the application
process before the Coast 2 Coast loan closed, (2) asked Camacho,
and not Plaintiff, about the desired amount for the loan, and (3)
agreed to give Camacho advance notice regarding the readiness
of the loan documents so that Camacho could—pursuant to his
express statement—have Plaintiff ‘ready.’ The court finds, after
considering the totality of the circumstances, that this evidence
shows that Burt arranged the Ladera loan at Camacho’s direction
and not Plaintiff’s, and therefore breached his fiduciary duty to
Plaintiff.”
21
The court concluded, “Burt worked with Camacho and at
his direction to maximize the amount of the loans and to abet
Camacho in obtaining additional money from Plaintiff.”
(b) Sharing Loan Information with
Camacho Without Written Consent
The court noted Pardo credibly testified she did not give
Burt permission to discuss loan details with Camacho, and Burt
himself admitted he lacked written authorization from Pardo to
do so. While Pardo, Camacho, and Burt all discussed the loans
together, “agreeing to discuss the loans with Burt and Camacho
together, in her presence, does not show that Plaintiff was
amenable to Burt’s discussing the loan with Camacho outside of
her presence.”
(c) Failure to Disclose Communications
with Camacho
The court found “Burt failed to disclose to Plaintiff his
communications with Camacho regarding her loans,” which
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.
(d) Originating Excessive Loans
The court found “Burt breached his fiduciary duties to
[Pardo] by originating loans in her name in excessive amounts
when (1) she said that she did not need the money, and (2) it
caused her debt-to-income ratio to exceed 50 percent.” “Burt
testified that he could not recall whether he advised Plaintiff (1)
that she may experience difficulties in paying off the Ladera loan,
or (2) against taking out the Ladera loan.” Pardo’s expert
witness testified that “the origination of the Ladera loan was not
in Plaintiff’s best interest because it ‘took her debt-to-income up
22
to $1,800, which exceeded the Fannie [Mae] guidelines which are
50 percent.”
(e) Failing to Inform Pardo She Was the
Sole Obligor
The court found Burt breached his fiduciary duty to Pardo
“by failing to inform her, upon witnessing Camacho’s false
representation to Plaintiff that he would make the payments on
the loan, that Plaintiff would be the sole obliger on the Coast 2
Coast loan.”
(f) Originating the Ladera Loan with
Usurious Interest Rates and
Excessive Points
The court found “Burt breached his fiduciary duties of
loyalty and to act in the utmost good faith toward Plaintiff by
originating the Ladera loan with a usurious interest rate and
excessive points.”
(g) Not Telling Pardo He Owned Ladera
The court found Burt breached his fiduciary duty to Pardo
“by failing to provide a written disclosure to Plaintiff that Ladera,
with which Plaintiff entered into a loan agreement that was
facilitated by Burt, was Burt’s lending company.”
(h) Advising Camacho How to “Get More
Money” From Pardo
The court found Burt breached his duty to “act always in
the utmost good faith” toward Pardo “by sending a message to
Camacho advising him how he could ‘get more money’ from her.”
Sometime after this text message, Camacho “arranged for
23
Plaintiff to obtain a loan in the amount of $165,000 from Point
Digital Finance, Inc., which operated similarly to a reverse
mortgage.”
(i) Damages
The court found Burt’s breaches of fiduciary duty with
regards to the Coast 2 Coast loan damaged Pardo in the amount
of $22,968, “consisting of the $22,968 in proceeds claimed by
Camacho” (i.e., the amount of the “cash-out” proceeds Pardo sent
to Camacho). The court also found Pardo was entitled to
prejudgment interest from the date the loan closed (November
14, 2018) until the date judgment was entered. The court
declined to award the costs associated with the loan, finding
Pardo “would have incurred those charges irrespective of Burt’s
breaches of fiduciary duty.”
For the Ladera loan, “which the court finds should not have
been originated,” the court awarded damages in the amount of
$38,991.51, consisting of the $36,918.36 required to pay it off
from the Point Digital loan and the $2,073.15 in monthly
payments Pardo made on the loan before it was repaid. The court
awarded prejudgment interest “from the date that the Point
Digital Finance loan (which refinanced the Ladera loan) closed
(June 27, 2019) through the date of judgment, to be calculated
upon entry of judgment.”
Finally, for the Point Digital transaction, the court
awarded “$181,747.22 as a result of Burt’s breach of fiduciary to
her by advising Camacho on how to get ‘more money’ out of her,
which led to the origination of the Point loan, consisting of the
$218,665.58 that Plaintiff paid to buy back her home equity less
the $36,918.36 of the re-financed Ladera loan amount.” The
court also awarded prejudgment interest “from the date that
24
Plaintiff paid off the Point loan (January 20, 2021) through the
date of judgment.”
The court declined to impose punitive damages because
Pardo “has not met her burden of establishing the financial
condition of Burt.”
2. Fraud
The court found Burt “committed constructive fraud”
toward Pardo because he owed her a fiduciary duty but
nevertheless failed to share material information with her,
namely: (i) “his communications with Camacho regarding
Plaintiff’s loans”; (ii) “upon witnessing Camacho’s false
representation to Plaintiff that he would make the payments on
the Coast 2 Coast Loan, that she would be the sole obligor
thereunder”; and (iii) that Ladera Lending was his company.
The court found Pardo did not prove intentional fraud but
did prove “Burt aided and abetted Camacho in committing fraud
because, as set forth in connection with the court’s ruling on the
eighth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the evidence
shows that Burt gave Camacho substantial assistance in
accomplishing a tortious result regarding the origination of the
Coast 2 Coast and Ladera loans.”
The court found “Ladera may be held vicariously liable for
Burt’s conduct.” As Ladera Lending’s “sole owner, manager, and
employee, . . . Burt was acting in his capacity as agent and
employee for Ladera when he failed to provide a written
25
disclosure to Plaintiff that Ladera is his own company and that
there was a conflict of interest.”16
As for damages, the court found Burt liable for the “$22,968
in proceeds claimed by Camacho” from the Coast 2 Coast loan,
and $38,991.51 for the Ladera loan (consisting of the repaid
amount of $36,918.36 and the $2,073.15 in monthly payments
Pardo made on the loan before it was refinanced), plus
prejudgment interest. Both amounts were the same as the court
awarded for the Coast 2 Coast and Ladera loans for breach of
fiduciary duty.
3. Elder Abuse
The court found no one disputed Pardo was an “elder”
within the meaning of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult
Civil Protection Act, and that Pardo proved Burt “assist[ed] in
taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or
personal property” of Pardo’s by originating the Coast 2 Coast
loan, the Ladera loan, and the Point Digital transaction.
However, the court found Pardo failed to prove Burt’s
assistance in taking her property was “for a wrongful use because
she has not proven, based on the arguments and analysis set
forth in connection with this cause of action, that Defendants
knew or should have known that this conduct was likely to be
harmful to Plaintiff.” While Burt “originated loans in the highest
amounts possible,” knew Pardo “did not want to take these loans
16 The court rejected Ladera Lending’s argument that
Pardo “signed a release in which she released defendant Ladera
from all liability for damages caused by Camacho” because
Ladera Lending dismissed the affirmative defense of release from
its Answer, and therefore the court deemed it waived.
26
out,” and understood Camacho “wanted loans with higher
amounts,” this did not mean Burt knew or should have known
that originating these loans “would likely cause harm to
Plaintiff.”
4. Negligence and Unfair Competition
The court found Pardo failed to prove negligence or unfair
competition against Burt and Ladera.
D. Judgment and Appeal
On the same day as it issued the Statement of Decision, the
court entered judgment in favor of Pardo, ordering that she would
recover:
“(1) [F]rom defendants Jason Eugene Burt and Coast 2
Coast Funding Group, Inc., jointly and severally, damages in the
amount of $22,968, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum from November 14, 2018 to the date of
judgment in the amount of $9,913.68.”
“(2) [F]rom defendants Jason Eugene Burt and Ladera
Lending, LLC, jointly and severally, damages in the additional
amount of $38,991.51, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 7
percent per annum from June 27, 2019 to the date of judgment in
the amount of $15,132.04.”
“(3) [F]rom defendant Jason Eugene Burt, individually,
damages in the additional amount of $181,747.22, plus
prejudgment interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum from
January 20, 2021 to the date of judgment in the amount of
$50,547.”
Burt and Coast 2 Coast timely appealed. Pardo timely
cross-appealed. In February 2026, pursuant to a stipulation filed
27
by Coast 2 Coast and Pardo, we dismissed their respective
appeals against each other.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Err in Finding Burt Liable
for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the
fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the
breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070,
1086.) Burt does not dispute he owed Pardo a fiduciary duty.
Instead he argues the court erred in finding him liable for breach
of fiduciary duty because: (1) “[r]outine lender-contractor
coordination does not breach fiduciary duty absent evidence Burt
placed Camacho’s interests above Pardo’s or failed to disclose
material facts on which she relied”; (2) any breaches of fiduciary
duty did not cause Pardo to enter the Point Digital transaction;
and (3) the court erred in awarding Pardo the “full Ladera payoff”
because “Pardo received the Ladera proceeds, controlled
disbursement, and wrote checks to Camacho.”
1. Placing Camacho’s and His Own Interest
Above Pardo’s
Ample evidence supports the conclusion that Burt placed
Camacho’s and his own interest above Pardo’s and failed to
disclose material facts.
Substantial evidence supports a conclusion that Burt knew
Pardo did not need the excess money the loans provided. When
arranging the Coast 2 Coast loan, Pardo told Camacho in front of
Burt, “I don’t need all that money. What do I need all that money
28
for? . . . I already paid you.” Despite this knowledge, Burt
worked on arranging two loans for Pardo: the Coast 2 Coast loan
and the Ladera loan. The Coast 2 Coast loan included an
unnecessary “cash-out” component, when Burt could have
arranged for Pardo to borrow only what she needed to refinance
her current debt. The Ladera loan charged excessive fees and
provided Pardo cash at a usurious interest rate when Burt
already knew she did not need the money. Further, the Ladera
loan put Pardo’s debt-to-income ratio over 50 percent and was
made because Coast 2 Coast would not loan Pardo any more
money. Burt testified the amount of the Coast 2 Coast loan was
the “maximum amount of a government-backed loan that she
could qualify based on her income.” Coast 2 Coast’s agreement
with Burt provided him commissions based on the dollar amount
of loans he generated—the higher the amount, the higher the
percentage of commissions. Further, Burt asked Camacho, not
Pardo, what the “max payment” on the Ladera loan should be,
and Pardo testified Camacho decided on the loan amounts, not
her.
Substantial evidence also supports a conclusion that Burt
failed to disclose material facts to Pardo. When Pardo told
Camacho she did not need the money from the loans, Camacho
told her, in front of Burt, “Don’t worry about it. I’m going to pay
for it.” Yet Burt did not inform Pardo she would be the sole
obligor on the loans, and that any failure to repay would
jeopardize her home. Nor did Burt tell Pardo he was
communicating with Camacho about her loans, which Burt
admitted he lacked written permission to do. Although Burt
claimed to have verbal permission to discuss the loans with
Camacho, Pardo expressly testified to the contrary.
29
Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion
that Burt breached his fiduciary duties to Pardo by placing
Camacho’s and his own interests above hers.
2. Causation
Burt next argues the court erred in attributing to him “the
entire $181,747 net loss from the Point transaction . . . based
solely on his February 2019 text: ‘I was thinking if you want to
get more money from Mary Pardo, she would qualify for a reverse
mortgage. Just a thought.” He contends the Point Digital
transaction “was not a reverse mortgage; it was an unrelated
equity-share deal entered into four months after Burt’s text
message and arranged solely by Camacho with a third-party
lender Burt never contacted or knew.” Citing Viner v. Sweet
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1240, he asserts “[t]he chain of causation
is broken by Camacho’s independent acts.” Viner is unhelpful to
Burt.
In Viner, our Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff in a
transactional malpractice action must show that but for the
alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff
would have obtained a more favorable result.” (Viner v. Sweet,
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) In discussing causation generally,
the high court stated that “ ‘California has definitively adopted
the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts for
cause-in-fact determinations.’ ” (Id. at p. 1239.) The court went
on to explain that “[t]he text of Restatement section 432
demonstrates how the ‘substantial factor’ test subsumes the
traditional ‘but for’ test of causation. Subsection (1) of section
432 provides: ‘Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s
negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even if
30
the actor had not been negligent.’ (Italics added.) Subsection (2)
states that if ‘two forces are actively operating . . . and each of
itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s
negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it
about.’ ” (Id. at p. 1240.) The court also reiterated that “plaintiff
need not prove causation with absolute certainty. Rather, the
plaintiff need only ‘ “introduce evidence which affords a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not
that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
result.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1243.)
Here, Pardo introduced evidence which afforded a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not
that Burt’s conduct was the cause in fact of Pardo entering the
Point Digital transaction: Burt suggested to Camacho that if he
wanted to “get more money from Mary Pardo, she would qualify
for a reverse mortgage.” Camacho responded: “Afternoon bro ok
ty I will put it out there.” This evidence permits a conclusion
that, until Burt sent his text, Camacho had not thought of
“get[ting] more money from Mary Pardo” through a different
lending vehicle that did not require monthly payments, such as a
reverse mortgage, as it was clear no institution would lend Pardo
any more money based on her then extant loans and income.
Burt also argues the Point Digital transaction was not a
reverse mortgage but an “equity-share deal.” While this is true, a
reverse mortgage (which Burt told Camacho Pardo would qualify
for) and the Point Digital transaction share at least three key
commonalities: the borrower need make no monthly payments; it
would be possible for someone like Pardo, who had exhausted her
ability to obtain traditional loans, to enter into both types of
transactions; and at the end of either transaction, Pardo would
31
receive a large sum of cash that Camacho could “get . . . from”
her.
Thus, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion
that Burt’s text to Camacho ultimately caused her to enter the
Point Digital transaction.
3. Ladera Loan Damages
Finally, Burt argues that, even assuming he is liable for
breach of fiduciary duty in arranging the Ladera loan, the
“proper measure for breach of fiduciary duty or fraud is
detriment proximately caused by the breach—typically excess
interest, points/fees, or other actual loss—not the entire principal
repaid by a borrower who received and used the funds.”
We agree the proper measure for damages for Burt’s breach
of fiduciary duty is the detriment caused by his breach. Burt
knew Pardo did not need the proceeds from the Ladera loan, and
that it was Camacho who wanted Pardo to borrow the money.
Further, Burt worked with Camacho on the terms of that loan
and informed him when it funded. Thus, the court found that the
Ladera loan “should not have been originated,” and that Burt
breached his fiduciary duty by originating it. Had Burt not
breached his fiduciary duty by originating the Ladera loan, Pardo
would not have had the obligation to repay it, and Camacho could
not have convinced her to send him the proceeds. And had Burt
not disclosed loan details to Camacho, it would have impaired
Camacho’s ability to get Pardo “ready” to give Camacho the
funds. In such circumstances, we conclude the court did not err
in finding Burt liable for the entire amount required to repay the
Ladera loan.
32
B. Fraud
After finding Burt committed constructive fraud and aided
and abetted Camacho in committing fraud, the court found Burt
liable for the “$22,968 in proceeds claimed by Camacho” from the
Coast 2 Coast loan, and $38,991.51 for the Ladera loan
(consisting of the refinance amount of $36,918.36 and the
$2,073.15 in monthly payments Pardo made on the loan before it
was refinanced), plus prejudgment interest. The court awarded
these same damages for Burt’s breach of fiduciary duty. Thus,
even were we to reverse the court’s finding of liability on fraud,
because of our conclusion that the court did not err in finding him
liable for breach of fiduciary duty, Burt would still be liable to
Pardo for the damages awarded for fraud. We therefore need not
consider Burt’s arguments regarding fraud.
C. Prejudgment Interest
Citing Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) and KGM
Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 376
(KGM), Burt contends the trial court erred in awarding
prejudgment interest because such interest “is permitted only
where damages are certain or capable of being made certain by
calculation,” and “[t]he damages awarded here required judicial
discretion” as “[t]he court attributed some damages to alleged
diversion of loan proceeds, excluded other claimed amounts,
segregated damages among different transactions and actors, and
resolved disputed expert testimony to arrive at final figures.”
The damages awarded by the trial court were in fact
“certain or capable of being made certain by calculation” as they
were calculated based on the specific amounts arising from the
loan transactions, adduced by uncontradicted testimony and
evidence. The trial court did not base its award of damages on
33
any amounts that were subject to its own determination of
damages, such as pain and suffering. That the trial court
awarded some amounts sought and not others does not make the
damages awarded not “certain or capable of being made certain
by calculation.” (See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Los Angeles (1975)
52 Cal.App.3d 317, 322 [prejudgment interest warranted when
plaintiff “testified to the value of the destroyed property,” and
“testimony was uncontradicted”].)17
Moreover, whether or not interest was permitted under
Civil Code section 3287, Civil Code section 3288 provides: “In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be
given, in the discretion of the jury.” “While section 3288 only
grants such authority to the ‘jury,’ the trial court, when acting as
the trier of fact, may award prejudgment interest under this
section.” (Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat’l Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801,
814, fn. 16.)
“When, by virtue of the fraud or breach of fiduciary duty of
the defendant, a plaintiff has been deprived of the use of his
money or property and is obliged to resort to litigation to recover
it, the inclusion of interest in the award is necessary in order to
make the plaintiff whole.” (Michelson v. Hamada (1994) 29
17 KGM does not hold otherwise. In KGM, a seller of lettuce
refused to fulfill its contract, requiring the buyer to purchase
replacement lettuce on the open market at a higher price. (KGM,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 380.) The Court of Appeal
determined the buyer was entitled to prejudgment interest on the
damages awarded because the defendant “could have computed
[the damages] from reasonably available information.” (Id. at p.
391.) Here, too, Burt could have computed the damages from
reasonably available information.
34
Cal.App.4th 1566, 1586.) In such cases, “the trial court may
award prejudgment interest under section 3288 whether or not
plaintiff’s damages are ‘liquidated.’ ” (Redke v. Silvertrust (1971)
6 Cal.3d 94, 106; see also Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72
Cal.App.3d 544, 587 [“The law is clear that the jury may award
interest even on an unliquidated sum against a joint venturer
who has violated his fiduciary duties”].) Burt presents no
argument why an award of prejudgment interest under Civil
Code section 3288 would have been an abuse of discretion.
D. Financial Elder Abuse
“Financial abuse” of an elder occurs when a person “[t]akes,
secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal
property of an elder . . . for a wrongful use or with intent to
defraud, or both” or “[a]ssists in taking, secreting, appropriating,
obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder . . .
for a wrongful use . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd.
(a).) A person “shall be deemed to have taken, secreted,
appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if,
among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes,
appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person . . .
knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be
harmful to the elder . . . .” (Id., subd. (b).) “A plaintiff is not
required to prove bad faith or fraud to prevail on a claim of
financial elder abuse.” (Cameron v. Las Orchidas Properties, LLC
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 507.)
The court found that although Pardo had proven that she
was an elder and that Burt “ ‘assist[ed] in taking, secreting,
appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property
of' Plaintiff,” she failed to prove that he “assisted in the taking of
her property for a wrongful use because she has not proven,
35
based on the arguments and analysis set forth in connection with
this cause of action, that Defendants knew or should have known
that this conduct was likely to be harmful to Plaintiff.”
Pardo contends the court erred in finding she failed to meet
her burden of proof. Burt does not dispute substantial evidence
supports the court’s findings that Pardo was an elder and that he
assisted in “taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or
retaining” her property. But he argues Pardo has not shown the
court erred in finding he neither knew nor should have known his
actions would harm her.
1. Pardo Did Not Waive This Issue
Preliminarily, Burt argues Pardo waived this issue because
she did not object to the statement of decision. Burt cites no
authority for this contention, and we reject it. While Burt
correctly notes that Pardo’s failure to object requires us to imply
findings necessary to support the court’s judgment, this does not
mean Pardo cannot argue the court erred in its conclusions based
on the findings it either expressly or impliedly made. (See, e.g.,
United Services Auto. Assn. v. Dalrymple (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d
182, 186 [“party who fails to file opposition to a statement of
decision” cannot “be deemed to have waived objection to legal
errors which appear on the face of the statement”].)
In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 does not
hold otherwise. There, the appellant asserted the trial court’s
statement of decision “failed to decide two matters on which a
decision was requested, and that it was deficient in three other
respects.” (Id. at p. 1132.) Because he had failed to raise these
objections before the trial court, the Court of Appeal “inferred
that the trial court decided in favor of wife as the prevailing party
on any issue not addressed in the statement,” and our Supreme
36
Court affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1132–1133.) Here, Pardo is not
asserting the court failed to decide whether Burt should have
known his actions would harm Pardo—she is arguing the court
erred in deciding the evidence it had already credited failed to
show he should have known his actions would harm Pardo.
Marriage of Arceneaux did not hold that objecting to the
statement of decision is a prerequisite to challenge whether
substantial evidence supports a finding or whether, as in this
case, the undisputed evidence compels a conclusion different than
the one reached by the trial court.
2. The Court Erred in Finding Burt Not
Liable
“ ‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at
trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached”
and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.” ’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE
Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.)
Pardo contends that there was “no room for a judicial
determination” that the evidence the court had already credited
“was insufficient to support a finding that Burt knew—or at least
should have known—his conduct was likely to harm Pardo.”
Specifically, Pardo points out the court found that: (1) Burt knew
Pardo’s monthly income; (2) Burt knew the loans he procured for
Pardo “were at the limit of Pardo’s ability to repay”; (3) “Burt
knew Camacho was the one getting the proceeds of Pardo’s
loans”; (4) “Burt advised Camacho how to get a reverse mortgage
37
for Pardo” even though he knew she could not make any more
monthly payments; (5) “Burt knew that Plaintiff did not need to
obtain a loan in a high amount”; (6) “Burt knew that it was
Camacho who desired the highest loan possible” and (7) “despite
those facts, Burt originated the highest possible loan for
Plaintiff.”
Burt disagrees, contending the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that “originating a loan within standard
guidelines, even at the maximum amount, does not establish that
the loan officer knew the loan was likely to harm the borrower,”
that “Burt’s knowledge that Camacho was receiving loan
proceeds for a construction project does not, by itself, establish
that Burt knew or should have known Pardo would be harmed,”
and that “suggesting a legitimate financial product does not
demonstrate knowledge that the proceeds would be misused.”
But whether each piece of evidence by itself would compel a
contrary finding, taken together, we conclude the evidence does
compel a finding that Burt should have known his action would
likely harm Pardo.
Burt was not just originating a maximum loan within
standard guidelines. He was doing so when he, as the court
found: (1) knew the borrower had expressly stated she did not
need “all that money”; (2) knew it was Camacho who wanted the
Coast 2 Coast loan to be as high as possible; (3) knew Camacho
had assured Pardo that Camacho would make the Coast 2 Coast
loan payments; and (4) was communicating the details of the
Coast 2 Coast and Ladera loans with Camacho without Pardo’s
involvement or knowledge, including asking Camacho how high
he wanted Pardo’s payments on the Ladera loan to be.
Additionally, Burt, the owner of Ladera, “originat[ed] the Ladera
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loan with a usurious interest rate and excessive points.” And
finally, as Burt concedes is “the strongest piece of evidence,” after
knowing that Pardo’s debt-to-income ratio exceeded 50 percent,
Burt sent Camacho a text message advising Camacho not on how
he could help Pardo get more money, but on how Camacho could
“get more money from” Pardo in the form of a reverse mortgage.
On such a record, we conclude there is no room for a
judicial determination that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that Burt should have known his actions were
likely to be harmful to Pardo. To the contrary, the evidence
permits only the conclusion that Burt should have known his
actions were likely to be harmful to Pardo.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment finding Burt not liable for
elder abuse is reversed. On remand, the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Pardo and against Burt on that cause of
action, and to conduct any further proceedings necessitated by
that change, such as permitting Pardo to request attorneys’ fees
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5. The
remaining portion of the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff and
appellant Pardo shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
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