Filed 8/12/26 Parco v. Henkels & McCoy CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
ROBERT PARCO et al., B343636 c/w B346617
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV20692)
HENKELS & MCCOY, INC. et
al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Affirmed.
Rose, Klein & Marias, Richard G. Barone, and Chase P.
Nielsen for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Klinedinst, Robert G. Harrison, Robert M. Shaughnessy,
and Suzanne L. Schmidt for Defendants and Respondents
Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Southern California Gas Company,
Inc.
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Brian I. Hamblet, Alena
Shamos, and Robert L. Theiring for Defendant and Respondent
City of Santa Clarita.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Tracy D. Forbath, Ernest
Slome, and Brittany B. Sutton for Defendant and Respondent
Traffic Management, Inc.
******
A motorist made an unprotected left turn in an intersection
where construction was taking place, and was hit by an oncoming
car. The motorist’s passenger was injured. After the passenger
passed away, her family members sued the city, a public utility,
the public utility’s general contractor and a subcontractor,
alleging that the construction had blocked the motorist’s view
from the turn lane. The defendants moved for summary
judgment based on the motorist’s unequivocal deposition
testimony that the construction did not in any way block her view
or cause the collision. Because the evidence the plaintiffs
produced in opposition was insufficient to raise a triable issue of
material fact as to whether construction vehicles blocked either
driver’s view of the intersection and caused the collision, the trial
court granted summary judgment. We affirm.
2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The intersection
In August 2021, the Southern California Gas Company
(SoCal Gas) began construction on an underground gas pipe
located at the intersection of Lyons Avenue and Avenida Rotella
in Santa Clarita, California. The City of Santa Clarita (the City)
issued SoCal Gas a permit, SoCal Gas hired Henkels & McCoy,
Inc. to perform the work, and Henkels & McCoy hired Traffic
Management, Inc. to provide traffic control services at the site.
Lyons Avenue is an east-west thoroughfare. In the blocks
on either side of its intersection with Avenida Rotella, Lyons
Avenue has two lanes of traffic in each direction as well as a left
turn bay. The construction necessitated closing the left lane and
left turn bay of the westbound portion of Lyons Avenue
approaching the intersection; the sole lane remaining for
westbound traffic was the right lane nearest the curb.
B. The accident
At half past noon on a sunny and clear day in September
2021, Helen Ann Lynn was driving eastbound on Lyons Avenue
with Stellina Parco in the backseat of her car. Lynn entered the
left turn bay to turn left onto Avenida Rotella. Despite the
construction in the median and westbound lefthand lane, Lynn
repeatedly and steadfastly maintained that her view “of the cars
coming the other way” “wasn’t blocked” or “obstructed in any
way,” and that she “could see” “everything down the street,”
including “all the [oncoming] cars.” After waiting behind the
limit line for two light cycles and for 25 westbound cars to pass,
she saw a “red car” “pull out of a driveway” less than a block
away from the intersection. Because the red car was “still way
3
down the street” and “there were no [other] cars coming,” Lynn
began to turn left.
Alexander Gray Popejoy, who was driving a red vehicle,
stated that he entered the westbound lane of Lyons Avenue after
making a U-turn from the eastbound lane more than 500 feet
away from the intersection (further away than the driveway
Lynn identified). As Popejoy approached the Avenida Rotella
intersection, he saw a construction truck in the left turn bay of
the westbound portion of Lyons Avenue, but Popejoy was
nonetheless able to see Lynn’s vehicle waiting in the eastbound
left turn bay from approximately 90 feet away. When Popejoy’s
vehicle was approximately 50 to 60 feet away from the
intersection, Lynn started her left turn. Popejoy slammed on his
brakes but struck Lynn’s vehicle, causing injuries to Stellina.1
Officer Steven Jagiello responded to the scene of the
collision. Although neither Lynn nor Popejoy reported that the
construction obstructed their views, Officer Jagiello noted in his
report that the lane closures “created a visual obscurement to
eastbound traffic turning left into northbound traffic of Avenida
Rotella” and later opined that “it would be hard for people
making a left-hand turn to properly clear all lanes of traffic.” He
based this on “what [he] could visually see,” but did not
“physically walk out to the left turn lane that [Lynn] had been in
to determine what kind of obstruction, if any, was present.”
1 Because more than one party shares the same last name,
we refer to each by their first name to avoid confusion. No
disrespect is intended.
4
II. Procedural History
A. The allegations
On June 24, 2022, Stellina and her husband John Parco
sued the City, SoCal Gas, Henkels & McCoy, and Traffic
Management (collectively, defendants),2 with Stellina alleging
claims for negligent infliction of personal injury against all
defendants and a claim for dangerous condition of public property
(Gov. Code, § 835) against the City, and John alleging a claim
against all defendants for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs alleged
that the construction in the intersection “caus[ed] obstructions to
visibility for traffic entering said intersection thereby creating a
trap and a resultant dangerous condition at said location.”
Stellina subsequently passed away on March 5, 2024. The
operative first amended complaint—brought by Stellina’s son
Robert Parco, individually and as Stellina’s successor-in-interest;
John; Stellina’s daughter Maria Parco; and Stellina’s son Johnny
Parco (collectively, plaintiffs)—alleges the same claims as the
original complaint and adds a claim for wrongful death against
all defendants. Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed the cause of
action for negligent infliction of personal injury against the City.
B. The motions for summary judgment
The City filed a motion for summary judgment on July 24,
2024. SoCal Gas and Henkels & McCoy filed a joint motion for
summary judgment on August 12, 2024. Traffic Management
filed a motion for summary judgment on October 11, 2024. Each
defendant argued plaintiffs could not establish that the
2 Plaintiffs originally sued Traffic Management as Doe
defendant 17. Plaintiffs also sued Popejoy and Lynn, but they
are not parties to this appeal.
5
construction at the intersection created a visual obstruction that
caused the collision.
Plaintiffs opposed the motions, pointing to several pieces of
evidence they contend create a triable issue of material fact on
the issue, including: (1) Lynn’s response to form interrogatories,
in which Lynn repeated plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants
“caus[ed] obstructions to visibility for traffic entering the
intersection, thereby creating a trap and a resultant dangerous
condition”; (2) Officer Jagiello’s report and deposition testimony
that the construction created a “visual obscurement” that made it
“hard for people making a left-hand turn to properly clear all
lanes of traffic”; (3) inconsistencies between Popejoy’s and Lynn’s
accounts of the accident; and (4) city inspector Kevin Viser’s
deposition testimony that “there’s an obstruction until there
isn’t.”
In opposition to Traffic Management’s motion only,
plaintiffs also submitted a declaration from expert witness
Russell Gish opining, based on the physical evidence, that Lynn’s
account of the collision was impossible, further demonstrating
that her view was obstructed. Traffic Management objected to
portions of the declaration on grounds that they lacked
foundation, were not based on personal knowledge, contained
opinions not based on admissible evidence, were speculative and
therefore irrelevant, and contained improper opinions on
ultimate facts. The trial court sustained these objections.
After holding hearings on each motion, the trial court
granted the City’s motion on October 17, 2024; SoCal Gas and
Henkel & McCoy’s motion on November 1, 2024; and Traffic
Management’s motion on January 16, 2025. The court
subsequently entered judgments in favor of each defendant.
6
D. The appeal
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ summary judgment motions because there are triable
issues of material fact as to causation, whether SoCal Gas and
Henkels & McCoy could be liable, and whether the City had
notice of the dangerous condition of the intersection.3
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it can
“show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The defendant bears the
initial burden of establishing that the plaintiff’s cause of action
has “no merit” by showing that the plaintiff cannot prove “one or
more elements of [her] cause of action.” (Id., subds. (o) & (p)(2).)
If this burden is met, the “burden shifts” to the plaintiff “to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the
cause of action.” (Id., subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 (Aguilar).) To satisfy
this burden, the opposing party must produce “specific,
substantial evidence”—that is, evidence that is not “based on
‘speculation, imagination, guesswork, or mere possibilities.’”
(Eng v. Opperman (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 354, 376 (Eng).) We
review the grant of summary judgment de novo. (Brantley v.
Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601.)
To establish a negligence claim (including a wrongful death
claim premised on negligence), plaintiffs must show the
“‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that [it] breached that
duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the
3 Plaintiffs do not on appeal contest the trial court’s denial of
their request to continue the summary judgment hearings.
7
resulting injury.’” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th
204, 213.) To establish a claim for dangerous condition of public
property against a public entity (here, the City), plaintiffs must
show that a “dangerous condition” on public property
“proximately caused” an injury and that the public entity either
created that condition itself or was otherwise negligent because it
had actual or constructive notice of the condition but did not
repair it. (Gov. Code, §§ 835, 835.2; Cordova v. City of Los
Angeles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099, 1105.) Although causation is
typically a question of fact, summary judgment is appropriately
granted where the undisputed facts establish no more than a
“‘mere possibility’” of causation. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 775-776; Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1672, 1687 (Nichols).)
Here, defendants carried their initial burden of producing
prima facie evidence that plaintiffs could not prove one of the
essential elements of their claims—namely, that the construction
at the intersection caused Stellina’s injuries. In support of their
motions, defendants submitted Lynn’s deposition testimony in
which she consistently maintained that there was “no
obstruction” and that her view of oncoming traffic when she
attempted the left turn “wasn’t blocked” “in any way.” Thus, the
burden shifted to plaintiff to produce “specific, substantial
evidence” establishing more than a mere possibility that the
construction at the intersection obstructed Lynn’s view and
thereby caused the collision. (Eng, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p.
376.)
Plaintiffs attempt to make this showing with five pieces of
evidence.
8
First, plaintiffs point to Lynn’s verified response to a form
interrogatory that she completed prior to her deposition, in which
Lynn stated that the City, SoCal Gas, Henkels & McCoy, and
Traffic Management “caus[ed] obstructions to visibility for traffic
entering the intersection, thereby creating a trap and a resultant
dangerous condition at said location.” Lynn’s discovery response
does no more than mirror the verbiage of plaintiffs’ complaint
and state a conclusion on an ultimate fact without pointing to
any evidentiary facts; it is not the type of “specific, substantial
evidence” required to overcome a motion for summary judgment.
(See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 Cal.3d
176, 184 [statements that “merely repeat the allegations” of the
pleadings insufficient to defeat summary judgment motion];
Colvig v. KSFO (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 357, 364 [statements on
ultimate facts alone insufficient to defeat summary judgment];
Schessler v. Keck (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 663, 669 [affidavit that
“contains no evidentiary statements but merely repeats the
general allegations of the pleading is . . . useless”]; accord, Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) [opposing party may not meet
burden by “rely[ing] upon the allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but,
instead, shall set forth the specific facts”].)
Second, plaintiffs point to Officer Jagiello’s opinion that the
construction “created a visual obscurement to eastbound traffic
turning left” and that it would therefore “be hard for people
making a left-hand turn to properly clear all lanes of traffic.”
Officer Jagiello formed this opinion based “off what [he] could
visually see,” but admitted that at no point did he actually
observe the intersection from Lynn’s vantage point. Thus, his
opinion that someone in the eastbound left turn bay might have
9
trouble viewing oncoming traffic is no more than speculation.
(See People v. Consiglio (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 615, 637 [opinion
testimony is “only as good as the facts and reasons on which it is
based”].)
Third, plaintiffs point to Popejoy’s testimony that he “can’t
say exactly how much” the construction truck “obstructed [his]
vision,” but “[i]t’s definitely possible that [he] would have seen
Lynn’s car earlier, if the truck had not been in the left-hand turn
pocket.” From this, plaintiffs argue that Popejoy’s view was
obstructed, and thus an obstruction contributed to the collision.
This argument rests on a selective citation of Popejoy’s testimony.
In full, Popejoy testified that he first saw Lynn’s car when he was
“90 feet away from the intersection,” and that he might have
“seen Lynn’s car earlier” but for the truck “in the left-hand turn
pocket.” But it is undisputed that Popejoy was fully able to see
Lynn “start[] making a left-hand turn” when Popejoy was
“approximately” 50 or 60 feet away from the intersection.
Because Popejoy could not have tried to avoid Lynn’s car until it
started to turn, and because Lynn did not start her turn until
Popejoy’s view was no longer obstructed by a truck, no reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the truck’s presence created a
dangerous condition that caused the accident. (See Nichols,
supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1687.)
Fourth, plaintiffs point to inconsistencies between Popejoy
and Lynn’s differing accounts as to when and where Popejoy’s
vehicle first entered the westbound traffic on Lyons Avenue as
evidence that Lynn could not actually see oncoming traffic
because the construction blocked her view. Although the
differing accounts of how Popejoy’s vehicle got into the westbound
lane of Lyons Avenue creates a factual dispute as to where that
10
vehicle first entered Lyons Avenue, that factual dispute is not
material to causation because, as explained above, it is
undisputed that Lynn’s subsequent view of oncoming traffic was
clear before she started her turn and because Popejoy’s
subsequent view of the approaching intersection was clear before
Lynn started her turn. Even if we assume that Lynn’s failure to
accurately recount the first time she saw Popejoy’s vehicle was
due to an obstructed view (rather than inattentiveness or
misremembering), it does not affect Lynn’s view immediately
prior to initiating her left turn, which is what matters for
causation here. And to the extent plaintiffs argue (as they did at
oral argument) that Lynn’s account is “absurd,” we reject that
attack on her credibility.4 (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 852
[“‘summary judgment’ may ‘not be denied on grounds of
credibility’”]; § 437c, subd. (e) [same].)
Fifth and finally, plaintiffs point to city inspector Kevin
Viser’s deposition testimony, in which he denied that the
construction blocked the view of oncoming traffic, stating, “Well,
you know, there’s an obstruction until there isn’t. If you pull far
enough forward, you can see up the road, and you turn when it’s
clear.” This testimony does not help plaintiffs. At most, it is a
restatement of the driver’s safety principle that a motorist trying
to make an unprotected left turn with any blocked view can
always pull forward further until the view is no longer blocked,
4 Because evidence that Lynn did not properly observe
Popejoy’s vehicle is insufficient on its own to create a triable issue
of fact as to whether the construction visually obstructed her
view and caused the accident, we need not consider plaintiffs’
argument that the trial court improperly excluded expert Russell
Gish’s opinion that Lynn’s account of events was impossible.
11
and should not attempt to turn until the road is clear. This does
not create a triable issue of fact as to whether Lynn’s view was
obstructed in this case or that any such obstruction caused the
collision.
Plaintiffs also argue that, in reaching its conclusion, the
trial court improperly weighed the evidence when it stated that
“the totality of the evidence establishe[d]” that Lynn “saw []
Popejoy’s vehicle at all relevant times” notwithstanding the other
evidence plaintiffs proffered. Because we review the trial court’s
ruling and not its rationale (Huerta v. City of Santa Ana (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 41, 47), and because we conclude that, as a
matter of law, plaintiffs have not produced the type of specific,
substantial evidence needed to create a triable issue of material
fact on the issue of causation and thereby to overcome summary
judgment, we affirm. Our affirmance on this ground obviates any
need for us to consider plaintiffs’ challenges to the trial court’s
alternative bases for granting summary judgment.
12
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Each party is to bear their
own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
13