Filed 8/14/26 Pacific Attorney Group v. Nejad CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PACIFIC ATTORNEY GROUP,
PROFESSIONAL LAW
CORPORATION, G064975
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01190425)
v.
OPINION
AZADEH SHIRAZI NEJAD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Motion to augment granted in part
and denied in part.
Azadeh Shirazi Nejad, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Pacific Attorney Group and Michael P. Hollomon, Jr., for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Defendant Azadeh Shirazi Nejad retained plaintiff Pacific
Attorney Group, Professional Law Corporation, to represent her in a personal
injury matter. As relevant to the issues presented in this appeal, the parties
entered a contingency fee agreement whereby Pacific was entitled to 40
percent of any gross recovery in the matter. A few years later, Nejad
discharged Pacific and later directly entered into a settlement agreement of
the matter whereby she was paid $61,000 by an insurance company. Pacific
sued Nejad to recover the reasonable value of the professional services
rendered to her before it was discharged. Following a bench trial, the trial
court found the fair settlement value of the action was $100,000 and
concluded Pacific was entitled to 40 percent of that amount as compensation
for its legal services, plus costs. Judgment was entered accordingly and Nejad
appealed.
Because Pacific failed to submit any evidence of the number of
hours worked, rates claimed, or the reasonableness of the fees allegedly
incurred by its attorneys in the personal injury matter, insufficient evidence
supported the damages award in the judgment. We therefore modify the
judgment to strike the damages awarded, and as so modified, affirm the
judgment.
SUMMARY OF FACTS1
In May 2017, Nejad retained Pacific to represent her in handling
a personal injury claim arising from an April 2017 automobile accident.
Pacific was retained on a contingency fee basis whereby Nejad agreed to pay
Pacific 25 percent of any gross recovery if Nejad prevailed before a lawsuit
was filed and 40 percent of any gross recovery if Nejad prevailed after a
1 This summary of facts is based on the trial court’s written
decision, which was attached to its minute order dated November 1, 2024.
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lawsuit was filed. In addition, Nejad agreed to pay costs for, among other
things, court filing fees, depositions, and medical reports.
The personal injury claim was originally handled by Pacific’s
prelitigation department. After issues arose regarding medical
documentation provided by Nejad, which Pacific determined was
inappropriate to present in support of a settlement demand to the relevant
insurance company, Pacific filed a lawsuit on behalf of Nejad to protect her
against the running of the statute of limitations against her claim. Nejad’s
file was thereafter transferred to Pacific’s litigation department and assigned
to attorney Michael Holloman, Jr.
After Holloman had difficulty meeting with Nejad to prepare her
for her deposition in the matter, Nejad requested a modification of the
parties’ contingency fee agreement. After Pacific denied Nejad’s request,
Nejad directed Pacific to substitute out of the case. A substitution of attorney
form was prepared and filed, and Nejad became self-represented in the
personal injury action.
Before substituting out of the personal injury action, Pacific had
received an opening offer to settle for $30,000. According to Pacific, the
personal injury action had a value of at least $150,000, “based on alleged
ongoing injuries to [Nejad’s] shoulder, spine, and knees with surgery needed.”
Nejad later settled the matter with the relevant insurance company for
$61,000.
Nejad never paid and refused to pay Pacific anything from the
settlement.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2022, Pacific filed a complaint asserting claims against
Nejad for the following: (1) intentional interference with prospective economic
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advantage; (2) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage;
(3) fraud; (4) conversion; (5) breach of written contract; (6) unjust enrichment;
(7) declaratory relief; (8), accounting; (9) constructive trust; and (10) money
had and received.
On May 9, 2022, the trial court set the matter for a five-day jury
trial in August 2022 and ordered that the parties post jury fees within five
days. On the trial date set for August 26, 2024, the court noted that neither
party had “posted jury fees and therefore both sides had waived a trial by
jury pursuant to section 631 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”2
After several continuances of the trial date, a one-day bench trial
was specially set for September 18, 2024, for which Nejad received notice.
Nejad did not comply with pre-trial requirements pursuant to the Superior
Court of Orange County, Local Rules, rule 317 and did not appear for trial.
Following the less than two-hour bench trial, at which testimony
of three Pacific attorneys described the parties’ contingency agreement,
Nejad’s lack of cooperation, her attempts to renegotiate that agreement,
Nejad’s settlement of the personal injury action, and the fair settlement value
of that action, the trial court took the matter under submission.
On November 1, 2024, the trial court issued its written decision
in which it concluded Nejad “is and was obligated to pay [Pacific] for the
reasonable value of its services rendered . . . for [Nejad] in the personal injury
action.” The court further concluded Pacific failed to meet its burden of proof
on the fraud claim or with respect to punitive damages as “evidence of
[Nejad’s] financial condition was not introduced.”
2 The trial court also stated no party obtained a fee waiver for
jury fees and expenses.
4
After finding the fair settlement value of the case was $100,000,
the trial court awarded Pacific a total of $64,482.60 by awarding (1) $60,000
in damages (calculated at 40 [percent] of the $100,000 recovery);3
(2) $1,320.35 for costs incurred by Pacific in the personal injury action; and
(3) $3,162.25 in costs incurred by Pacific in the present action. On
November 19, 2024, judgment was entered accordingly, awarding Pacific a
total amount of $64,482.60.
On November 26, 2024, Nejad filed a motion for reconsideration.
Shortly after filing the motion, however, on December 10, 2024, she filed a
notice of appeal from the judgment.
MOTION TO AUGMENT
During the pendency of this appeal, Nejad filed a motion
requesting the record be augmented to include the following documents:
(1) the trial court’s November 1, 2024 minute order; (2) Nejad’s reply brief in
support of her motion for reconsideration filed July 7, 2025; (3) the court’s
July 11, 2025 minute order denying the motion for reconsideration; and
(4) “[s]elected pages” of the reporter’s transcript for the September 18, 2024
bench trial.
The November 1, 2024 minute order was part of the trial court
record. We therefore grant the motion to augment the record on appeal with
respect to that order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A)).
3 We note the trial court’s statement it awarded Pacific $60,000
in damages “calculated at 40 [percent] of the $100,000 recovery” is erroneous.
As pointed out by Nejad, 40 percent of $100,000 is $40,000, not $60,000.
Although this error is incorporated into the judgment, it is inconsequential
given that we strike that damages award in its entirety from the judgment
for the reasons we discuss post.
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We deny the motion to augment the appellate record with respect
to the reply brief Nejad filed in support of her motion for reconsideration as
well as the trial court’s minute order ruling on that motion. Neither
document was before the court at the time judgment was entered. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A)). We also deny Nejad’s request that we augment
the appellate record with selected pages from the reporter’s transcript
because it is duplicative of the reporter’s transcript prepared in this case.
DISCUSSION
I.
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE $60,000 DAMAGES AWARD
COMPENSATING PACIFIC FOR THE REASONABLE VALUE OF ITS SERVICES
In her opening brief, Nejad mounts several challenges to the
judgment’s award of $60,000 compensating Pacific for the reasonable value of
services rendered to Nejad in the personal injury action. She argues the trial
court’s finding the personal injury action had a fair settlement value of
$100,000 was speculative and its damages award to Pacific of 40 percent of
that amount was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree with Nejad
the court’s damages award is unsupported by substantial evidence.
It is well established that an attorney discharged prior to
settlement is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of
services rendered up to the time of discharge “in spite of a valid contingent
fee contract.” (Blank v. Borden (1974) 11 Cal.3d 963, 966, citing Fracasse v.
Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 791; see Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 272.)
“‘The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective
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basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.
The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the
hours worked and rates claimed.’ [Citation.] However, providing evidence as
to the number of hours worked and rates claimed is not the end of the
analysis in such a quantum meruit action. The party seeking fees must also
show the total fees incurred were reasonable. Factors relevant to that
determination include ‘[t]he nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount
involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention
given, the success or failure of the attorney’s efforts, the attorney’s skill and
learning, including his [or her] age and experience in the particular type of
work demanded.’ [Citations.] Because evidence and analysis of all these
factors can be a ‘formidable undertaking’ [citation], expert testimony in a
quantum meruit action for attorney fees is appropriate to assist the fact
finder.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
p. 272.)
Here, Pacific did not provide any evidence of the number of hours
worked by any of the Pacific attorneys in Nejad’s personal injury matter, such
attorneys’ respective billing rates, or the reasonableness of the total fees
allegedly incurred by such attorneys. Instead, the record indicates, based on
the testimony Pacific presented at trial, Pacific assumed it was automatically
entitled to, at a minimum, 40 percent of Nejad’s $61,000 recovery after she
directly settled with the insurance company, and at most 40 percent of the
fair settlement value of that case which the trial court found to be $100,000.
That is not the law. Consequently, as insufficient evidence supports the
judgment’s award of $60,000 for the reasonable value of the services Pacific
rendered up to the time Nejad discharged Pacific, that award must be struck
from the judgment.
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II.
WE AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT AS TO THE COSTS AWARDS
In the judgment, the trial court awarded Pacific $1,320.35 in
costs it claimed it incurred in the underlying personal injury action, and
$3,162.25 in costs incurred in the instant action. Nejad does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting those cost awards in this appeal. Nor
does she dispute she agreed in the parties’ contingency fee agreement to pay
incurred costs including court filing fees, depositions, and medical reports.
In her opening brief, Nejad mentions costs once, and in that
instance, she mentions costs in conjunction with the damages award, stating
in her “Statement of the Case” that: “[T]he trial court entered judgment
awarding [Pacific] $64,482.60—an inflated amount based on miscalculated
fees and costs.”4 Nejad, however, does not provide any further discussion of
the awarded costs, much less an explanation of how the costs awards might
have been based on an erroneous calculation. She therefore has forfeited any
such challenge to the costs awards. (See Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 404, 418 [“‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it
but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived’”]; Pas v. Hill (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 521, 531–532
[when defendants do not contend the costs claimed by plaintiffs were in any
respect unjustified or excessive, defendants “must be said to have waived any
irregularity”], overruled on other grounds in Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan
Assn. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 309, 315.)
In her appellate briefs, Nejad argues generally she was unfairly
deprived of a jury trial and the trial court erred by proceeding with the bench
4 Nejad does not mention costs at all in her reply brief.
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trial in her absence. To the extent she intends that those arguments apply to
the costs awards, they do not have merit. The record shows Nejad did not
post jury fees; she does not contend otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 631,
subd. (f)(5) [jury trial is waived by a party who “fail[s] to timely pay [jury
fees] unless another party on the same side of the case has paid that fee”].)5
Nejad fails to show the court was mistaken in confirming in its written
decision that no party had obtained a fee waiver for jury fees and expenses in
this case.
The record also establishes Nejad did not appear at trial as duly
noticed and failed to submit any evidence showing her absence was excusable
before the court’s written decision was issued or judgment was entered in this
case. (Code Civ. Proc. § 594, subd. (a) [“In superior courts either party may
bring an issue to trial or to a hearing, and, in the absence of the adverse
party, unless the court, for good cause, otherwise directs, may proceed with
the case . . . provided, however, if the issue to be tried is an issue of fact, proof
shall first be made to the satisfaction of the court that the adverse party has
had 15 days’ notice of such trial”].)
“‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.’” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619.) As Nejad
failed to carry her burden of showing the court committed reversible error
with respect to its awards of costs, we affirm that aspect of the judgment.
5 As pointed out in the court’s written decision, a party can also
waive a trial by jury “[b]y failing to appear at the trial.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 631, subd. (f)(1).)
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DISPOSITION
We modify the judgment to strike the $60,000 damages award in
its entirety. We affirm the judgment as so modified to solely award
respondent $1,320.35 in costs incurred in the personal injury action and
$3,162.25 in costs for the instant action. Appellant to recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
DELANEY, J.
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