Filed 6/24/26 P. v. Young CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B346130
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A525703)
v.
DANNY JEROME YOUNG,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Melanie Dorian,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Danny Jerome Young appeals from the denial of
his resentencing petition under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. The
resentencing court found defendant ineligible for relief because
defendant admitted at a civil trial held after his criminal trial
that he personally killed the victim. On appeal, defendant argues
it was physically impossible for him to have killed the victim
given the medical examiner’s opinion at his criminal trial as to
the time of death, and therefore his admission at the civil trial
cannot be substantial evidence in support of the denial of his
resentencing petition. We conclude resolution of any conflict
between defendant’s admission and the medical examiner’s
opinion was for the resentencing court, as finder of fact, to
determine. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The record in this matter is extensive. Because the crux of
the appeal is a purported conflict between forensic evidence at
defendant’s trial and defendant’s posttrial admission that he
killed the victim, we limit our summary of the proceedings below
to the information relevant to that conflict.
1. The crime
Ten-year-old Ronald Tolleson, Jr., a resident of West
Covina, disappeared on Friday, March 28, 1980. At
approximately 5:00 p.m. that day, Tolleson’s family received a
telephone call from someone demanding $3,000 if the family
wanted to see Tolleson alive again.
The family did not have $3,000, so with the assistance of
police detectives, they placed $100 in $20 bills in a bag along with
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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torn-up newspaper to simulate additional money. The family
received a second call instructing them where to leave the money.
Tolleson’s father left the bag of money on a bench in a park as
instructed.
Tolleson was found dead in defendant’s garage on April 4,
1980. Defendant’s home was two houses away from Tolleson’s.
2. Trial and sentencing
An information charged defendant with murder and
kidnapping for ransom, and alleged the murder occurred during
commission of a kidnapping. The information further alleged two
counts of attempted kidnapping unrelated to Tolleson and not
relevant to this appeal.
Defendant concedes there was “ample evidence” at trial he
participated in the kidnapping. We do not summarize that
evidence.
The People called a medical examiner to testify regarding
the victim’s time of death, based on photographs and an autopsy
report prepared by a different doctor. The medical examiner
opined Tolleson most likely died Tuesday, April 1, 1980, four days
after the kidnapping and three days before his body was
discovered, although it was possible he died a day earlier or later,
i.e., Monday, March 31 or Wednesday, April 2.
The medical examiner further opined Tolleson died by
strangulation.
Defendant testified and denied participating in the
kidnapping and killing, instead pointing the finger at defendant’s
brother and an unidentified man. He admitted, however, that he
“tried to take advantage of the situation” by calling Tolleson’s
family on March 28 and demanding $3,000 as if defendant were
the kidnapper. He admitted he paid an acquaintance to pick up
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the bag of money Tolleson’s father left in the park, and when he
discovered the bag contained only $100 and torn-up paper, he
told the acquaintance, “ ‘They bullshitted me.’ ”
There was evidence defendant left West Covina on
March 29, 1980 and stayed in a motel in Fontana that night. He
stayed in a friend’s guest house in Ontario the night of March 30.
On March 31 he was seen in a Claremont bus station and in
Santa Ana looking for a place to stay. Defendant flew from
Los Angeles to San Francisco on April 1, and stayed at a hotel in
Stockton April 2 through 4.
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated he “never
intended to prove” defendant himself killed Tolleson, and had
“offered no evidence of that.” The prosecutor “believe[d] . . . that
the evidence has shown . . . that there was more than one person
involved in this.” Citing the medical examiner’s testimony, the
prosecutor said Tolleson “was kept alive Friday, Saturday,
Sunday, at least, and according to the coroner, in all probability,
even Monday.” The prosecutor conceded defendant had left West
Covina by Saturday afternoon and did not return to his home
after that, but argued defendant was culpable even though he
was not present when Tolleson was killed.
The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder,
kidnapping for ransom, and the two counts of attempted
kidnapping. The jury found true that the victim of the
kidnapping for ransom charge suffered bodily injury and death.
By stipulation of counsel, the trial court struck the kidnapping-
related special allegations as to the murder count.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for
murder, life without the possibility of parole for kidnapping for
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ransom, and 11 years 4 months on the attempted kidnapping
counts, all to be served consecutively.
3. Resentencing proceedings
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The resentencing court held an evidentiary
hearing on the petition on April 16, 2025.2
At the hearing, the People called Tolleson’s father and an
attorney, Peter Wucetich. Wucetich represented Tolleson’s father
in a wrongful death lawsuit against the City of West Covina and
its police department. Wucetich testified that at the civil trial in
1989, defendant admitted under oath that he kidnapped Tolleson
and murdered him by strangulation “several days after the
kidnapping.” According to Wucetich, defendant testified he
worked alone with no one assisting him. Wucetich said there was
conflicting testimony at the civil trial regarding the time of
Tolleson’s death, and defendant’s testimony was more consistent
with the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion.
Tolleson’s father testified that defendant admitted at the
civil trial to kidnapping Tolleson and killing him by strangling
him with an electrical cord, and that defendant further testified
he acted alone. According to Tolleson’s father, defendant testified
he killed Tolleson the day of the kidnapping.3
2 The resentencing court initially denied defendant’s
petition at the prima facie stage, a denial we reversed. (People v.
Young (Jan. 31, 2024, B327718) [nonpub. opn.].)
3 Neither the People nor defendant offered the transcript
of the civil trial into evidence. All information regarding that
trial came from testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
5
Defendant also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He
acknowledged he admitted at the civil trial that he killed
Tolleson, but said that testimony was false, and he was not
present when Tolleson died. Defendant explained he was
suffering from ankylosing spondylitis at the time of the civil trial,
which caused him pain and made it difficult to walk. He said he
agreed to testify on behalf of West Covina and the police
department in exchange for transfer to another prison where he
could receive medical treatment.
After hearing argument of counsel, the resentencing court
denied defendant’s petition. The court found defendant was
aware kidnapping endangered Tolleson’s life, and that he acted
with conscious disregard, thus establishing second degree implied
malice murder as an aider and abettor. The court further found
defendant was culpable under a felony murder theory as having
“participated in [a] designated felony” and “acted with reckless
indifference to human life.”
The resentencing court also found the testimony at the
evidentiary hearing “clarified everything that was missing in the
[criminal] trial.” The court observed there was some question at
defendant’s criminal trial whether defendant acted alone, “but
now we know. Defendant admitted it under oath in another
proceeding that he was the one who killed this young boy. As a
result, there is no relief in this matter. He could be convicted on
basically every theory of murder there currently is.”
Defendant timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of
the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173
(Lee).)
Assembly Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95,
now numbered section 1172.6, “which creates a procedure for
convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as
amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) “If a petitioner makes a prima facie
showing of relief under section 1172.6 . . . the resentencing court
must issue an order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing.
[Citations.] At that hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the petitioner remains guilty of murder
or attempted murder despite the amendments to sections 188 and
189.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174; see § 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(3).) At the evidentiary hearing, “[t]he prosecutor
and the petitioner may . . . offer new or additional evidence to
meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) In
determining whether the prosecution has met its burden, “[t]he
trial court acts as an independent fact finder.” (People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
We review a resentencing court’s denial order following a
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (See
People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) Under that
standard, “we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
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evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Grandberry (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.) “We resolve all
evidentiary conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the
judgment. [Citation.] We cannot reweigh the evidence or
reassess witness credibility on our own.” (Ibid.)
B. Substantial evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Ruling
Under the felony murder statute as amended by Senate Bill
No. 1437, when a killing occurs during the commission of an
enumerated felony, the actual killer is guilty of murder. (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1).) Defendant concedes his criminal trial record
contains substantial evidence he kidnapped Tolleson.
Kidnapping is an enumerated felony under the felony murder
statute. (§ 189, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted at the civil trial
to personally killing Tolleson. That admission, combined with
the evidence at the criminal trial that defendant kidnapped
Tolleson, is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion defendant remains guilty of felony murder under the
amended Penal Code, and is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6.4
Defendant contends his admission at the civil trial cannot
constitute substantial evidence of guilt because it conflicted with
the medical examiner’s testimony at the criminal trial regarding
the victim’s time of death. Defendant argues, “[T]he forensic
evidence, unchanged and unaugmented at the evidentiary
4 Because there was substantial evidence to support guilt
under a felony murder theory, we need not address the other
theories upon which the resentencing court relied.
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hearing, established that the victim was killed sometime between
Monday, March 31, and Wednesday, April 2, and most likely
killed Tuesday, April 1. [Citations.] The evidence of
[defendant’s] whereabouts, unchanged and unaugmented at the
evidentiary hearing, showed it was physically impossible for
[defendant] to have been at the scene of the murder after
March 28.” (Fn. omitted.) Defendant notes the prosecutor at his
criminal trial expressly disclaimed the theory that defendant
personally killed the victim because of the evidence of time of
death.
Defendant observes our Supreme Court has held that a
witness’s testimony cannot support a conviction if “it describes
facts or events that are physically impossible or inherently
improbable.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585.) “The
standard for rejecting a witness’s statements on this ground
requires ‘ “ ‘either a physical impossibility that they are true, or
their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thompson (2010)
49 Cal.4th 79, 124 (Thompson).)
Thompson itself undercuts defendant’s argument. In
Thompson, the defendant argued a witness’s testimony was
inherently incredible because “(1) the angle of the bullet wounds
in [the victim’s] body . . . contradict[ed] [the witness’s] testimony
regarding where defendant stood when he shot [the victim], and
(2) . . . [the victim’s] body was found in the water, although [the
witness] testified at trial he did not see the body fall in the
water.” (Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 124.) Our Supreme
Court rejected the defendant’s argument: “[The witness’s]
testimony did not recount facts that were physically impossible,
nor did it exhibit falsity on its face. Rather, defendant’s
contention that [the witness’s] testimony was inherently
incredible depends on the asserted inconsistencies that defendant
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argues exist between [the witness’s] testimony and other
evidence presented at trial. We reject defendant’s attempt to
reargue the evidence on appeal and reiterate that ‘it is not a
proper appellate function to reassess the credibility of the
witnesses.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 124–125.)
Here, also, defendant is arguing his admission at the civil
trial is inherently incredible because it conflicts with evidence at
his criminal trial, in particular the medical examiner’s opinion.
It was for the resentencing court, however, as finder of fact, to
assess credibility and weigh the evidence. Medical examiners
make mistakes sometimes, and there is no legal barrier to a
finder of fact crediting a defendant’s admission of guilt over
contradictory forensic evidence. The resentencing court could
also have credited the forensic evidence but rejected the evidence
establishing that defendant was not in West Covina at the time of
death. Like the defendant in Thompson, defendant is simply
“reargu[ing] the evidence on appeal,” which is not proper under
the substantial evidence standard. (Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th
at p. 125.)
In his appellate briefing, defendant summarizes in detail
the medical examiner’s opinion, and asks, “What part of this did
the resentencing court reasonably reject?” Defendant misstates
the standard of review — although we may reject evidence that is
inherently improbable, we may not reject evidence merely
because there is reason to disagree with the finder of fact’s
assessment of that evidence. To do so would supersede the finder
of fact’s authority to determine credibility and weigh evidence.
Defendant suggests the resentencing court had to accept
the medical examiner’s evidence because the People presented no
contrary evidence as to the time of death at the evidentiary
hearing. We fail to see how evidence that defendant later
admitted to killing the victim is not contrary evidence.
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It is of no moment the prosecutor at the criminal trial
disclaimed the theory that defendant was the actual killer. The
prosecutor did not have the benefit of defendant’s later
admission, and therefore proceeded on the evidence available at
the time. Section 1172.6 expressly permits parties to submit new
evidence at the evidentiary hearing, and therefore the
resentencing court is not bound by the evidence upon which the
prosecution relied at the criminal trial.
In his reply brief, defendant argues the jury necessarily
found he was not the actual killer, but concedes “issue preclusion
does not squarely fit this case because of the new evidence
adduced at resentencing.” (See People v. Hart (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1114–1115 [distinguishing cases applying
issue preclusion in section 1172.6 proceedings because in Hart
the prosecution introduced new evidence at the evidentiary
hearing].) Even absent that concession, defendant has forfeited
any argument based on issue preclusion by not raising it in his
opening brief. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550,
fn. 9 [claim omitted from opening brief waived].) We therefore
do not address this argument further.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
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