Filed 10/6/26 P. v. Ybarra CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F090507
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F24900801)
v.
ELIZABETH YBARRA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Stephanie L.
Negin, Judge.
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, and Amanda D. Cary,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* Before Snauffer, Acting P. J., DeSantos, J. and Sandhu, J.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Elizabeth Ybarra pled no contest to the felony offense of gross
vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code1 section 192, subdivision (c)(1) and admitted
the accompanying enhancements. She was placed on formal probation for a period of
two years. As a condition of probation, she was required to serve one year in county jail.
She was awarded a total of two days of presentence custody credits.
On appeal, Ybarra argues that she is entitled to an additional two days of custody
credits. The People argue that, pursuant to section 1237.1, our court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the alleged error. We agree with the People and dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2024, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a complaint
charging Ybarra with vehicular manslaughter while driving a vehicle in the commission
of an unlawful act and with gross negligence (§ 192, subd. (c)(1)).
On July 1, 2025, Ybarra pled no contest. On September 5, 2025, the trial court
suspended imposition of judgment and placed her on formal probation for a period of two
years. As a condition of probation, she was required to serve one year in county jail. The
court awarded her a total of two days of presentence custody credits.
On September 25, 2025, Ybarra filed a notice of appeal.
On May 1, 2026, Ybarra filed with our court a copy of a Fares2 letter addressed to
the Fresno County Clerk of the Court.3 In the letter, Ybarra asserted that the
September 5, 2025 minute order reflected that she was awarded a total of four days of
presentence custody credits, consisting of “two actual days and two days for good/time
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954.
3 Both parties request that we take judicial notice of the Fares letter, and we do so.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
2.
[sic] and work time.” However, “the trial court failed to award her credit for two days for
good time and work time.” Ybarra further asserted that it appeared the court meant to
award her two additional days of custody credits, but it failed to do so. Accordingly,
Ybarra requested that the case be recalled “for the limited purpose of orally awarding
[her] two days of conduct credit.” The court’s response to the letter, if any, is not in the
record.
DISCUSSION4
I. Applicable Law
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s
judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.”
(People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) As relevant here, a defendant has the
right to appeal from an order granting probation, subject to section 1237.1. (§ 1237,
subd. (a)). Pursuant to this section, “[n]o appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the calculation of presentence
custody credits, unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time
of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first
makes a motion for correction of the record in the trial court, which may be made
informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been
filed to correct any error in the calculation of presentence custody credits upon the
defendant’s request for correction.”
“ ‘Appellate courts have jurisdiction over a direct appeal … only where there is an
appealable order or judgment.’ ” (People v. Montellano (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 148, 153
(Montellano).)
II. Analysis
4 Because the facts underlying the offense are not relevant to the issue on appeal,
we omit a summary of those facts. The relevant facts are included in the Procedural
History and Background section, ante.
3.
Ybarra argues she is entitled to two additional days of presentence custody credits
pursuant to section 4019. She further argues that she complied with section 1237.1 by
sending the Fares letter to the trial court.
The People do not address whether Ybarra is entitled to two additional days of
presentence custody credits. Instead, the People argue that she did not comply with
section 1237.1. The People acknowledge that she sent a Fares letter, but identify several
issues, including that the intended recipient of the letter was the Clerk of the Court; that
there is no evidence in the record that Ybarra ever followed up with the trial court
regarding the letter; and that the letter did not address the issue now on appeal (whether
Ybarra is entitled to two additional days of presentence custody credits pursuant to
section 4019). Accordingly, the People argue that Ybarra did not give the trial court an
opportunity to correct the error alleged on appeal as required by section 1237.1.
We agree with the People that Ybarra did not comply with section 1237.1. To
begin, she does not even assert that the error was not discovered until after sentencing.
This alone is fatal to her claim. (§ 1237.1.)
Moreover, even if the error was not discovered until after sentencing, her claim
still fails. Most importantly, in the Fares letter, Ybarra asserted that because the minute
order awarded four days of custody credits while the trial court’s oral pronouncement
only awarded two, it appeared the trial court intended to award four days. However,
there is no discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the minute order. The trial
court awarded two days of credits at the sentencing hearing, and the minute order
accurately reflects this award. Thus, the only issue asserted in the letter did not have
merit. As Ybarra never asserted that she was entitled to an additional two days of credit
pursuant to section 4019, the court was not given an opportunity to correct this alleged
error.
Of less importance is the fact that the trial court was not the intended recipient of
the letter (see § 1237.1 [requiring that a motion for correction be made in the trial court]);
4.
that the record is silent as to the court’s response (if any) to the letter; and that there is
nothing in the record suggesting that Ybarra ever attempted to press the court to rule on
her request (see, e.g., People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 472 [“In order to preserve
an issue for review, a defendant must not only request the court to act, but must press for
a ruling.”]).
In sum, based on this record, the issue on appeal was not preserved in the manner
required by section 1237.1 Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed. (§ 1237.1;
Montellano, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
5.