Filed 10/2/26 P. v. Wright CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B333500
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XWESA039138)
v.
TERRELL WRIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William Sadler, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Cynthia Janis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Louis W. Karlin, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 2001, a jury convicted Terrell Wright of various offenses,
and a court sentenced him to a prison term that included one-
year prison priors imposed under Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (b).1 Wright later sought resentencing under
section 1172.75. Without appointing counsel for Wright and in
Wright’s absence, the trial court struck the one-year prison priors
but declined to conduct a full resentencing. Wright appeals,
contending that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel
for him, proceeding in his absence, and declining to conduct a full
resentencing. The People concede, and we agree, that the trial
court erred. We therefore reverse the judgment with the
direction to the trial court to appoint counsel for Wright and to
conduct a full resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, a jury convicted Wright of three counts of false
imprisonment by violence or menace, seven counts of second
degree robbery, conspiracy to commit second degree robbery,
conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, and seven counts of
assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The jury also found true
firearm allegations and that the false imprisonment, robbery, and
conspiracy counts involved a theft of over $100,000.
At Wright’s 2002 sentencing hearing, he admitted three
prior convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
and two prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b). The court denied Wright’s motion to dismiss a
strike under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497. The court then sentenced Wright, on one robbery count, to
25 years to life, plus 10 years (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), five years
(§ 667, subd. (a)), 2 one-year terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and one
year (§ 12022.6). On a false imprisonment count, the court
sentenced Wright to a consecutive upper term of three years,
doubled to six years. The court either stayed sentences on the
remaining counts or ran them concurrent. The court awarded
custody credits and imposed restitution and parole revocation
fines.
In 2022, Wright, self-represented, filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in which he requested resentencing under
section 1172.75.
In an off-the-record proceeding on June 14, 2022, the trial
court struck the 2 one-year prison priors imposed under
section 667.5, subdivision (b). But the court found “the
previously entered judgment to be final; therefore, the request for
re-sentencing is denied.” The court did not appoint counsel for
Wright and conducted the hearing in Wright’s absence.
DISCUSSION
Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b),
required courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for
each prior prison or county jail term the defendant served if the
defendant had not remained free of custody for the preceding five
years. (§ 667.5, former subd. (b); People v. Jennings (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 664, 681.) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill
No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136) amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b), by limiting the enhancement to
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prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses only. (§ 667.5,
subd. (b); Jennings, at p. 681.)
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.), which made Senate Bill No. 136’s changes to the
law retroactive (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1), and added former
section 1171.1, now section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3;
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (a),
provides that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed
prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code is legally invalid.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) sets
forth procedures for the trial court to recall sentences that
include the now invalid enhancements and to resentence the
defendants.2
2 Section 1172.75 created a procedure and timeline for the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to identify
defendants eligible for resentencing. It does not include a
procedure for defendants independently to petition for recall of a
sentence and resentencing. Here, however, the trial court did not
deny Wright’s petition on the ground it was unauthorized and
instead dismissed the one-year priors. (See generally § 1172.75,
subds. (b), (c); People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055.)
The record does not indicate whether the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation notified the trial court of Wright’s
eligibility for resentencing relief. On appeal, the Attorney
General does not argue that Wright’s petition was unauthorized
and instead concedes he is entitled to relief. (See generally
People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332–333; People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375.) We accept the concession.
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When a defendant is being resentenced, a resentencing
court shall “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences
or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) At resentencing, the court may “consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
Here, Wright contends, the People concede, and we agree
that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel for Wright,
conducting the resentencing proceeding in Wright’s absence, and
declining to conduct a full resentencing.
First, a court “shall” appoint counsel to represent a
defendant at resentencing proceedings. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(5).)
The trial court thus violated the statute’s express mandate to
appoint counsel for Wright.
Second, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
federal Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
be at all critical stages of the proceeding, including sentencing
and resentencing. (People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663,
673; see § 1172.75, subd. (e) [parties may waive resentencing
hearing or defendant may agree to remote hearing].) Although a
defendant may waive the right, there is no evidence that Wright
waived his right to be present at the resentencing hearing. The
trial court therefore erred by resentencing Wright in his absence.
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Third, other than to strike the one-year prison priors, the
trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing, believing it
could not do so because the judgment was final. However,
section 1172.75, including subdivision (d)(2), applies retroactively
to final judgments like Wright’s. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
“Because the statute mandates striking the now invalid
enhancements, the statute by its express terms—backed by
supportive case law—also requires that defendant receive a full
resentencing.” (People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270,
1276.) Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction and the duty to
reconsider the entirety of Wright’s sentence, not just the one-year
prison priors.
We therefore reverse the judgment with the direction to the
trial court to appoint counsel for Wright and to conduct a full
resentencing. Because we are remanding for a full resentencing,
we need not address Wright’s contentions regarding custody
credits, restitution fines, and his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed with the direction to the trial
court to appoint counsel for Wright and to conduct a full
resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
DELGADO, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Clara Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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