Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Woolen CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B348855
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA070163)
v.
MICHAEL SHABOYA WOOLEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I
In 2004, a jury convicted defendant Michael Shaboya
Woolen of one count of willful, deliberate, premeditated
attempted murder (Pen. Code,2 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and found
that he personally used a firearm in the offense causing great
bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced
him to an aggregate term of 35 years to life in prison, consisting
of life with the possibility of parole after seven years for
attempted murder (see §§ 664, (a)(1), 3046, subd. (a)(1)), plus 25
years to life for the firearm enhancement, plus three years for
enhancements under section 667.5, former subdivision (b) for
prior prison sentences Woolen had served.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1), which eliminated the
one-year enhancement for prior prison terms under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) except in the case of defendants whose prior
prison term was imposed for a sexually violent offense. Two
years later, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, which
declared all existing enhancements imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) invalid except when the enhancement was
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense, and
created a mechanism for eliminating the invalid enhancements
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“is determined by a controlling decision which does not require a
reexamination of its principles or rules.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1(2).)
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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from sentences of defendants in custody. (Sen. Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.)
In 2022, the superior court resentenced Woolen pursuant to
section 1172.75, striking the three section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements but leaving the rest of the sentence intact. This
resulted in a new aggregate sentence of 32 years to life. In July
2025, Woolen filed a motion in the superior court for a new
resentencing hearing on the ground that the court at the previous
hearing did not consider all subsequent changes in the law when
deciding on the new sentence.
The court held a new hearing in August 2025, at which it
found that the court in 2022 had failed to conduct a full
resentencing. The court therefore recalled Woolen’s sentence and
once again resentenced him. After considering the relevant
factors, the court imposed the same sentence of 32 years to life.
The court recognized that Woolen had obtained an associate’s
degree while in prison and that he suffered from bipolar disorder
and schizophrenia. Nevertheless, the court found that a reduced
sentence was not warranted because of the circumstances of the
original offense, and because Woolen had committed significant
rules violations in prison and had not participated in enough
rehabilitative programming.
We appointed counsel to represent Woolen on appeal.
Woolen’s attorney filed a brief raising no issues and requesting
that we exercise our discretion to independently review the
record for error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216. In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court established procedures for
cases in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order
denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases,
“(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
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determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a
copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may
dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does
not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as
abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) In that instance, we do “not need to
write an opinion but should notify the defendant when [we]
dismiss[] the matter.” (Ibid.) Because a defendant who has been
denied postconviction relief has no constitutional right to an
appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent review of
the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may conduct such
a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.)
If the defendant does file a supplemental brief or letter, we
are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in
that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a
supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent
review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
We followed the procedure outlined above and, on June 12,
2026, Woolen submitted a supplemental brief. Recognizing our
discretion to conduct an independent review of the record, we
decline to do so here.
II
Woolen raises several arguments in his supplemental brief.
We reject all of these arguments as we explain below.
First, Woolen argues the superior court erred by refusing to
consider alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S.
83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (Brady) and Napue v. Illinois
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(1959) 360 U.S. 264 [79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217] that occurred
at his trial. He argues that the court in People v. Nuno (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 1030 held that documents related to these issues
are relevant in resentencing proceedings. But Nuno involved
resentencing under section 1172.6, where the “evidentiary
hearing resembles a criminal trial” because “the prosecution
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
petitioner’s guilt” under current law. (Nuno, supra, at p. 1059.)
In that context, the court held that “principles of fundamental
fairness require disclosure of material exculpatory evidence”
pursuant to Brady. (Nuno, supra, at p. 1061.) Proceedings under
section 1172.75 do not work the same way. The court must
conduct “a full resentencing” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 393, 402), but the statute does not require the
prosecution to prove the defendant remains guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, the court’s reasoning in Nuno does not
apply. Instead, the ordinary rule prevails: a defendant may not
use an appeal of a postjudgment order to contest “matters that
could have been reviewed on timely appeal from the judgment.”
(People v. Howerton (1953) 40 Cal.2d 217, 220; accord, People v.
Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 883.)
Next, Woolen contends the trial court erred by failing to
rule on his “[m]otion to [c]onsolidate [s]entences pursuant to . . .
[section] 669.” Section 669 gives superior courts discretion to
direct different components of a sentence to be served either
concurrently or consecutively. “We assume the trial court was
aware of and followed applicable law” (People v. Coleman (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724), and that its decision to reimpose
consecutive sentences for the attempted murder conviction and
the firearm enhancement was the result of an exercise of the
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court’s informed discretion. In his motion to consolidate
sentences, Woolen refers to a 2014 conviction for possession of a
weapon in violation of section 4502, subdivision (a)(1), and argues
that the determinate sentence in that case must be served before
the indeterminate life sentence in this case, and that the court
lacked jurisdiction to resentence him for any other offense. The
record does not document the 2014 conviction, and we do not see
what it has to do with the resentencing on Woolen’s attempted
murder conviction.
Woolen also complains that the abstract of judgment does
not reflect his credits for time served. At the resentencing
hearing, the parties agreed that Woolen had served 271 days
prior to his sentencing and 7,849 days from that date until the
resentencing, not including conduct credits. The court ordered
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to
calculate the balance. Woolen has provided no information to
show those numbers were incorrect, or that the CDCR
miscalculated Woolen’s conduct credits.
Next, Woolen argues his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance at the resentencing hearing by preventing him from
being present and speaking during the resentencing hearing, and
by failing to ensure the superior court received copies of
documents he submitted. These documents include a motion to
augment the record with information related to Woolen’s
background and performance in prison, another motion to
augment the record with an excerpt from a hearing during
Woolen’s trial at which the court discussed the issue of motive
with both attorneys in the case, and the aforementioned motion
to consolidate sentences.
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To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
“the defendant must show [both] that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674]), and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”
(id. at p. 687). Woolen’s claims fail one or both of these tests.
First, the record shows Woolen was electronically present for the
hearing, and he has not shown there was any additional relevant
information he could have provided that his attorney prevented
him from sharing. Instead, his attorney submitted documents to
the superior court at Woolen’s request for resentencing. The
court stated during the resentencing hearing that it “received the
supplemental briefings” that Woolen’s attorney had received from
Woolen, and that it “had time to review” them. Thus, there is no
reason to think his attorney failed to present the court with the
relevant documents. In addition, Woolen has not shown how the
parties’ discussion of motive during the original trial was
relevant to his resentencing hearing.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Woolen’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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