Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Woodley CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E087978
v. (Super.Ct.No. FERI2505737)
AHKEEL TYWON WOODLEY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gary Polk, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Levingston Bergman
and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In October 2025, the People filed a felony complaint charging Ahkeel Tywon
Woodley with one count of first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling while a person
other than an accomplice was present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21); unlabeled
statutory references are to this code) and four counts of assault by means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).
In March 2026, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Woodley pled guilty to first
degree burglary (§ 459), and he admitted that another person, not an accomplice, was
present during the commission of the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The trial court
dismissed the remaining charges, suspended imposition of his sentence, ordered that
Woodley serve 90 days in custody, which were to be satisfied by work release, and placed
him on formal probation for 36 months subject to various terms and conditions. One of
the terms was that he “[p]articipate and complete at [his] expense any counseling,
rehabilitation treatment, program deemed appropriate by probation officer; and authorize
release of information relative to progress” (the “treatment condition”).
On appeal, Woodley argues that the treatment condition improperly delegates
judicial authority to the probation officer because it “does not specify the kind of program
[Woodley] might be required to complete.” The People concede the point and argue that
remand is necessary so that the trial court can correct the error. We agree.
Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution states that “[t]he powers of
state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the
exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
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Constitution.” Penal Code section 1203.1 “gives trial courts broad discretion to impose
probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.” (People v.
Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26.) But “no statutory provision sanction[s] a delegation
of unlimited discretion to a probation officer” to implement or interpret probationary
terms. (People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353, 358.) “[T]hese determinations
are essentially judicial functions.” (Ibid.) “While the probation officer may properly
specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s
duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.” (People v.
Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902.)
Woodley’s treatment condition delegates unlimited discretion to his probation
officer to determine and implement the nature and amount of treatment that Woodley may
be required to complete, including whether a program is residential or outpatient.
Because the treatment condition does not identify the type of counseling or treatment that
he is required to complete, the trial court’s imposition of the condition is an improper
delegation of authority.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to modify the treatment condition by either specifically
identifying the type of treatment program(s) or striking the condition altogether. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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