Filed 9/22/26 P. v. Wolfer CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, PUBLIC VERSION
Redacts material from sealed record
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A174334
ROSS WOLFER, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 02-25-01042)
Defendant, Ross Wolfer, appeals from the trial court’s order
authorizing the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) to administer
antipsychotic medication involuntarily pursuant to Penal Code section 1370.1
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2025, the Contra Costa District Attorney charged
defendant with cemetery vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594.35, subd. (a); count 1, a
felony); mortuary vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594.35, subd. (c); count 2, a felony);
and mutilation, disinterment, or sexual contact with human remains
(Health & Saf. Code, § 7052, subd. (a); counts 3–4, felonies). The complaint
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
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also alleged, as to each count, property damage exceeding $50,000 (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.6, subd. (a)).
On June 18, 2025, the trial court declared doubt as to defendant’s
competence to stand trial. Accordingly, on June 25, 2025, the trial court
suspended criminal proceedings and appointed Ken M. Loya, Ph.D., to
evaluate defendant pursuant to section 1368. On August 1, 2025, Dr. Loya
submitted his evaluation, which concluded that defendant was not competent
to stand trial.
On August 12, 2025, the trial court held a competency hearing in which
the court found defendant unable to “understand the nature and purpose of
the proceedings taken against him” and “cooperate with Counsel in
presenting a defense in a rational manner.” The court also found it in the
interest of justice to restore defendant and referred the matter to the
conditional release program (CONREP) for placement recommendation.
The trial court received CONREP’s placement evaluation on
September 3, 2025. The trial court held a placement hearing on September 9,
2025. The trial court subsequently committed defendant to DSH for two
years and found defendant met the criteria for involuntary medication for
reasons of capacity and dangerousness. Accordingly, the court authorized
DSH to administer antipsychotic medication as needed, including on an
involuntary basis.
DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the trial court’s order authorizing the DSH to
administer antipsychotic medication without his consent on the grounds that
there was insufficient evidence that his disorder required treatment with
antipsychotic medication or that he presented a demonstrated danger to
others.
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We review the court’s findings for substantial evidence. (People v.
Garcia (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1054 (Garcia) [“A court’s order
authorizing a state hospital to administer antipsychotic medication
involuntarily to a defendant will be upheld on appeal so long as it is
supported by substantial evidence”]; People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
381, 397 (Lameed).) Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence must
account for the burden of proof required for the trial court’s judgment.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995; see Conservatorship of
Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 733, fn. 14 [to order involuntary
medication, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant lacks capacity to provide consent or refuse medication].)
Accordingly, “the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.,
supra, at pp. 995–996.)
I. Legal Framework
Under section 1370, “[a] trial court is required to authorize involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication if it finds one of three sets of
conditions to be true.” (Garcia, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055, citing
§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(II)–(III) & (ii).)2 Here, relying on the first and
2 The third condition, comprised of four factors established in Sell v.
United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166 [156 L.Ed.2d 197], applies only when the
purpose of involuntary medication is to render the defendant competent to
stand trial. (Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 394.) “[T]he trial court
need not consider the Sell factors ‘if forced medication is warranted for a
different purpose,’ such as ‘the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes
related to the individual’s own interests where refusal to take [medication]
puts his health gravely at risk. [Citation.]’ ” (Lameed, supra, at p. 395,
quoting Sell, supra, at p. 182.)
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second conditions under section 1370, the trial court issued its involuntary
medication order.
Relevant here, under the first condition, the trial court must find:
(1) the defendant lacks capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic
medication; (2) the defendant’s mental disorder requires treatment with such
medication; and (3) if the defendant’s mental disorder is not treated with
medication, it is probable that serious harm to the defendant’s mental or
physical health will result. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).) “Probability of
serious harm to the physical or mental health of the defendant requires
evidence that the defendant is presently suffering adverse effects to their
physical or mental health, or the defendant has previously suffered these
effects as a result of a mental disorder and their condition is substantially
deteriorating. The fact that a defendant has a diagnosis of a mental disorder
does not alone establish probability of serious harm to the physical or mental
health of the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Further, under the second condition, the trial court must find the
defendant is a danger to others “in that the defendant has inflicted,
attempted to inflict, or made a serious threat of inflicting substantial physical
harm on another while in custody, or the defendant had inflicted, attempted
to inflict, or made a serious threat of inflicting substantial physical harm on
another that resulted in the defendant being taken into custody,” and the
defendant presents a danger of causing substantial physical harm to others
because of his or her mental disorder. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(II).)
“Demonstrated danger may be based on an assessment of the defendant’s
present mental condition, including a consideration of past behavior of the
defendant within six years prior to the time the defendant last attempted to
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inflict, inflicted, or threatened to inflict substantial physical harm on
another, and other relevant evidence.” (Ibid.)
“In exercising its discretion pursuant to [section 1370, subdivision (a)],
the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the charged offense,
including . . . the defendant’s mental health condition, including, without
limitation, any intellectual or developmental disability, the history of
treatment, the criminal history of the defendant, whether the defendant is
likely to face incarceration if convicted, whether the defendant has previously
been found incompetent to stand trial, whether restoring the person to
mental competence will enhance public safety, and any other relevant
considerations.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i)(II).)
II. Legal Analysis
Defendant argues that the information in the report provided by the
court’s appointed psychologist, Dr. Loya, does not amount to clear and
convincing evidence that defendant’s disorder required medication and that
the report lacked evidence that he caused or threatened substantial physical
harm on another during the immediate offense or in custody or that he
presents a danger of doing so because of his disorder. We disagree.
The trial court issued an order authorizing involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication to defendant after finding the first and second
conditions under section 1370 to be true. (Garcia, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1055, citing § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I)–(II) & (ii).) The trial court
followed both its prior findings and Dr. Loya’s opinions in making its
assessment pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B). Defendant fails
to address the evidence beyond Dr. Loya’s report, available to and considered
by the trial court, and sufficient to satisfy both the first and the second
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conditions under section 1370.3 We find the substantial evidence standard is
met based on defendant’s medical records, and the testimonial evidence,
evaluations, and written declarations offered by various medical
professionals familiar with defendant.
[REDACTED] The trial court previously found by clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) defendant was determined to have a serious mental
disorder; (2) if not medicated, defendant was a danger to himself;
(3) defendant’s psychiatrist had prescribed psychiatric medication for
defendant, considered the risks and benefits of the medication, and
determined that it was in his best medical interest; and (4) defendant’s
psychiatrist had considered the treatment alternatives and concluded that
his needs could be met by any reasonable alternatives.
A. The Trial Court’s Findings Related to the First Condition
Under Section 1370.
The first condition under section 1370 requires the trial court to find
that (1) defendant lacks capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic
medication; (2) defendant’s schizophrenia requires treatment with such
medication; and (3) if defendant’s schizophrenia is not treated with
medication, it is probable that serious harm to his mental or physical health
will result. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).) We find the substantial evidence
3 In a footnote of defendant’s opening brief, defendant appears to raise
an issue concerning the propriety of the trial court’s reliance on its findings
made in relation to a separate proceeding of the defendant. Raising an
argument only in a footnote is a violation of California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B), which requires each point to be raised under a separate
heading or subheading summarizing the point. (Sabi v. Sterling (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947 [“Footnotes are not the appropriate vehicle for
stating contentions on appeal”].) We therefore disregard this argument
because of noncompliance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
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standard is met for this first condition based on Dr. Loya’s report, the
testimonies of Nayeli Galarza and Dr. Tiger, and the written declaration of
Dr. Holoyda.
Dr. Loya noted [REDACTED]. Dr. Loya opined that defendant was
likely gravely disabled due to his inability to care for himself in the most
basic manner by remaining a potential threat to himself.
Nayeli Galarza, a mental health clinical specialist, met with defendant
approximately four times between June 23, 2025, and August 1, 2025.
Galarza observed [REDACTED].
Licensed psychiatrist Zachary Tiger, defendant’s treating physician at
the time of the evidentiary hearing, testified [REDACTED]. Dr. Tiger
observed [REDACTED]. Dr. Tiger believed that defendant’s psychiatric
disorder made him a danger to himself and required medication.
In a parallel section 2603 proceeding for the defendant, Brian
Holoyda, M.D., submitted a written declaration [REDACTED].
B. The Trial Court’s Findings Related to the Second
Condition Under Section 1370.
The second condition under section 1370 requires the trial court to find
defendant a danger to others “in that the defendant has inflicted, attempted
to inflict, or made a serious threat of inflicting substantial physical harm on
another while in custody, or the defendant had inflicted, attempted to inflict,
or made a serious threat of inflicting substantial physical harm on another
that resulted in the defendant being taken into custody,” and the defendant
presents a danger of causing substantial physical harm to others because of
his or her mental disorder. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(II).) We find the
declaration of Dr. Holoyda and the CONREP report sufficient to meet the
substantial evidence standard under the second condition of section 1370.
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Dr. Holoyda and the CONREP report both concluded that due to his
mental disorder defendant presented a serious threat of inflicting substantial
physical harm on another. (See People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
1151, 1165 [“A single psychiatric opinion that an individual is dangerous
because of a mental disorder constitutes substantial evidence to support an
extension of the defendant’s commitment”]; id. at p. 1168 [“there was
substantial evidence that at the time of the hearing [the defendant] suffered
from mental illness that caused him to engage in potentially dangerous
behavior over which he had little, if any, control, and that he represented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others”].)
Dr. Holoyda noted, [REDACTED].
In relevant part, the CONREP report found that defendant
“[REDACTED]. Additionally, [defendant’s] extensive criminal history,[4]
including violent and high-risk offenses, combined with the severity of the
current charges involving property destruction and desecration of human
remains, indicate an elevated risk for future dangerousness when acutely
symptomatic.”
Contrary to defendant’s contentions, we find the evidence sufficiently
demonstrates that defendant’s symptoms cause him identifiable suffering,
4 At the time of committing the immediate offense, defendant was on
felony probation in Alameda County for elder abuse. Officers also checked
defendant’s criminal history and found previous arrests for the following
charges: criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422); battery (id., § 242); aggravated
battery (id., § 243, subd. (d)); simple assault (id., § 240); assault with a deadly
weapon (id., § 245); burglary (id., § 459); vandalism (id., § 594); possession of
drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364); indecent exposure
(Pen. Code, § 314); petty theft (id., § 484); trespassing (id., § 602); elder abuse
(id., § 368); tampering with a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852); violation of
probation (Pen. Code, § 1203.2); and failure to appear (id., § 853.7).
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place him at continuing risk of physical harm, prevent him from engaging
with medical staff, and otherwise make medication necessary.
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
involuntary medication order pursuant to section 1370.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Burns, J.
A174334/People v. Ross Wolfer
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