Filed 7/7/26 P. v. Wilson CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086044
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FVI024734)
v.
DEANTHONY GEORGE WILSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Debra Harris, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Deanthony George Wilson appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A).1 That statute authorizes the filing of such a petition by a
defendant who was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP) for an offense the defendant committed while under 18
years of age after the defendant has served 15 years in prison. (§ 1170, subd.
(d)(1)(A).) Wilson acknowledges that he was sentenced to imprisonment for
life with the possibility of parole for a murder that he committed when he
was 17 years old.
Wilson, however, contends that his 40-years-to-life sentence is the
functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence. Wilson further contends that
this court’s decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard)
and its progeny provide that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)’s exclusion of
those sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP from the ability to file
a petition under that statute violates the guarantee of equal protection of the
law. (See Heard, at p. 612 [“denying juvenile offenders, who were sentenced
to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity to petition
for resentencing violates the guarantee of equal protection”].)2 The Heard
court noted that the defendant in that case was serving a sentence of 103
years to life (ibid.), a term of years with a parole eligibility date that was
unquestionably beyond his natural life expectancy. The Heard court
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2 The issue of whether defendants who were sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP may petition for a recall of sentence under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A) is currently pending in a case before the California
Supreme Court. (See People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review
granted June 25, 2025, S290828 (Munoz).)
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concluded that “[s]uch a sentence constitutes a de facto life without parole
sentence.” (Id. at p. 629.)
Wilson cites no California authority, and we are not aware of any,
concluding that a sentence of 40 years to life for a crime committed as a
juvenile is functionally equivalent to an LWOP sentence. For the reasons we
discuss below, we conclude that Wilson’s 40-years-to-life sentence is not a de
facto LWOP sentence such that principles of equal protection require that he
be permitted to petition for recall of sentence under section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A). (See People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 1006 (Baldwin)
[“[A]s applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to 44 years to life,
appellant fails to demonstrate section 1170[, subdivision] (d)’s eligibility
limitation has no rational basis and is therefore unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment”].)3 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying Wilson’s petition.
3 There is a conflict of authority with respect to whether a sentence of
50 years to life for an offense committed as a juvenile amounts to a de facto
LWOP sentence for purposes of an equal protection claim under Heard.
(Compare Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 503, review granted
[concluding that defendant’s sentence of 50 years to life is not the functional
equivalent of LWOP sentence] and People v. Thompson (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1072, fn. 4, review granted September 24, 2025,
S292540 (Thompson) [disagreeing with “the conclusion that section 1170[,
subdivision] (d) violates equal protection guarantees in denying relief to
juvenile offenders sentenced to 50 years to life”] with People v. Cabrera (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653 (Cabrera) [concluding that 50-year-to-life sentence
is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence]).) Our Supreme Court
may address this issue in Munoz. There is no conflict, however, with respect
to a term of 40 years to life, as is at issue in this case.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, a jury found Wilson guilty of second degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) (count 1) and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2). With
respect to count 1, the jury also found true allegations that Wilson committed
the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury
and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). With respect to both counts, the jury found
true the allegation that Wilson personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)).
In 2010, the trial court sentenced Wilson to 53 years to life in prison,
consisting of 40 years to life on count 1 (15 years to life on the underlying
offense, plus 25 years consecutive on the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
gun enhancement), along with a consecutive 13 year term on count 2 (three
years on the underlying offense, plus 10 years consecutive on the section
12022.5, subdivision (a) gun enhancement). The trial court imposed and
stayed sentences on the remaining enhancements.
In 2012, Wilson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial
court.4 The trial court granted the petition and modified Wilson’s sentence
by staying the 13-year aggregate term on count 2. The effect of the trial
court’s order was to modify Wilson’s sentence to 40 years to life in prison.
4 We grant Wilson’s unopposed March 16, 2026 request that we take
judicial notice of three court records, one from a state trial court and two from
a federal district court, related to the procedural background described in this
paragraph. (See Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) [providing that a “reviewing
court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in [Evidence Code]
Section 452”], 452, subd. (d) [permitting the taking of judicial notice of
“[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United
States or of any state of the United States”].)
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In 2013, Wilson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. In 2015, the district court granted the petition in part,
concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support Wilson’s street
terrorism conviction (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2) and directing that the trial
court resentence Wilson on the remaining conviction on count 1.
In 2016, the trial court resentenced Wilson to 40 years to life in prison
on count 1, comprised of 15 years to life on the underlying offense, plus 25
years consecutive on the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) gun enhancement.
The court struck the conviction pertaining to count 2 per the federal district
court’s judgment granting Wilson’s habeas petition in part.
In January 2024, Wilson filed a petition for recall of his sentence and
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) and Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th 608. In an accompanying brief, Wilson argued that a defendant
sentenced to a de facto LWOP term is entitled to file a section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A) petition for recall of sentence under Heard after 15 years
of incarceration. Wilson argued further that he had been incarcerated for
15 years and that his 40-years-to-life sentence was a de facto life sentence
because it did not “provide him the meaningful and realistic hope of release
or a genuine opportunity to reintegrate.” (Citing People v. Contreras (2018)
4 Cal.5th 349, 373 (Contreras).) Wilson supported his petition with various
exhibits, including those demonstrating his rehabilitative efforts while in
prison.
The People filed an opposition in which they argued that Wilson was
statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)
because he had not been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
The People contended that Wilson’s claim that he was entitled to recall of his
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sentence under Heard failed for several reasons, including that his 40-years-
to-life sentence did not amount to a de facto LWOP sentence.
After Wilson filed additional documents attesting to his work toward
rehabilitation, the People filed two supplemental briefs in opposition
discussing recent case law pertaining to the legal issues in the case.
On April 4, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Wilson’s petition
and denied it.
Wilson timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
Wilson contends that his 40-years-to-life sentence is the functional
equivalent of an LWOP sentence and that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)’s
exclusion of those sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP from its
scope violates equal protection of the law. We assume for the sake of this
opinion that the independent standard of review applies, since we conclude
that Wilson’s claim fails even if we accord the trial court’s ruling no
deference.
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) provides, “When a defendant who
was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant
may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
In Heard, we concluded that section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)
“violates the guarantee of equal protection” by “denying juvenile offenders,
who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the
opportunity to petition for resentencing.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 612.) Our decision in Heard, however, and the published cases following it,
involved defendants serving sentences with minimum parole eligibility dates
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greater than 40 years. (See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612 [103
years]; Cabrera, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 653 [50 years to life]; People v.
Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047 [67 years, plus 40 years to life];
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440 [10 years, plus 130 years to
life].) No published case has concluded that a sentence of 40 years to life for
a crime committed as a juvenile is the functional equivalent of LWOP for
purposes of deciding an equal protection challenge to section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A).
Moreover, in Baldwin, the Court of Appeal rejected an equal protection
challenge to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) brought by a defendant who
had been sentenced to a term of 44 years to life in prison for a crime he
committed as a juvenile. (Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) In
reaching this conclusion, the Baldwin court first explained that the parties
had based their arguments on the formulation of functional equivalence of
LWOP that the California Supreme Court had applied in considering an
Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of 50 years to life in Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th 349. (Baldwin, at p. 1001.) The Baldwin court rejected this
approach, reasoning that “an equal protection analysis to section 1170[,
subdivision] (d) requires ‘an equal protection specific’ analysis that is not
centered on Eighth Amendment concerns.” (Baldwin, at p. 985.) The
Baldwin court concluded that, in resolving the equal protection claim before
the court, it was instead appropriate to apply equal protection principles
elucidated in our Supreme Court’s recent decisions in People v. Williams
(2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 and People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834. (Baldwin,
at p. 1001.)
In applying these principles, the Baldwin court concluded that the
Legislature had a rational basis for treating juvenile offenders sentenced to
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44 years to life differently from juveniles sentenced to LWOP. (Baldwin,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002–1006.) The Baldwin court reasoned in
part that the legislative history of the bill that enacted what is now section
1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) supported the conclusion that the “Legislature’s
primary concern was with those juveniles whose sentences guaranteed their
death in prison because they offered no opportunity for parole.” (Baldwin,
at p. 1002.) The Baldwin court also noted that “legislative committee reports
reflect concerns centered specifically on LWOP, not lengthy juvenile
sentences generally.” (Id. at p. 1003.) The Baldwin court reasoned that the
Legislature acted rationally in focusing on those sentenced to LWOP since
the Legislature could have decided that this was the most “ ‘pressing
priority,’ ” (id. at p. 1005, quoting Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1077, review granted). Further, the Baldwin court noted that it was well
established that it is rational for the Legislature to proceed incrementally
and that courts are not permitted to second guess the Legislature’s authority
to determine which problem was most in need of addressing. (Baldwin, at
p. 1005.)
We find these aspects of Baldwin persuasive and apply them here.
“[T]he Legislature could have made a rational choice to target the harshest
juvenile punishment first, and the one that guarantees the juvenile will die in
prison.” (Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.) Wilson’s sentence of
40 years to life is not functionally equivalent to LWOP under Heard because
it is “not a sentence that guarantees death in prison, like LWOP or like
sentences of 103 years to life . . . .” (Ibid.) In light of Baldwin, and in the
absence of any published authority holding that a sentence of 40 years to life
imposed on a defendant for a crime committed as a juvenile is a de facto
LWOP, we conclude that Wilson has failed to establish that principles of
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equal protection require that he be permitted to petition for recall of sentence
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
DISPOSITION
The April 4, 2025 order denying Wilson’s petition to recall his sentence
is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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