Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Williams CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B340738
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA120283)
v.
TIANA WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Blake R. Armstrong and Kenneth C. Byrne,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Tiana Williams of carjacking, fleeing a
pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly,
and felony vandalism. On appeal, Williams challenges only her
felony vandalism conviction, contending that there is insufficient
evidence she maliciously damaged the car. We conclude that
there was sufficient evidence and so affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The victim Visal Yeng worked as a delivery driver for
DoorDash and drove a car that could be started with a keyless
fob. On August 9, 2022, Yeng was at a sandwich shop to pick up
a delivery order, his car parked outside. He had left the car’s key
fob under the seat. When Yeng left the shop, he saw Williams
getting into his car. As he tried to remove Williams, she asked
Yeng, “ ‘Do you want to leave because insurance is going to pay
for it, or do you want to die?’ ” The two struggled and eventually
Williams pushed Yeng out of the car. She reversed the car,
crashed into a van, and drove away. At some point, Yeng called
911.
Officer Jordan Lasch was on patrol with his partner when
he received a report of a carjacking. The officers located Yeng’s
car, which was being driven without its lights on. Officer Lasch
turned on the police car’s lights and sirens, but Yeng’s car pulled
away at 50 or 60 miles per hour, later reaching 80 miles per hour.
During the pursuit, Yeng’s car ran a red light and stop signs.
Yeng’s car finally collided with a curb because it was
“driving at such an unsafe speed.” The front right side tire
popped, the car slowed, and finally Yeng’s car pulled over and
Williams got out of the car. Officers arrested Williams.
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Yeng said he had paid over $44,000 for his car, and it was
now a “total loss.” The front bumper, front passenger side wheel
and the “back” were damaged.
DISCUSSION
Williams’s only contention on appeal is that her conviction
for felony vandalism must be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence of an element of the crime, namely, that she
acted maliciously in damaging Yeng’s car. But there was
sufficient evidence.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we ‘ “ ‘ “must review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’…. We
presume ‘ “ ‘the existence of every fact the [jury]
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’
(People v. Jimenez (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 602, 608,
citations omitted.)
Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a) defines vandalism:
Every person who maliciously commits any of the
following acts with respect to any real or personal
property not [their] own, in cases other than those
specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism:
(1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed
material. (2) Damages. (3) Destroys.
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The term “maliciously” only requires “the intent to do the
proscribed acts of defacing, damaging, or destroying property.”
(People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 895.) Thus,
vandalism is a general intent crime. (Id. at p. 896.) Two types of
malice can support a finding of vandalism. Penal Code section 7,
subdivision (b)(4) states that malice “import[s] a wish to vex,
annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act,
established either by proof or presumption of law.” (See
generally In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1028.)
The first type of malice has been termed “malice in fact”
and the second has been termed “malice in law.” The People only
argue that Williams acted with malice in law. That mental state
may be presumed or implied from the intentional doing of the act
without justification or excuse or mitigating circumstances.
(People v. Royal (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1251.) The mental
state may be inferred when the damage is “the direct, natural,
and highly probable” consequence of the defendant’s acts. (Ibid.;
In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1029.)
Williams says she never intended the damage: she
obviously did not want to damage the car or blow out the tire
because that would have hampered her flight from the police.
But under the “malice in law” test, that’s not the issue.
The issue is whether Williams acted in such a way that the
damage was a direct, natural, and highly probable consequence.
It was. Williams took over Yeng’s car by force, she threw it into
reverse crashing into a van behind, she fled the officers, ran a red
light, failed to stop at stop signs, drove at almost 80 miles per
hour, and hit a curb, blowing out a tire. Yeng’s car was totaled.
Williams notes that the police found no visible damage to
the curb where the car hit it. This, she says, shows that the tire
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damage resulted from natural wear and tear or by “accident.”
The “wear and tear” argument requires us to reweigh the
evidence, which we can’t do. (People v. Covarrubias (2016)
1 Cal.5th 838, 890.) The “accident” argument reiterates the
suggestion that the requisite mental state must intend the
specific damage done; but that’s not the test for malice in law.
Sufficient evidence supports Williams’s conviction of felony
vandalism.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
KARNOW, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
*
Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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