Filed 8/5/26 P. v. Walker CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085226
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SCD282520)
v.
ANDREW BLAKE WALKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with
instructions.
Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Donald W.
Ostertag and Anne Spitzberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Andrew Blake Walker of misdemeanor assault against
his ex-wife. After trial, the trial court issued a criminal protective order
(CPO) barring Walker from contacting his ex-wife and their two minor
children. The CPO also included a pretrial order prohibiting Walker from
dissuading the victim or witnesses from attending court hearings. The order,
however, left unselected an option that would allow exceptions for future
juvenile, family, or probate court orders “for the safe exchange of children and
court-ordered visitation.” On appeal, we agree with the People’s concessions
that the CPO should not include Walker’s children as protected parties, and
it should not have included the pretrial provision regarding the dissuading of
witnesses. We also agree with Walker that the lack of any exceptions for
future orders from other courts does not reflect the trial court’s oral ruling.
We therefore partially vacate the CPO and modify it accordingly. We
otherwise affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office charged Walker
with corporal injury to a spouse1 (Pen. Code,2 § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1),
sexual penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a); count 2), false imprisonment
(§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 3), forcible oral copulation, (§ 287,
subd. (c)(2)(A); count 4), two counts of spousal battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1);
counts 5 & 7); and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4); count 6).
1 Walker and the victim were married at the time of the charged offenses
but have since divorced.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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A jury acquitted Walker of all charges except for misdemeanor assault
(§ 240) as a lesser included offense of count 6. The trial court sentenced
Walker to 180 days in custody with credit for time served.
The trial court issued a CPO prohibiting Walker from contacting the
victim and their two minor children for 10 years. The CPO is a mandatory
judicial council form, and the minor children are named as additional
protected persons in item 3 of the form.
The trial court also checked item 9 in the CPO, preventing Walker from
dissuading victims or witnesses from attending court hearings. Item 9 is “for
pretrial orders issued under Penal Code section 136.2(a)(1).”
The trial court declined to check item 14 in the CPO, which authorizes
exceptions to the no-contact order for the safe exchange of children or
court-ordered visitation pursuant to an existing or future family, juvenile, or
probate court order. The trial court explained, “I’m going to let the family
court deal with it. I’m not going to get into that at this point. [¶] . . . [¶] This
situation has so many twists and turns and issues. . . . [¶] . . . I don’t want to
go there at this point, . . . [s]o I think they need to go back and see the family
court judge.” Walker’s timely notice of appeal followed.
III. ANALYSIS
Criminal protective orders are governed by section 136.2; the trial court
may issue a pretrial order under subdivision (a) of the statute, which does not
survive after final judgment is rendered. (People v. Lopez (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 227, 236.) On the other hand, section 136.2, subdivision (i)
authorizes posttrial orders if the defendant has been convicted of a qualifying
offense, including those involving domestic violence. (Lopez, at pp. 236–237.)
In a postconviction order, the court may bar the defendant from contacting “a
victim of the crime,” (§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1)) or “a percipient witness to the
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crime” (id., subd. (i)(2)). (See People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
127, 143.)
The trial court issued the challenged CPO after trial. The parties are
therefore correct that the trial court erred by entering a pretrial order under
item 9.
The parties are also correct that the trial court should not have
included Walker’s children as protected parties under the CPO. The jury
convicted walker of assault on his ex-wife, which is a qualifying domestic
violence offense. (§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); Fam. Code § 13700, subds. (a) & (b).)
However, nothing in the record indicates that Walker’s children were victims
or percipient witnesses of that crime. (People v. Lopez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
at p. 237 [children who were present during domestic violence event, but
asleep, did not qualify as victims or percipient witnesses under § 136.2,
subd. (i)].) As such, there was no basis to include Walker’s children as
protected parties.
Finally, the trial court expressed its intention to “let the family court
deal with” any potential exceptions to its no-contact order. However, the trial
court did not select item 14(b), which would allow an exception for future
orders from another court. The CPO therefore does not match the trial
court’s stated ruling.
Based on the foregoing, we modify items 3, 9, and 14 of the CPO to
remove the pretrial order, remove the children as protected persons, and
authorize an exception for future orders from a family, juvenile, or probate
court regarding exchange of the children or court-ordered visitation.
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IV. DISPOSITION
Items 3, 9, and 14 of the CPO are vacated. The trial court shall issue
an amended CPO in which (1) the children are not listed as protected persons
in item 3; (2) the pretrial order in item 9 is deleted; and (3) there is an
exception to the CPO under item 14(b). The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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