Filed 9/22/26 P. v. Villegas CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065340
v. (Super. Ct. No. 07NF3050)
RAMON VILLEGAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kevin Haskins, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant an
d Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Connor O. Sakati, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
* * *
In 2007, defendant Ramon Villegas was arrested for molesting a
five-year-old girl. Villegas posted bail and fled the jurisdiction. In 2025, a jury
found Villegas guilty of committing a lewd act upon a child, and engaging in
sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10. (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd.
(a), 288.7, subd. (a).) 1 The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life.
Villegas raises three claims on appeal.
First, Villegas claims his sentence is cruel and/or unusual under
the federal and state Constitutions. We disagree.
Second, Villegas claims the minute order and abstract of
judgment erroneously includes a $300 fine that was not imposed by the trial
court. The Attorney General concedes the error. We agree.
Third, Villegas claims that a recent California Supreme Court
opinion clarified the rules for imposing fines and fees at sentencing, and that
he is entitled to a remand so he can “challenge the imposition of any fine as
constitutionally excessive under the federal and state Constitutions.” (People
v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30 (Kopp).) We agree.
Thus, we will remand this case with directions to the trial court
to conduct a hearing as to fines and fees, and to correct its records as needed.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2007, Diana S. was five years old and was at
the home of her babysitter. The babysitter’s husband, Villegas, whom Diana
1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. We shall also generally omit the word “subdivision” or its abbreviation.
2
referred to as an uncle, lured her into a bedroom by offering her candy.
Villegas locked the door, placed Diana on the bed, pulled down her
underwear, and rubbed his penis between the labia of her vagina.
Diana developed symptoms that are consistent with a herpes
infection. Diana told her godmother that Villegas’s penis touched her vagina.
Villegas possessed medications to treat herpes.
On August 23, 2007, Villegas was arrested. Villegas appeared in
court and bail was set. Villegas then failed to appear, and a warrant was
issued for his arrest. About 14 years later, Villegas was detained in Mexico
and was transported to the United States.
On March 5, 2025, a jury found Villegas guilty of committing a
lewd act upon a minor, and engaging in sexual intercourse with a child 10
years of age or younger. (§§ 288 (a), 288.7 (a).) The trial court imposed a total
indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. The court also imposed various
fines and fees.
II.
DISCUSSION
Villegas claims: A) his sentence is cruel and/or unusual; B) the
court’s records do not match the oral pronouncement of judgment; and C) he
is entitled to a hearing on remand to challenge the fines and fees.
A. Cruel and/or Unusual Punishment
Villegas contends his sentence of 25 years to life is cruel and/or
unusual; he challenges the punishment under both the United States
Constitution, and the California Constitution. We disagree.
It is generally the role of the Legislature to determine the
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appropriate penalties for criminal offenses. (People v. Crooks (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 797, 807.) Thus, it is the defendant’s “considerable burden” to
convince an appellate court that the punishment imposed is disproportionate.
(People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174; People v. Baker (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 711, 722 [rejecting a facial constitutional challenge to an
indeterminate life sentence for a sexual offense against a child].)
1. The United States Constitution
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend., italics added.) A sentence violates
the federal Constitution if it is grossly disproportionate to the crime for which
it is imposed. (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 72.) We independently
review whether a sentence meets this standard. (See United States v.
Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 336–337.)
The Supreme Court has previously held that life sentences for
theft offenses are not cruel and unusual under the federal Constitution. (See,
e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 [consecutive sentences of 25
years to life for two petty theft with prior convictions did not violate the
Eighth Amendment]; Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 18–20 [a three
strikes sentence of 25 years to life for stealing three golf clubs did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment]; Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S.
263, 265–285 [a life sentence for credit card fraud, passing a forged check,
and theft by false pretenses did not violate the Constitution].)
Consequently, compared to other sentences for less serious
crimes, we find that Villegas’s sentence of 25 years to life for engaging in
sexual intercourse with a five-year-old child is not grossly disproportionate.
Thus, we hold that the sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
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2. The California Constitution
Under our state constitution: “Cruel or unusual punishment may
not be inflicted . . . .” (Cal. Const. art. I, § 17, italics added.) To determine
whether a sentence is disproportionate, California courts generally weigh and
compare: a) the nature of the offense and the offender; b) the punishment
imposed to the punishments for other offenses; and c) the punishment
imposed by other jurisdictions for the same or similar offenses. (In re Lynch
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425–429 (Lynch), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 974.)
However, the Lynch analysis merely provides guidelines for
determining whether a given punishment is cruel or unusual, and the
importance of each criterion depends on the facts of each case. (Lynch, supra,
8 Cal.3d at pp. 425–429.) A court’s determination may be made based on the
first Lynch factor alone, i.e., the nature of the offense and/or offender. (People
v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1197–1200.) Further, the defendant has
the burden of establishing that his punishment is greater than that imposed
for more serious offenses in California, and that similar offenses in other
states do not carry punishments as severe. (In re DeBeque (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 241, 248.) It has been noted that successful challenges based on
proportionality are an “exquisite rarity.” (Weddle, supra, at pp. 1196–1197.)
As to the first Lynch factor, courts evaluate the seriousness of the
crime as well as the totality of the circumstances surrounding the offense,
such as the manner in which the crime was committed. (People v. Em (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 964, 972.) Here, sex offenses against children are among the
most serious crimes listed in the Penal Code. (See Ashcroft v. The Free Speech
Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 244 [“The sexual abuse of a child is a most
serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent
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people”].) Further, as to how the crime was committed, Villegas lured a five-
year-old child into a bedroom by offering her candy. Villegas then had
intercourse with the child by abusing his position of trust. In short, we find
that Villegas’s sentence is proportional, considering the first Lynch factor
alone. (See People v. Weddle, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1197–1198 & fn. 8 [a
court’s determination may be made based on the first Lynch factor alone].)
We also find that the second Lynch factor weighs against
Villegas’s claim. A sentence of 25 years to life is not disproportionate when
compared to other crimes in California that mandate similar sentences. (See,
e.g., People v. Meneses (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1092–1094 [15 years to
life for lewd act on a child]; People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066,
1071–1072 [25 years to life for failure to register as a sex offender].)
And finally, as to the third Lynch factor, Villegas refers us to
sentences for similar sex offenses in two other jurisdictions: New York (five to
25 years), and Oregon (20 years to life). However, the Attorney General refers
us to sentences for similar sex offenses in three other states: Nevada (35
years to life); Utah (25 years to life); and Virginia (life without parole). Taken
together, California’s sentence of 25 years to life “is no doubt severe, it is not
so disproportionate to the punishment imposed in other states to render
[defendant’s] sentence constitutionally suspect.” (People v. Baker, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 730 [life sentence for defendant convicted of sexual
penetration of a child was not cruel and unusual].)
Villegas argues that his sentence is disproportionate because he
had no prior criminal record and he is now 78 years old. We disagree.
As the trial court stated at sentencing, there were aggravating
circumstances of Villegas transmitting herpes to a five-year-old child,
inflicting enduring pain upon her, abusing a position of trust, and evading
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justice for nearly two decades. Again, given the crime and circumstances in
this case (the first Lynch factor), Villegas’s arguments do no persuade us that
his sentence is disproportionate. (See also People v. Christensen (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 781, 807 [“the lack of a prior criminal record is not
determinative”].)
To reiterate and conclude, we hold that Villegas’s sentence is not
cruel and/or unusual under the federal and state Constitutions.
B. The Court’s Records
As a general rule, when there is a discrepancy between the oral
pronouncement of judgment and the trial court’s records, the oral
pronouncement controls. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.)
“The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by
adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment.” (People
v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388.)
Here, the trial court’s minutes and abstract of judgment include a
$300 sex offender fine that was not imposed at sentencing. (See § 290.3.) The
Attorney General concedes the error and we agree.
Thus, on remand the trial court is directed to correct its records
to conform with the oral pronouncement of judgment.
C. Hearing Regarding Fines and Fees
While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court
addressed the means by which a criminal defendant may challenge various
payments typically imposed at sentencing. (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 11.)
Those payments “fall into three broad categories: fines, ancillary costs, and
victim restitution.” (Ibid.)
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As to fines, Kopp did “not find a due process requirement to hold
an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine.” (Kopp, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 23 & fn. 17.) Instead, Kopp clarified that an “excessive fines
analysis,” which includes consideration of “ability to pay, is the proper vehicle
to challenge punitive fines” under either the federal or state Constitutions.
(Kopp, at p. 23.) As to ancillary costs, Kopp clarified that an equal protection
analysis is appropriate and held: “[E]qual protection principles require a
court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing
a court operations assessment.” (Id. at p. 30.) As to restitution, Kopp
reiterated that crime victims have a “right to ‘secure restitution from the
persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.’” (Id. at p. 12.)
The Attorney General argues Villegas is not entitled to a hearing
on remand because he made an argument to the trial court at sentencing
challenging the court operations fee. We disagree.
Because Villegas did not have the benefit of Kopp’s reasoning and
did not invoke the excessive fines clauses in the trial court, consistent with
Kopp, “[w]e remand to give him the opportunity to assert the legal analyses
applicable to such a challenge and argue how the particular facts of this case
inform such an inquiry.” (See Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23.)
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III.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions (1) to
conduct a hearing as to fines and fees (see Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23),
and (2) to correct the court’s records as needed. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
___________________________
MOORE, J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________
MOTOIKE, P. J.
___________________________
MACAULAY, J.
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