Filed 7/8/26 P. v. Venson CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B344271
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XCNBA140055)
v.
CLIFFORD ALLAN VENSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Defendant and appellant Clifford Allan Venson appeals
from the trial court’s order summarily denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91.1 Because the
court did not follow the required procedures for adjudicating the
petition, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We also
direct the superior court to correct a clerical error in the abstract
of judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 1997, a jury found Venson guilty of unlawful driving of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and evading an officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and found true that he had three prior
convictions constituting “strikes” under the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). He was sentenced to 25 years to
life. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. (People v.
Venson (Feb. 26, 1998, B111731) [nonpub. opn.].)
On January 17, 2025, Venson filed a petition requesting,
among other things, to be resentenced pursuant to
section 1170.91, which allows individuals convicted of some
felonies to seek recall and resentencing so that certain mitigating
factors related to military service can be considered. He alleged
his “prior service within the military [and] his service related
mental health issues were not considered during sentencing [and]
qualif[ied] as newly discovered evidence to support resentencing
[under section] 1170.91.” In support of his petition, Venson
attached documents from the National Personnel Records Center
and Department of Veterans Affairs that indicated he is a
veteran.
On February 3, 2025, with no parties present, the trial
court summarily denied Venson’s petition.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Venson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Erred by Summarily Denying
Venson’s Request for Resentencing Under
Section 1170.91 Without Holding a Public Hearing to
Determine His Eligibility and Suitability
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
We interpret the requirements of section 1170.91 de novo.
(People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 237 (Bonilla-
Bray).)
Section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1) states: “A person
currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by
trial or plea, who is, or was, a member of the United States
military and who may be suffering from sexual trauma,
traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance
abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the person’s
military service may petition for a recall of sentence, before the
trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in the case, to
request resentencing if the circumstance of suffering from sexual
trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the
person’s military service was not considered as a factor in
mitigation at the time of sentencing.”
Upon receiving a section 1170.91 petition for resentencing,
the trial court must hold “a public hearing” to determine whether
the defendant satisfies the statutory criteria for relief. (Id.,
subd. (b)(3).) The prosecution, the defense, and any victim must
be given at least 15 days’ notice of the hearing. (Ibid.) “At that
hearing, the prosecution shall have an opportunity to be heard on
the [defendant]’s eligibility and suitability for resentencing.”
(Ibid.)
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If the trial court finds the defendant satisfies the criteria
for relief, “the court may, in the interest of justice,” do either of
the following: (1) “[r]educe the defendant’s term of imprisonment
by modifying the sentence”; or (2) “[v]acate the conviction and
impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or
lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in
the original pleading, and then resentence the defendant to a
reduced term of imprisonment with the concurrence of both the
defendant and the [prosecution].” (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(3)(A)–(B).)
B. Analysis
We agree with Venson that the trial court erred by denying
his petition for resentencing without holding a properly noticed
“public hearing” as required by section 1170.91,
subdivision (b)(3).
Venson filed a facially sufficient petition under
section 1170.91, subdivision (b) indicating that he served in the
military and suffers from service-related mental health issues
that were not considered by the trial court as mitigating factors
at his initial sentencing.
Under section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(3), the trial court
was thus obligated to hold “a public hearing” with at least
15 days’ notice given to the prosecution, the defense, and any
victim of Venson’s crimes, where it could determine if he satisfied
the statutory requirements for relief and, if so, whether
resentencing was warranted. The court’s denial of Venson’s
petition without holding such a hearing was improper.
Bonilla-Bray is instructive and supports reversal here. In
that case, the defendant filed a petition alleging he met the
statutory requirements under section 1170.91, subdivision (b).
(Bonilla-Bray, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.) “Nevertheless,
soon after receiving [the] defendant’s petition, the [trial] court—
with no parties present and no apparent notice to [the] defendant
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or the prosecution—summarily denied [the] defendant’s petition.”
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal found the summary denial to be
improper and reversed and remanded with directions for the trial
court to hold a hearing. (Id. at pp. 236, 239.)
Resisting this conclusion, the People argue Venson is
ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.91 because Venson
is serving an indeterminate sentence and the statute does not
apply to such sentences. The People would be correct under the
pre-2022 version of the statute. As observed by the Court of
Appeal in People v. Estrada (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 839, the
version of section 1170.91 that became effective in January 2019
expressly limited resentencing eligibility to those serving
determinate sentences pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b).
(Estrada, at pp. 841–843.)
However, in 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170.91
to remove this limitation. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 721, § 1; see also
People v. Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325, 330 [“In 2022, the
Legislature amended [section 1170.91] again. [Citation.] The
2022 amendment . . . expanded subdivisions (a) and (b) to include
those serving indeterminate sentences”]; People v. Harrison
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1154 [same].) Accordingly, that
Venson is serving an indeterminate sentence does not make him
ineligible for relief under section 1170.91.
II. The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Corrected
As Venson points out, there is a clerical error in the
abstract of judgment. It states Venson was convicted of grand
theft of a vehicle pursuant to section 487h, subdivision (a), when
in fact he was convicted of the lesser included offense of unlawful
driving of a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a). The People do not contest this. If not already
done, the abstract of judgment must be amended to correct this
error. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
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DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order summarily denying Venson’s
section 1170.91 petition is reversed. The case is remanded for the
court to conduct a noticed public hearing in accordance with
section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(3).
The superior court is directed to amend the abstract of
judgment to correctly reflect that Venson was convicted of
unlawful driving of a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code
section 10851, subdivision (a). The court is further directed to
send a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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