Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Velasco CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B343812
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 24SFCF00205-01)
v.
MARCO VELASCO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Marco Velasco appeals from a judgment after he was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 100 years for forcible oral
copulation, forcible sodomy, forcible sexual penetration, and
forcible rape. We appointed counsel to represent Velasco on
appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel for Velasco filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 that did
not identify any arguable issues. After independently reviewing
the record, we have not identified any either. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After a domestic violence incident with her boyfriend,
Roberta P. became stranded in Burbank without her cell phone.
She asked the police department if they would take her home.
The police left Roberta at a hotel and told her to either call a
friend or ask the hotel to call a taxi for her. The hotel, however,
would not help, and no hotel guests would let Roberta use their
phone.
Sometime between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, Roberta
walked across the street to a gas station. Roberta saw a police
officer talking with Velasco, who was sitting inside a big rig
truck. Roberta told them that she needed help getting home to
Newbury Park, and Velasco offered to take her because “he was
going in that direction.” Roberta got into the truck and gave
Velasco $100 for gas.
At some point during the drive, Velasco began driving in
the wrong direction. When Roberta pointed this out to Velasco,
he told her he would turn around. However, when he got off the
freeway, Velasco drove the big rig to a freeway overpass in San
Fernando and parked underneath it. Velasco told her he was
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expecting a delivery of cars, but that if they were not delivered
within the next 15 minutes, he would take her home.
After a few minutes, Velasco told Roberta he was going into
the back of the truck to relax. Velasco invited her to come to the
back of the truck, but she declined. However, Velasco “became
adamant and stern” and told her to come into the back. Roberta
went into the back and sat down on a mattress.
Velasco then took out a pipe and began smoking
methamphetamine. Roberta indicated that Velasco “turned a
little evil” and began asking her more personal questions,
including if she had a boyfriend and whether she liked going to
bars.
Velasco then reached out and touched Roberta’s knee, came
towards her, and began moving his hand up her leg. Roberta
tried to block him, but he told her he wanted to have sex. When
Roberta continued to refuse his advances, Velasco opened a
drawer and showed her that he had a gun, which later turned out
to be a BB gun.
Velasco then advanced toward her, grabbed her, and began
touching her. When she tried to stand up, Velasco threw her onto
the mattress and told her that “this is going to happen no matter
what.” In an attempt to prevent him from continuing, Roberta
falsely told him that she had multiple sclerosis, was married, and
had a sexually transmitted disease. However, none of this
dissuaded him, and he told Roberta to take off her clothes. When
she refused, he began to grab at her clothes. Velasco was able to
remove her pants and underwear, and to push up her shirt.
When Roberta continued to fight him, Velasco took out the
gun and placed it against her jaw. When the pressure of the gun
forced her mouth open, Velasco placed his penis in her mouth.
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However, when Roberta slightly bit down with her teeth to
irritate him, he removed his penis from her mouth.
Velasco then tried to put his penis between Roberta’s
breasts. When that failed, he told her to spread her legs. When
she continued to fight him, he flipped her over and forced open
her legs. Velasco then put his finger in her anus and vagina. He
then removed his finger from her anus and inserted his penis. At
one point, Roberta felt a metal object in her anus, which Roberta
believed was the gun. The insertion of the metal object caused
Roberta to start bleeding.
After being forcibly sodomized, Roberta tried to stand up.
Velasco pushed her back down and told her that he wanted to
ejaculate. Velasco fondled her breasts and placed his penis inside
her vagina. However, when Velasco became flaccid, he began
rubbing his penis all over Roberta. Velasco told Roberta that
once he was able to ejaculate, he would take her home. After
Velasco ejaculated, Roberta threw up.
Roberta then got dressed but deliberately “swiped [her
clothes] ... through his ejaculation so that there would be ...
something that [she] could hand to the police.” Velasco then
drove her to a fast-food restaurant in Simi Valley. He opened her
door and pushed her out of the truck.
Roberta identified Velasco from a police six-pack photo
lineup, and police matched Velasco’s DNA to clothing items that
Roberta was wearing on the night of the assault.
Velasco was charged by information with two counts of oral
copulation by use of force (Pen. Code, § 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)1;
counts 1 and 2); one count of sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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(c)(2)(A); count 3); one count of sexual penetration with force
(§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 4); and one count of forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 5). As to each count, it was further
alleged that Velasco committed the offense under two of the
circumstances specified in section 667.61, subdivision (e),
specifically that Velasco kidnapped the victim (id., subd. (e)(1))
and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (id., subd.
(e)(3)), with the result that each sex offense carried a punishment
of imprisonment for 25 years to life (id., subd. (a)).2
After the trial court denied Velasco’s motion under People
v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to appoint a new attorney for
him, the matter proceeded to trial. The jury found Velasco guilty
on all counts and found true the allegations that he kidnapped
the victim and used a dangerous or deadly weapon within the
meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(3).
The trial court sentenced Velasco on February 3, 2025. The
court indicated each of the five counts carried a mandatory term
of 25 years to life pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (a),
based on the jury’s true finding on the two aggravating
circumstances under section 667.61, subdivision (e).
With respect to whether the sentences for counts 2 through
5 should be imposed consecutively or concurrently to count 1, the
prosecution argued “this was a sexual assault that … took place
over the course of multiple hours in the back of the defendant’s
truck, and the victim was moved to various parts of the back
cabin of the truck. The defendant committed different sex acts …
2 The information also alleged that during the offenses
Velasco engaged in aggravated kidnapping, within the meaning
of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2), but the jury found that
allegation not true.
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throughout the time.” The defense argued that, given the
secluded setting in the back of the truck, “there really was no
external interruption such as the presence of a third party or a
movement to a new location from there or any significant break
in time which would have provided Mr. Velasco with an
opportunity to reflect.”
The court determined the sentence for count 2, the second
charge of oral copulation, should run concurrently with the first
oral copulation offense charged in count 1. However, the court
concluded that each of the other offenses (counts 3 through 5)
constituted “a separate occasion” within the meaning of section
667.61, subdivision (i), because before each one Velasco had an
opportunity for reflection before switching to an assault on an
“entirely different body part,” i.e., from oral copulation to sodomy
to vaginal penetration. Thus, the court imposed consecutive
sentences for counts 3 through 5. The aggregate term was 100
years to life.
Velasco timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Velasco in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, counsel filed a brief raising no issues.
Appointed counsel advised Velasco on February 23, 2026, that he
could personally submit any contentions or issues he wanted this
court to consider. Appointed counsel also sent Velasco the record
on appeal and a copy of the appellate brief. This court also sent a
letter to Velasco on February 23, 2026, advising him that
“[w]ithin 30 days of the date of this notice, appellant may submit
a supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal,
or contentions, or arguments which appellant wishes this court to
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consider.” At his request, we extended Velasco’s time to file a
supplemental brief to May 22, 2026. We did not receive a brief
from Velasco by the deadline.
On May 29, 2026, we received a motion from Velasco
seeking to have counsel appointed to pursue a claim under the
Racial Justice Act (RJA). (§ 745.) This motion, however, should
be filed in the superior court. (See People v. Wilson (2024)
16 Cal.5th 874, 944 [“Under both the RJA and long-settled
principles of law, appellants are entitled to file a concurrent
habeas corpus petition raising extrarecord RJA claims in superior
court, regardless of where the proceedings stand in the appeal”];
see also McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33,
39-40 [“[t]he appointment of counsel in RJA habeas proceedings
is governed by section 1473, subdivision (e)…. [T]he plain
language of section 1473(e) imposes a duty on trial courts to
consider whether indigent petitioners who request counsel ... are
entitled to appointed counsel based on an assessment of the
adequacy of the factual allegations in the habeas petition”].)
To the extent Velasco’s motion could be construed as an
untimely supplemental brief seeking to appeal RJA violations
based on the trial record (§ 745, subd. (b)), the RJA claims are
forfeited on appeal because they were not raised in the trial
court. (See People v. Wagstaff (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1219-
1220; People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 41; People v.
Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 811-812.)
We have examined the record and are satisfied appellate
counsel for Velasco has complied with counsel’s responsibilities
and there are no arguable issues. (Smith v. Robbins (2000)
528 U.S. 259, 277-284; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-
119; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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