Filed 7/8/26 P. v. Vasquez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B351422
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA095636)
v.
ISAIAS VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Isaias Vasquez, in pro. per., Richard B. Lennon, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Isaias Vasquez appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his petitions for resentencing filed under Penal Code
sections 1170, 1172.1, and 1172.6.1 We appointed counsel to
represent Vasquez on appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel
for Vasquez filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
reviewing the contentions in Vasquez’s supplemental brief, we
have not identified any either. Therefore, we affirm. However,
we direct the court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2013 Vasquez knocked on the front door of
Carlos M.’s house. When Carlos’s mother came to the door,
Vasquez asked whether Carlos was home. Carlos came to the
door, and Vasquez shot him seven times with a semiautomatic
firearm.
Vasquez was charged in an information with one count of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187,
664; count 1); and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246; count 2). As to both counts, the information alleged
Vasquez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm within
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d).
On July 16, 2014 Vasquez pleaded no contest on count 1 to
attempted murder and admitted the firearm use allegation
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and that he was at least 16 years old when
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
he committed the offense (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (d)(1)).2
The trial court dismissed count 2 and sentenced Vasquez to an
aggregate sentence of 29 years in state prison, comprising the
upper term of nine years for the attempted murder and 20 years
for the firearm enhancement.
A. Petition for Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
On April 4, 2023 Vasquez filed a form petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).3
Vasquez checked the boxes indicating that he “was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or I
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial” and that he “could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
Vasquez requested and was appointed counsel.
In their opposition, the People argued Vasquez was not
eligible for relief because “Vasquez plead no contest to . . .
attempted murder as the actual shooter, therefore he had the
required mens rea of specific intent to kill.”
Vasquez filed a reply in which he argued the superior court
should issue an order to show cause and set an evidentiary
2 The court struck the “premeditated” language in the
information before accepting Vasquez’s plea. However, the
abstract of judgment incorrectly states that Vasquez was
convicted of attempted willful, premeditated murder. We direct
the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect
Vasquez’s conviction of attempted murder.
3 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
former section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive
change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
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hearing because it was improper for the court to consider at the
prima facie review stage whether he had the specific intent to
kill.
B. Petition for Resentencing Under Section 1172.1
On April 2, 2024 Vasquez filed a form petition requesting
the superior court recall his sentence and resentence him
pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) and
section 1172.1.4 In his petition, Vasquez argued he was entitled
to sentencing relief because of three changes in the law:
(1) amendments to sections 1170 and 1170.1 (requiring proof of
aggravating factors to support an upper-term sentence);
(2) amendments to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) (requiring that
the court dismiss an enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of
4 Assembly Bill No. 600 amended section 1172.1, under
which trial courts now have jurisdiction to resentence a
defendant on the court’s own motion if the applicable sentencing
laws have changed since the original sentencing due to changes
in statutory or case law. Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1),
provides: “[T]he court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of
the date of commitment or at any time if the applicable
sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law, at
any time upon the recommendation of the secretary or the Board
of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in
state prison, the county correctional administrator in the case of
a defendant incarcerated in county jail, the district attorney of
the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney
General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the
case, recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced.”
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justice” and to give great weight to specified mitigating
circumstances); and (3) Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Sess.)
(granting courts authority to dismiss firearm enhancements).
Vasquez stated as his reasons for relief: “I can show that I
got a high school diploma. I [have] been out of trouble these past
years. I go to [various rehabilitation] group[s]. I had a kitchen
job. I am doing things that can get me release[d], I can show I’m
a[n] inmate that programs. I don’t condone violence. I don’t
condone negative relationships. I do help others with anything
that I can help others with. I do believe I can be a good resident
to the community if relief is granted. I’ve shown I can follow
simple instructions the past two years. I could be a good
community member.”
On June 3, 2024 Vasquez, through his appointed counsel,
filed a motion titled “Invitation to consider resentencing pursuant
to former AB 600 now 1172.1.” Vasquez attached his high school
graduation diploma and other documents showing his progress in
rehabilitation while in prison. Vasquez also submitted a
handwritten statement setting forth his plans following release
and how he would stay out of trouble.
In their opposition the People argued Vasquez was not
entitled to file a petition seeking relief under section 1172.1, and
the superior court did not have authority to impose a lesser
sentence because the sentence was the result of a plea
agreement. In addition, Vasquez was ineligible for resentencing
because he had at least seven major violations while in prison,
including attempted murder and assault.
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C. Heard Petition
On April 10, 2024 Vasquez filed a third petition, this time
seeking to be resentenced under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),5
and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608. According to the
petition, “section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) permits anyone who
was under the age of 18 at the time of the crime and sentenced to
life without parole . . . to petition for resentencing after 15 years
of incarceration. In People v. Heard . . . the Court of Appeal held
that this statutory right extends to those sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP. . . [¶] The imposed sentence of
29 years [in] state prison is a de facto LWOP sentence.”
The People opposed the motion on the basis Vasquez’s 29-
year sentence was not the functional equivalent of life without
the possibility of parole and Vasquez had a parole eligibility date
of September 2026, “which made him eligible for parole after
serving less than half of his total sentence.” In addition, Vasquez
was ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),
because he had “not yet served 15 years of his 29-year sentence,
having been sentenced in July of 2014 and [he] already has a
parole suitability hearing set in March of 2027 which will be the
13th year of incarceration.”
5 Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), states: “When a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to
the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
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D. The Superior Court’s Ruling
On December 10, 2025 the superior court denied Vasquez’s
petitions for resentencing. With respect to Vasquez’s petition
filed under section 1172.6, the court explained that “defendant
did plead no contest to attempted murder which does require an
intent to kill. And he did also admit that he personally
discharged a firearm during the offense—to commit that offense.
There were no other defendants charged. He was the actual
shooter by the plain reading of the case file . . . and the statute to
which he pled and admitted. [¶] The court does not believe that
he met his prima facie burden of showing that he was convicted
of a now no longer valid theory of homicide. And, in fact, he was
the actual killer or shooter, although this was not a complete
murder, who possessed the intent to kill. Therefore, he is not
eligible by a matter of law so the court would deny the prima
facie on the 1172.6.”
The superior court stated with respect to Vasquez’s petition
under section 1172.1, that it “declines [the] invitation to
resentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1”6
The superior court also denied Vasquez’s petition for
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), explaining:
“[Vasquez] was 17 at the time. The court’s going to indicate that
it[’s] not the functional equivalent of LWOP . . . [and] the
defendant’s violent conduct in this case is a grave concern to the
court. His performance in prison has been good but has not been
flawless and the court is not convinced that the court has
6 We note that a superior court’s decision not to recall and
resentence a defendant under section 1172.1 is not an appealable
order. (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996; People
v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696-697.)
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evidence that would indicate to the court that he would not be a
risk, further threat to the public. [¶] The court believes that the
parole board has already set up hearing dates for him and they
are in a better position to determine whether he is suitable for
parole. It appears that he in September of 2015, while in prison,
participated in an attempted murder of another inmate with an
inmate-manufactured weapon and he was transferred to a higher
level facility for 35 months. He was later cited for possessing
inmate-manufactured alcohol and later for inmate-manufactured
alcohol again. [¶] [He] [p]articipated in 2020 with an assault
and he was sentenced to four years prison consecutive during a
prison assault. So he has simply shown that after receiving this
sentence he is a continued threat so the court would decline the
invitation to resentence the defendant based upon his violent
conduct in prison which evinces a current and present danger to
society.”
Vasquez timely appealed from the denial of his three
resentencing petitions.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Vasquez in his appeal
from the order denying his petitions for resentencing. After
reviewing the record, counsel advised this court that he could not
identify any arguable issues. Counsel advised Vasquez on
April 7, 2026 that he was filing a brief stating he was unable to
find any arguable issues and that Vasquez could personally
submit any contentions he wanted the court to consider. Counsel
sent Vasquez a copy of his brief, as well as the record on appeal.
On May 5, 2026 Vasquez filed a five-page handwritten
supplemental brief addressing his resentencing petition under
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section 1172.6. Vasquez noted that the prosecutor during the
hearing mentioned only Vasquez’s disciplinary record while in
prison. Vasquez requested we consider that he “also [has] been
doing good things for myself to better myself.” He elaborated:
“During my incarceration, I have made wrong choices. I was part
of the Sureños Prison gang, that led me to problems, to violence
and crime.” Since then, however, he dropped out of the gang, and
he no longer wants “to live a life where violence is part of my
environment.” Vasquez also explained that he committed the
underlying offense because he believed the victim had raped his
girlfriend, but she later admitted to Vasquez that she had lied
about the rape.
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts
if he or she could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of the legislative changes to the definitions of
murder.7 (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880; People
v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 468-469; People v. Curiel (2023)
7 Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), provides: “A person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a
petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the
petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts” if specified conditions are met.
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15 Cal.5th 433, 449-450.) Because a section 1172.6 hearing is “a
continuation of the underlying criminal proceeding” (Gomez v.
Superior Court (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 778, 787), the only issue
before the superior court is whether the “petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294 [“The question is whether the petitioner
committed murder under a still-valid theory, and that is a factual
question.”].)
If, as here, appellate counsel finds no arguable issues exist
in a postconviction appeal from the denial of a Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition, the reviewing court is not required to
independently review the record. (People v. Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) However, “[i]f the defendant subsequently
files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is
required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that
brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Ibid.)
Vasquez’s argument that he had made mistakes and now
wants to pursue a path of nonviolence, while commendable, is not
a basis for granting a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (See People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
451, 457 [§1172.6 “does not permit ‘“litigat[ing] anew” any trial
issues or allowing “a petitioner to challenge any aspect of the
factfinding from the original trial that [they] wish[] to revisit.”’”].)
This argument is more appropriately raised before the parole
board. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, [setting forth what
information shall be considered by the parole board to determine
suitability of parole, including “past and present mental state,”
“behavior before, during and after the crime,” and “past and
present attitude toward the crime”].) Vasquez’s argument
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regarding his mistaken belief his girlfriend had been raped is
likewise not a basis for relief under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Vasquez’s petitions for resentencing is
affirmed. The superior court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment reflecting that Vasquez was convicted of
attempted murder and to send a copy of the amended abstract of
judgment to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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