Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Vanhorn CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
THE PEOPLE, C102356
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 21CF05832)
v.
THOMAS BRIAN VANHORN,
Defendant and Appellant.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Thomas
Brian Vanhorn was found guilty by a jury of multiple drug and firearm counts. On
appeal, defendant challenges the denial of the motion to suppress. He contends that the
trial court erred in finding he voluntarily consented to law enforcement retrieving his
identification from his car, which led to the discovery of methamphetamine inside. We
defer to the trial court’s factual findings and agree with its legal conclusion that defendant
was not subjected to an unreasonable search because he consented to the officers
retrieving the identification. We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In July 2021, Chico Police Lieutenant Terry Tupper responded to a radio call
about a car that had become stuck on a median in Butte County. When Lieutenant
Tupper arrived at the scene, defendant and another officer were discussing how the
accident happened. Defendant provided his name, and the other officer asked him for
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identification. Defendant responded that he did not have his identification on him but
believed it was in the car. Lieutenant Tupper then asked where the identification was in
the car and walked around the back of the car toward the passenger side because the
driver’s side was inaccessible. Defendant stated that his wallet was on one of the front
seats. When Lieutenant Tupper reached the passenger’s side of the car, he asked
defendant, “Which seat was it?” Defendant described the seat and said, “something to
the effect I can grab that for you.” However, the officer would not allow defendant to get
the wallet due to officer safety concerns. Lieutenant Tupper assumed defendant was
giving him permission to retrieve his wallet by telling him where it was in the car.
Because the car was tilted up on the median, Lieutenant Tupper had to stand up on
the curb to look inside. He shined his flashlight into the car and “immediately saw a
large bag of quite a bit of what appeared to be methamphetamine crystal, white-ish kind
of clear-ish crystalline substance” on the floor of the driver’s side of the car. Lieutenant
Tupper then closed the door and radioed another officer to have him detain defendant
because he saw something in the car.
Defendant was arrested after the discovery of the methamphetamine and
handcuffed for officer safety reasons because he was agitated. Another officer opened
the door of the car to retrieve the methamphetamine and saw a firearm in the pocket of
the driver’s side door and a .40 caliber bullet on the front passenger floorboard. Officers
subsequently found a small digital scale and vials of clear liquid in a backpack believed
to belong to defendant. Ultimately, officers recovered 1.72 ounces of methamphetamine.
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The People charged defendant with possession of methamphetamine while armed
with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1); possession of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 2); selling, offering to
sell, or transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 3);
being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4); and
unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 5).
Defendant moved to suppress his statements and all evidence obtained during the
encounter arguing, among other things, that he had been unlawfully detained. Defendant
further argued (1) the drugs were not in plain view and the officers could not see them
until Lieutenant Tupper opened the car door; (2) the officers did not ask for consent to
open defendant’s car door; (3) the officers could have identified defendant without seeing
his identification; and (4) the identification was never found and defendant had not been
suspected of committing a crime before the search of the car. In addition, defendant
noted he never gave the officer explicit permission to open the car door, and when he
informed the officer that he could retrieve the wallet, the officer declined to allow him to
do so. Defendant argued that by ignoring his request to retrieve the wallet himself, the
officer led him to believe the officer was going to enter his car regardless, and he
therefore never implicitly consented to the search.
After discussing applicable authorities on warrantless searches and implied
consent, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the following facts:
“One, at approximately 10:30 p.m., defendant was involved in a single vehicle
collision into a shopping center driveway median causing…defendant’s vehicle’s driver’s
side to be dipped down into an unfilled planter area of the median. Two, defendant was
speaking with Sergeant Bower when Lieutenant Tupper arrived as support. Three,
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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defendant was shirtless, … very aggravated, agitated, and demonstrative. Four, the
defendant was not handcuffed. Five, the defendant stated he was not injured or in need of
medical treatment. Six, … [d]efendant was asked for his identification. Defendant said
he didn’t have I.D. on him, but believed it was in the car. Lieutenant Tupper then asked
where [it was] in the car … and the defendant described [his] identification’s location on
one of the front seats. This discussion occurred while Lieutenant Tupper was walking
from the driver’s side around the backside of the vehicle towards the passenger side. On
the passenger side, Lieutenant Tupper asked for clarification, which seat is it. The
defendant described the location. The defendant said also something to the effect of I can
grab it for you. Seven, Lieutenant Tupper never asked the defendant specifically may I
go grab your identification. Eight, the defendant never objected to Lieutenant Tupper
obtaining the identification from the vehicle. Nine, Lieutenant Tupper, with almost 18
years of law enforcement experience, interpreted the defendant’s description on two
occasions of where the identification was located as implied consent. Lieutenant Tupper
did not accept the defendant’s offer to retrieve the identification himself due to officer
safety concerns, based upon the defendant’s very agitated state and police policy. Ten,
Lieutenant Tupper opened the passenger door without breaking the plane of the car with
his body or flashlight for the purpose of obtaining the defendant’s identification, and
from that location observed a large bag of what appeared to be methamphetamine on the
driver’s side floorboard. Lieutenant Tupper communicated the observation by radio to
the other officers.
“In this Court’s determination, the facts present a very close call regarding implied
consent. But ultimately the Court is persuaded the People have satisfied their burden by
preponderance of the evidence that the voluntariness of the defendant’s implied consent
has been shown. Here the defendant was not handcuffed. Defendant provided
Lieutenant Tupper with the location of his identification in the car on two separate
occasions. Simultaneously to these statements by the defendant, the lieutenant was
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moving in the direction of the passenger door, which was the only way to access the front
seat. By doing so, he communicated to the defendant [his] intention to follow the
defendant’s directions as to the location of the identification. Lieutenant Tupper
reasonably rejected the defendant’s offer to obtain the identification for officer safety
reasons in light of the circumstances, including the time of night, the response to a single
vehicle collision, the position of the vehicle, which made access limited, and the
defendant’s agitated state. Thus, the opening of the passenger side door authorized by a
theory of implied consent provided Lieutenant Tupper with a lawful vantage point from
which the observation of the large bag of what appeared to be methamphetamine. The
search and seizure of the bag of methamphetamine was justified by the plain view
doctrine. Defendant was then arrested. Incident to this arrest, and having heard
Lieutenant Tupper’s transmission that there was controlled substances in the vehicle,
Officer Jukestock had probable cause to enter the vehicle [and] seize the bag of
methamphetamine. When the car door was opened, he observed the firearm in the
driver’s side inside door pocket, and the .40 caliber bullet on the front passenger floor.
The backpack in the defendant’s possession was searched incident to an arrest as well.
The inevitable inventory search prior to towing does provide an alternative exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”
The jury later found defendant guilty of all counts. The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of five years four months in state prison.2 Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding he voluntarily consented to
the officers retrieving his identification from his car, including its implied finding that
2 This sentence includes an eight-month consecutive term in Butte County Superior
Court case No. 24CF02500, a case not at issue in this appeal.
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defendant was not illegally detained, and therefore the evidence obtained during and after
their search of the car must be suppressed.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend.) “[A] warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the People
prove that the search comes within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”
(People v. Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 604, 609-610.) One such recognized exception is
a search conducted pursuant to a subject’s consent.3 (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th
668, 674.) But consent must be voluntary, not submission to an assertion of authority.
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341.) Consent that is the product of an illegal
detention is not voluntary. (Ibid.) The People have the burden to prove consent was
given freely and voluntarily, under the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at pp. 341, 346;
see also People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152 [preponderance of
evidence applies to prosecution’s burden in opposing suppression motion].) “[C]onsent
to enter and search may be express or implied, and may be demonstrated by conduct as
well as words.” (People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004,
1012.)
Our review of the trial court’s finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the
search is limited. “ ‘The … voluntariness of the consent is to be determined in the first
instance by the trier of fact; and in that stage of the process, “The power to judge
credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual
inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise
of that power, and the trial court’s findings–whether express or implied–must be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743,
758; see People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) We consider the
3 The People do not contend there was probable cause for an arrest or search before
the officers discovered the methamphetamine on the floor of defendant’s car.
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evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s suppression motion ruling.
(People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 673-674.)
Defendant first contends that he was illegally detained by the officers and thus he
could not have voluntarily consented. Defendant argues the officers detained him by,
among other things, insisting that he produce identification and refusing to allow him to
retrieve it himself, after he had already provided his name. The People claim the issue is
forfeited by defendant’s failure to specifically argue in the trial court that he was
detained. We note that defendant did argue in his moving papers that he was detained.
But even assuming defendant did not properly argue to the trial court he was detained, we
will address the claim here. It is well established that “an appellate court is generally not
prohibited from reaching questions that have not been preserved for review by a party.” 4
(People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1215.)
“A detention occurs when an officer intentionally applies physical restraint or
initiates a show of authority to which an objectively reasonable person innocent of
wrongdoing would feel compelled to submit, and to which such a person in fact submits.”
(People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 57.) “Circumstances establishing a seizure
might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer’s display
of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (In re
Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) “The test for the existence of a show of
authority is an objective one and thus, ‘[n]either the officer’s uncommunicated state of
mind nor the subjective belief of the individual citizen is relevant to the determination of
whether a police contact is a detention.’ ” (Linn, at p. 58.) Questions of a “sufficiently
accusatory nature” may “ ‘be cause to view an encounter as a nonconsensual detention.’ ”
4 Because we address defendant’s claim that he was detained, we do not address his
alternative argument that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve this issue.
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(Ibid.) “[T]here is ‘no “bright-line” distinction between a consensual encounter and a
detention …. “The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the
coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular
details of that conduct in isolation.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 59.)
Although the trial court did not explicitly find that defendant was not detained, it
impliedly found that he was not when it found defendant implicitly consented to the
search. (See People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 341.) Substantial evidence
supports that implied finding. Defendant had not been pulled over by law enforcement,
and there were only two officers on the scene before the search of defendant’s car. There
is no evidence that the officers displayed weapons, used any physical force, placed him
under arrest, or used any language or tone “indicating that compliance with the officer’s
request might be compelled.” (See In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) While
they did request defendant’s identification twice and declined his offer to retrieve the
identification, it appears their questioning was neutral, not accusatory.
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s explicit finding that defendant
voluntarily consented to the officers retrieving his identification from his car. As we
have already discussed, defendant was not detained at the time of the search. He then
volunteered that his identification was in his car on the seat, did not object to Lieutenant
Tupper looking for the identification, and was engaged in an ongoing conversation with
that officer about the location of the identification. Under the totality of the
circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that defendant impliedly
consented, through his conduct and words, to the officers retrieving his identification
from his car. (See People v. Superior Court (Chapman), supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at
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p. 1012.) Once defendant consented, officers lawfully discovered the methamphetamine
in the vehicle and arrested him.5
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\
EARL, P. J.
\s\
HULL, J.
5 Defendant does not separately challenge the searches that led to the discovery of
the firearm, ammunition, and other evidence after the initial discovery of the
methamphetamine in the car.
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