Filed 8/26/26 P. v. Valladares CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B343702
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24VWCF01377)
v.
JAIME VALLADARES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael V. Jesic, Judge. Affirmed.
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles G. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
A jury convicted defendant Jaime Valladares of one count
of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)1 for entering a
woman’s home uninvited late at night. Valladares challenges his
conviction, arguing there was no substantial evidence that he
intended to commit theft or rape. Valladares also contends the
trial court erred with respect to the admission of evidence
concerning a similar offense he committed two years earlier. He
does not claim the evidence was inadmissible, but he argues the
trial court erred by refusing to tell the jury that the prior offense
resulted in a charge and conviction for trespassing rather than
burglary. Finally, Valladares argues the trial court erred by
refusing to hold a jury trial on the issue of whether he was on
probation when he committed the burglary, and then using his
probation status as an aggravating factor to justify imposing the
upper-term sentence. We find no prejudicial error, and we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Samantha C. lived in a condominium in North Hollywood.
She slept in a bedroom with a sliding glass door that led to a
small, enclosed patio. At around 12:45 a.m. on June 28, 2024, she
awoke and saw Valladares standing about four feet from her bed
near the sliding glass door. Valladares had his back to her and
appeared to be doing something to the sliding door. Samantha
was confused at first, then terrified. She yelled, “What the fuck
are you doing? Get out of here.” Valladares turned around, put
his index finger up to his mouth, and shushed her. He then
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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opened the door and fled to the patio, and Samantha closed and
locked the sliding door.
Samantha called 911 and went out into the hallway. She
saw that her kitchen window was open, and the screen had been
ripped out. She grabbed a knife and hid in the bathroom for
about 20 minutes until the police arrived. When they did, she
went into the living room and saw that the window there was
also open, and the screen was almost completely detached. She
also saw a hat on her chair that had not been there previously,
and the police found a bag outside her wall containing someone’s
belongings. Nothing had been taken from her home.
At around 7:30 the next morning, Samantha looked outside
the sliding glass door and saw Valladares outside near a
dumpster. She was confident Valladares was the man who had
broken in because lights from a nearby parking lot illuminated
her bedroom, allowing her to see Valladares’s face clearly during
the break-in. In addition, Samantha remembered seeing
Valladares near the dumpster on the two nights leading up to the
burglary. Only a few hours before the break-in, he had asked her
what time it was. She felt uneasy about how close he was to her,
and she made sure to close the garage door behind her.
At Valladares’s trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of
a similar event that had happened two years earlier. Tiffany M.
testified that, at 3:30 a.m. on July 21, 2022, she was in her
bedroom in an apartment she shared with two roommates. The
room was completely dark with the door ajar to allow in a breeze.
Tiffany was on her bed looking at her phone when she heard a
sound near the doorway. She shined her phone’s flashlight in
that direction and saw Valladares standing about six feet away.
She made eye contact with him and screamed. He put his index
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finger to his mouth, shushing her. Tiffany’s roommates, who
were in another bedroom nearby, heard the noise, came to the
rescue, and chased Valladares away. Tiffany testified that she
believed Valladares intended to rape her, as he had ignored
valuables in the living room of the apartment and instead went to
her bedroom.
This was not the first time Tiffany had encountered
Valladares. Valladares’s relatives lived in an apartment upstairs
from her, and in the six months leading up to the break-ins,
Tiffany had had increasingly scary and threatening interactions
with Valladares. He would stand near the gate of her apartment
complex so that she had to address him when she entered, and on
several occasions, he blocked the entrance. In the week before
the break-in, he had been watching her and following her, and
the day before the incident, he tried to walk into her apartment.
A couple of days after the break-in, Valladares knocked on the
door to Tiffany’s apartment, leaving only when he could see police
cars arriving.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Burglary
Conviction
Burglary is defined as “enter[ing] any house, room,
apartment,” or any one of many other specified structures “with
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (§ 459,
subd. (a).) Valladares does not deny he entered Samantha’s
condominium, but he argues we must reverse his burglary
conviction because there was insufficient evidence that he
intended to commit theft or another felony.
Valladares notes that Samantha testified there was
nothing missing from her apartment, nor was there any evidence
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he brought a bag or flashlight with him. The prosecution
theorized that Valladares intended to rape Samantha, but
Valladares claims this is only speculation, and argues that if he
had actually intended to commit a sexual assault, he would have
moved toward Samantha when she awoke rather than fleeing
from her. In addition, Valladares notes that Samantha testified
that she had locked the sliding doors and closed the curtains
before she went to bed. He argues that if he had intended to
sexually assault Samantha, there was no reason for him to have
opened the curtains and to be “doing something with the door”
with his back to Samantha. He claims his behavior was more
consistent with an expression of mental illness than an attempt
to rape.
The problem with Valladares’s arguments is that they ask
us to draw different inferences from the evidence than the jury
did. That is not our role in deciding a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. Instead, “ ‘[w]e review the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘ “An appellate court must accept logical
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence
even if the court would have concluded otherwise.” ’ ” (People v.
Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811-812.)
As Valladares acknowledges in his opening brief,
“[p]revious decisions have not demanded much in terms of
evidence to support the element of intent for residential burglary”
when reviewing for substantial evidence. This is in part because
of the nature of these cases. As the court noted in People v.
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Moody (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 357, “[p]roof of intent is rarely
susceptible of direct proof and may be inferred from the
circumstances of the case.” (Id. at p. 363.) Indeed, “burglarious
intent [can] be reasonably and justifiably inferred from . . .
unlawful and forcible entry alone.” (People v. Stewart (1952) 113
Cal.App.2d 687, 691; accord, People v. Fitch (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d
825, 827.) Thus, in Moody, the court affirmed a burglary
conviction in a scenario similar to this one. In that case, the
defendant entered a home “at night after all the doors had been
locked and when discovered he had his arms outstretched toward
the intended victim, a 15-year-old girl who was dressed only in a
nightgown. When discovered he ran. Thereupon when
confronted by a police officer [the defendant] once again took
flight.” (Moody, supra, at p. 363.) The court held “there was
substantial evidence to support a finding that [the defendant]
had either entered the house with an intent to commit theft or to
commit rape.” (Ibid.)
Valladares objects that Moody and other 20th century cases
“should be considered in light of the California Supreme Court’s
requirement that the reasonable doubt standard be accounted for
by the reviewing court in any claim by the defendant that the
conviction is not supported by substantial evidence.” But the
case Valladares cites in support of this proposition,
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, addressed
substantial evidence review of findings based on a standard of
clear and convincing evidence, and the court held that “an
appellate court must determine whether the evidence reasonably
could have led to a finding made with the specific degree of
confidence required by this standard.” (Id. at p. 1005.) This
holding did not alter the standard of review as to findings in
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criminal trials. The court stated explicitly that the standard it
enunciated “harmonizes with the firmly established rule in
criminal cases that the prosecution’s burden of proving a
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt affects how an
appellate court reviews the record for substantial evidence.” (Id.
at p. 1007.) For decades, our Supreme Court has instructed
appellate courts to “determine whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425.) There is no reason to suppose
the existing cases on inferring intent in burglary applied an
incorrect standard.
In addition, our substantial evidence review requires us to
“ ‘review the whole record.’ ” (People v. Solomon, supra, 49
Cal.4th at p. 811.) That includes not only the immediate
circumstances in which Samantha discovered Valladares, but
also Valladares’s prior behavior. Of particular relevance is his
apparent fixation on Tiffany over a period of several months
leading up to his eventual decision to enter her apartment late at
night, which sheds light on his intent as to Samantha. (See
People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41 [“The inference that
[the] defendant entered Miss G’s apartment with felonious intent
is amply supported by evidence that he used the same modus
operandi to rape Mrs. H 11 days earlier”].) Although Valladares
did not assault Tiffany, his prior behavior toward her supported
an inference that he intended to. The jury could reasonably infer
he had a similar intent toward Samantha, with whom he
interacted only a few hours before entering her apartment.
During closing argument, Valladares’s attorney argued that his
client may have been experiencing a mental health episode, and
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only entered Samantha’s apartment in order to frighten or
intimidate her, but the jury necessarily rejected that proposition
when it convicted him of burglary. The jury’s finding was not
unreasonable.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Refusing to Inform
the Jury that Valladares’s Previous Conviction Was
for Trespassing
The trial court admitted Tiffany’s testimony regarding
Valladares’s entry into her apartment even though that was not
the basis of the charges in this case. Evidence of uncharged
conduct is inadmissible to show the defendant’s propensity to
commit other similar acts (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), but it
may be admissible for other purposes, including for proving the
defendant’s intent and his identity (see id., subd. (b)). The trial
court relied on the latter two grounds in admitting Tiffany’s
testimony.
Valladares does not challenge that decision, but he argues
the trial court erred by failing to admit evidence about the nature
of his prior conviction in Tiffany’s case. Although the People did
not seek to introduce any evidence that Valladares was charged
or convicted in connection with his actions towards Tiffany,
Valladares requested that the court take judicial notice that he
had been convicted of aggravated trespassing rather than
burglary of Tiffany’s apartment, and that the court describe his
prior conviction specifically in its instruction to the jury
regarding the use of evidence of uncharged prior conduct. The
court declined the request for judicial notice, and in its jury
instruction on evidence of uncharged conduct, stated that “[t]he
People presented evidence that the defendant committed another
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offense that was not charged in this case” without specifying the
nature of the prior offense.
Valladares contends this was error. He argues for an
extension of the well-established rule that “if a trial court permits
the prosecution to present evidence that the defendant committed
one or more similar offenses for which he or she is not charged in
the current prosecution, the trial court must also allow the
defense to present evidence of the defendant’s acquittal, if any, of
such crimes, and failure to allow such acquittal evidence
constitutes error.” (People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
648, 664-665, citing People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459, 464-
466.) Valladares was not acquitted of burglary in the Tiffany
case, but he argues that the fact he was only charged with and
convicted of aggravated trespassing would have been relevant to
the jury’s evaluation of his conduct.
We are aware of only one case that nominally extended the
rule our Supreme Court first established in Griffin in the
direction Valladares advocates. In People v. Jenkins (1970) 3
Cal.App.3d 529, two defendants were jointly tried for possession
of a completed check with intent to defraud (former § 475a), and
the prosecution introduced evidence that the codefendant had
previously been arrested for a similar scheme. (Jenkins, supra,
at p. 533.) The court held that the trial court erred by refusing to
admit evidence that the codefendant was not charged for that
offense because “such evidence tended to weaken or rebut the
prosecution’s evidence of the other crime.” (Id. at p. 535.)
Jenkins is not directly on point, because unlike in that case,
Valladares was charged with and convicted of a crime for his
prior conduct. In addition, we have doubts as to how far, if at all,
the Griffin rule should be extended to cases where the defendant
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was not acquitted. In Griffin, the court reasoned that evidence of
a defendant’s acquittal on previous charges may “assist[] the jury
in its assessment of the significance of the evidence of another
crime.” (People v. Griffin, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 466.) The jury
would “know[] that at another time and place a duly constituted
tribunal charged with the very issue of determining [the]
defendant’s guilt or innocence of the other crime concluded that
he was not guilty.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) That rationale does not
apply here, where no factfinder ever considered whether
Valladares was guilty of burglary for entering Tiffany’s
apartment. The decision to charge Valladares with trespassing
rather than burglary was a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
which was likely influenced by numerous factors having little to
do with Valladares’s guilt or innocence of committing burglary.
We need not resolve this issue because even if the court did
err by failing to inform the jury that Valladares’s prior conviction
was for trespassing, the error was harmless. It is not “reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to [Valladares] would have
been reached” if the jury had known specifically what the prior
offense was. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)2 The
jury heard testimony about the actual conduct that led to his
prior conviction, as Tiffany detailed her interactions with
Valladares both on the night of the break-in and in the months
leading up to it. The information that the prosecutor for
unspecified reasons charged him with trespassing rather than
burglary in the Tiffany case would have provided little assistance
2 Both Valladares and the People agree, as do we, that the
Watson standard applies because admission of evidence on the
nature of a defendant’s prior conviction is a matter of state law.
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to the jury in deciding Valladares’s guilt or innocence with regard
to the burglary of Samantha’s home.
C. The Error in Failing to Provide a Jury Trial on
Valladares’s Probation Status Was Harmless
In the information, the People alleged that several
aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)
applied, but after the jury found Valladares guilty, the People
elected to dismiss all of those factors except one: that “[t]he
defendant was on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease
community supervision, or parole when the crime was
committed.” (Id., rule 4.421(b)(4).) Valladares requested a jury
trial on that issue, but the trial court concluded he was not
entitled to one. The court found the aggravating factor true, and
on that basis imposed the high term sentence of six years for
burglary.
In June 2025, five months after Valladares was sentenced,
our Supreme Court in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 held
that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating
factors “beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that expose[] a
defendant to harsher punishment.” (Id. at p. 1084.) This
includes even straightforward inquiries such as whether the
defendant “remained on probation at the time he or she
committed the new offense.” (Id. at p. 1083.)
Valladares argues Wiley applies to his case and, thus, the
denial of his request for a jury trial was error. The People
concede the point, and we agree. Nevertheless, we agree with the
People that the error was harmless because we “ ‘conclude[]
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same
standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon
which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified.’ ”
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(People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087; see Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705].)
The trial court took judicial notice of two cases on which
Valladares was serving probation at the time he committed the
burglary of Samantha’s home. Valladares did not object, and we
are aware of no basis for reasonable doubt on that issue.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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