Filed 7/2/26 P. v. U.S Fire Insurance Co. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE B346280
OF CALIFORNIA,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. 24PDSJ0064 &
GA110783
v.
UNITED STATES FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Mark E. Windham, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Law Office of John Rorabaugh and John M. Rorabaugh for
Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County
Counsel, Keever R. Muir, Assistant County Counsel, Steven M.
Rich, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
United States Fire Insurance Company (Fire Insurance), a
bond surety, appeals from a summary judgment and related
orders requiring it to pay on a bail bond deemed forfeited when a
criminal defendant failed to appear. Fire Insurance contends the
trial court lacked authority to enforce the bond because the court
did not comply with the notice requirements set forth in Penal
Code section 1305, subdivision (b). (Undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) We agree. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand the case to the trial court with directions to
discharge the bond’s forfeiture and to exonerate the bond — that
is, cancel the surety’s responsibilities.
I.
In September 2021, Fire Insurance posted a $75,000 bond
for defendant Rojo Raul’s release from custody.
On the morning of December 6, 2021, Raul failed to appear
in court. Consequently, the trial judge, part of the Superior
Court for the County of Los Angeles, declared the bond forfeited
in open court and issued a bench warrant.
Raul appeared at a hearing held that afternoon. Through
counsel, Raul told the court he had been delayed due to a “car
problem” and that “[h]e couldn’t contact anyone because he did
not have a phone at the time.” Accepting Rojo’s explanation, the
trial court found “there was no willful failure to appear by the
defendant[ ] . . . .” It therefore vacated the bond’s forfeiture and
set the forfeiture aside. In so doing, the trial court specifically
noted it “deem[ed]” the morning and afternoon hearings held that
day to be “one session . . . .”
Several months later, on April 19, 2023, Raul again failed
to appear in court, and the trial court again declared the bond
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forfeited. The next day, the clerk mailed written notice of the
forfeiture to Fire Insurance.
Raul did not appear in court within the exoneration period,
a period during which a surety may produce a defendant in court
and thereby avoid being liable on the bond. (See People v.
Western Ins. Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1030.)
Consequently, the court entered summary judgment on the
forfeited bond. A few days later, the clerk mailed Fire Insurance
notice of the judgment’s entry.
Fire Insurance moved to set aside the summary judgment,
discharge the bond’s forfeiture, and exonerate the bond.
According to Fire Insurance, section 1305, subdivision (b),
required the clerk of court to mail notice of the first forfeiture, the
one the court declared on the morning of December 6, 2021.
Raul’s appearance that afternoon, Fire Insurance argued, did not
excuse the clerk of its notice obligation. The lack of notice, Fire
Insurance asserted, released it from its bond obligations and
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce the bond.
The trial court denied the motion based on its view that,
under local rule 2.16 of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
(rule 2.16), “the norm is for each [court] day to constitute a
[single] session . . . .” Accordingly, it applied People v. Bankers
Ins. Co. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 543 (Bankers) to conclude the
forfeiture’s declaration and vacatur occurred “within th[e] same
court session,” such that Fire Insurance was not entitled to notice
of the forfeiture under section 1305, subdivision (b).
Fire Insurance timely appealed.
II.
“Bail forfeitures are governed by section 1305 et seq. The
trial court must carefully follow these provisions or its acts may
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be found to be” unauthorized. (People v. Financial Casualty &
Surety, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 127, 133.) “In addition, the
law traditionally disfavors forfeitures of bail. [Citations.] As a
result, ‘Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306 dealing with
forfeitures of bail bonds must be strictly construed in favor of the
surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture.’ ” (Ibid.)
If a defendant fails to appear in court without sufficient
excuse, the trial court must, in open court, declare the bail bond
forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) For bonds exceeding $400, “the
clerk of court shall, within 30 days of the forfeiture, mail notice of
the forfeiture” to the surety and to the bail agent. (Id., subd.
(b)(1).) The clerk’s non-compliance with this notice requirement
releases the surety and the bail agent “of all obligations under
the bond” (id., subd. (b)(3)) and, as some courts put it, deprives
the trial court of jurisdiction to enter summary judgment on the
bond (County of Orange v. Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp. (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1497 [“[A]bsent notice within the required
period, the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter summary
judgment on the bond”]).
“While a reviewing court ordinarily assesses the trial
court’s denial of a motion to vacate an order of forfeiture under
an abuse of discretion standard [citation], here the ‘evidence
before the appellate court is not in dispute’ and we therefore
employ de novo review [citation]. The party challenging the order
carries the burden of establishing error.” (Bankers, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.)
The parties dispute whether the trial court had to notify
Fire Insurance of the forfeiture declared on the morning of
December 6, 2021, and purportedly undone that afternoon. Fire
Insurance contends notice was required because “[t]his case falls
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squarely under” County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty &
Surety, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 875 (Financial Casualty).
The People respond not by attacking the validity of Financial
Casualty but by asserting this case bears more resemblance to
Bankers, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 543, such that notice was
unwarranted.
Our case is essentially indistinguishable from Financial
Casualty. There, another judge of the Superior Court for the
County of Los Angeles declared a $100,000 bail bond forfeited
when the defendant failed to appear at that morning’s hearing.
(Financial Casualty, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) That
afternoon, the defendant appeared in court and explained he had
missed the morning hearing due to a doctor’s appointment. (Id.
at p. 878.) The court vacated the forfeiture and told the
defendant to return to court at a later date. (Ibid.) After the
defendant’s subsequent failure to appear, the trial court again
declared the bond forfeited and mailed notice thereof to both the
bond agent and the surety. (Ibid.)
On appeal from the summary judgment entered against it,
the surety argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
bond, because the court failed to notify the surety of the initial
forfeiture. (Financial Casualty, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p.
878.) Our colleagues in Division Two of this court agreed,
explaining: “In our view, the language of section 1305,
subdivision (b) is inescapable. The triggering event for the notice
requirement is a trial court’s declaration of forfeiture in open
court. Consequently, once a forfeiture is declared in open court,
the clerk must mail notice to the surety and bond agent within 30
days or the trial court loses jurisdiction over the bond.” (Id. at p.
883.) Thus, Division Two concluded the trial court “lost
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jurisdiction over the bond” because it “did not mail notice after
the first forfeiture was declared in open court . . . .” (Ibid.)
The facts in this case parallel those in Financial Casualty.
Like the defendant there, Rojo failed to appear at a morning
hearing. He later appeared at a hearing held that afternoon and
provided an excuse for his tardiness, which the trial court
accepted. On these facts, Financial Casualty counsels that
regardless of the court’s attempt to vacate the forfeiture and
reinstate the bond in the afternoon, the clerk was statutorily
required to notify Fire Insurance of the forfeiture declared in the
morning. (See Financial Casualty, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p.
883.) The clerk’s failure to do so deprived the court of authority
to enforce the bond. (Ibid.) Thus, under Financial Casualty, the
court should have set aside the summary judgment, discharged
the forfeiture, and exonerated the bond. (See ibid.)
Bankers does not require a different result. In that case,
the trial court declared a $25,000 bail bond forfeited when the
defendant failed to appear. (Bankers, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p.
546.) Five minutes later, and that same afternoon, the
defendant’s counsel entered the courtroom and related that he
had called earlier to inform the court of his impending, albeit
tardy, appearance on his client’s behalf, but forgot to leave his
name. (Ibid.) Given this information, the court immediately set
aside the forfeiture and reinstated the bond, finding no fault on
the defendant’s part. (Ibid.)
Several months later, neither the defendant nor his
attorney appeared for a different court date. (Bankers, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) The trial court forfeited the bond, and
the clerk mailed notice of the forfeiture the following day. (Ibid.)
Subsequently, the surety moved to vacate the forfeiture and
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exonerate the bond based on the court’s failure to provide written
notice of the initial forfeiture. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the
motion, reasoning that “ ‘if [the forfeiture] is within the same
session, the court has the power to take it back . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
Our colleagues in the Sixth District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that “within a single court session,” trial courts
may “correct forfeitures erroneously declared without also
mailing notices of forfeiture.” (Bankers, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 549–550.) Recognition of this narrow exception to section
1305, subdivision (b), the Sixth District explained, did not
“undercut[ ]” this District’s holding in Financial Casualty that a
defendant’s “failure to appear during a single court session —
even if rectified within a few hours — triggers section 1305’s twin
requirements that the trial court declare the bail bond forfeited
and the clerk mail a notice of forfeiture.” (Bankers, at p. 551.)
Here, the bond’s forfeiture and reinstatement did not occur
within a single court session as contemplated in Bankers.
Instead, exactly as in Financial Casualty, the former took place
in the morning, while the latter happened hours later in the
afternoon.
Nonetheless, the People assert Bankers should govern
because, in their view, the trial court properly treated the
morning and afternoon hearings as a single session. We
disagree.
In denying Fire Insurance’s motion for post-judgment
relief, the trial court reasoned that under rule 2.16, which was
last amended in 2011, “the norm” is for criminal courts to treat
“each day” as a single session. But the rule suggests otherwise.
And Financial Casualty, addressing the same morning and
afternoon scenario in the same Los Angeles County Superior
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Court under the same local rule, could only undermine the trial
court’s view. In describing the court’s hours of operation, rule
2.16 (a) states: “Sessions of departments will be from 8:30 a.m. to
12:00 noon and from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.” (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, Local Rules, rule 2.16 (a), italics added.) Similarly, rule
2.16 (b) states: “Opening of Sessions. Morning and afternoon
sessions will be opened by the bailiff, court attendant, or clerk.
After a recess during a session, the bailiff, court attendant, or
clerk will call for order and state that the court is again in
session.” (Id., rule 2.16 (b), italics added.) By way of its plain
language, then, the rule treats the court’s morning and afternoon
proceedings as separate “sessions,” each of which must be opened
by certain judicial officers. (Id., rule 2.16 (a).) Consistent with
this view, the rule recognizes that recesses may occur within a
morning or afternoon “session” and specifies how the “session”
must be resumed after a recess is taken. (Id., rule 2.16 (b).)
Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 631 does not, as
the People suggest, demonstrate courts may deem morning and
afternoon hearings held on the same day to be a single session for
purposes of undoing bond forfeitures. That statute pertains to
jury trials in civil cases and, as relevant to the People’s
argument, requires “[t]he parties demanding a jury trial [to]
deposit with the clerk or judge, at the beginning of the second
and each succeeding day’s session, a sum equal to that day’s fees
and mileage of the jury, including the fees and mileage for the
trial jury panel if the trial jury has not yet been selected and
sworn.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subd. (e).) This provision simply
requires payment of certain fees to the court and specifies when
they must be tendered. (See ibid.) It does not bear upon the
issues presented in this appeal.
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The People offer no other basis for permitting the trial
court to treat same-day morning and afternoon hearings as a
single session for purposes of erasing declarations of bond
forfeitures.
Given the foregoing, we conclude the trial court was
required to notify Fire Insurance of the bond forfeiture declared
in December 2021. The clerk’s failure to send such notice by mail
released Fire Insurance from its obligations under the bond and
deprived the trial court of authority to enter summary judgment
on the bond’s forfeiture. The court, therefore, should have
granted Fire Insurance’s motion to set aside the summary
judgment, discharge the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Fire Insurance’s motion to
set aside the summary judgment, discharge the bond forfeiture,
and exonerate the bond. We also reverse the summary judgment
on the bond’s forfeiture. We remand the case to the trial court
with directions to discharge the forfeiture and exonerate the
bond. Fire Insurance shall recover its costs on appeal.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
WILEY, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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