Filed 7/22/26 P. v. Urrutia-Barbosa CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B346361
(Super. Ct. No. 24CR04747)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
HIPOLITO TENOCH
URRUTIA-BARBOSA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Hipolito Tenoch Urrutia-Barbosa was convicted
of transporting and possessing fentanyl with the intent to sell,
possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition
by a felon. He admitted that he had two prior juvenile
convictions that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes law.
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to strike his prior juvenile convictions for purposes of
sentencing. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2024, when he was 19 years old, appellant was charged
with: 1) transportation for sale of a controlled substance (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11352 subd. (a)); 2) possession for sale of a
controlled substance (id., § 11351); 3) possession of a firearm by a
convicted person (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (b)); and 4)
possession of ammunition by a felon (id., § 30305, subd. (a)(1)).
The information alleged a firearm enhancement for the first two
counts (id., § 12022, subd. (c)), and two prior juvenile strikes (id.,
§ 667, subd. (d)(3)). The two prior strikes were for robbery
convictions in 2021 and 2022, when appellant was a minor.
Appellant moved the trial court to dismiss his juvenile
strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13
Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and Penal Code section 1385. Appellant
asked the court to consider his background, including that he was
born addicted to heroin and had been subjected to trauma
throughout his childhood. He had faced poverty, housing
instability, physical abuse by his mother, his father had largely
abandoned him, and he had no stable source of love or
connection. Appellant also had a history of drug and alcohol use.
In support of his motion, appellant relied heavily on an
expert declaration from Dr. Billi Starr, a doctor of education, who
opined that appellant’s crimes were impulsive acts attributable to
his young age, undeveloped brain, and years of trauma that had
gone untreated. It was Dr. Starr’s view that appellant needed
treatment, not prison. Appellant had received some
rehabilitative services through the juvenile court over the years,
but maintained those services were inadequate. He requested
the trial court grant his motion so that he could be sentenced to
probation and enroll in a residential drug and alcohol program.
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The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that
appellant’s current and past crimes did not warrant relief.
Appellant had just been charged with possession of 92 fentanyl
pills and a loaded, unregistered firearm. His most recent prior
felony involved domestic violence. As a juvenile, appellant had
been arrested twice for felonies while in possession of a firearm or
knife, and suffered prior convictions involving violence against
others, weapons, and gangs. His criminal history had been
chronic since 2019. His juvenile prior strikes were previously
struck in another case, yet appellant continued to reoffend.
After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties, the
trial court denied the Romero motion. The court was sympathetic
to appellant’s circumstances. It acknowledged appellant’s
parents had “completely failed him.” It stated, “I want to strike
the strike. I want to have a reason to strike the strike for him
because of his age and the things he went through.” The court
also lamented whether there were orders that could have been
made in prior cases that might have provided more targeted
treatment for appellant.
However, the trial court noted the danger of fentanyl and
expressed concern that this was “not the first time” appellant was
involved with fentanyl and firearms. The court observed that
appellant continued to engage in serious criminal conduct even
after he had been shown leniency. The court found that
appellant’s criminal behavior included incidents that were
violent, victimized others, and were unprovoked. In denying the
motion, the court explained that appellant had been given many
chances and remained a danger to the community.
After denying the motion, the trial court invited counsel to
discuss appellant’s sentence, asking for their input on whether
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there was a way to get the sentence below 10 years. Appellant
faced a maximum sentence of 16 years four months. The court
ultimately imposed the minimum authorized prison term of six
years.
DISCUSSION
A court has discretion to strike prior convictions that fall
within the Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp.
529-530.) To properly exercise this discretion, the trial court
must balance the legitimate societal interest in imposing longer
sentences for repeat offenders and the defendant’s constitutional
right against disproportionate punishment. (Id. at pp. 530–531.)
In deciding whether to strike a prior, the court reviews the
nature of the offenses, the defendant’s background, the
defendant’s prospects, and whether the sentence fulfills the
purpose of the sentencing law. (People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
374 (Carmony).) There are only narrow, extraordinary
circumstances under which an appellate court will find an abuse
of discretion. (Id. at p. 378.) These circumstances include the
trial court’s lack of awareness of its discretion to strike a prior
conviction, the court’s consideration of impermissible factors, or
the imposition of a three strikes sentence that is irrational or
arbitrary. (Ibid.)
On review, we do not reweigh the evidence and it is
immaterial that we might have ruled differently had the motion
been directed to us. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) If a
defendant is unable to demonstrate the trial court abused its
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discretion, we presume the court acted within its authority. (Id.
at pp. 376–377.)
Appellant contends the trial court acted irrationally and
arbitrarily by failing to give sufficient weight to his background,
particularly the circumstances of his childhood, his young age
and its impacts on his brain development and culpability. He
also argues that the court did not fully appreciate the opinion of
Dr. Starr.
By arguing that the trial court did not adequately weigh
the evidence, Appellant essentially asks us to reweigh the
relevant factors and reach a different conclusion than the one
reached by the trial court. Our task is not to reweigh factors
bearing on the decision below, but instead to ensure that the trial
court considered the appropriate factors and reached a
sentencing decision that is not irrational or arbitrary. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
The trial court discharged its duty. The court reviewed
appellant’s motion and supporting documents, including Dr.
Starr’s report. The court discussed why these materials did not
overcome serious concerns about public safety. Appellant was
again in possession of fentanyl and an illegal firearm. He had
again resorted to crime despite the lenience that had been shown
to him. His past criminal conduct involved violence toward
others, and the record did not establish that appellant had
matured such that a grant of probation and enrollment in a drug
and alcohol program would likely facilitate necessary changes in
his behavior. Far from making a sentencing decision that was
irrational or arbitrary, the court grappled with both the sad
reality of appellant’s situation and the real and ongoing threat
appellant posed to the community. The information provided by
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Dr. Starr was not so compelling that it required the court to
grant appellant’s motion.
Appellant also contends the trial court did not consider his
prospects for rehabilitation. We disagree.
The trial court expressly acknowledged appellant’s
prospects for rehabilitation were better on probation and in a
program than if he were to go to prison. The court expressed
disappointment that his issues had not been sufficiently
addressed through prior sentencing orders. It considered the
record and ultimately found appellant’s violent criminal history
and the threat he posed to the community did not warrant the
striking of his priors. Even so, the court took immediate steps to
engage counsel and to impose as lenient a sentence as the law
allowed, so as to reduce appellant’s prison time to the extent
feasible.
This was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court could
not disregard the Three Strikes law simply because a prison
sentence may not be rehabilitative. The court was obligated to
consider whether appellant was within the “spirit” of the Three
Strikes law such that maintaining his convictions fulfilled the
purpose of the law. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 378-379.)
Individuals with a criminal history that amounts to “ ‘an
exemplar of the “revolving door” career criminal’ ” fall squarely
within the spirit of the law. (Id. at p. 379.) The fact that
appellant had been consistently engaged in serious criminal
activity since 2019 supported the trial court’s determination that
he fell within the spirit of the law.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MCKAIG, J.*
We concur:
BALTODANO, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
* Judge of the Ventura Superior Court assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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Von Deroian, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
John Schneider for under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General for
Plaintiff and Respondent.