Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Tran CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064785
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. 12WF2714)
TUAN THANH TRAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene Servidal, Robin Urbanski and Brendon
Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This matter is before this court for a third time. The first time, a
panel of this court affirmed appellant Tuan Thanh Tran’s convictions and his
indeterminate sentence of 37 years to life, without addressing any sentencing
issues. (People v. Tran (Sept. 27, 2017, G053008) [nonpub. opn.] (Tran I).)
The second time, Tran appealed from a resentencing that
corrected parts of his sentence but denied full resentencing. This court
reversed and remanded for the trial court to correct illegal sentences on one
count and several enhancements. We also ordered the trial court to consider
whether full resentencing would be warranted. (See People v. Tran (Dec. 21,
2023, G062173) [nonpub. opn.] (Tran II).)
Following issuance of the remittitur, the trial court corrected the
errors and imposed a new sentence totaling 37 years to life. Although the
court declined to conduct a full resentencing, it stated it would impose the
same sentence if it had conducted a full resentencing. Tran appealed.
Tran contends the trial court erred in denying full resentencing.
The Attorney General disagrees. The Attorney General argues this court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the trial court lacked an
independent basis to correct the illegal sentences. Alternatively, the Attorney
General argues the denial of full resentencing is harmless because the trial
court stated it would impose the same sentence in a full resentencing. As
discussed below, we conclude any resentencing error was harmless, and thus
affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
THE UNDERLYING FACTS
The underlying facts in this case are undisputed and summarized
in our prior opinion. “In May 2015, a jury found [Tran] guilty of willful,
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deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (count 1; §§ 187, subd. (a),
664, subd. (a)), two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter (counts 2 &
3; §§ 192, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle
(count 4; § 246). It also found true all alleged firearm enhancements (§§
12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d)). Prior to sentencing, the trial
court found true Tran had a prior serious and violent felony (§§ 667, subds.
(d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)), and a prior serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1),
1192.7).” (Tran II, supra, G062173.) Tran was sentenced to a total term of 37
years to life. (Ibid.)
II.
THE PRIOR APPEAL
In July 2010, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the trial court. The CDCR letter
notified the court that the abstract of judgment and/or minute order “may be
in error, or incomplete” and identified three possible sentencing errors. The
court filed the letter and reassigned the matter to a different judge. After the
parties filed their briefing, the court made various modifications to the
abstract of judgment, but left the sentence as to count 4 and its associated
enhancement unchanged. “As to that count, it reasoned as follows: ‘And then
on count 4[,] the sentence which is not stated is stayed under [section] 654.
And that’s the one that has a 3-5-7 sentence. So I’m not going to correct that.
I’m just going to leave it as stayed by [section] 654 because [the original
sentencing judge] doesn’t make it clear, and I don’t know what he intended.’”
(Tran II, supra, G062173.)
Tran appealed, arguing “his sentences as to count 4 and several
firearm enhancements are illegal because the original sentencing court
stayed execution of the sentences pursuant to section 654 without first
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imposing a term for each, and the trial court erred in not correcting the
problem when brought to its attention after the CDCR’s letter. The Attorney
General agrees the sentence is unauthorized, as do we.” (Tran, supra II,
G062173.) This court concluded that “[d]ue to the original sentencing court’s
error in applying section 654 in this case, and the subsequent trial court’s
failure to remedy the error, we must remand the matter for correction of the
unauthorized sentences. The parties’ appellate briefing does not address, and
we express no opinion regarding, whether such correction will trigger the
need for a full resentencing as to all counts.” (Ibid.)
We ordered the trial court to “take appropriate steps to correct
the unauthorized sentences on count 4 and the enhancements for which a
sentence term was not imposed prior to its stay pursuant to section 654,
which shall include consideration of whether full resentencing on all counts is
necessary under the circumstances.” (Ibid.)
III.
RESENTENCING
Following issuance of the remittitur, Tran filed a supplemental
resentencing brief arguing the trial court should fully resentence him and
apply newly enacted legislation to reduce his sentence to the minimum of 7
years to life.
On October 4, 2024, the trial court conducted a new sentencing
hearing. It declined to fully resentence Tran, but instead “restate[d]” the
original sentence while vacating and correcting the sentences on counts 2, 3
and 4. Specifically, it corrected the sentences for count 4 and the firearm
enhancements attached to counts 2, 3 and 4. The total term remained 37
years to life. The court expressly stated that if full resentencing was required,
it would resentence Tran to the same sentence.
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Tran appealed. On April 28, 2025, appointed counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), requesting this
court to conduct an independent review of the record. Tran filed a
supplemental brief, noting the issue of full resentencing but providing no
argument.
On September 25, 2025, this court independently reviewed the
record and ordered the parties to brief two questions. First, whether the trial
court erred in denying full resentencing. Second, whether any sentencing
error is reviewable in this appeal or must be raised in a petition for habeas
corpus.
DISCUSSION
I.
JURISDICTION
The Attorney General argues this appeal should be dismissed
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Tran in response to
the CDCR’s letter. We disagree.
“Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of
jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence
has commenced.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344.)
Additionally, subject to certain exceptions, “once a judgment is rendered, . . .
the sentencing court is without jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.”
(People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326.)
Important exceptions to this common rule concerning the trial
court’s jurisdiction include: (1) recall and resentencing provisions set forth in
specific statutes; (2) petitions for habeas corpus challenging unlawful
sentences; (3) the court’s inherent power to correct clerical errors; and, in
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some cases, (4) the unauthorized sentence doctrine. (People v. King (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 629, 637.)
As to correcting clerical errors, “[i]t is not open to question that a
court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to
make these records reflect the true facts. [Citations.] The power exists
independently of statute and may be exercised in criminal as well as in civil
cases. [Citation.] The power is unaffected by the pendency of an appeal or a
habeas corpus proceeding. [Citation.] The court may correct such errors on its
own motion or upon the application of the parties.” (In re Candelario (1970) 3
Cal.3d 702, 705 (Candelario).)
“Clerical error, however, is to be distinguished from judicial error
which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical
error and judicial error is ‘whether the error was made in rendering the
judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered. ” (Candelario, supra, 3
Cal.3d at p. 705.) “If the error is in rendering judgment, then it is judicial
error.” (People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63 (Boyd).)
For judicial errors, the appellate courts are split on whether the
trial court has jurisdiction under the unauthorized sentence doctrine to
correct such errors. (Compare Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 [“We are
unaware of any controlling authority holding that trial courts possess
inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences where cases are
final.”] with People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990, fn. omitted [“A
trial court that imposes a sentence unauthorized by law retains jurisdiction
(or has inherent power) to correct the sentence at any time the error comes to
its attention, even if execution of the sentence has commenced or the
judgment imposing the sentence has become final and correction requires
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imposition of a more severe sentence, provided the error is apparent from the
face of the record”].)
Here, the original sentences on counts 4 and several firearm
enhancements were unauthorized because of judicial error, that is, the trial
court failed to impose a term before staying the sentence. (See, e.g., People v.
Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [concluding “the trial court
committed unauthorized sentencing error by failing first to pronounce
sentence on count 9 and then stay execution of that sentence”].) The Attorney
General argues this court should follow Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 56, and
conclude Tran cannot challenge any sentence error except by a habeas
petition. We disagree. The Attorney General’s argument essentially
challenges our jurisdiction in Tran II, supra, G062173, to order the trial court
to correct the unauthorized sentences. “Under the doctrine of ‘law of the case,’
a party may not in subsequent appeals relitigate an appellate court's
jurisdiction in an earlier appeal for the purpose of attacking the prior rulings
as void; this is true whether or not the earlier opinion expressly considered
jurisdiction.” (Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of Cal. State University (1996) 48
Cal.App.4th 1656, 1660, fn. 2.)
As to the current appeal, to the extent that an independent basis
is required to consider the current sentencing claim, in the interest of judicial
economy, we would exercise our discretion to treat the instant appeal as a
habeas petition. (See Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71–72 [exercising
discretion to “treat Boyd's appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
interest of judicial economy” where “the parties have already submitted
appellate briefing” on “the contested and purely legal issue of whether
remedying the 2006 sentencing error must include a full resentencing”].)
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II.
FULL RESENTENCING
Turning to the merits of the instant appeal, we note the question
of whether review of one aspect of a defendant’s sentence in habeas corpus
proceedings would require the trial court to apply newly enacted ameliorative
legislation is currently pending in the California Supreme Court. (See People
v. Powell (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 595, 605 [noting the California Supreme
Court is considering: “‘Does the issuance of an order to show cause to review
one aspect of a defendant's sentence in habeas corpus proceedings render
applicable all ameliorative laws taking effect after the defendant’s judgment
became final?’”].) Regardless of how the high court decides that issue, we
conclude any sentencing error in denying full resentencing is harmless in this
case. Under the full resentencing rule as stated in People v. Buycks (2018) 5
Cal.5th 857, 893, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand
for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the
trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.’” When a court sentences without full awareness of its
discretionary powers, “‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached
the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.”’”
(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432.) Here, the trial court expressly
stated that if it conducted a full resentencing, it would impose the same
sentence. Remand for full resentencing would be a futile and idle act. Thus,
any error in not conducting a full resentencing is harmless.
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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
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