Filed 10/9/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086181
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF2100367)
SHAUN LAYJEWEL THORNTON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. F. Paul Dickerson III,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura
Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2021, multiple law enforcement vehicles engaged in the pursuit of a
vehicle being driven by defendant and appellant Shaun Layjewel Thornton. Defendant’s
vehicle eventually crashed, causing injury to Jane Doe, a passenger in the vehicle.
As a result of this incident, a jury convicted defendant of multiple offenses,
including one count of evading a police officer while operating a motor vehicle causing
serious bodily injury (count 2; Veh. Code, § 2800.3) and one count of causing serious
bodily injury while driving under the influence of a drug (count 6; Veh. Code, § 23153,
subd. (f)). Defendant’s sentence included imposition of punishment for both count 2 and
count 6.
Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred by imposing punishment on
both count 2 and count 6 in violation of Penal Code1 section 654 because defendant’s
conviction on both counts arose from the same physical act; (2) the trial court erred by
imposing a restitution fine higher than that imposed at a previous sentencing hearing;
(3) the failure of defendant’s trial counsel to object to imposition of a higher restitution
fine constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) the trial court erred in calculating
defendant’s custody credits at the time of sentencing; and (5) the abstract of judgment
contains a clerical error that fails to accurately reflect the offenses for which defendant
was convicted.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
We conclude that the imposition of punishment on both count 2 and count 6 in this
case violated section 654’s prohibition against multiple punishments for the same act. As
such, reversal and remand for resentencing is required. Given this conclusion, we need
not reach the merits of defendant’s remaining claims in this opinion. While the People
concede that some of these claims have merit, the trial court and the parties will have an
opportunity to correct each of these errors at the time of resentencing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Charges
Defendant and Jane Doe had been in a romantic relationship since sometime in
2020. On March 11, 2021, multiple law enforcement vehicles engaged in the pursuit of a
vehicle being driven by defendant. Defendant eventually crashed the vehicle into a tree,
exited the vehicle, and attempted to flee on foot. After defendant fled, law enforcement
officers discovered Jane Doe pinned under the dashboard of the vehicle.
As a result of this incident, defendant was charged with kidnapping (count 1;
§ 207, subd. (a)); causing serious bodily injury as the result of evading a police officer
while operating a motor vehicle (count 2; Veh. Code, § 2800.3); failure to remain at the
scene of an accident involving an injury (count 3; Veh. Code, § 20001); false
imprisonment (count 4; § 236); domestic violence resulting in a traumatic condition
(count 5; § 273.5, subd. (a)); causing bodily injury as the result of driving under the
influence of a drug (count 6; Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (f)); possession of prohibited
drug paraphernalia (count 7; Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)); and resisting arrest
(count 8; § 148).
3
The second amended information also alleged that (1) defendant had suffered two
prior convictions qualifying as serious felonies under section 667, subdivision (a);
(2) defendant’s commission of counts 1, 2, 4, and 6 constituted serious felonies pursuant
to sections 667 and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8); (3) defendant inflicted great bodily injury
against a person other than an accomplice (§ 12022.7, subdivision (a)) in the commission
of counts 1 and 4; and (4) defendant inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances
involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subdivision (e)) in the commission of count 6.
B. Relevant Evidence at Trial2
1. Testimony of Jane Doe
Jane Doe testified that she had been in a complicated, unsteady romantic
relationship with defendant since sometime in 2020. Defendant’s use of illicit drugs was
a concern throughout their relationship, and Jane Doe also experienced occasions in
which defendant inflicted physical injuries on her. She also testified that defendant
typically exhibited possessive, controlling behaviors as a result of drug consumption.
On the evening of March 10, 2021, Jane Doe rented a motel room for herself and
defendant. According to Jane Doe, she rented the room to “keep [defendant] safe”
because she believed defendant was in some type of trouble with his parole officer.
While at the motel, she witnessed defendant consume some type of drug, which she
2 The summary of evidence presented at trial is taken from our opinion in
defendant’s first appeal. (People v. Thornton (Nov. 14, 2024) E080933 [nonpub]
(Thornton I).) Both parties have submitted our summary of trial evidence in Thornton I
as a sufficiently accurate statement of facts for purposes of this present appeal.
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believed to be methamphetamine. Defendant then drove Jane Doe and another friend in
Jane Doe’s car to a casino. However, when they arrived, defendant became angry,
argued with Jane Doe, struck Jane Doe in the face, and eventually drove erratically from
the scene with Jane Doe in the passenger seat of the vehicle.
When they arrived back at their motel, a law enforcement vehicle pulled up behind
them. Jane Doe testified that when defendant saw the law enforcement vehicle,
defendant “took off,” “driving fast, trying to get away from the cop.” Jane Doe admitted
she remained in the vehicle but claimed she did not do anything. Eventually, defendant
parked Jane Doe’s vehicle in a residential area, told Jane Doe to exit the vehicle, and the
two started to run away together on foot. At some point, Jane Doe decided to stop
running and instead stopped to speak with the pursuing law enforcement officers while
defendant continued to run. The officers spoke with Jane Doe and escorted Jane Doe
back to her motel room, where Jane Doe spent the night alone.
On the morning of March 11, Jane Doe called defendant on the phone, informed
defendant that she had returned to their motel room but urged defendant not to return to
the motel because she had observed law enforcement officers present in the area.
Defendant ignored Jane Doe, returned to the motel driving Jane Doe’s car, and began
yelling at Jane Doe to get in the vehicle. Jane Doe initially refused to get in the vehicle
but eventually entered the vehicle and sat in the front passenger seat. She testified that
she did so because she wanted to avoid making a scene and “didn’t want to create a
bigger situation,” worrying that she could get kicked out of her apartment, become
entangled with child protective services, go to jail, or be found in violation of the terms of
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her probation. Jane Doe also suggested that she believed at the time that she wanted to
avoid getting into trouble because “this was a drug-and alcohol-induced toxic
relationship.”
Jane Doe recalled that shortly after she entered the vehicle with defendant, a law
enforcement vehicle pulled up behind them and signaled for defendant to pull over. Jane
Doe testified that both she and defendant began making statements expressing anxiety
over the fact that a law enforcement officer was following them. At first, defendant
drove “normal[ly],” but he suddenly drove through a red traffic signal without stopping
and began to drive faster than the speed limit. According to Jane Doe, defendant was
driving in an attempt to evade police, but she did not feel that his driving was so reckless
that she feared for her safety. However, Jane Doe was also impeached with prior
testimony that she feared for her safety; impeached with prior testimony that she believed
she was at risk of being physically injured during this time; and later gave contradictory
testimony describing the situation as a “life or die situation” and claiming she was “trying
to stay alive.”
Jane Doe testified that, as defendant was attempting to avoid pursuing law
enforcement vehicles, she did not yell or do anything to make him upset because she
“was trying to do whatever [she] could to make him drive good to get us out of the
situation that was at hand,” and acknowledged that that might have entailed telling
defendant “whatever he wanted to hear.” When pressed, Jane Doe equivocated and
repeatedly stated that she could not remember with sufficient detail what she might have
said in the vehicle, but she acknowledged that she did not tell defendant to stop driving or
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tell defendant how to maneuver the vehicle. On more than one occasion, Jane Doe
suggested that she could not remember because she was under the influence of drugs and
alcohol at the time.
Eventually, defendant drove Jane Doe’s vehicle over a curb and crashed into a
tree. After the crash, defendant ran from the scene on foot. Jane Doe was pinned down
in the vehicle and could not get out on her own. Jane Doe fractured her pelvis, requiring
surgery and several months of recovery before she could walk again.
2. Testimony of Law Enforcement Officer
A law enforcement officer testified that on March 11, 2021 he was driving in a
patrol vehicle when he witnessed a vehicle pull out of a motel parking lot in an unsafe
manner, barely avoiding a collision with another vehicle. He began to follow the vehicle,
which he described as traveling at a high rate of speed. When the officer activated his
vehicle’s patrol lights, the vehicle he was following did not yield and instead drove away,
running through a stoplight.
The officer testified that he observed the driver of the vehicle engage in at least
three traffic violations during his pursuit of the vehicle: (1) failing to stop at a traffic
signal, (2) failing to stop at a stop sign, and (3) driving at an excessive unsafe speed. He
lost sight of the vehicle at one point but confirmed that other law enforcement vehicles
had also joined the pursuit by that time. When the officer caught up with the vehicle, he
observed Jane Doe trapped inside the vehicle and defendant exiting the vehicle and
running away on foot.
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3. Forensic Evidence
After defendant was apprehended, he was transported to the Inland Valley Medical
center. A blood test revealed the presence of cannabinoids, methamphetamine, and
amphetamine in defendant’s blood system. An expert testified that, given the level of
methamphetamine, it was likely defendant had ingested it sometime in the 48 hours prior
to the blood draw. The expert also explained that the stimulant effects of
methamphetamine are typically experienced within the first 12 hours after ingestion, but
could not give a definitive opinion regarding whether defendant was impaired to the point
where he could not safely drive an automobile.
C. Verdict, Initial Appeal, and Sentence
The jury acquitted defendant on the charges of kidnapping (count 1; § 207,
subd. (a)) and false imprisonment (count 4; § 236), but it found defendant guilty on the
remaining charges, including causing serious bodily injury as the result of evading a
police officer while operating a motor vehicle (count 2; Veh. Code, § 2800.3) and
causing bodily injury as the result of driving under the influence of a drug (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (f)). The jury found true a special allegation that defendant “personally
inflicted great bodily injury to [Jane Doe], pursuant to Penal Code section 1192.7,
subdivision (a)” in the commission of count 2 and also found true a special allegation that
defendant “personally inflicted great bodily injury to [Jane Doe], pursuant to Penal Code
Section 12022.7[,] subdivision (a)” in the commission of count 6. In a bifurcated
proceeding, appellant admitted that he suffered two prior convictions that qualified as
serious felonies within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a).
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Defendant appealed from the judgment, and we reversed on the ground that the
trial court committed instructional error with respect to the great bodily injury
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7. (Thornton I, supra, E080933.) Upon remand,
the People elected not to retry the special allegation. As relevant to this appeal, the trial
court resentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life in state prison on count 2 and a
concurrent term of four years on count 6, representing double the middle term. (Veh.
Code, § 23153, subd. (f); Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(1).)3 The trial court also imposed a
$500 restitution fine, which was suspended pending a hearing on defendant’s ability to
pay, as well as a $500 parole revocation fine, which was suspended unless parole was
revoked. Finally, the trial court stated it did not “need to do credits because [defendant
is] still in state prison.”
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Erred in Applying Section 654
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to impose sentence on
3 With respect to the remaining counts not subject to defendant’s claims on
appeal, the trial court sentenced defendant to a concurrent middle term of two years on
count 3 (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)), doubled to four years as a result of his prior
strike convictions (§ 667, subd. (e)(1), (e)(2)(C)); a concurrent middle term of three years
on count 5 (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), doubled to six years as a result of his prior strike
convictions (§ 667, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2)(C)); a concurrent term of 90 days in any penal
institution on count 7 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)); and another concurrent
term of 90 days in any penal institution on count 8 (§ 148). The trial court stayed the
imposition of sentence on count 8 pursuant to section 654. The trial court also imposed
additional consecutive terms of five years in state prison for each of defendant’s prior
strike convictions pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
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both count 2 and count 6, arguing that doing so violates section 654’s prohibition against
multiple punishment for the same act. We agree.
1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The current version of section 654 provides: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either
of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than
one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)
“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654
requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may
include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several
acts pursued with a single objective.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.)
A court “first consider[s] if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical
act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act.
Only if [the court] conclude[s] that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a
course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single
‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Whether a defendant will be found to have committed a single physical act for
purposes of section 654 depends on whether some action the defendant is charged with
having taken separately completes the actus reus for each of the relevant criminal
offenses.’ [Citation.] When the facts are undisputed, the application of section 654
raises a question of law we review de novo. [Citation.] We review any factual findings
underlying the trial court’s ruling for substantial evidence.” (People v. Washington
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(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 795; People v. Crenshaw (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1169,
1180.)
2. Application
Here, defendant argues that he cannot be subject to separate punishment because
his convictions in count 2 and count 6 derive from the “same act of driving and causing
injury to [Jane Doe].” The People argue that defendant remains subject to separate
punishment because defendant harbored divisible intents and different objectives while
driving. We agree with defendant that he cannot be separately punished for both count 2
and count 6 under the facts of this case.
Defendant’s conviction on count 2 was for violation of Vehicle Code section
2800.3, which provides in pertinent part: “Whenever willful flight or attempt to elude a
pursuing peace officer … proximately causes serious bodily injury to any person, the
person driving the pursued vehicle ... shall be punished by imprisonment ….” (Veh.
Code, § 2800.3, subd. (a), italics added.) Defendant’s conviction on count 6 was for
violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (f), which provides in pertinent
part: “It is unlawful for a person, while under the influence of any drug, to drive a
vehicle and concurrently do any act forbidden by law, or neglect any duty imposed by
law in driving the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes bodily injury to any
person other than the driver.” (Ibid., italics added.) Thus, contrary to the People’s
argument, the act required to complete the crimes at issue here are not the acts of driving,
driving under the influence, or evading a pursuing peace officer. While these are all
necessary elements for a conviction under Vehicle Code sections 2800.3 or 23153,
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subdivision (f), merely establishing these actions is not sufficient for a conviction under
either statute because both statutes require that the specific act involved cause bodily
injury to another person. Thus, the actus reus required to commit either of these crimes is
the act that actually causes bodily injury to another.
In this case, the only evidence of bodily injury to another person presented at trial
was the testimony of Jane Doe, who briefly testified that the defendant’s act crashing the
vehicle he was driving caused her to suffer a fractured pelvis. Because this was the only
evidence of bodily injury at trial, defendant’s convictions on count 2 and count 6 must
necessarily have been premised upon the single act that caused Jane Doe to suffer this
injury. And where the actus reus necessary for both crimes constitutes a discrete single
act, a defendant cannot be punished more than once for the same act under section 654.
Thus, we conclude the trial court’s conclusion that section 654 did not apply is not
supported by any evidence in the record and the trial court erred by declining to stay
either sentence pursuant to section 654.4
Under the current version of section 654, the trial court has discretion to impose
and execute the sentence on either count 2 or count 6. (§ 654, subd. (a); People v. Mani
4 We further observe that a conviction for violation of Vehicle Codes section
2800.3, subdivision (a), and section 23153, subdivision (f), already carry more severe
consequences by virtue of the fact that the defendant caused great bodily injury. (See
Veh. Code, § 2800.1 [evading police without causing great bodily injury is punishable
only as a misdemeanor]; § 23554 [providing greater penalties for causing great bodily
injury while driving under influence].) The People’s argument that section 654 does not
apply would effectively subject the defendant in this case to two enhanced punishments
for causing the same injury to the same victim.
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(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) And when a trial court erroneously imposes multiple
punishments in violation of section 654, the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and
“remand for the trial court to resentence [defendant] in compliance with section 654.”
(People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 846.) We express no opinion as to how
the trial court should exercise its discretion at the time of resentencing.
B. It Is Unnecessary To Resolve the Remaining Sentencing Issues in This Appeal
Given our conclusion that vacatur of defendant’s sentence is necessary because the
trial court erred in its application of section 654, defendant is entitled to a full
resentencing upon remand. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“[W]hen part of
a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances.’ ”].) And because defendant will receive a full resentencing
upon remand, it is not necessary for us to address his additional claims that: (1) the trial
court erred by imposing a restitution fine higher than that imposed at a previous
sentencing hearing; (2) the failure of defendant’s trial counsel to object to imposition of a
higher restitution fine constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court
erred in calculating defendant’s custody credits at the time of sentencing; and (4) the
abstract of judgment contains a clerical error that fails to accurately reflect the offenses
for which defendant was convicted.
We observe the People have conceded that the trial court erred with respect to
some of these additional claims of error. However, we need not reach the merits of these
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claims in this opinion, as the parties and trial court will have an opportunity to address
and correct each of these issues at the time of resentencing.
IV. DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall conduct a full
resentencing where it will have discretion to reexamine all aspects of defendant’s
sentence. Upon resentencing, the trial court is directed to recalculate defendant’s
entitlement to credits as of the date of the new sentence. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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