Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Thompson CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173500
v. (San Mateo County
BRANDON DAVID THOMPSON, Super. Ct. No. SC074931A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant and appellant Brandon David Thompson (appellant) appeals
following resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2013, appellant pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192, subd. (a)) and three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)) in exchange for an 18-year prison sentence and dismissal of a
murder charge.2 Appellant also admitted allegations that he personally used
a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)), personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and had served two prior prison terms
(former § 667.5, subd. (b)).
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Because they are not relevant to the issue on appeal, we do not
summarize the facts underlying the charged offenses.
1
In June 2013, the trial court sentenced appellant to 18 years in prison,
calculated as follows: (1) for voluntary manslaughter, the upper term of 11
years, with a consecutive year for using a deadly weapon; (2) for each of the
three assaults, consecutive one-year sentences (one-third the middle term);
(3) a consecutive year for inflicting great bodily injury as to one of the
assaults; and (4) an additional year for each of the two prior prison terms.
Appellant sought resentencing under section 1172.75, and requested a
sentence of 13 years. In May 2025, the trial court resentenced appellant to
16 years in prison, without the now-invalid prior prison term enhancements
but otherwise the same sentence. The present appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In 2021, the Legislature amended section 1170 to provide that the trial
court “may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of” an
upper term sentence, and “the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2); see People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 371, review
granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628 (Mathis).)
That same year, in Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 483), the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, making retroactive a 2019
enactment that “amended section 667.5 by limiting imposition of the prior
prison term enhancement to prior terms for sexually violent offenses.”
(People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595.) Senate Bill 483
provided in section 1172.75, subdivision (a) that “[a]ny sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for
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a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” The Legislature further
provided that, as to any in-custody defendant whose term includes an invalid
prior prison term enhancement, the trial court “shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see also People v. Burgess
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380; People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393,
402 [“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not
merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements”].)
Senate Bill 483 also added section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) (Section
1172.75(d)(4)), which provides: “Unless the court originally imposed the
upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
Below, the trial court interpreted Section 1172.75(d)(4) to mean that
the court was permitted to reimpose the upper term on the voluntary
manslaughter count without the aggravating circumstances findings required
by amended section 1170. On appeal, appellant argues this court should
reject that interpretation and instead follow the reasoning in People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312 (Gonzalez).3 Gonzalez reasoned that
Section 1172.75(d)(4) has two “reasonable interpretation[s]”: either (1) as
“creating a condition or exception independently justifying the imposition of
the upper term”; or (2) as “restrict[ing] the scope of defendants eligible to
receive the upper term at resentencing to those who previously received the
upper term.” (Gonzalez, at p. 329, italics omitted.) The Gonzalez court
3 Because we reject appellant’s claim, we need not address respondent’s
argument that appellant forfeited this claim.
3
concluded the second interpretation was the proper interpretation (id. at pp.
329–330) and appellant urges this court to do so as well.
However, as appellant acknowledges, the court in People v. Brannon-
Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 466–467, reached the opposite
conclusion from the Gonzalez court, concluding that, “Giving [Section
1172.75(d)(4)] its plain meaning, it is evident the Legislature intended the
new burden of proof amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply only if
the trial court is imposing the upper term for the first time at a section
1172.75 resentencing. Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) is, therefore, an
exception to the general rule that the trial court must apply ameliorative
changes in the law at a section 1172.75 resentencing.”
This court agreed with Brannon-Thompson and rejected the reasoning
of Gonzalez in Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pages 371–374. We
concluded that Section 1172.75(d)(4) is “not ambiguous” and that it
“expresses the Legislature’s intent that the new, heightened factfinding
requirements for aggravating factors do not apply where the defendant was
originally, lawfully sentenced to an upper term.” (Id. at p. 374.) We adhere
to our conclusion in Mathis and reject appellant’s claim on appeal.4
4 The issue in the present case is currently before the California
Supreme Court. (See People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096863) [nonpub.
opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903; see also Mathis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at p. 373, fn. 6.)
4
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A173500)
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