Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Thomas CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
THE PEOPLE, C103137
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR2019-13)
v.
BUCK MALDONADO THOMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Buck Maldonado Thomas guilty of multiple crimes arising
out of his sexual abuse of two high school students whose families had hired him for his
coaching services. At defendant’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced
defendant to a term of 25 years to life, plus 12 years four months. This sentence included
a term of 25 years to life for forcible sexual penetration and a term of six years for felony
burglary that the trial court stayed pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 654. This court
affirmed defendant’s convictions on appeal but remanded the case for resentencing so the
trial court could exercise discretion provided by new amendments to section 654. On
remand, the trial court resentenced defendant to 25 years to life for forcible sexual
penetration and stayed a shorter, two-year term for burglary.
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under
section 654 by staying punishment on the shorter term. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
Statement Of Facts
The relevant facts are taken from this court’s opinion in the prior appeal, People v.
Thomas (Jun. 6, 2023, C093565) [nonpub. opn.] (Thomas). Defendant “was a private
softball coach who offered training and liaison services to high school students to help
them secure college softball scholarships.” (Ibid.) The victims were two teenage girls,
15-year-old H.L. and 16-year-old M.R., who hoped to secure college softball
scholarships. (Ibid.)
In 2018, H.L.’s family hired defendant as a batting trainer and liaison on the
recommendation of her softball coach. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) The family allowed
defendant to stay in a spare room in their home from July 30 to August 4, 2018. (Ibid.)
When defendant arrived, he discussed logistics for training and payment with the
family, then told H.L. they should begin training in her room, without her parents.
(Thomas, supra, C093565.) “Defendant told H.L. not to wear her bra or underwear. H.L.
and defendant went into her room and defendant closed the door. Once inside, they
began stretching on a mat with H.L. lying on her back. Defendant sat by her legs and
began rubbing the inner lips of her vagina with his finger under her clothes. As he
rubbed her vagina, defendant said something like, ‘[Y]ou like that, huh.’ H.L. froze and
tried not to cry. When she tried to push him with her legs, defendant, who was much
larger than H.L., pulled her shorts aside and began licking her vagina. As he did so, he
held H.L.’s legs down, and she was unable to get up. Defendant eventually stopped.”
(Ibid.)
Two days later, M.R. met with defendant at H.L.’s house for training. (Thomas,
supra, C093565.) While alone with M.R. outside H.L.’s house, defendant grabbed
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M.R.’s hips, moved her against him, and began groping her breasts under the guise of
loosening her muscles. (Ibid.) He stopped when M.R.’s father returned. (Ibid.) M.R.
did not say anything about the touching to her father at the time. (Ibid.)
M.R.’s parents subsequently hired defendant to coach her. (Thomas, supra,
C093565.) In September 2018, and again in November 2018, M.R. went to defendant’s
Arizona house for training. (Ibid.) Those trips resulted in repeated, escalating sexual
offenses against her. (Ibid.) Defendant was later prosecuted in Arizona for some of
those offenses, as well as sexual offenses against other victims.
II
Procedural History
The jury found defendant guilty of five counts against H.L.: two counts of first
degree burglary by means of unlawfully entering an inhabited child’s bedroom with the
intent to commit forcible sex acts against a minor; one count of lewd and lascivious acts
upon a child 14 or 15 years of age; one count of forcible sexual penetration of a minor;
and one count of forcible oral copulation of a minor. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) For the
forcible sexual penetration count, the jury found true that defendant committed the crime
during the commission of first degree burglary. (Ibid.) The jury further found defendant
guilty of sexual battery against M.R. (Ibid.)
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life plus 12 years four
months, which included, among other things, a term of 25 years to life for forcible sexual
penetration and a term of six years for burglary, which it stayed pursuant to section 654.
(Thomas, supra, C093565.) Defendant appealed the judgment. (See ibid.) While his
appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1), which amended section 654 to give trial courts
discretion to choose between sentences when the provision applies. (See Thomas, supra,
C093565.)
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Also while this appeal was pending, evidence of offenses uncharged in this case
formed the basis for a prosecution in Arizona, where defendant pled guilty to several
charges of sexual abuse. The Arizona court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of
24 years, to be served concurrently with defendant’s sentence in this case.
Ultimately, on the first appeal in this matter, this court vacated defendant’s
sentence and remanded for the trial court to exercise its new discretion under section 654.
III
Resentencing Hearing
On remand, the parties filed resentencing briefs. To his brief, defendant attached
several exhibits that were unavailable during his original sentencing. These exhibits
included an October 2022 sentencing order from the Arizona case in which defendant
pled guilty and a document showing defendant had a California static risk assessment
score of 1, which defendant said “translate[d] to an estimated risk that there was a 3.9[
percent] chance to reoffend within five years.” Defendant also included a social history
that showed he was a victim of repeated childhood sexual abuse, had successfully
completed a substance abuse program, and wanted to ensure he did not relapse or
reoffend.
The trial court also heard victim impact statements from H.L.’s mother and M.R.’s
parents. Both stressed the harm defendant caused to their children and others and urged
against leniency.
Defendant argued the trial court should stay punishment for forcible sexual
penetration in favor of punishing him for burglary because (1) before trial, the
prosecution had sought a prison term of only 15 years eight months, (2) staying the
greater punishment “would achieve a level of uniformity in sentencing” with defendant’s
Arizona case, and (3) defendant’s risk assessment results and social history showed he
was at a low risk of reoffending.
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The prosecution argued that punishment for forcible sexual penetration was
appropriate because defendant committed the burglary as a means to commit rape. The
prosecution further argued the crimes did not constitute the same act within the meaning
of section 654 and defendant’s arguments relative to his Arizona case were irrelevant and
lacked support. Finally, the prosecution argued that defendant’s assertion regarding his
childhood trauma was unpersuasive and the nature of defendant’s crimes, his pattern of
predatory behavior, and imprisonment “in a male dominant, paramilitary environment”
without access to young females for the last three years all belied his argument he had
rehabilitated.
After considering the arguments and evidence and acknowledging its new
discretion under section 654, the trial court chose to again impose punishment for forcible
sexual penetration and stay punishment for burglary. The court explained that defendant
had not provided any basis to consider the pretrial offer or legal authority to consider
uniformity in sentencing with his Arizona case. The court further explained it found
defendant’s social history unpersuasive both because it was told solely from defendant’s
perspective and therefore of uncertain veracity, and because defendant had failed to
articulate how his sobriety would assist him in not reoffending when there was no
evidence showing his crimes had been committed while intoxicated. And the court noted
the risk assessment only predicted the likelihood of reoffending within a three-year
period and defendant’s score on that assessment was, in the court’s recollection, average.
The trial court then explained that imposing the greater penalty, i.e., 25 years to
life for sexual penetration, was appropriate in light of multiple considerations. These
included the fact that defendant committed the burglary with the intent of committing the
sexual assault; the seriousness of the sexual assault—forcible sexual penetration of a
minor; and that his victim was a 15-year-old girl seeking his help to earn a softball
scholarship. The court also considered the particular factual circumstances of the crimes,
such as defendant’s instructions to H.L. not to wear a bra or underwear for her first
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session with him and that he committed the crime within hours after meeting her, while
her parents were in another bedroom.
After these explanations, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years
to life, plus eight years four months, which included 25 years to life for forcible sexual
penetration and a term of two years for burglary, stayed pursuant to section 654.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion under section 654 by staying
the two-year sentence for burglary instead of the 25-year-to-life sentence for forcible
sexual penetration. Specifically, defendant argues the court’s sentencing decision was
arbitrary because (1) he had been repeatedly sexually abused as a child and (2) he was
already serving a concurrent 24-year sentence in an Arizona case for other offenses,
which “[a] reasonable jurist should have taken … into account … especially in light of
the newly-discovered abuse in his background” and his lack of danger to the public. The
People disagree and so do we.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, “An act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” That section previously required “punish[ment] under the law that provided
for the longest potential term of imprisonment.” (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
343, 351; see § 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1, p. 2752.) As
amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the section now “afford[s]
[trial] courts the discretion to punish the act or omission under either provision.” (Mani,
at p. 351; see id. at p. 379; Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) On appeal, we will affirm unless the trial court
was not aware of its discretion, considered impermissible factors, or exercised its
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discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 378; Sandoval, at p. 847.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate
sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence
will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Carmony, at pp. 376-377.) In evaluating whether
defendant has met this burden, we do not reweigh evidence; nor do we substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court. (Id. at pp. 374, 378-379.)
Applying this standard, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
staying defendant’s burglary sentence. The trial court was aware of its discretion under
section 654. In exercising that discretion, the trial court considered the particular facts
and circumstances of the offenses, including that defendant committed the burglary to
facilitate his commission of forcible sexual penetration, that the sexual offense was very
serious, and that defendant took advantage of his particular position of power over H.L.
to assault her. The trial court also explicitly addressed all of the considerations defendant
has raised again on appeal. It considered defendant’s childhood history of abuse and
evidence of rehabilitation in the social history but found that unpersuasive since it was
told solely from defendant’s perspective and lacked corroboration. It considered
defendant’s risk assessment but found it of limited utility because it only predicted
defendant’s rate of recidivism within a limited timeframe. And it reviewed but did not
consider defendant’s sentence in Arizona because defendant did not, and still does not,
provide any legal authority for doing so or persuasive argument as to its relevance. In
this context, defendant’s argument amounts to a claim that the court did not give enough
weight to the evidence and arguments in his favor. This essentially asks us to reweigh
the evidence, which we cannot do. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 374,
378-379.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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