Filed 7/9/26 P. v. Thomas CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088914
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F15904751)
v.
LACHANCE LARUE THOMAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Arlan L.
Harrell, Judge.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney, Christina
Simpson and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, a jury found appellant LaChance Larue Thomas and a
codefendant guilty of the first degree, premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),
189, subd. (a))1 of Von Randell Correia, Jr. The jury also found true an allegation that, as
to appellant, a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense
within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a) (section 12022(a)). Appellant was
sentenced to 25 years to life, plus one year for the firearm enhancement. In 2022,
appellant filed a petition for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 and requested the
appointment of counsel. After appointing counsel for appellant, the trial court denied the
petition at the prima facie stage, finding the record conclusively established appellant was
ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred by making factual findings, and
by drawing on evidence gleaned from the opinion in appellant’s direct appeal, the
preliminary hearing, and the trial transcript. The Attorney General disputes that the trial
court engaged in any factfinding to deny the petition, and maintains the jury instructions
together with the jury’s verdict establishes appellant is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law.
Pursuant to de novo review, we conclude the jury instructions and verdict establish
appellant is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The
jury found appellant guilty of first degree premeditated murder. The jury was not
instructed under any invalid theory of murder or other theory by which malice may have
been imputed to appellant merely by his participation in some underlying crime. Rather,
to find appellant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, the two theories of first
degree murder liability—together with the instruction for first degree premeditated
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
murder—required the jury to find appellant personally harbored an intent to kill (in
addition to the other elements of murder). As such, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Based on evidence presented at trial, Thomas and a confederate (Brown) were
seen by witnesses at an apartment building’s outdoor courtyard around midnight on
July 28, 2015. Witnesses saw someone they later identified as Brown walk toward the
complex’s laundry room. Witnesses saw another man, later identified as appellant,
walking behind Brown; one witness saw appellant turn around, and he appeared to walk
back to a carport area; a second witness saw appellant peering after Brown behind a wall.
After seeing Brown advance toward the laundry room, the witnesses heard gunshots. A
gunshot victim was later found at the back of the complex. After the gunshots, witnesses
saw Brown leave the courtyard, heard car doors closing in an adjacent parking lot, and
saw a car drive away from the apartment complex. An on-duty police officer happened
to be in the vicinity and heard the gunshots. Minutes later, the officer stopped the car that
had been seen leaving the apartment complex. Brown, appellant and another person were
inside the vehicle. The firearm that killed the victim was located approximately 100 feet
from where that vehicle was stopped. Gloves found on the floor of the vehicle where
Brown was sitting when the vehicle was pulled over tested positive for gunshot residue.2
The prosecutor’s theory, as evidenced by the firearm enhancements alleged in the
information and as argued to the jury, was that Brown shot and killed Correia while
appellant directly aided and abetted the murder. The jury was instructed on murder under
CALCRIM No. 520, first degree premeditated murder under CALCRIM No. 521, direct
aiding and abetting principles under CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401, and conspiracy to
commit murder principles under CALCRIM No. 416.
2 These facts, provided only for context, are derived from our opinion on appellant’s direct
appeal. (People v. Brown (Sept. 9, 2021, F077143) [nonpub. opn.].)
3.
The jury found appellant and Brown guilty of first degree willful, deliberate and
premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)). As to appellant, the jury found
true a firearm enhancement that appellant was a principal in a crime where a firearm was
used, regardless of whether appellant was personally armed with a firearm.
(§ 12022(a)(1).) Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life for the first degree murder
conviction (§ 190, subd. (a)), and a consecutive one-year term for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022(a)(1).
In 2022, appellant sought resentencing relief under section 1172.6, which the
People opposed. In 2023, the trial court denied the petition, reasoning as follows:
“This Court has read and considered the petition and the opposition
as well as considered the arguments of Counsel and the record of
conviction including transcripts from the trial and preliminary hearing, the
verdicts issued by the jurors, and the instructions given to jurors by this
Court.
“Based on this Court’s review of the record, the Court finds that
[appellant] has failed to establish a prima facie case for relief because the
instructions and first degree murder findings, factual findings made by the
jurors, show that [appellant] was not convicted of first degree murder based
upon felony murder, natural and probable consequence doctrine, or any
other theory that imputed malice to him based solely on his participation in
the crime. Rather, jurors were instructed on two theories of murder
liability, direct aiding and abetting and a conspiracy, direct aiding and
abetting pursuant to CALCRIM [Nos.] 400 and 401, and conspiracy based
on CALCRIM [No.] 416. Each of these theories require that jurors find
and decide the culpability of each defendant separately and each of which
theories remain viable … despite the 2019 amendments to Penal Code
Sections 188 and 189. Specifically, CALCRIM [No.] 548 … instructed the
jurors that they had to make independent findings as to each of the
defendants concerning their culpability for first degree murder.
“The evidence at trial showed that [appellant], while not the actual
killer, did, with the intent to kill, assist the actual killer in the commission
of the murder in this case. That was the jury finding based upon the
instructions that were provided.
4.
“A direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought. That is the instruction provided to the Court, or law provided
to the Court based on People v. Gentile [(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848].
“Also, a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a
finding of intent to kill. That’s from [People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th
593, 607].
“Each of these theories satisfies the requirement that [appellant]
acted with malice aforethought. That was the finding that the jurors had to
have made in order to return the verdicts that they did in this case.
“Further, under CALCRIM [No.] 416 the People were required to
prove that members of the alleged conspiracy had an agreement and an
intent to commit murder.
“So under either theory that was actually presented during the course
of the trial, the People were required to prove that [appellant] acted with an
intent to kill, and the jurors finding, as reflected in the verdicts, based upon
instructions given, establish as a fact that [appellant] had such an intent.”
(Italics added.)
Appellant did not appeal from this order denying his petition. In October 2024,
appellant filed a second petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was
summarily denied. Appellant appealed from that denial, and our court granted
appellant’s motion for constructive filing of the notice of appeal, and this court deemed
the November 2024 notice of appeal timely filed from the trial court’s original 2023 order
denying the petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of murder. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Under this doctrine, “‘“[a] person who knowingly aids
and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but
also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a
natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.”’” (People v. Hin (2025) 17
5.
Cal.5th 401, 441 (Hin), quoting People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920.)
Accordingly, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 to provide that, except as to the law
governing felony murder, to be convicted of murder, “a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
In addition, Senate Bill 1437 limited the scope of the felony-murder rule by
“providing that a defendant who was neither the actual killer nor acted with the intent to
kill can be liable for murder only if he was a ‘major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 441,
quoting § 189, subd. (e)(3).)
Finally, Senate Bill 1437 created a procedural mechanism for those convicted
under the theories of murder made invalid pursuant to these changes in the law to seek
retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960
(Lewis).) Under what is now section 1172.6, the process begins by filing a petition
containing a declaration that all the requirements for eligibility are met. (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)(A).) “When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary
declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’” (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If the petition and
record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, at p. 708, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c) &
Lewis, supra, at pp. 970–972; accord, People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 460
(Curiel).)
If, on the other hand, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement
to relief, the court is required to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The
court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or attempted
6.
murder under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d).) “If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations
and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the [defendant] shall
be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
II. Discussion
Appellant maintains the trial court impermissibly engaged in factfinding in
denying the petition at the prima facie stage, and that the first degree murder theories
relevant to appellant could have allowed the jury to convict under a theory of imputed
malice. The Attorney General disputes that the trial court’s ruling depended on any fact
finding or the weighing of any evidence. Even though the trial court made a general
reference to the trial evidence, the Attorney General argues this does not supply any basis
to presume the court failed to properly and regularly perform its obligations at the prima
facie stage.
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of the petition at the prima facie stage.
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 [prima facie eligibility for resentencing is a
“‘“purely legal conclusion”’” reviewed de novo].)
A. Information, Jury Instructions, and Jury Verdict Establish Appellant
is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
To find appellant guilty of first degree premediated murder, the jury was
instructed on two theories: (1) direct aiding and abetting, and (2) an uncharged
conspiracy to commit murder. The jury was instructed under CALCRIM Nos. 400 and
401 on aiding and abetting principles:
Under CALCRIM No. 400, the jury was instructed that “[a] person may be guilty
of a crime in two ways: One, he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will
call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator
7.
who directly committed the crime. [¶] A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she
committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.”3
Under CALCRIM No. 401, the court instructed as follows:
“To prove that [appellant] is guilty of a crime based on aiding and
abetting that crime, the People must prove that:
“One, the perpetrator committed the crime;
“Two, [appellant] knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the
crime;
“Three, before or during the commission of the crime, [appellant]
intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;
“And four[, appellant’s] words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.
“Someone aids and abets a crime if he knows of the perpetrator’s
unlawful purpose and he specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid,
facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
that crime.
“If all of these requirements are proved, [appellant] does not need to
actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an
aider and abettor.
“If you conclude that [appellant] was present at the scene of the
crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in
determining whether [appellant] was an aider and abettor. However, the
fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the
crime does not, by itself, make him an aider and abettor.”
3 The trial court also read an additional paragraph on aiding and abetting to the jury that
was on the slides in the courtroom while the instructions were given: “Under some specific
circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be
found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.”
However, the court noted this paragraph was not applicable and directed the jury as
follows: “that paragraph, I’m reading it because it is on the slide but you are to disregard that
paragraph in its entirety. That does not apply to this case. That is the third paragraph on the first
slide—or the only slide for CALCRIM [No.] 400. You are to disregard that. And that will not
be among the final jury instructions you will receive for your consideration during your
deliberations.”
8.
The court also instructed the jury on conspiracy to commit murder under
CALCRIM No. 416. In relevant part, the jury was instructed that, for an uncharged
conspiracy to commit murder, the People were required to prove that (1) “[appellant]
intended to agree and did agree with one or more co-conspirators to commit murder”;
(2) “at the time of the agreement, [appellant] and one or more of the other alleged
members of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit murder”;
(3) “one of the defendants committed at least one of the following overt acts to
accomplish murder: Discharging a firearm or going to the shooting location”; and
(4) “this overt act was committed in California.”
To find appellant guilty of first degree murder, the jury was required, under
CALCRIM No. 521, to find appellant acted with an “inten[t] to kill.”
To find appellant guilty of first degree murder on the only two theories presented,
the jury was required to conclude he personally acted with malice—each theory remains
valid after Senate Bill 1437. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 [“Senate Bill
1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct
aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought”]; People v. Virgen (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 440, 451 [“[m]urder liability based on an uncharged conspiracy to
commit murder remains a valid legal theory because it requires proof that the defendant
acted with express malice regardless of whether he was the actual killer”].)
Because no invalid theory, including any theory that involved imputed malice, was
presented to the jury, the jury’s guilty finding on first degree premeditated murder
necessarily supports a murder conviction under current law. (People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [the petitioner is ineligible for § 1172.6 relief as a matter of law if
the jury instructions show that jurors were not instructed on any theory of murder liability
that allowed malice to be imputed]; People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677
[absence of jury instructions based on any theory of liability affected by Sen. Bill 1437
renders the petitioner ineligible for relief as a matter of law]; cf. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
9.
at p. 471 [given instruction on natural and probable consequences doctrine, jury finding
of intent to kill insufficient to conclusively establish the petitioner was liable for murder
under current law].) Because appellant was found guilty of first degree murder, and the
jury was instructed only on theories of murder that remain valid after Senate Bill 1437,
appellant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
With respect to the conspiracy instructions, appellant argues that because he was
not charged with conspiracy, the jury did not return a verdict finding him guilty of
conspiracy to commit murder. As we understand appellant’s argument, because
conspiracy to commit murder was uncharged, appellant claims the jury had no occasion
to find that appellant had both the specific intent to agree to the conspiracy and to commit
murder. Thus, the fact the jury was instructed on the elements of conspiracy to commit
murder does not establish he is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Further, appellant
argues, the conspiracy instructions were ambiguous, leaving open the possibility the jury
imputed malice to him based solely on his conduct in going to the location of the
shooting.
We disagree. Under either theory (aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit
murder), the jury was instructed it had to find appellant personally intended to kill to find
him guilty of first degree murder, and it required the jury to find all elements of
conspiracy true to convict of first degree murder on that uncharged theory. The
conspiracy instructions did not allow the jury to find appellant guilty merely because he
went to the location of the shooting. Rather, the instructions informed the jury that for
conspiracy to commit murder, appellant must have “intended to agree and did agree with
one or more co-conspirators to commit murder”; must have, with one or more of the other
alleged conspiracy members, “intended that one or more of them would commit murder”;
and that one of the defendants committed at least one overt act to accomplish the murder:
discharging the firearm or going to the shooting location. The instructions also explicitly
informed the jury that “[s]omeone who merely accompanies or associates with members
10.
of a conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the crime is not a member of the
conspiracy.” Finally, the instructions made clear the crime that the defendants allegedly
conspired to commit was murder. These instructions leave no avenue for the jury to
impute malice to appellant for first degree murder based solely on his participation in
some other crime or act or his mere presence at the crime scene.
Appellant also argues an aiding and abetting theory did not exclude the possibility
that, at an evidentiary hearing, appellant could demonstrate that malice was imputed to
him based solely on his participation in a crime. In making this argument, appellant cites
People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 984. Langi, however, involved a second
degree murder conviction and a theory of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder
for which the jury received a confusing instruction that may have led the jury to impute
malice to the defendant based solely on his participation in an underlying offense. Here,
in contrast, appellant was convicted of first degree murder—there was no instructional
basis for the jury to find him guilty unless it found he personally harbored an intent to
kill.
Appellant argues the prosecutor’s closing argument invited the jury to find
appellant aided and abetted by going to the location of the shooting, allowing for a
possibility the jury convicted appellant based solely on his participation in a crime. We
are unpersuaded. The jury instructions eliminated the possibility the jury convicted
appellant without finding that he personally harbored malice. To find appellant guilty of
first degree murder, the instructions under CALCRIM No. 521 required the jury to find
appellant intended to kill (in addition to the other elements of murder). To convict for
first degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory under CALCRIM No. 401, the
instructions required the jury to find appellant knew the perpetrator intended to commit
murder, appellant intended to engage in actions to aid and abet that murder, and
appellant’s conduct did, in fact, aid in the commission of murder. The jury was also
instructed that nothing the attorneys would say is evidence, including their opening
11.
statements and closing arguments. We must presume that in reaching its verdict, the jury
followed these instructions. (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 200–201
[reviewing court presumes jurors understand and follow the trial court’s jury
instructions].)
In finding all the elements of first degree murder were met, the jury’s verdict
necessarily establishes it found appellant guilty of express malice murder under one of
two valid theories of liability on which it was instructed, both of which explicitly
required that appellant personally harbored an intent to kill (in addition to the other
murder elements) beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the jury instruction and the
jury’s verdict, appellant cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate he cannot presently be
convicted of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
B. Trial Court Did Not Engage In Judicial Factfinding
Appellant argues the trial court impermissibly relied on the appellate opinion
issued in appellant’s direct appeal, the preliminary hearing transcript, and the trial
transcripts in finding appellant ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage. For example,
attached to the People’s brief filed in opposition to the petition was the prior appellate
opinion, which the People invited the trial court to consider. Appellant also points out
the trial court indicated on the record at the hearing that it had considered “transcripts
from the trial and preliminary hearing, the verdicts issued by the jurors, and the
instructions given to jurors by this Court.” The court noted that “[t]he evidence at trial
showed that [appellant], while not the actual killer, did, with the intent to kill, assist the
actual killer in the commission of the murder in this case. That was the jury finding
based upon the instructions that were provided.”
Although the trial court referenced the preliminary hearing and the trial transcripts,
it clearly based its decision only on the instructions that were provided to the jury and the
jury’s verdict. Notably, the court relied on nothing in the appellate opinion or the
preliminary hearing transcript in making its ruling on the petition. Further, the court’s
12.
comment on what the evidence at trial showed, when considered in context, was a
comment on what the jury concluded from the evidence based on the jury instructions
and the verdict. The trial court did not conduct any factfinding in reaching its conclusion,
nor did it rely on or cite any facts in the appellate opinion; and it did not consider or
weigh any evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing or at the trial.
Moreover, even if the court’s general comment on the trial evidence could be
construed as improper—and we do not interpret the court’s ruling in that manner—the
trial court’s ruling was legally correct. “‘“No rule of decision is better or more firmly
established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety,
than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in the law, will not be disturbed on appeal
merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable
to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved
the trial court to its conclusions.”’” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976; accord,
People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123–124.) Based on the information, the jury
instructions, and the jury’s verdict, appellant is not eligible for resentencing relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The jury was not instructed on an invalid theory of
murder, and in finding appellant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, the jury
necessarily, based on the theories of liability on which it was instructed, concluded
appellant personally harbored an intent to kill along with all the other elements of first
degree murder.
Pursuant to de novo review, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling that
appellant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
13.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition at the prima facie stage as a
matter of law is affirmed.
MEEHAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SNAUFFER, J.
DESANTOS, J.
14.