Filed 8/14/26 P. v. Thatcher CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F090792
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF077196B-01)
v.
DAVID CHARLES THATCHER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Jennifer Conn
Shirk, Judge.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
On October 23, 2025, the trial court attempted to hold a resentencing hearing for
defendant David Charles Thatcher. However, he refused to appear at the hearing, and the
court left the previous sentence in place. On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), identifying no error
and asking our court to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.1
Thatcher was afforded an opportunity to submit a letter brief, and he did so. After
reviewing the record and considering the contentions raised by Thatcher, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
On November 8, 2001, a jury found Thatcher guilty of four counts of second
degree robbery (Pen. Code,2 § 211) and one count of grand theft of a firearm (§ 487,
former subd. (d)). The jury also found true that, as to three of the robbery counts,
Thatcher personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to the fourth robbery
count, the jury found true that Thatcher personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1). At a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true two prior strike conviction
allegations (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), two prior serious felony
conviction allegations ((§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior prison term allegations
(§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
On December 18, 2001, Thatcher was sentenced to an aggregate term of 162 years
to life, which included a prior prison term enhancement. Thatcher appealed. Our court
1 Pursuant to Delgadillo, which applies to certain postconviction proceedings, we
are not required to conduct an independent review of the entire record. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 222–227, 232; People v. Rosemond (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 667,
671–674.) Instead, when a defendant files a letter brief, as defendant did here, we are
only “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a
written opinion.” (Delgadillo, at p. 232.) This procedure does not bar us from exercising
our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record. (Rosemond, at p. 673.)
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
reversed the conviction on the count of grand theft of a firearm, resulting in an aggregate
term of 137 years to life. This term included a prior prison term enhancement.
On June 29, 2023, the trial court held a resentencing hearing pursuant to
section 1172.75. The court struck the prior prison term enhancement, as well as the prior
serious felony enhancement, and imposed an aggregate term of 131 years to life.
Thatcher was not present at the hearing because defense counsel waived his presence.
On or about March 13, 2024, Thatcher sent a letter to the trial court, asking about
the status of his resentencing hearing. In response, the court sent Thatcher a copy of the
June 29, 2023 resentencing order.
On March 7, 2025, defense counsel filed a request for a new resentencing hearing
on the ground that Thatcher was not present at the resentencing hearing. The trial court
granted the request.
On April 29, 2025, Thatcher filed a motion, asserting that he had a conflict with
defense counsel and asking that different counsel be appointed. He also asked for the
resentencing hearing to be continued.
On May 15, 2025, Thatcher was not present at the resentencing hearing, and the
trial court continued the matter.
On August 11, 2025, Thatcher was not present at the resentencing hearing, and the
trial court continued the matter.
On October 7, 2025, Thatcher filed three motions. One motion was filed pursuant
to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). He asserted there was a
fundamental breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, that he was receiving
incompetent representation, and that there was a conflict between himself and defense
counsel. He asked the court to appoint different counsel. He also filed a motion to
modify the transportation order, asking that he be transported directly from prison to
Tulare County Superior Court. Finally, he filed a motion to stay the proceedings until
October 2028.
3.
On October 23, 2025, the trial court attempted to hold the resentencing hearing,
but Thatcher was not present. The court stated that Thatcher had previously refused to be
transported to court for the resentencing hearing, and he was advised that if he refused to
be transported again, the court would proceed without him. Despite this warning, he
once again refused to be transported. Accordingly, the court denied Thatcher’s motions
and left the June 29, 2023, sentence in place.
On November 21, 2025, Thatcher filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION3
As noted above, Thatcher’s appellate counsel filed a brief identifying no basis for
relief and requesting that we determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.
Thatcher subsequently submitted a letter brief. Having carefully reviewed the entire
record, we conclude that there is no arguable issue on appeal.
As to Thatcher’s letter brief, he argues defense counsel was ineffective.
According to Thatcher, he told defense counsel that he wanted defense counsel to submit
mitigating circumstances to the court, including his age at the time of the crime, drug use,
and childhood trauma. However, defense counsel refused, stating that it was not his job
to do so. Additionally, Thatcher told defense counsel that if the court denied his motion
to modify the transportation order, he wanted to appear remotely. However, defense
counsel never informed the court. Finally, defense counsel’s failure to act as a diligent
advocate resulted in Thatcher not being able to appear at the hearing.
The defendant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.
(People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, overruled on other grounds in People v.
Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.) To establish such a claim, a defendant
must show (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
3 Because the facts underlying the offense are not relevant to the issue on appeal,
we omit a summary of those facts. The relevant facts are included in the Procedural
History and Background section, ante.
4.
reasonableness and (2) prejudice, that is, but for counsel’s unprofessional error a different
result would have been reasonably probable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687-688, 694; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
(Strickland, at p. 694.) “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of
counsel’s performance], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” (Id. at p. 689.)
“It is … particularly difficult to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, where we are limited to evaluating the appellate record. If the record does
not shed light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must
reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to provide a
satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v.
Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.) Reversal is permitted “ ‘only if (1) the record
affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th
694, 711.)
Thatcher’s ineffective of assistance of counsel claim fails on direct appeal.
Nothing in the record supports his assertions regarding his alleged communications with
defense counsel. Additionally, the record does not show, nor does Thatcher describe, the
mitigating evidence he wanted defense counsel to submit. As we do not know what
evidence could have been submitted, we cannot find that a different result would have
been reasonably probable had the evidence been submitted.
DISPOSITION
The order issued on October 23, 2025, is affirmed.
5.