Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Taylor CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H054191
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1511498)
v.
CHARLES MARSHALL TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before this court for the second time, appellant Charles Marshall Taylor appeals
from the trial court’s judgment on resentencing reimposing an indeterminate term of life
in prison with the possibility of parole for his conviction for torture (Pen. Code, § 206)1
and staying under section 654 the sentences for the remaining counts. On appeal,
Taylor’s counsel has filed a brief which states the case but raises no issues, asking this
court to conduct an independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 (Wende). We advised Taylor of his right to submit written argument on his own
behalf within 30 days, and he has not done so. We have found one clerical error in the
abstract of judgment, which we will order corrected. And finding no arguable issues in
our independent review of the record, we affirm.
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
In 2018, Taylor was tried by jury and was sentenced by the trial court to a term of
seven years to life for torture (§ 206; count 1). The trial court further imposed and stayed
the following determinate terms under section 654: an upper term of four years for
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2); an upper term of eight years
for sodomy with an unconscious person (§ 286, subd. (f); count 3); three upper terms of
four years each for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, former spouse, or
former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 4, 6, and 7); two upper terms of four years
each for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4);
counts 5 and 8); an upper term of three years for threats to commit a crime resulting in
death or great bodily injury (§ 422; count 9); and an upper term of four years for
dissuading or attempting to dissuade a witness by use of force or threat of force (§ 136.1,
subd. (c)(1); count 10). The trial court also imposed and stayed under section 654 two
5-year enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).
In Taylor’s direct appeal in case No. H046288, this court rejected Taylor’s claims
of trial error but reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for resentencing as
Taylor was entitled to the retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.). Senate Bill No. 567 had amended section 1170 to make the middle term the
presumptive sentence and permitted trial courts to impose a sentence exceeding the
middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) This court further observed that on remand, Taylor could
argue in the trial court that he was also entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly
Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). Assembly Bill No. 518 had amended section 654,
which previously required that an act or omission punishable by different laws be
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punished under the law that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment. As
amended, section 654 now permits trial courts the discretion to punish the act or omission
under either law.
Following this court’s remand, Taylor filed a sentencing brief. Taylor requested
that the trial court stay the indeterminate life sentence on count 1 (torture) and impose the
middle term sentences for counts 2 through 10, as aggravating factors were neither
stipulated to by Taylor nor found true by a jury as required under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2). In sum, Taylor proposed that the trial court sentence him to a total
determinate term of 19 years in prison.
The People opposed Taylor’s resentencing proposal and requested that the trial
court again impose and execute the indeterminate life term on count 1, staying the
sentences for counts 2 through 10. Should the trial court stay the sentences on counts 2
through 10, the People submitted to the trial court’s imposition of middle terms for those
counts.
The probation department submitted a report that aligned with Taylor’s suggested
sentence, proposing that the trial court sentence Taylor to a total term of 19 years and
stay the sentence for count 1.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court decided to reimpose and execute the
indeterminate term of seven years to life on count 1. In particular, the trial court noted
that the impact of Taylor’s actions on the victim had “lifelong consequences” and that it
would not serve the interest of justice to impose a lesser punishment. The trial court
nonetheless concluded that imposition of the middle terms on the other counts was
appropriate given “the manner in which this case was presented,” as no aggravating
circumstances were found true by a jury or admitted to by Taylor. Therefore, the trial
court imposed and stayed the following sentences under section 654: the middle term of
three years each for counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10; the middle term of six years for count 3;
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and the middle term of two years for count 9. The two great bodily injury enhancements
alleged as to counts 7 and 8 were also stayed.
Taylor’s counsel requested that the trial court either “waive or stay the fines and
fees” under People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1. The trial court stayed a $300 restitution
fund fine, noting that it may have “already been paid [or] satisfied from the defendant’s
earnings while in prison.” The trial court also waived the “security fee and criminal
conviction assessment” based on Taylor’s inability to pay, noting again that “[i]f they
have been paid already, they have been satisfied.”
The abstract of judgment listed as an enhancement a violation of section 1170.15,
which was stayed, although the trial court made no such oral pronouncement at
sentencing.
Taylor timely appealed from judgment upon resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Having independently reviewed the record under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we
find no arguable issues absent a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. (See People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [reviewing court may correct a clerical error in the
abstract of judgment at any time].) The abstract of judgment erroneously lists
section 1170.15 as a stayed enhancement. Section 1170.15 provides that notwithstanding
subdivision (a) of section 1170.1, if a person is convicted of a felony and an additional
felony that is a violation of section 136.1 (dissuading a witness) or section 137
(influencing testimony) with respect to a witness, potential witness, or person who was
going to give material information pertaining to the first felony, “ ‘the subordinate term
for each consecutive offense’ ” of dissuading a witness or influencing a witness must be
the full middle term plus any applicable enhancements. (People v. Hennessey (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1834.) But contrary to the abstract of judgment’s notation,
section 1170.15 is not an enhancement but an alternative sentencing scheme.
Furthermore, section 1170.15 applies only when a trial court imposes consecutive
4
sentences. (People v. Woodworth (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1479.) Whereas here,
not only was Taylor’s punishment for his conviction for dissuading a witness (count 10)
stayed under section 654, but the trial court made no mention of section 1170.15 at
sentencing. To avoid any confusion and to comport the written judgment with the oral
pronouncement, we direct the clerk of the superior court to delete the reference to
section 1170.15 on the abstract of judgment. We otherwise affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is directed to correct the
abstract of judgment to delete the reference to Penal Code section 1170.15 as a stayed
enhancement. A certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment shall be forwarded
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
5
LIE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
WILSON, J.
BROMBERG, J.
People v. Taylor
H054191