Filed 10/21/26 P. v. Taylor CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A174336
v.
DARNELL JOSEPH TAYLOR, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant.
022302004)
ORDER DISMISSING MOOT APPEAL
After finding defendant Darnell Joseph Taylor incompetent to stand
trial, the trial court, “exercising its discretion” under Penal Code section
1370, subdivision (a)(1)B)(i)(II),1 determined it was “in the interests of
1 This provision provides:
“(B) If the defendant is found mentally incompetent and is not charged
with an offense listed in subdivision (d) of Section 1001.36, the trial, the
hearing on the alleged violation, or the judgment shall be suspended,
and the court shall do all of the following:
“(i)(I) Determine whether restoring the person to mental competence is
in the interests of justice.
“(II) In exercising its discretion pursuant to this clause, the court shall
consider the relevant circumstances of the charged offense, including
the harm done to the victim, the defendant’s mental health condition,
including, without limitation, any intellectual or developmental
disability, the history of treatment, the criminal history of the
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justice” to restore him to mental competence and committed him to the
Department of State Hospitals (Department). Taylor challenges the court’s
“in the interests of justice” determination, asserting the court misunderstood
the nature of this inquiry.
However, as the Attorney General points out, the appeal is moot.
Taylor’s competency was quickly restored and thereafter he pleaded no
contest to misdemeanor theft. The Attorney General therefore urges that the
appeal be dismissed.
Appellate courts decide actual controversies, not cases that become
moot. We “will not render opinions on moot questions or abstract
propositions, or declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter at
issue on appeal.” (Daily Journal Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557.) Thus, generally, an “appeal should be
dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the
appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.” (Cucamongans United
for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479.)
Taylor does not dispute that his appeal is moot. Rather, he asks that
we exercise our discretion to decide the issue he has presented—what is the
extent of a trial court’s discretion under section 1370, subdivision
(a)(1)(B)(i)(II)? He asserts no case has considered the extent of the trial
defendant, whether the defendant is likely to face incarceration if
convicted, whether the defendant has previously been found
incompetent to stand trial, whether restoring the person to mental
competence will enhance public safety, and any other relevant
considerations. The court shall provide the defense and prosecution an
opportunity to be heard on whether restoration is in the interests of
justice.” (Pen. Code, §1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(II).)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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court’s statutorily conferred discretion and, specifically, what factors are
encompassed within the final phrase, “other relevant considerations.” He
maintains this phrase cannot include consideration that the defendant would
be benefited by services because that vitiates the significance of other
provisions of the statute that provide if the court determines it is not in the
interest of justice to restore the defendant to competence, it can grant
diversion if the defendant is eligible therefore. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iii).)
We decline to exercise our discretion to decide this moot case, in
particular because the record is not as clear as it could be. When the trial
court asked, “Is there any argument that restoration is not in the interest of
justice?” defense counsel answered “No.” The court minute order for the
hearing at which the trial court made that inquiry states that “[t]he Court
also finds that restoring the person to mental competence is in the interest[s]
of justice.” The minute order further states, “[p]ursuant to the provisions of
Penal Code § 1370[, subdivision] (a)(2)(A), the Contra Costa Conditional
Release Program (CONREP/MHM Services) is requested to provide their
recommendations as to placement for this defendant within 15 judicial days.”
At a subsequent hearing, defense counsel objected to the CONREP
report recommendation that Taylor be committed to the Department,2 stating
“in terms of in the interest of justice argument on the issue of restoration, you
know, to consider not submitting Mr. Taylor to the Department” and to do
“outpatient restoration.” The court responded that was a “commitment
argument,” not an “interest of justice argument.” Counsel then asked the
court to consider “dismissing the case.” The trial court responded, “[t]he
2The CONREP report included a multi-page discussion of why it
recommended that Taylor be committed to the Department, rather than an
unsecured facility.
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commitment question is one of where he would be capable of being restored,
and given the CONREP report I do not think he can be restored in the
community.” The court then commented, “[e]ssentially it’s between dismissal
and commitment, and given what I’m seeing here [in the CONREP report]
about his pretty significant mental health issues, I don’t believe that it is
consistent with the legislative mandate to provide services for me just to
dismiss the case given the concerns that have been raised. And that
everyone would be better suited if he received services. So for that reason I
will find it is in the interest of justice to restore Mr. Taylor. So I’ll commit
him to a Department of State Hospitals to two years, no credits.”
In short, the record reflects counsel submitted on the restoration “in the
interest of justice” question and that the dismissal versus commitment choice
Taylor now argues indicates the court did not understand its threshold task,
appears to have been the suggestion of counsel at the hearing set for
assessing the appropriate commitment. Nor did counsel direct the court’s
attention to other provisions of the statute Taylor now points to on appeal.
We therefore conclude this case is an unsuitable vehicle for establishing
any broader precedent on the extent of the trial court’s broad discretion, and
we cannot say this appeal presents a “recurring” issue of “public importance”
that warrants our invoking an exception to the mootness doctrine.3
3 As a final matter, we note that Taylor requested oral argument in
response to a notice sent by the court’s clerk, as a matter of course, when an
appeal is fully briefed. A party’s right to oral argument exists in any appeal
considered on the merits and decided by written opinion. (See Moles v.
Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 871; accord, Lewis v.
Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1255.) Because we dismiss the appeal
without reaching the merits, Taylor does not have a right to oral argument,
and no argument will be calendared.
We deny Taylor’s request for judicial notice.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A174336, People v. Taylor
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