Filed 10/8/26 P. v. Sylva CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
THE PEOPLE, C103916
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 62198621A
v. & 62199900B)
KAYLA CHERIE SYLVA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Kayla Cherie Sylva was found guilty of several offenses related to
controlled substances and firearms found during two searches of her residence. The trial
court placed defendant on two years formal probation. On appeal, defendant’s only
contention is that the police officer’s statement of probable cause supporting the search
warrant for the first search of her residence omitted material facts and contained a false
representation, rendering it fatally defective. We will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A first amended information charged defendant with possession for sale of a
controlled substance, fentanyl (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; counts three & ten),
possession for sale of a controlled substance, heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351;
counts four & eleven), possession for sale of a controlled substance, methamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; counts five & twelve), possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count six), and
1
misdemeanor possession for sale of cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (b);
count thirteen). The first amended information also alleged on-bail enhancements as to
counts ten through twelve (Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b)), and numerous circumstances
in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421).
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. For purposes of this appeal, in which
defendant challenges only the denial of her motion to suppress evidence, we need not
summarize the trial evidence. It is sufficient to say that, between two searches of
defendant’s residence pursuant to search warrants, law enforcement found controlled
substances, cannabis, and firearms.
Following the close of the prosecution’s case, the jury found defendant not guilty
on count three, possession for sale of fentanyl; not guilty on count four, possession for
sale of heroin, but guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of heroin; guilty on
count five of possession for sale of methamphetamine; guilty on count six of possession
of a controlled substance with a firearm; not guilty on count eleven of possession for sale
of heroin, but guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of heroin; not guilty on
count twelve of possession for sale of methamphetamine, but guilty of the lesser included
offense of possession of methamphetamine; and guilty on count thirteen of misdemeanor
possession for sale of cannabis. Because the trial court dismissed count ten and the jury
returned verdicts of guilty of lesser included offenses—misdemeanors—on counts eleven
and twelve, the on-bail enhancements were rendered nugatory. (See Pen. Code,
§ 12022.1, subd. (a)(2).)
The trial court suspended imposition of a prison sentence and admitted defendant
to formal probation for a term of two years.
2
DISCUSSION
I
Additional Background
A. The Statement of Probable Cause and Search Warrant
In May 2024, City of Roseville Police Officer Andrew Harry sought a search
warrant for defendant’s residence. Harry stated that victim D.P.1 had discovered
fraudulent activity on her credit card. Fraudulent activity began on April 17, 2024, but
D.P. did not discover it until the next day. Harry stated that, on April 18, 2024,
defendant, and codefendants Daniel Calbillo2 and Travis Terry, made fraudulent
purchases with D.P.’s credit card in Roseville and Lincoln.
According to Officer Harry, on April 18, 2024, at 4:28 p.m., defendant drove her
Toyota Corolla to an Enterprise rental location with codefendants Siemon and Terry.
There, defendant rented a Dodge RAM 1500. Defendant drove off in the Dodge, and
Siemon and Terry drove away in defendant’s Toyota.
Both the Dodge and the Toyota traveled to a Lowe’s location in Roseville. The
“Asset Protection Manager … for the Lowes … in Roseville … found the following on
video surveillance: On April 18, 2024, at approximately 1722 hours to 1808 hours, Terry
and [Siemon] shopped at the Lowes …, ultimately committing theft of $2068.24 using
[D.P.’s] stolen Lowes credit card. They purchased a tankless water heater, a garbage
disposal and laundry detergent. Video surveillance at the Lowes captured both [Siemon]
and Terry in the store, selecting merchandise and going to a checkout where the credit
card was fraudulently used. [Siemon] was seen on still images from the video
1 To protect their privacy, we will refer to the victims by their initials. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2 Daniel Calbillo was charged and prosecuted as a codefendant under the name
Edward A. Siemon. We will hereafter refer to him as Siemon, although his name appears
as Calbillo throughout much of the record.
3
surveillance using his cellphone while shopping in the store. Further, there was video
surveillance of Travis Terry seen exiting from an employee-only area (the same area
where a victim-employee’s wallet was stolen from). Terry was seen walking into the
garden center momentarily and returned to the store where he was seen manipulating
something in his hands. Based off prior theft events known to Officer Grinder, who
informed me, Terry’s modus operandi is to … steal wallets, go to an obscure area to steal
cash and credit cards from the wallets, to then throw the wallets away and then utilize
those same stolen cards. Both men exited the business and loaded up the stolen items
into the RAM 1500.”
While codefendants Terry and Siemon were at Lowes in Roseville, defendant
drove her Toyota to Lowe’s in Lincoln. She “walked into the store at approximately
1824 hours. Note: in a still image provided by Lowes Asset Protection, [defendant] was
seen on her cellphone–presumably speaking to someone–with it up to her ear. At
approximately 1840 hours, [defendant] was seen outside with Terry at the front of Lowes
on video surveillance. Both she and Terry walk around together at the front for a short
while, they looked around at some golf carts (believed to be a hand-to-hand passing of
stolen credit cards) and [defendant] re-entered the Lowes and Terry walked off and into
the parking lot. At 1908 hours, [defendant] was seen at the self-checkout aisle where she
attempted to purchase a weedwhacker tool, some gasoline cannisters, and some other
small, assorted items. [Defendant] appeared to have difficulty paying for the items with a
credit card, an associate joined her, and she left without the property. Both my
investigation (involving my victim [D.P.]) and Officer Grinder’s investigation found that
all charges at the Lincoln Lowes location were declined transactions. At 1911 hours,
[defendant] was seen waiting at the front driveway of the Lincoln Lowes, on her
cellphone with it to her ear, when the RAM 1500 drove up, she stepped into the rear
passenger seat, and the RAM 1500 drove away from the store.”
4
On April 30, 2024, Officer Grinder watched a male who looked like codefendant
Siemon sit on a retaining wall in front of defendant’s residence for about 15 minutes
before the man walked away. On May 2, 2024, Grinder watched codefendant Terry
access the rear entrance of defendant’s residence. He “didn’t see Terry use a key to enter
the house.”
Officer Harry concluded there was probable cause to believe defendant had an
unknown association with Siemon and Terry. “There is probable cause to believe that
[defendant], for some unknown reason, has allowed [Siemon] access to her vehicle, and
she has allowed both [Siemon] and Terry access to her residence.” Harry also stated, “I
recognize that thieves often use rental cars to commit their thefts, as the rental vehicle
will have clean registration, they will look neat in appearance and inconspicuous to the
public eye–and to law enforcement.” Harry continued: “There is probable cause to
believe that [defendant], [Siemon] and Terry were all conspiratorial in the theft events
that occurred on April 18, 2024. There is probable cause to believe that [defendant]
rented the RAM 1500 for the sole purposes of committing the credit card fraud on April
18, 2024. She, [Siemon] and Terry were all seen using the RAM 1500, and [defendant’s]
Corolla, at multiple Lowes locations where completed theft and attempted theft occurred.
The RAM 1500 tail bed was used to store a large water tank (possibly too large for her
Corolla to carry), and there were other multiple large purchases that were attempted that
the RAM 1500’s tail bed would have easily accommodated. [¶] … I … find there to be
probable cause to believe that there will be other items stolen or fraudulently obtained” at
defendant’s residence.
The trial court issued search warrant number 63-025545.
B. Relevant Preliminary Hearing Testimony
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Harry testified that he did not allege that
defendant used a stolen credit card to rent the Dodge RAM 1500.
5
Both Officers Harry and Grinder testified that they did not see whether
codefendant Terry handed a credit card to defendant at the Lincoln Lowe’s location.
Grinder testified that he did “not know what they passed off to each other.”
Victim A.N. told Officer Grinder that her wallet had been stolen from her Lowe’s
employee locker in Roseville between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. on April 18, 2024. A.N.
claimed that there was a fraudulent transaction posted to her credit card at Lowe’s in
Lincoln at approximately 6:26 p.m. However, Grinder testified that defendant attempted
to make a purchase at the Lincoln Lowe’s at 7:08 p.m. Grinder believed the two were the
same transaction. Grinder did not “know where the time discrepancies would be. If it’s
on Lowe’s or if it’s on the bank statement.” In the surveillance video, one could see
defendant using a blue credit card, but the name on the card could not be discerned.
Officer Grinder did not see codefendant Siemon at defendant’s house except for
possibly on one occasion when he saw someone who “matched the description” outside
for about 15 minutes. He did not see whether codefendant Terry had a key when he
entered defendant’s residence.
C. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and/or Quash the Search Warrant
Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, denominated a
motion to suppress and/or quash the search warrant. The defense argued, among other
things, that the statement of probable cause contained false statements and intentional or
reckless material omissions in violation of Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154
(Franks). In a memorandum of points and authorities, defendant claimed there were
three material omissions and four misleading, false statements. Among other things,
defendant alleged:
Officer Harry knew defendant rented the Dodge RAM 1500 with her own driver’s
license “and omitted this exculpatory fact from the affidavit.”
Officer “Harry knew that [defendant] could not have been the person that used
[A.N.’s] credit card at the Lincoln Lowes even though the transaction was ‘declined’ that
6
is why he omitted the critical material fact that the declined transaction on [A.N.’s] card
occurred at 18:26, and [defendant] walked in the store at 18:24, met with Terry outside at
18:40 and was seen at the self-checkout at 19:08 but he deliberately omits these
exculpatory facts and ignores them in his conclusion since there is no way [defendant]
could have engaged in a transaction that posted to a credit card over a half an hour before
she attempted her purchase.”
Officer “Harry makes a deliberately misleading statement that when [defendant]
and Terry met in front of Lowes in the surveillance footage that he ‘believed to be a
hand-to-hand passing of stolen credit cards’ then both Grinder and Harry admitted at the
preliminary hearing … that they saw no credit cards exchanged.”
D. The Trial Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Motion
Following oral argument, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. The court
summarily denied that part of defendant’s motion which was to quash the search warrant.
The court then proceeded to that part of the motion which was, in effect, to traverse, as
we will explain. The court found that defendant “did not make the preliminary showing
required pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, supra., i.e. that the omissions were made
intentionally or recklessly, that the omissions were material, that the alleged false
statements were actually false, and that the alleged false statements were material. The
court further finds that even if the preliminary showing had been made, the court would
have denied motions at the evidentiary phase.”
II
Analysis
A. Applicable Principles of Law
A “ ‘defendant moving to quash a warrant asserts the warrant on its face lacks
probable cause.’ [Citation.] ‘A defendant moving to traverse a warrant “mount[s] a
subfacial challenge, i.e., attack[s] the underlying veracity of statements made on the face
of the search warrant application.” ’ ” (Meiner v. Superior Court (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th
7
284, 288.) Defendant’s arguments on appeal pertain to her motion to traverse the warrant
and suppress evidence. She argues that the statement of probable cause omitted material
information and contained a false misrepresentation, and that, when the material
information is added to the statement, probable cause is lacking.
“A defendant has a limited right to challenge the veracity of statements contained
in an affidavit of probable cause made in support of the issuance of a search warrant. The
trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing only if a defendant makes a substantial
showing that (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made
in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the affidavit’s remaining contents, after the false
statements are excised, are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.”
(People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 484 (Scott); see Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at
pp. 154-156.)
“A defendant who challenges a search warrant based on omissions in the affidavit
bears the burden of showing an intentional or reckless omission of material information
that, when added to the affidavit, renders it insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause.” (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484.) “ ‘[A]n affiant’s duty of disclosure extends
only to “material” or “relevant” adverse facts.’ [Citation.] ‘[F]acts are “material” and
hence must be disclosed if their omission would make the affidavit substantially
misleading. On review under [Penal Code] section 1538.5, facts must be deemed
material for this purpose if, because of their inherent probative force, there is a substantial
possibility they would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause
determination.’ ” (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 410 (Sandoval).)
Whether a defendant’s claim is a challenge to the veracity of statements or is
based on omissions, “the defendant must make his showing by a preponderance of the
evidence, and the affidavit is presumed valid.” (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484.) An
appellate court reviews the denial of a Franks hearing de novo. (Sandoval, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 410.)
8
B. Omission of Material Information/False Representation
1. Two Different Victims
Defendant first claims that Officer Harry omitted the fact “that the declined
transaction at the Lincoln Lowe’s was from a different victim than the one from the
Roseville Lowe’s.” Defendant claims that this constituted a material omission because
Officer Harry “presented information about appellant meeting up with Terry at the
Lincoln Lowe’s and presumably had a hand-to-hand transaction of the credit card that
was used to commit a theft at the Roseville Lowe’s.”
Defendant did not raise this as a material omission in her motion. Defendant did
raise the declined charge to A.N.’s credit card in oral argument before the trial court, but
not in reference to a handoff of a credit card from codefendant Terry to defendant, but
rather in arguing the issue of the time discrepancy, discussed below. We agree with the
People that, by failing to raise this specific claim in the trial court, defendant has forfeited
her contention. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136 [“when defendants move
to suppress evidence, they must set forth the factual and legal bases for the motion”]; see
Pen. Code, § 1538.5 [memorandum of points and authorities in support of suppression
motion “shall set forth the factual basis and the legal authorities that demonstrate why
the motion should be granted”].) However, we will exercise our discretion to consider
the merits of defendant’s argument as to this issue and others identified below. (See In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7 [“an appellate court may review a forfeited
claim—and ‘[w]hether or not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion’ ”].)
The statement of probable cause identified D.P. as the victim of codefendants
Siemon’s and Terry’s fraudulent charges at the Lowes in Roseville. It did not identify a
victim of the attempted fraudulent charge at the Lowes in Lincoln. At the preliminary
hearing, Officer Grinder testified that victim A.N. stated that her wallet had been stolen
from her Lowe’s employee locker in Roseville between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. on April 18,
9
2024, and that there was a fraudulent transaction posted to her credit card at Lowe’s in
Lincoln at approximately 6:26 p.m.
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the probable cause determination did not rest
on the conclusion that codefendant Terry passed to defendant the card that was
fraudulently used in Roseville for her to use in Lincoln. The statement of probable cause
did not state as much. Nor did it indicate that there was only one victim involved. And,
where Officer Harry referred to the “hand-to-hand” exchange, he referred to “stolen
credit cards” in the plural.
We conclude that the failure to expressly state in the statement of probable cause
that the Lincoln location may have involved a different victim than the Roseville location
was not material. The omission of this fact did not render the statement of probable
cause “ ‘substantially misleading,’ ” and there was not a “ ‘substantial possibility’ ” that
the inclusion of this fact “ ‘would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause
determination.’ ” (Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.)
2. Vehicle Rental Using Defendant’s Own Name
Next, defendant claims that Officer Harry omitted the material fact that defendant
rented the Dodge RAM 1500 in her own name with her own credit card. According to
defendant, those facts were material “because the officer, in the affidavit, attempted to
portray [defendant] as having rented the vehicle to facilitate and aid in the theft at the
Roseville Lowe’s, for which appellant had no connection to and was not present for. She
merely allowed Terry and Siemon to use her rental.”
Officer Harry stated that defendant drove her Toyota Corolla to an Enterprise
rental location at 4:28 p.m. with codefendants Siemon and Terry. There, she rented the
Dodge RAM 1500. Defendant left in the Dodge, and Siemon and Terry drove off in
defendant’s Toyota. At the Lowes in Roseville, where they arrived less than an hour
after renting the Dodge, Terry and Siemon used D.P.’s credit card and “purchased a
tankless water heater, a garbage disposal and laundry detergent.” “Both men exited the
10
business and loaded up the stolen items into the RAM 1500.” After she unsuccessfully
attempted a purchase in the Lincoln Lowe’s, defendant went out in front of the store, with
her cellphone to her ear, and, outside, she was picked up in the Dodge RAM 1500. Harry
also stated, “I recognize that thieves often use rental cars to commit their thefts, as the
rental vehicle will have clean registration, they will look neat in appearance and
inconspicuous to the public eye–and to law enforcement.”
Officer Harry did not allege the purpose of employing a rental vehicle was to
conceal defendant’s identity. Nor did he allege that the rental of the vehicle, in and of
itself, constituted a criminal act. As the People argue, the trial court’s probable cause
determination “relied on the use of the rental truck in the Roseville Lowe’s theft, not on
the inference that appellant fraudulently obtained the rental car to mask her identity.”
Defendant is correct that she was not present in the Roseville Lowe’s during the theft
there. However, this does not establish that she was not aware of codefendants Terry and
Siemon’s intentions, that she did not rent the Dodge to facilitate their fraudulent
transaction, or that, if she was going to do so, she necessarily would have taken steps to
conceal her identity in the rental of the Dodge RAM 1500.
That defendant rented the Dodge using her own name and credit card was not
material. The omission of this fact from the statement of probable cause was in no way
“ ‘substantially misleading,’ ” and there is not a substantial possibility this fact “ ‘would
have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause determination.’ ” (Sandoval,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.)
3. Transaction Time Discrepancy
Next, defendant argues that Officer Harry deliberately omitted the fact that
defendant’s declined transaction at the Lowes in Lincoln occurred at 7:08 p.m., but A.N.
reported that the declined transaction on her credit card posted at 6:26 p.m. According to
defendant, this “information was important because it shows that it was not actually
[defendant] who had used the credit card, since the attempted purchase was done about
11
30 minutes before [defendant] was even seen on the surveillance video as being at the
checkout stand.”
Officer Harry did not state that, when defendant attempted a credit card
transaction at the Lowes in Lincoln, she used A.N.’s card. He stated: “At 1908 hours,
[defendant] was seen at the self-checkout aisle where she attempted to purchase a
weedwhacker tool, some gasoline cannisters, and some other small, assorted items.
[Defendant] appeared to have difficulty paying for the items with a credit card, an
associate joined her, and she left without the property. Both my investigation (involving
my victim [D.P.]) and Officer Grinder’s investigation found that all charges at the
Lincoln Lowes location were declined transactions.” The statement of probable cause
did not expressly identify A.N. Additionally, in a police report, Grinder stated that it was
unknown if the credit card used in this attempted transaction was A.N.’s credit card.
However, Officer Grinder also testified at the preliminary hearing that he believed the
two were the same transaction. Grinder did not “know where the time discrepancies
would be. If it’s on Lowe’s or if it’s on the bank statement.” Although Harry relied on
Grinder’s police report, in which Grinder stated it was unknown if the card used by
defendant was A.N.’s card, the statement of probable cause established Harry had spoken
to Grinder, and he may have known of Grinder’s opinion that the two transactions were
the same.
We cannot conclude that this omitted state of facts is not material. Given that the
transaction posted to A.N.’s account 42 minutes before defendant appeared at checkout at
the Lowe’s in Lincoln, and that Grinder testified at the preliminary hearing that he
believed defendant had attempted to use A.N.’s credit card, we conclude there is a
substantial possibility this omission could have altered the trial court’s probable cause
determination. (See Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.) Assuming for argument’s
sake that defendant established this omission was intentional or reckless, we shall discuss
below whether defendant satisfied her burden of showing that adding this omission to the
12
statement of probable cause would render it insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. (See Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484.)
4. Observation of Siemon at Defendant’s Residence
Next, defendant emphasizes that, in the statement of probable cause, Officer Harry
omitted the fact that codefendant Siemon was observed entering her residence on only
one occasion. “This information was material because the officer …, by omitting that
information, was able to portray it as if Siemon had free access to appellant’s residence.”
Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in her motion, but we will address it
on its merits.
We note that a magistrate may have inferred that codefendant Siemon only entered
once based on the absence of additional allegations of Siemon’s presence at defendant’s
residence. In any event, the omission of the fact that officers did not observe someone
who appeared to be Siemon at defendant’s residence on additional occasions was not
material. The omission of this fact was not “ ‘substantially misleading,’ ” and there is not
a substantial possibility this fact “ ‘would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable
cause determination.’ ” (Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.)
5. Observation of Terry at Defendant’s Residence
Lastly, defendant emphasizes that Officer Harry stated that he did not see
codefendant Terry use a key to enter defendant’s residence, “giving the impression that
Terry freely had access to [her] residence …, when in fact, during cross, the officer
testified he was not sure whether or not Terry used a key.” Defendant claims “it can only
be said the officer did it intentionally or recklessly to give … the impression that there
was probable cause [defendant] was tied to the criminal activity of the Roseville Lowe’s
thefts.” Defendant did not raise this claim in her motion, but, again, we will address the
claim on its merits.
In the statement of probable cause, Officer Harry stated that, on May 2, 2024,
Grinder watched codefendant Terry access the rear entrance of defendant’s residence. He
13
“didn’t see Terry use a key to enter the house.” At the preliminary hearing, Grinder
testified that he did not see whether Terry had a key when he entered defendant’s
residence.
Officer Harry’s representation in the statement of probable cause was not a
material false representation; it was not a false representation at all. Officer Grinder
apparently told Officer Harry he did not see Terry use a key to enter defendant’s
residence, and Officer Grinder subsequently testified he did not see whether Terry had a
key when he entered the residence. These statements are consistent, and defendant has
not identified anything false in them. Defendant has not made a substantial showing that
this statement was “deliberately false or … made in reckless disregard of the truth….”
(Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484.) To the extent defendant’s claim could be deemed to
raise a material omission of some further explanation that Grinder did not see whether or
not Terry had a key, this was not “ ‘substantially misleading,’ ” and there was not a
substantial possibility further explanation “ ‘would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s
probable cause determination.’ ” (Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410.)
C. Sufficiency of Statement of Probable Cause
We turn to whether omission of the time discrepancy at the Lowes in Lincoln
rendered Officer Harry’s statement insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
(See Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484.) “ ‘In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit
for the issuance of a … warrant the test of probable cause is approximately the same as
that applicable to an arrest without a warrant … namely, whether the facts contained in
the affidavit are such as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and
conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v.
Hochanadel (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 997, 1014-1015.)
With the omitted time discrepancy included, the statement of probable cause
would provide roughly as follows: on April 18, 2024, at approximately 4:28 p.m.,
defendant drove her Toyota Corolla to Enterprise with codefendants Siemon and Terry,
14
where defendant rented a Dodge RAM 1500. Defendant left in the Dodge, and Siemon
and Terry drove off in defendant’s Toyota. Both the Dodge and the Toyota traveled to a
Lowe’s location in Roseville.
At the Lowes in Roseville, codefendants Terry and Siemon, as seen on surveillance
video, made fraudulent purchases using victim D.P.’s stolen Lowe’s credit card,
including a tankless water heater and a garbage disposal. Terry and Siemon exited
Lowe’s and loaded the items into the Dodge RAM 1500.
Meanwhile, defendant drove her Toyota to the Lowe’s in Lincoln. At
approximately 6:40 p.m., defendant was seen in surveillance video outside with
codefendant Terry, who had recently completed the fraudulent transaction in Roseville.
They walked around together, and it was believed that there was a hand-to-hand passing
of stolen credit cards. Defendant then re-entered the Lowe’s. At 7:08 p.m., she was seen
on video at self-checkout, where she attempted to make a purchase. She appeared to
have difficulty paying for the items with a credit card, and she left without them. Victim
A.N.’s credit card, stolen from her employee locker at Lowe’s in Roseville between 4:00
and 6:00 p.m., had a fraudulent transaction posted to it from the Lowe’s in Lincoln, but it
was posted at approximately 6:26 p.m., 42 minutes before defendant appeared at self-
checkout. At 7:11 p.m., defendant was waiting in front of the Lowes in Lincoln, on her
cellphone, when the Dodge drove up, defendant entered, and the Dodge RAM 1500 drove
away.
On April 30, 2024, Officer Grinder saw a male who looked like codefendant
Siemon sit on a retaining wall in front of defendant’s residence for about 15 minutes. On
May 2, 2024, Grinder watched codefendant Terry access the rear entrance of defendant’s
residence.
We conclude that the statement of probable cause, including the addition of the
time discrepancy, was sufficient for a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe,
and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion, of defendant’s guilt. The statement
15
was sufficient to give rise to probable cause that defendant rented a truck for use in the
scheme to fraudulently acquire items from Lowe’s stores and that defendant’s residence
would contain evidence of a crime. Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the addition of the evidence concerning the time discrepancy rendered
the statement “insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” (Scott, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 484.) In light of our conclusion, we need not address defendant’s
argument that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\
RENNER, Acting P. J.
\s\
MESIWALA, J.
16