Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Stinson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C103000
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
v. 2017-0000918)
ANTUAN JERMALE STINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Antuan Jermale Stinson appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 after the trial court issued an order to
show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in
finding that he could still be convicted of first degree murder as a direct aider and abettor,
or as a major participant in the underlying felony (attempted robbery) who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.2 We will affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022,
the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. Defendant filed his original petition
under former section 1170.95, but we will cite to the current section number throughout
this opinion.
2 On the court’s own motion, we incorporate by reference the record in defendant’s
direct appeal. (People v. Stinson, et al., (Mar. 4, 2022, C087504) [nonpub. opn.]
(Stinson).).
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Trial Testimony
In November 2015, T.L.3 (the father) lived in a duplex, along with his girlfriend,
his girlfriend’s two young children, and T.L’s son (the son). The unit’s entrance was
separated from the street by a gated courtyard that was kept locked. The son did not have
a key for the gate. There was also a screen door that could only be opened with a key.
The father sold marijuana and often kept some at the house. The father also kept large
amounts of cash on hand, up to $10,000.
Codefendant Harold Miles and defendant also lived on the same street; they knew
the father, and both had been to his home. The father was so familiar with defendant that
he nicknamed him “little nephew.”
On November 4, 2015, the father was home with his son, girlfriend, and his
girlfriend’s children. Late that afternoon, the father left to put air in his car’s tires.
Defendant and another man approached the front gate and asked the girlfriend’s child if
the father was there. The men sounded mad but left when they learned the father was not
there.
The father then returned home. At around 6:00 p.m., an argument broke out
outside the home. The father “begg[ed],” “Just take the money. That’s all I have.” The
father continued, “Please, just take it. My family’s in there. It’s right there. Don’t kill
me.” There was a “tussle” and then multiple gunshots. According to one witness, there
was a shot from a handgun followed by a pause and then a shot from a shotgun.
3 To protect his privacy, we will refer to the victim by his initials. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
The son, who was unarmed, ran to the front door but was unable to get out. The
son saw his father and codefendant Miles grabbing each other. As more gunshots rang
out, the son went out the back door and ran towards the fenced gate in front of his
father’s house. The son saw Miles, who appeared unarmed, and defendant, who was
using both hands to hold a shotgun. Defendant shot the son, and he fell. The son
suffered superficial wounds and eventually was able to get back into the house.
Codefendant Miles and defendant fled the scene at a “frantic pace.” Before
leaving, Miles told defendant to “[p]ut that gun in your pants.” Meanwhile, the father
laid face down on the ground, bleeding and unresponsive. Medical help arrived, but the
father died at the scene from 18 gunshot wounds, including three to his chest and
abdomen.
Investigating police officers found bullet holes in the fence. There were also
multiple bullet casings, expended bullets, and bullet fragments in or near the courtyard,
garage, and front door. The father’s dog was in the backyard, dead from a gunshot
wound. In the house, officers found a loaded handgun and marijuana. Officers found
$65 cash in the father’s breast pocket.
The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy of the father opined that the
shooter had used a handgun, probably 10-millimeter or .45-caliber, rather than a rifle or
shotgun. In addition, the father had been shot from at least three feet away.
Police officers detained codefendant Miles the next day in a nearby home. In that
home, officers found four live 12-gauge shotgun shells but did not find any other
ammunition or weapons. Defendant was arrested four months after the shooting.
Defendant testified that, on the day of the shooting, he was inside his home when
he heard gunshots from outside. His dog ran outside, so he grabbed his loaded rifle and
went outside to find it. He then saw a man he did not recognize coming over the
neighbor’s fence holding a handgun. Scared, defendant fired a single overhead shot in an
attempt to scare the man. The man fell, and defendant began running. Defendant saw
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codefendant Miles, who is defendant’s brother-in-law, and Miles agreed to help search
for defendant’s dog. They eventually found the dog and then went to the liquor store to
buy cigarettes.
Defendant later learned he was a suspect in the father’s killing, so he stayed away
from the area and visited with his children. He eventually returned to Stockton to turn
himself in, but, before he could police arrested him during a traffic stop.
The parties stipulated that police investigated five local incidents occurring
between September 2015 and February 2016 where police collected various live
ammunition, a firearm, and used or expended bullet casings from the crime scenes. The
defense ballistics expert determined that the 10-millimeter caliber gun used in the
shooting of the father was also used in other crimes occurring between September 2015
and February 2016. Evidence was presented that indicated similar handguns were
connected to Freeman Owens and Michael Deloach, who were not charged in the instant
case. Cellphone records indicated that codefendant Miles and defendant both had
multiple phone contacts with Owens prior to the shooting.
Charges, Verdict, and Sentencing
In 2017, defendant and codefendant Miles were charged with murder of the father
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), attempted second degree robbery of the father (§§ 664/211;
count 2), attempted murder of the son (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 3), and unlawful
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 5-6). Defendant was also charged
with animal cruelty. (§ 597, subd. (a); count 4.) As to count 1, it was alleged the murder
occurred during the commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Firearm use
enhancements were also alleged as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.4 (§§ 12022.53, 12022.5.)
4 It was further alleged that codefendant Miles had a prior strike (§§ 667, subd. (d),
1170.12, subd. (b).)
4
In April 2018, the jury found defendant guilty of counts 1, 2, 3, and 4. The jury
also found true that defendant committed the murder while committing a robbery. The
jury found not true the firearm enhancement allegations as to each of the charges against
defendant.5
The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the
murder charge, life without the possibility of parole for the attempted murder charge,
three years consecutive for the animal cruelty charge, and three years stayed pursuant to
section 654 for the attempted robbery charge.
On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. (Stinson, supra, C087504).)
Section 1772.6 Petition and Hearing
In December 2022, defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel, ordered briefing, and subsequently
issued an order to show cause.
During the November 2024 evidentiary hearing, the prosecution argued that
defendant had not been tried under a now-invalid theory because his trial was held after
the law had changed regarding murder culpability under (1) the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and (2) being a major participant acting with reckless indifference
to human life. (See People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 [an aider
and abettor may not be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine].) Moreover, the evidence established that defendant
5 The jury found codefendant Miles guilty of counts 2 and 3. The jury found the
firearm enhancement allegations to each of the charges against Miles not true. The jury
was deadlocked on count 1 as to Miles and counts 5 and 6 as to defendant and Miles
(respectively), and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts.
5
was both (1) a direct aider and abettor and (2) a major participant acting with reckless
indifference to human life because he was present at the crime scene before the robbery
and murder. There may have been other individuals who were also at the crime scene,
but defendant and codefendant Miles were still “principally involved in the murder and
robbery.” Defendant demonstrated he acted with reckless indifference to human life by
firing his gun at the son while running away from the half-open garage where the father
laid dying after being shot 18 times.
Defendant responded that he was not a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. According to defendant, there was “no evidence whatsoever”
that he was in the “immediate area” of the shooting, and the jury found that he did not
shoot a firearm. In addition, defendant was not in any position to prevent the shooting,
and he could not help the father because all the gates were locked.
The trial court (which also presided over the original trial) issued its ruling in
January 2025. The court stated that it had considered the trial court clerk’s transcript and
the reporter’s transcript, including the indictment, the abstract of judgment, the closing
arguments, the jury instructions, the jury verdicts, the prosecution’s trial exhibits, and this
court’s opinion in defendant’s original appeal. The court found that defendant could still
be convicted as a direct aider and abettor because the circumstantial evidence, including
that defendant used his gun, established that defendant harbored the intent to kill. The
court addressed the jury’s not true findings on the gun use enhancements, noting that the
prosecution had only charged defendant with using a handgun, rather than a rifle or
shotgun.
Turning to whether the evidence established that defendant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, the trial court addressed
the Banks factors. The court inferred that defendant was involved in planning the crimes
because he was present and armed. And, although it appeared that defendant did not fire
the shot that killed the father, defendant did fire his firearm during the crimes. He also
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must have been aware of weapon use during the crimes, since he himself was armed and
fired his gun. After the shootings, he fled the scene instead of rendering aid or calling for
assistance.
As to the Clark factors, the trial court noted that defendant used a gun during the
crimes, including shooting the son and the dog. Defendant was present at the scene of the
crime, where a fight broke out, and the father begged for his life before getting shot to
death. However, defendant did nothing to help any of the victims.
The trial court noted that it had considered defendant’s young age (24 years old) at
the time of the crimes, and the jury’s not true findings on the firearm enhancements.
However, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant was a
direct aider and abettor, or that, under Banks/Clark, defendant was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Under the circumstances, defendant
was guilty of murder and attempted murder under a valid theory and therefore was
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Legal Background: Senate Bill 1437
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) amended the
felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437 achieves these goals by amending section 188 to require
that a principal act with express or implied malice (§ 188, as amended by Stats. 2018,
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ch. 1015, § 2), and by amending section 189 to state that a person can be liable for felony
murder only if: (1) the “person was the actual killer;” (2) the person, with an intent to kill,
was an aider or abettor in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the “person
was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Where, like here, the trial court issues an order to show cause and holds an
evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under California law as amended by the
changes to sections 188 or 189 made effective by Senate Bill No 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).) The parties may offer evidence from a prior trial, or new or additional evidence
at the hearing. (Ibid.)
We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing
for substantial evidence. (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “Our
job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the
trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is
to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We examine “ ‘the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence–that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier
of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. San
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit
credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Pham (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests
primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
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“An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
When “Senate Bill 1437 amended [section 189] to incorporate major participation
and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those
requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
710.) The major participation and reckless indifference requirements “ ‘often overlap’ ”
and cannot be uncoupled. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th. at p. 615.) Generally, “ ‘the greater
the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Ibid.) Accordingly, evidence of major
participation “ ‘often provide[s] significant support’ ” of reckless indifference. (Ibid.)
As relevant here, our Supreme Court considered the reckless indifference element
in Clark. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-623.) Reckless indifference to human life
is “ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death.’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that
death as the outcome of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective
and an objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, the defendant must consciously
disregard risks known to him. (Ibid.) Objectively, recklessness is determined by “what
‘a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether the
defendant’s conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would observe.’ ” (Ibid.) The fact that a
robbery carried a risk of death is insufficient, by itself, to support a finding of reckless
indifference. (Id. at pp. 617-618; see also In re Scroggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scroggins) [“ ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate
lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human
life”].)
9
The Clark court identified various factors to be considered in determining whether
the defendant acted with reckless indifference. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623;
see also Scroggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [courts must analyze the “totality of the
circumstances” when considering reckless indifference].) These include: “Did the
defendant use or know that a [lethal weapon] would be used during the felony? How
many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime?
Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the
duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or
likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the
risk of violence during the felony?” (Scroggins, at p. 677 [listing factors set forth in
Clark, at pp. 618-623].) As courts have explained, youth may also be a relevant factor in
considering reckless indifference. (People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558-559.)
The Clark court found the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant acted
with reckless indifference to human life in the armed robbery of a computer store, where
the defendant planned the robbery but was not armed or physically present in the store
when the victim was shot, did not have the intent to kill, and attempted to minimize the
likelihood of violence by timing the robbery for a time when fewer people would be
present and using an unloaded gun. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 611, 613, 618-623.)
II
Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his resentencing petition because
there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life. We disagree.
10
We first note that defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the major participant finding. As such, we assume defendant was properly
found to be a major participant for the purposes of the Banks court’s discussion of the
requirements of felony murder.6 We include a brief discussion of these uncontested
findings, as they overlap with the findings supporting reckless indifference.
The trial court found that defendant was present at the scene of the crime and was
there when the argument broke out, and codefendant Miles scuffled with the father.
Defendant was also armed with a firearm that he used during the crimes. Instead of
offering aid or assistance to the father, defendant fled and left the father to die.
We agree that the evidence is sufficient to establish that defendant was personally
present and armed at the scene, including during the argument, fight, and shooting.
While defendant may not have fired the fatal shots, he failed to render aid or seek
assistance as the father lay dying from 18 gunshot wounds. Although such extensive (or
“major”) participation does not necessarily show reckless indifference, it does provide
“ ‘significant support’ ” for the trial court’s findings of reckless indifference. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th. at p. 615 [“ ‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony
murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life’ ”].)
6 The Banks court identified various factors that should be considered in making the
determination, including: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying
or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
11
Turning to the Clark factors, we conclude the record contains sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted
with reckless indifference to the father’s life.
As the trial court found, the second Clark factor (presence at the scene and
opportunity to prevent or mitigate the crime or aid the victim) weighs heavily against
defendant. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 619-620.) Defendant was armed and
present when the argument broke out, the father begged for his life, codefendant Miles
scuffled with the father, and the father was shot 18 times. When the shooting ended,
instead of calling for aid or otherwise helping the father, defendant fled the scene, leaving
the father to die.
Given that the armed robbery was planned at night at the father’s home, the final
Clark factor—minimizing the risks of violence during the robbery—also weighs against
defendant. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621-622.)
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 does not compel
a different conclusion. “When we decide issues of sufficiency of evidence, comparison
with other cases is of limited utility, since each case necessarily depends on its own
facts.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) In Emanuel, the defendant and a
compatriot robbed a marijuana dealer; during the robbery, the dealer was shot and killed.
(Emanuel, at pp. 877-879.) Although the defendant’s compatriot used a gun during the
robbery, there was no evidence that the defendant used a gun, or that he knew his
compatriot would bring a gun to the robbery. (Id. at p. 885.) In addition, the robbery was
planned to occur in the middle of the day at a public park, suggesting the defendant and
his compatriot took steps to minimize the risk of violence. (Id. at p. 887.) Although the
defendant was present during the murder, at one point he proposed leaving and tried to
walk away, suggesting that he unsuccessfully tried to prevent violence. (Id. at p. 891.) In
addition, the murder unfolded quickly over the course of less than nine minutes, with the
shooting occurring during a brief struggle. (Id. at p. 886.) Defendant had little
12
opportunity during this brief encounter to restrain his compatriot, especially since there
was no evidence that the compatriot threatened to shoot or otherwise warn the victim.
(Id. at p. 892.) Because, on the whole, the Clark factors did not weigh in favor of finding
reckless indifference, our Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to
grant the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, vacate his murder conviction, and
resentence him. (Id. at p. 896.)
Here, unlike in Emanuel, defendant arrived at the scene armed and apparently
willing to use his gun, including against the son. Prior to the scuffle, the victim begged
codefendant Miles and defendant to take his money instead of killing him, suggesting that
at least one of them threatened the victim before the situation turned violent and the
shooting began. Although the opportunity for intervention may have been brief,
defendant had “ ‘the time to observe and react before the murder.’ ” (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 892.) Moreover, unlike in Emanuel, there is no evidence that defendant
tried to leave the scene before the shooting began. In sum, there is substantial evidence
of reckless indifference to human life.
The totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial
court’s finding that defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. As such, we find no error in the petition’s denial.
13
Given our conclusions, we need not address defendant’s argument that the trial
court erred in finding he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a direct aider and
abettor.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
\s\
KRAUSE, J.
We concur:
\s\
MAURO, Acting P. J.
\s\
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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