Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Steele CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086182
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN462018)
v.
AARON JAHROOTZ STEELE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Aaron Jahrootz Steele appeals a judgment of conviction after a jury
found him guilty of two counts of resisting an executive officer with force or
violence (Pen. Code,1 § 69; counts 1 and 5); one count of misdemeanor
trespass (§ 602, subd. (o)(1); count 2); and three counts of threatening a public
officer (§ 71; counts 3, 4, and 6). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court
found that Steele committed counts 5 and 6 while he was released from
custody on bail or his own recognizance. (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).) The court
struck the on-bail enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c), and
placed Steele on felony probation for two years subject to various terms and
conditions including the completion of 281 days of custodial confinement.2
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, Steele presents
several claims of error. He contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support one of his convictions for resisting arrest (count 1), his trespassing
conviction (count 2), and two of his convictions for threatening a public officer
(counts 3 and 4); (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel did not request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact for one
of the charges of threatening a public officer (count 6); (3) the trial court
abused its discretion and violated his constitutional due process rights when
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Counts 1 through 4 arose out of an incident at a shopping center on
December 13, 2024, and were originally charged in Case No. SCN462018
(hereafter, Case ‘018). Counts 5 and 6 arose out of a separate incident
outside a gas station on January 1, 2025, and were initially charged in Case
No. SCN462463 (hereafter, Case ‘463). The trial court consolidated the two
cases under Case ‘018.
2
it refused to sever his criminal charges; and (4) two of his probation
conditions impermissibly delegate judicial authority to the probation
department and improperly require him to bear the costs of any treatment
programs that might be ordered by the probation department.
While this appeal was pending, Steele filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus presenting two additional claims of error. (In re Steele, D087757.) In
that petition, he reiterates his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of
fact for count 6. He also argues that he suffered violations of the Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (hereafter, the RJA; § 745) because (1) one of his arresting
officers exhibited bias or animus towards him because of his race (id.,
subd. (a)(1)); and (2) he was charged or convicted of more serious offenses
than similarly situated defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national
origins (id., subd. (a)(3)). In a separate order filed concurrently herewith, we
have accepted Steele’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and granted
the relief requested in connection with that claim—reversal of his count
6 conviction. In that same order, we have denied relief as to Steele’s RJA
claim, without prejudice, subject to refiling in the San Diego County Superior
Court.
Our disposition in the related habeas corpus proceeding moots Steele’s
second claim of error in this appeal and renders it unnecessary for us to
address his fourth claim. We reject Steele’s remaining arguments on the
merits. Therefore, as set forth in our separate order granting Steele’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus in part, the count 6 conviction is reversed.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
3
II
BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case3
1. December 13 Incident (Case ‘018)
George Y. owns Felicita Village Shopping Center, a shopping center in
Escondido consisting of several commercial establishments and a parking lot.
The shopping center has multiple “no loitering” signs on display. Despite
these signs, unhoused individuals sometimes loiter or camp on the property.
To address this situation, George regularly dons a vest with the word
“security” on it, patrols the shopping center, and asks unhoused persons to
leave the premises.
George has had multiple encounters with Steele, an unhoused Black
man, at the shopping center. In August 2024, George saw Steele sitting on
the shopping center’s plumbing and electrical equipment. George asked
Steele to leave the premises, and Steele complied. About two weeks later,
Steele again left the property as he was being approached by George.
However, during multiple subsequent encounters, George asked Steele to
leave the premises and Steele ignored him.
On the morning of December 13, 2024, George saw Steele at the
shopping center and immediately called the police to have him removed.
Escondido Police Department Officers Jeff Bolton and Christian Baechli
responded to the call while dressed in their agency uniforms. Upon their
arrival at the shopping center, Bolton and Baechli approached Steele, who
sat on the ground outside an insurance office with his personal belongings
3 The trial court admitted into evidence the arresting peace officers’ body
worn camera footage for both incidents giving rise to Steele’s convictions.
4
spread on the ground around him. Steele repeatedly told the officers that
someone had stolen something from him. Steele later specified that his “bag”
had been stolen. Rather than inquiring about the alleged theft, Bolton said,
“they got no loitering signs, man. They called in about you.”
Bolton and Baechli told Steele they recognized him from prior contacts
with law enforcement, including an encounter in which Steele refused to give
his name to Baechli. Steele responded that the officers already knew his
name and knew he was not a criminal. Shortly after, Steele told the officers
they had “a fake badge,” and they were “not even real.” Baechli asked Steele
if they were “going down that route again,” and said he did not know Steele’s
name. In response, Steele called the officers “fake police,” said that someone
had stolen something from him, and stated, “It’s Aaron, you bitch. You want
me to stand up, or you gonna get too scared?”
Steele then stood up, said he had not done anything wrong, and
repeated his claim that someone had stolen something from him. Baechli
replied, “you can’t stay here.” An increasingly agitated Steele responded,
“I’m not, you bitch ass [n-word], I said somebody stole something from me,
‘cause you work with the [vulgar word] [n-words] around here. But you won’t
take–dog, take that badge off, I swear to God, I’ll swing on you so fast. You
not even a real police.” Baechli perceived this statement as a threat. Steele’s
statement to Baechli formed the basis for count 3, the first of three charges of
making a threat to a public officer.
After making this statement, Steele slowly took a step towards the
officers. They responded by warning Steele twice not to take another step or
they would use force against him. In reply, Steele said, “Whoa, whoa, if you
try to use force on me, I’m gonna fucking crack your neck, dog. Stop playing
with me. I’m gonna keep doing–I’m gonna put my shit in my bag and step off.
5
I’m gonna put my shit in my bag and step off. That’s what I’m gonna do.” As
Steele made these statements, Baechli turned on his Taser and pointed it
towards the ground in front of Steele. At that point, Steele packed his
belongings into a backpack while cursing, calling the officers vulgar names,
and repeating that someone had stolen his “shit.” As Steele finished
gathering his belongings, Baechli instructed him not to come back to the
property.
Steele walked a few feet away to a public sidewalk bordering the
shopping complex, stood facing the officers from the sidewalk, and paced in a
circle. After about 35 seconds, Baechli warned Steele not to come back to the
property. In response, Steele claimed “the owner” said he could be there.4
Bolton said “the owner” had called the police about Steele’s loitering and did
not want him there. Bolton instructed Steele to leave, and Steele replied that
he was standing “on the sidewalk.” The officers told Steele they were waiting
for him to leave, but if he wanted to “hang out there all day,” he could “[g]o
for it,” and they could “play this game all day.” Steele remained on the
sidewalk while the officers repeatedly said the owner of the shopping center
wanted him to leave.
As Steele stood on the sidewalk, Baechli asked him, “Why do you have
a problem with the police.” Steele responded, “Because you’re harrassive”
and “don’t do no work.” In response, Bolton asked Steele, “What work do you
do?” (Italics added.) An exasperated Steele cursed and walked away. As he
walked away, Bolton shouted after him, “Go fly your flag at the intersection.
Goodbye.” Bolton also hollered at Steele to “keep going.” In response, Steele
4 An insurance agent who leased office space at the shopping center
testified that he had assured Steele he would not call the police on him.
6
marched back towards the officers, accused them of “talk[ing] shit,” and
cursed at them. He then stormed away from the officers while remaining on
the sidewalk.
As Steele was seemingly about to leave the area, he spotted George
inside the shopping center, walked towards him, and crossed the boundary
between the sidewalk and the shopping center. At some point thereafter,
Steele returned to the sidewalk. From his vantage point on the sidewalk,
Steele confronted George and asked him, “Where’s the bag, I seen you take
that bag. Where the bag you stole? Where’s the bag that you stole?”
Baechli warned Steele to “keep walking,” and “stay off th[e] property.”
Steele began walking away, but then reentered the parking lot through a
driveway located about 50 feet from the place where the officers originally
initiated contact with him. Baechli told Steele he could not be anywhere in
the “entire mall,” but Steele said, “Nah,” claimed he could be there, and
continued questioning George about his missing bag from the interior of the
shopping center driveway.
Steele returned to the sidewalk and began pacing along the sidewalk
near the parking lot driveway. At that point, Baechli told Steele, “You can
leave or you can get arrested, it’s your choice.” Steele asked why he was
being arrested and Bolton said, “For trespassing. Refusing to leave.” Steele
and Bolton then argued about whether Steele was trespassing, and Steele
claimed the officers needed a “piece of paper” barring him from the property.
During this portion of the interaction, Steele straddled the boundary between
the sidewalk and the shopping center driveway.
Bolton then asked Steele if he was willing to leave. Steele replied that
he was “already off the property.” Bolton again said Steele could leave or he
would be arrested for trespassing. He then asked Steele three additional
7
times whether he would leave. Steele replied that he had already “left that
place,” and Bolton said, “So no? You’re not gonna leave?” In response, Steele
set his backpack down on the sidewalk and said, “Bitch [n-word], take your
badge off so I can punch you in the face, man. Come over here. Come over
here.” Steele’s statement to Bolton formed the basis for count 4, the second
charge of making a threat to a public officer.
Bolton perceived Steele’s act of setting down his bag as pre-assaultive
behavior because it freed his hands to exert force. Therefore, Bolton drew his
Taser, aimed it at Steele, and radioed to dispatch that he was holding a
suspect at Taser point. Bolton then asked Steele if he wanted to “play this
game.” Steele picked up his backpack, called Bolton a vulgar name, and
asked him, “What is that supposed to do? I’m not even on the property.”
Steele stood about 15 feet away from the officers, continued arguing with
them, claimed he had already left the property, and asked why the officers
were pursuing him. Meanwhile, Bolton kept his Taser pointed towards
Steele.
A backup patrol vehicle arrived at the scene and parked next to Steele.
As officers exited the vehicle, Steele started walking away from the shopping
center. Baechli and one of the backup officers, Sergeant Andrew Maxwell,
warned Steele to stop and take a seat or else force would be used against him,
but Steele disregarded these commands and continued walking. He also
yelled, “I’m on the sidewalk. Man, you’re being ridiculous. You’re following
me. I already left the place.” At this point, Bolton intended to arrest Steele,
take him to the police station a few miles away, and issue him a citation for
trespassing.
The officers closed in on Steele and tried to move his arms behind his
back to handcuff him, but Steele clenched his fists, tensed up, and exerted his
8
strength to keep his arms from being moved behind his back. To counteract
these measures, Bolton held onto Steele’s backpack and Maxwell used a leg
sweep maneuver to escort Steele to the ground. According to Bolton, the leg
sweep was performed for Steele’s own safety and to prevent him from
continuing to move away from the officers.
Steele was noncompliant after he was brought to the ground. He
tensed up, tried pulling away, and flailed his legs. Therefore, Bolton held
Steele’s head to the ground while two other officers controlled his limbs. The
officers then rolled Steele onto his stomach, handcuffed him, and seated him
upright on a nearby curb. Once Steele was seated upright, he quickly jumped
to his feet and kicked Baechli. Bolton pushed Steele back down to the ground
and Baechli pinned his head to the ground at a 90-degree angle. While Steele
was pinned down, he pinched Baechli hard enough to draw blood.
Meanwhile, other officers placed Steele in a WRAP, a nylon mesh device that
wrapped around Steele’s torso and prevented him from kicking, running
away, or injuring himself or others. The officers booked Steele into custody
shortly afterwards.
2. January 1 Incident (Case ‘463)
Steele was arraigned in Case ‘018 and released on his own
recognizance. He failed to appear for a readiness conference on December 27,
2024, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
On January 1, 2025, San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Shawn Gurren
and several other deputies approached Steele outside a gas station to execute
the warrant. The deputies wore their agency uniforms and drove marked
patrol vehicles. Gurren handcuffed Steele, who complied with being
handcuffed but was not forthcoming about identifying himself. Steele asked
the deputies if they had a warrant for his arrest, and they said they did.
9
Thereafter, Steele stated multiple times that he “went to court” on the 27th.
After the deputies repeatedly asked Steele to identify himself, he finally
provided the deputies with his name and date of birth. Steele asked the
deputies what he was being arrested for and Deputy Gurren responded that
Steele had a felony warrant. Steele replied, “No, I don’t. I just – I just went
to court on the 27th. My name [didn’t] show up on the thing.”
The deputies then walked Steele to a patrol vehicle to perform a search
for weapons and contraband. As they did so, he again told the deputies that
he “went to court” on December 27, “but it wasn’t on the docket.” Steele
added, “[t]here was no evidence.” The deputies positioned Steele so that he
faced the patrol vehicle. Meanwhile, Steele repeatedly demanded to see a
warrant and the deputies advised him they would show him a warrant at the
jailhouse. Steele also repeated that he “went to court, and [his] name didn’t
pop up on the docket.”
The deputies began searching Steele, who repeatedly demanded a
warrant, tensed and thrashed his body, and tried turning his body to face the
deputies. The deputies construed Steele’s act of turning around as pre-
assaultive behavior. During their search of Steele, the deputies recovered a
pocketknife from his waistband and asked if he had any other weapons on
him. Steele grew visibly more distressed and told one of the deputies, Deputy
Ethan Hatch, “Stop reachin’ on my balls like that, slim, for real. I’ll fuckin’
run and elbow your bitch ass for not havin’ a … you think this shit a game.”
Steele then tried elbowing Hatch, who had to dodge his head to avoid the
blow. Steele’s statement to Hatch that he would elbow him formed the basis
for count 6, the third charge of making a threat to a public officer.
As the deputies placed Steele in the patrol vehicle, Steele kicked Hatch
three times and continually claimed that the deputies needed a warrant.
10
Steele also repeatedly kicked at one of the backseat windows of the patrol
vehicle. After the deputies transported Steele to the jailhouse, they showed
him the arrest warrant in hopes it would de-escalate him. However, Steele
remained aggressive and threatened one of the deputies, saying, “I’ll fuck you
up … nah, for real, I’ll fuck you up. … [I]f you don’t get my shit off the
ground, bro. I’m gonna fuckin’ broke kick yo’ bitch ass [n-word] so hard.”
Faced with this resistance, the deputies used a leg sweep maneuver to take
Steele to the ground and place him into a WRAP device.
B. Defense Case
Steele took the witness stand in his own defense. Regarding the
December 13 incident, Steele testified that he had briefly walked away from
the shopping center before the police officers arrived and, upon his return, he
realized his bag had been stolen or was missing. Steele stated he did not
understand why the officers approached him that morning, and he felt they
were ignoring his theft complaint. He also testified that the officers did not
initially communicate to him that they wanted him to leave the property
entirely, nor did they advise him why he needed to leave. He claimed he
threatened to crack the officers’ necks because they had “mistreated and
disrespected” him. He also stated that he threatened to punch Bolton in the
face because he wanted to “go mano a mano” with Bolton, who was not acting
“within the scope of [his] law enforcement” duties.
Steele also testified that he went to the Vista courthouse for his
readiness conference for Case ‘018 on December 27, 2024, but he did not
know which courtroom to enter and therefore checked the court monitors for
11
information about his case. The monitors did not list his case, so he believed
the case had been dismissed for insufficient evidence.5
With respect to the January 1 incident, Steele testified that he had no
idea why the deputies were approaching him. Steele testified that he
requested a warrant because he had gone to the Vista courthouse on
December 27 and checked the court monitors for his case.
The prosecutor asked Steele how he felt when Deputy Hatch searched
him, and Steele testified that he felt “extremely uncomfortable” because
Hatch touched him near his groin. The prosecutor also asked Steele what
was going through his mind when he threatened Hatch, and Steele replied,
“That was m[e] defending myself from being touched on.” The prosecutor
then asked Steele if he recalled being in the patrol car, and Steele replied, “I
felt abducted, so that’s why the extra – that’s what the extra [was] for. The
extra [was] for it to be alarming so that somebody realizes that this is
completely illegal, like whatever’s happening to me is completely illegal,
which has happened before.” Further, when Steele was asked whether he felt
justified “in kicking and throwing [his] elbow,” Steele replied, “Yes. I felt like
I was [being] abducted.”
5 The parties stipulated that the “television monitors in the lobby area of
the San Diego Superior courthouse in Vista, California, only display traffic,
family, and civil matters. The monitors do not display criminal matters. On
December 27, 2024, the information booth in the lobby did not have an
attendant due to staffing shortages. On December 27, 2024, the Court was
open to the public and operating on a regular schedule.”
12
III
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Steele challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all four of
his convictions arising out of the December 13 incident. In particular, he
argues substantial evidence does not support his convictions for resisting an
executive officer with force or violence in violation of section 69 (count 1),
trespassing in violation of section 602, subdivision (o)(1) (count 2), and
threatening officers Baechli (count 3) and Bolton (count 4) in violation of
section 71, subdivision (a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports these convictions.
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘ “ ‘presumes in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 (Morales).)
“When a jury’s verdict is attacked on the ground that there is no
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support it,
13
and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a
reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the
jury. It is of no consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or
drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.”
(People v. Brown (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 968, 970.) “ ‘ “We resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” ’ the [fact finder]’s verdict.’ ” (People v.
Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 510.)
2. Count 1 (Resisting an Executive Officer)
Steele contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
for resisting an executive officer with force or violence in violation of
section 69. That statutory provision makes it a felony for any person to
“attempt[], by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an
executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law,
or … knowingly resist[], by the use of force or violence, the officer, in the
performance of his or her duty ….” (§ 69, subd. (a).)
“The longstanding rule in California and other jurisdictions is that a
defendant cannot be convicted of an offense against a peace officer ‘ “engaged
in ... the performance of ... [his or her] duties” ’ unless the officer was acting
lawfully at the time the offense against the officer was committed.
[Citations.] ‘The rule flows from the premise that because an officer has no
duty to take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in “duties,” for purposes of
an offense defined in such terms, if the officer’s conduct is unlawful.’ ” (In re
Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815.) Thus, “ ‘[t]he lawfulness of the
14
officer’s conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting ... a peace
officer.’ ” (People v. Southard (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 434 (Southard).)
An unlawful arrest includes an arrest made with excessive force.
(Southard, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 434; accord § 835a, subd. (a)(1) [“The
Legislature further finds and declares that every person has a right to be free
from excessive use of force by officers acting under color of law.”].) However,
an “officer who has reasonable cause to believe that [a] person to be arrested
has committed a public offense may use objectively reasonable force to effect
the arrest, to prevent escape, or to overcome resistance.” (§ 835a, subd. (b);
see § 835 [a “person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is
reasonable for his arrest and detention”]; Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S.
386, 396 (Graham) [“the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat thereof to effect it”].) If an officer uses excessive force to make an
otherwise lawful arrest, “the arrestee may use reasonable force to protect
himself in accordance with the principles of self-defense.” (People v. Olguin
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47.)
The determination whether an officer used excessive force “requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [was]
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (Graham,
supra, 490 U.S. at p. 396; see People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140,
157, disapproved on another ground by People v. Morgan (2026) 19 Cal.5th
132, 150, fn. 6 [the Graham standard applies “when an accused seeks to
defend against a charge of resisting arrest … by contending the arrest was
unlawful due to the officer’s use of excessive force”].) “The ‘reasonableness’ of
15
a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
(Graham, at p. 396.) This accounts “for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.” (Id. at p. 397; see § 835a, subd. (a)(4) [“the decision
by a peace officer to use force shall be evaluated from the perspective of a
reasonable officer … based on the totality of the circumstances known to or
perceived by the officer at the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight,
and … the totality of the circumstances shall account for occasions when
officers may be forced to make quick judgments about using force”].)
According to Steele, substantial evidence does not support the jury’s
implied finding that the officers used reasonable and necessary force to effect
his arrest. On the contrary, he claims, the only rational inference that can be
drawn from the evidence is that the officers used excessive force when they
used a leg sweep maneuver. Steele emphasizes that trespassing is a non-
bookable misdemeanor, he was “attempting to walk” away from the shopping
center when the officers used the leg sweep maneuver on him, and the
resistance he exhibited prior to the leg sweep maneuver was “minor” and
“insignificant.” Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
there is substantial evidence from which a rational jury could find that the
arresting officers exercised only reasonable and necessary force when they
performed the leg sweep maneuver on Steele.
Regarding the severity of Steele’s crimes, the crime of trespassing may,
at first blush, appear to be a relatively minor offense in isolation. However,
Steele did not merely commit a standalone crime of trespassing; instead, he
had perpetrated two additional crimes of significantly greater severity before
16
the officers subjected him to the leg sweep maneuver. Besides trespassing,
Steele threatened several acts of physical violence against officers Bolton and
Baechli. Specifically, he told Baechli he would “swing on [him] so fast,” a
statement that Baechli perceived as a threat. Shortly afterwards, Steele
stepped towards Baechli and said he would “crack [Baechli’s] neck.” After
making these threats against Baechli, Steele then told Bolton he would
“swing on [him] so fast,” while simultaneously setting down his backpack in a
gesture that Bolton considered to be pre-assaultive behavior. As we will
discuss, this conduct was sufficient to establish that Steele perpetrated two
separate counts of threatening the officers to influence the performance of
their duties in violation of section 71.
With respect to the threat Steele posed to the safety of others, Bolton
testified at trial that he was concerned about George’s safety due to Steele’s
aggressive behavior in the minutes preceding the arrest and leg sweep
maneuver. This aggression was apparent on the officers’ body worn camera
footage. That footage shows Steele following George as he tried to walk away
from the encounter, repeatedly badgering George about his allegedly missing
bag, and reentering the shopping center multiple times after he had been
ordered to leave. George himself told Bolton—and later the jury—that he
was afraid of Steele. Further, Steele ignored about two dozen orders to leave
the property and its vicinity, exacerbating the possibility that he would
continue posing a safety threat to George.
There was also ample evidence that Steele actively and forcefully
resisted arrest before the officers used a leg sweep maneuver on him.
According to Bolton, Steele tensed up and used “all his physical strength” to
impede the officers when they tried to pull his arms behind his back.
Similarly, Baechli told the jury that Steele “pulled away” and used “muscle
17
force” to resist the officers while they tried to arrest him. Maxwell, the officer
who performed the leg sweep maneuver, testified that Steele was “struggling,
he was tensing his arms, dropping his body weight, and trying to prevent [the
officers] from putting handcuffs on him.” The body worn camera footage of
the arrest corroborates the officers’ testimony. Based on the evidence of
Steele’s noncompliance and resistance, a jury could rationally find that more
forceful law enforcement tactics were necessary to accomplish the arrest.
Further, a jury could rationally find that the type of non-lethal force
exercised here—a leg sweep maneuver—was necessary and reasonable
considering the evidence we have discussed. During the leg sweep maneuver,
Bolton held onto Steele’s backpack, supported his body weight, and escorted
him to the ground while another officer swept behind each of Steele’s legs. As
deputy Hatch testified, this maneuver is intended to enable officers to effect
an arrest while ensuring the arrestee does not injure himself in the process.
Although the leg sweep maneuver was undoubtedly a non-trivial use of force,
a reasonable jury could conclude that such force was essential due to Steele’s
resistance to the officers, his repeated threats of violence against the officers,
and the continued safety threat he posed to George and the officers alike.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as
we must, we conclude there was substantial evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find that the arresting officers did not use excessive or
unreasonable force when they implemented a leg sweep maneuver on Steele.
Therefore, we reject Steele’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction for resisting the officers with force or violence.
3. Count 2 (Misdemeanor Trespass)
Steele also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
misdemeanor conviction for trespassing in violation of section 602,
18
subdivision (o)(1). That provision states, in part, “[A] person who willfully
commits a trespass by any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor: …
Refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to, or
lawfully occupied by, another and not open to the general public, upon being
requested to leave ….” (§ 602, subd. (o)(1).) According to Steele, no
reasonable jury could find that he refused or failed to leave the shopping
center because the evidence irrefutably showed he had already complied,
albeit slowly, with the officers’ orders to leave the property. We disagree.
From the officers’ body worn camera footage, a rational jury could find
that Steele refused or failed to depart the shopping center despite the officers’
repeated orders for him to leave. About two minutes into the interaction
between Steele and the officers, Bolton advised Steele, who was seated on the
ground of the shopping center, “they got no loitering signs, man. They called
in about you.” About a minute later, Baechli stated, “you can’t stay here.” In
response, Steele began collecting his belongings from the ground. As Steele
collected his belongings, Baechli stated, “Don’t come back here, please.”
Baechli repeated himself twice more, saying, “Don’t come back here,” and
“Don’t come back to this property.” Although Steele walked to the nearby
sidewalk about six minutes and 30 seconds into the interaction, he then
argued with the officers about whether he had permission to be on the
property. Bolton repeatedly told Steele the owner wanted him “gone,” so he
should “[p]lease leave,” and “be on [his] way,” or else he would be arrested.
Notwithstanding these warnings, Bolton’s body worn camera footage
shows Steele reentering the shopping center through its driveway about
10 minutes and 18 seconds into the encounter, apparently for the purpose of
confronting George about his missing bag. Baechli’s body worn camera
footage shows that Steele briefly returned to the sidewalk, but he then
19
reentered the shopping center yet again through its driveway to continue his
confrontation with George. At that point, Baechli ordered Steele to “stay off
this property … [t]his entire mall here,” and Steele refused. He
unequivocally said, “Nah,” and then advanced even further into the shopping
center to confront George.
The body worn camera footage shows Steele then returned to the
sidewalk, where he straddled and occasionally crossed the boundary between
the sidewalk and the shopping center while heatedly arguing with the officers
about whether they needed a “piece of paper” to evict him from the property.
About 16 minutes into the interaction, Steele continued arguing with the
officers and paced the sidewalk near the shopping center driveway he had
reentered at least twice before. The footage shows that Steele walked away
from the driveway only after a backup patrol vehicle arrived at the scene and
officers exited the vehicle to arrest him.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a
jury could reasonably find that Steele departed the shopping center only
momentarily when he went to the sidewalk, and that he did not comply with
the officers’ orders to leave the premises. Indeed, a jury could rationally find
that Steele refused or failed to leave the property based on the officers’ body
worn camera footage showing that he advanced into the shopping center
multiple times after he was asked to leave, verbally refused when he was
ordered to leave the “entire mall” and instead moved further into the
shopping center, vigorously argued with the officers about whether they could
evict him from the property without a warrant, straddled and repeatedly
crossed the threshold between the sidewalk and shopping center, and
continued to argue with the officers near the shopping center driveway until
20
a backup patrol vehicle arrived. Collectively, this evidence constitutes
substantial evidence supporting Steele’s trespassing conviction.
4. Counts 3 and 4 (Threatening the Arresting Officers)
Steele’s final evidentiary argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his felony convictions for threatening officers Baechli
(count 3) and Bolton (count 4) in violation of section 71, subdivision (a).
Section 71 states, in relevant part, “Every person who, with intent to
cause, attempts to cause, or causes … any public officer or employee to do, or
refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a
threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury
upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the
threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense.”
(§ 71, subd. (a).) “ ‘The purpose of the statute is to prevent threatening
communications to public officers or employees designed to extort their action
or inaction.’ ” (People v. Chaney (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 253, 257.)
“The essential elements under Penal Code section 71 are: ‘ “(1) A
threat to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property; (2) direct
communication of the threat to a public officer or employee; (3) the intent to
influence the performance of the officer or employee’s official duties; and
(4) the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” ’ ” (In re Ernesto H. (2004)
125 Cal.App.4th 298, 308 (Ernesto).) “[I]n determining whether the element
of intent has been established, we consider whether it may be inferred from
all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 313; see
also People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 736 [“ ‘There is rarely direct
evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must usually be derived from
all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’ ”].)
21
The jury found Steele guilty of threatening Baechli (count 3) based on a
statement Steele made to Baechli about three minutes into his interaction
with the officers. After Bolton told Steele, “they got no loitering signs,” and
“[t]hey called in” about him,” Baechli told Steele he could not “stay” at the
shopping center. Immediately thereafter, Steele replied, “I’m not, you bitch
ass [n-word], I said somebody stole something from me, ‘cause you work with
the [vulgar word] [n-words] around here. But you won’t take – dog, take that
badge off, I swear to God, I’ll swing on you so fast. You not even a real
police.” This threat gave rise to Steele’s count 3 conviction. After making
this threat, Steele stepped forward, prompting Baechli to warn Steele that
force would be used if he took one more step. In reply, Steele claimed he
would “fucking crack [Baechli’s] neck,” and warned Baechli to “[s]top playing
with [him].”
Steele argues this evidence does not give rise to a reasonable inference
that he intended to influence Baechli in the performance of his duties.
Instead, he asserts, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the
evidence is that his statement was an angry retort to the officers’ seeming
indifference to his claim that someone had stolen his bag. Although the
evidence may well have permitted the jury to find that Steele’s statement
was an angry outburst made without any intention of influencing the officers’
conduct, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution. (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 88.) Viewing the evidence
through this lens, we reject Steele’s claim.
As the body worn camera footage demonstrates, Steele threatened
Baechli and took a step towards him mere moments after Baechli told Steele
that he could not remain at the shopping center, and while the officers were
evicting Steele from the property. From this evidence, a jury could rationally
22
find that Steele threatened Baechli with the intent to dissuade or halt
Baechli’s attempts to remove him from the premises. (See Ernesto, supra,
125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 313–314 [evidence supported finding that minor
intended to influence teacher’s performance of duties where teacher told
minor to move away and minor responded by threatening teacher and
stepping towards him]; People v. Hopkins (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 36, 44
(Hopkins) [evidence supported finding that defendant aimed to influence
school officials’ performance of their duties where officials asked defendant to
leave school grounds and he threatened officials].)
Steele presents a similar challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction for threatening Bolton (count 4). That conviction
arose from Steele’s statement to Bolton, “Bitch [n-word], take your badge off
so I can punch you in the face, man. Come over here. Come over here.”
According to Steele, substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding
that he made this threat with the intent to influence Bolton in the
performance of his duties. For the reasons just discussed, we reject this
argument. Steele threatened Bolton while he and Baechli were still
attempting to evict Steele from the shopping center at George’s request, and
while Steele continued to disregard the officers’ requests that he leave the
area. Based on the officers’ body worn camera footage and testimony, we
conclude there was substantial evidence from which a jury could find that
Steele threatened Bolton with the intent to dissuade or prevent Bolton from
removing him from the property. (See Ernesto, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 313–314; Hopkins, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 44.)
In addition, Steele argues that substantial evidence does not prove he
had the apparent ability to carry out his threat against Bolton. He
emphasizes that he did not advance upon Bolton after he made his threat.
23
We also reject this contention. “[S]ection 71 does not require a present ability
to carry out the threat.” (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1311
(Harris).) “It is sufficient if the defendant made a threat with the requisite
intent and it reasonably appears to the recipient that the threat could be
carried out.” (Ibid.; see People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 918–919,
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421,
fn. 22, italics added [threat made by confined prisoner in locked area could
violate section 71 if “it reasonably appear[ed] to the recipient that the threat
could be carried out” in the future]; Ernesto, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 315
[section 71 requires only “that it reasonably appears to the victim that the
threat could be carried out”].)
Here, Bolton’s body worn camera footage showed an unrestrained
Steele setting his backpack on the ground as he threatened Bolton. Bolton
testified that he construed Steele’s conduct as pre-assaultive behavior
because it freed up Steele’s hands to engage in combat. When Bolton was
asked what was going through his mind during this portion of the encounter,
he said that he thought there would “be use of force.” Further, the body worn
camera footage showed Bolton removing his Taser, pointing it at Steele, and
radioing for backup in response to Steele’s threat. Viewing this evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding that Steele had the apparent ability to carry out
his threat. (See Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1311 [evidence was sufficient
“to establish a reasonable appearance that the [defendant’s] threats could be
carried out” where “officers testified that they took the[] threats seriously,
and took precautions against them”]; Ernesto, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
p. 311 [minor violated section 71 where teacher “felt the minor was very
upset and was serious,” and teacher “actually feared for his safety and
24
believed that the minor might retaliate against him”]; cf. People v. Hamilton
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 956 [evidence was insufficient to show a violation of
section 71 where “[t]he prosecution presented no evidence that … the victims
harbored a reasonable belief that the threat could be carried out”].)
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, Steele argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel because he failed to request a mistake of fact jury instruction for
count 6, which arose out of Steele’s threat to elbow Deputy Hatch during the
January 1 incident. Steele claims a mistake of fact instruction was
warranted, and should have been requested by his trial counsel, because
there was substantial evidence to support a finding that he subjectively
(albeit unreasonably) threatened Deputy Hatch based on his mistaken belief
that the arresting deputies were illegally abducting him.
Steele presented a similar argument in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus that he filed with this court while briefing was ongoing in this appeal.
(In re Steele (D087757).) By separate order, we have granted the relief
requested in Steele’s petition for habeas corpus. In doing so, we have
reversed the judgment, in part, and remanded the matter to provide the
district attorney with an opportunity to retry Steele on count 6. Because we
have granted Steele his requested relief in the habeas corpus proceeding, we
decline to consider his now-moot claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
this appeal. (See People v. Ruiz (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 324, 335 [dismissing
appeal rendered moot by grant of habeas corpus relief].)
C. Severance
Steele also claims the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
sever Case ‘018 (the charges related to the shopping center incident) and
Case ‘463 (the charges arising from the execution of the warrant). In the
25
alternative, he contends the joint trial, in practice, resulted in gross
unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. For reasons we shall
explain, we conclude the consolidated trial was proper.
1. Additional Background
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to consolidate Case ‘018 and
Case ‘463. The prosecution asserted that joinder was proper because the
charges in both cases fell into the same class of crimes and Steele could not
show that joinder would unduly prejudice him. The prosecution argued that
Steele could not establish undue prejudice because the cases were factually
similar, both cases were strong, and neither case was a death penalty case.
Steele did not file a written opposition brief. Nevertheless, he opposed the
consolidation motion at a pretrial hearing, arguing against joinder on
grounds that the cases involved “different [law enforcement] agencies,
different incidents, [and] different allegations,” a joint trial could “confuse
some issues for the jurors,” and a jury in a joint trial could improperly rely on
propensity evidence to find him guilty in both cases.
The trial court granted the consolidation motion, finding that both
cases involved the “same class of crimes” and there was not “any substantial
danger of undue prejudice.” In granting consolidation, the court found the
cases had cross-admissible evidence, neither case had charges that were
“more inflammatory than the other,” and neither case was a “weaker case”
that could be bolstered by joinder with a stronger case. Thereafter, the
prosecution filed an amended consolidated information under Case ‘018, and
the charges were prosecuted in a joint trial.
2. Legal Standards
Section 954 permits the joint trial of “two or more different offenses
connected together in their commission ... or two or more different offenses of
26
the same class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) Section 954 embodies our
state’s longstanding “policy of promoting judicial economy through the joinder
of appropriately related offenses, subject to severance as necessary to protect
the interests of the defendant.” (People v. Henson (2022) 13 Cal.5th 574, 590;
see People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 967 [“ ‘ “ ‘[B]ecause
consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency,
that is the course of action preferred by the law.’ ” ’ ”].) Here, the parties do
not dispute that the statutory prerequisites for joinder were satisfied because
the cases involved offenses falling within the same class of crimes.
“Even where the statutory requirements for joinder are satisfied,
however, ‘a trial court has discretion to order that properly joined charges be
tried separately.’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 395.) “ ‘ “ ‘The
burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a
substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately
tried.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 429 (Alvarez).) “ ‘ “[A]
party seeking severance must make a stronger showing of potential prejudice
than would be necessary to exclude other-crimes evidence in a severed trial.’ ”
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 689 (Westerfield).)
“ ‘We review [a] trial court’s ruling on [a] severance motion for abuse of
discretion.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 429.) To satisfy this standard,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that “the denial [of
severance] ‘exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 689.) “ ‘In determining whether a trial court’s refusal to sever charges
amounts to an abuse of discretion, we consider four factors: (1) whether
evidence of the crimes to be jointly tried is cross-admissible; (2) whether some
charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant;
(3) whether a weak case has been joined with a stronger case so that the
27
spillover effect of aggregate evidence might alter the outcome of some or all of
the charges; and (4) whether any charge carries the death penalty or the
joinder of charges converts the matter into a capital case.’ ” (Ibid.) We
conduct this inquiry by considering “the showings made and the facts known
by the trial court at the time of the court’s ruling.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Even if a defendant fails to demonstrate the trial court’s joinder
ruling was an abuse of discretion when it was made, reversal may
nonetheless be required if the defendant can demonstrate that “the joint trial
resulted in such gross unfairness as to amount to a due process violation.” ’ ”
(People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 439 (Hin); see People v. Vargas (2020)
9 Cal.5th 793, 819 (Vargas) [“we must also discern ‘ “whether events after the
court’s ruling demonstrate that joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness’
amounting to a denial of defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due
process of law” ’ ”].) “ ‘Whether joinder worked a gross unfairness turns upon
assessing whether it was “reasonably probable that the jury was influenced
by the joinder in its verdict of guilt.” ’ ” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th
400, 495 (Lamb).)
3. Analysis
We begin with Steele’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion
by declining to sever his cases before trial. His primary argument is that the
court abused its discretion in refusing severance because the evidence was
not cross-admissible in both of his cases. We disagree.
“Evidence Code section 1101 states that although evidence of a person’s
character is inadmissible when offered to prove conduct on a specific occasion,
‘evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act [is
admissible] when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident
28
...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.’ (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (b).) In other words, the statute allows the admission of
evidence of criminal activity other than the charged offense ‘ “ ‘when such
evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the person’s character
or disposition.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.)
“ ‘ “In this inquiry, the degree of similarity of criminal acts is often a
key factor, and ‘there exists a continuum concerning the degree of similarity
required for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which
introduction of the evidence is sought: “The least degree of similarity ... is
required in order to prove intent ....” ... By contrast, a higher degree of
similarity is required to prove common design or plan, and the highest degree
of similarity is required to prove identity.’ ” ’ ” (Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 817–818.) “To be admissible to prove intent, the charges must be
sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant probably
harbored the same intent in each instance. [Citations.] ‘[T]he recurrence of a
similar result ... tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident
or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state,
and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the
presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act ....’ ”
(People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 472.)
In the present case, evidence was cross-admissible in Steele’s cases to
prove his criminal intent. The incidents giving rise to both sets of charges
occurred just weeks apart and gave rise to the same charges. In both
incidents, Steele was seated outside, approached by law enforcement officers,
and ordered to engage in conduct (departing the shopping center in Case ‘018,
and submitting to arrest in Case ‘463). In both incidents, Steele disregarded
these orders, argued with the officers about the necessity of a warrant, and
29
claimed the officers were acting unlawfully. And, in both cases, Steele
threatened the officers with violence and resisted their efforts to arrest him.
Given these similarities, evidence was cross-admissible to show that
Steele harbored the same intent in both cases—i.e., the intent to interfere
with, or influence, the law enforcement officers—and that he did not act by
accident or inadvertence, or in self-defense or good faith. Standing alone, this
cross-admissibility establishes that the trial court properly refused
severance.6 (See Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 439 [“If the evidence is cross-
admissible, then this ‘is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of
prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly joined
charges.’ ”]; Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 817 [“If the evidence of any of the
charged offenses would be ‘ “cross-admissible” ’ in hypothetical separate trials
of any of the other charges, that is enough ‘standing alone, to dispel any
prejudice and justify a trial court’s refusal to sever the charged offenses.’ ”].)
“An examination of the remaining factors only further reinforces the
propriety of the trial court’s refusal to sever.” (Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 418.) As Steele admits, none of the charges was particularly inflammatory
and, except for the additional trespassing charge in Case ‘018, the charges in
both cases were identical. This also is not an instance in which a weak case
was joined with a strong case, threatening a spillover effect that might
influence the outcome of trial. Although Steele asserts that each of the
charges in Case ‘018 suffered from a want of proof, we have rejected that
argument in our analysis concerning the sufficiency of the evidence
6 Because the evidence was cross-admissible to prove the issue of intent,
it is unnecessary for us to assess whether the evidence was cross-admissible
for other purposes.
30
supporting counts 1 through 4. Further, neither case was initially a capital
case, and joinder did not convert either case into a capital case. Considering
all these factors, we conclude that Steele has failed to show that the court
abused its discretion by declining to sever the properly joined cases.
Steele also has not carried his appellate burden of establishing that the
trial court’s refusal to sever the cases produced a gross unfairness depriving
him of due process. In arguing that a joint trial likely influenced the jury
verdict, Steele emphasizes that, during closing arguments, the prosecutor
described him as a person with a “complete disregard for the rules and a
complete disregard for lawful orders,” and as someone who “has not acted
lawfully within our community,” based on his criminal acts. He claims the
jury would have viewed the circumstances of Case ‘018 differently if it had
been tried separately from Case ‘463. We are not convinced.
Although the prosecutor described Steele during closing arguments as a
person who disregarded rules and orders, she did not argue or suggest to the
jury that it should infer his guilt in one case based on his guilt in another
case. Indeed, the prosecutor’s comments properly reflected the state of the
evidence, which included direct and substantial evidence (namely, body worn
camera footage) from which a jury could reasonably find that Steele refused
to comply with officers’ orders and resisted arrest with force in both cases.
(See People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 553 [consolidated trial did not
violate due process because “[t]he evidence offered to prove defendant’s guilt
of the various charges arising from the two incidents was ‘relatively
straightforward and distinct,’ while the evidence relating to each charge was
‘independently ample’ to support defendant’s conviction on that charge”];
People v. Ybarra (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1439–1440 [rejecting claim
that joint trial violated defendant’s due process rights because prosecutor
31
“did not urge the jury to draw an impermissible inference” between separate
incidents in closing remarks, even though he referenced both incidents].)
“[E]ven if the prosecution’s closing arguments occasionally ‘encouraged
the jury to aggregate the evidence,’ the record does not suggest that the jury
was unable to decide each count separately as it was specifically instructed to
do.” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 277.) Indeed, the court instructed
the jury on the concepts of bias (CALCRIM No. 209), the consideration of
evidence for a limited purpose (CALCRIM No. 303), and the consideration of
each separate count (CALCRIM No. 3515), as well as the elements of each
separate charge. Absent a showing to the contrary, “we presume the jury
followed these instructions.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 130; see
People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 784 [“instructions mitigated the risk of
any prejudicial spillover”].) Considering the proceedings as a whole, we
conclude that the trial was not grossly unfair.
D. Probation Conditions
Finally, Steele claims that the court erred by imposing two probation
conditions, Conditions 7D and 10B, on grounds that they improperly delegate
judicial authority to the probation department and require him to bear the
costs of compliance even though he is unhoused. The probation conditions
require Steele to attend and complete one or more of several different types of
counseling programs if directed by the probation officer.7
7 Condition 7D provides that Steele must “[a]ttend and successfully
complete … [an] Individual-IF[,] … Group-IF[,] … Dual-Diagnosis-IF[,] …
cognitive behavior-IF counseling program approved by the [probation officer]
… if directed by the [probation officer].” Condition 7D requires Steele to pay
“all costs” necessary to satisfy the condition.
32
As discussed above, we have contemporaneously issued a separate
order granting Steele’s petition for habeas corpus, which reverses Steele’s
count 6 conviction and remands the matter to the trial court. Because the
People may elect to retry count 6 on remand, and at the very least our
reversal of the count 6 conviction will require the trial court to resentence
Steele on his extant convictions, it is unnecessary for us to address Steele’s
now-moot challenges to the probation conditions relating to treatment.
IV
DISPOSITION
As set forth in the separate order granting Steele’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus (see In re Steele, D087757) in part, the count 6 conviction is
reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
CASTILLO, J.
RUBIN, J.
Condition 10B states that Steele must “[a]ttend an[d] successfully
complete counseling program(s) … [an] Individual-IF[,] … Anger Mgmt-IF …
if directed by the [probation officer].” Like Condition 7D, Condition 10B also
requires Steele to pay “all costs” necessary to satisfy the condition.
33