Filed 6/26/26 P. v. Snyder CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B347889
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XCNBA306858)
THEODORE SNYDER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
Juvenile Innocence and Fair Sentencing Clinic, Christopher
Hawthorne and Gabriella Trujillo, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Theodore Snyder appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (d).1 He contends the court erred when
it determined that his 32-years-to-life sentence was not the
functional equivalent of a life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP) sentence. We affirm.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2007, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
charged defendant in an information with two counts of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder in
violation of sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a).2 The District
Attorney alleged that the crimes were committed for the benefit,
or at the direction, of a criminal street gang within the meaning
of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). The District Attorney
further alleged that in the commission of the offenses a principal
personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury or death within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) through (d) and (e)(1).
In April 2009, a jury found defendant guilty on counts 1
and 2 and found the gang and multiple firearm allegations true.
At the September 21, 2010, sentencing hearing, the trial court
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Because the facts underlying defendant’s attempted
murder convictions are not relevant to this appeal, we do not
include a recitation of them here.
2
imposed on count 1 an aggregate term of 32 years to life,
comprised of a life sentence on count 1, which included a seven-
year minimum parole eligibility term,3 plus 25 years to life for
the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions
(d) and (e); and, on count 2, an identical sentence to count 1 to
run concurrently.
On October 27, 2011, a prior panel of this court affirmed
defendant’s conviction. (People v. Snyder (Oct. 27, 2011) B227910
[nonpub. opn.].)
On December 9, 2024, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d), arguing
that “[a]lthough [defendant] was not sentenced to LWOP, he is
still eligible for relief under [section 1170, subdivision (d)]
because his [32-years-to-life] sentence is the functional
equivalent to an LWOP sentence. (People v. Heard (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 608 [(Heard)]; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
435, 435 [(Sorto)].)” His supporting memorandum of points and
authorities asserted that he “was shot in the head at 14 years old,
shortly before the crime was committed.” Defendant also
attached to his motion a statement in which he expressed
remorse and summarized his rehabilitative efforts while
incarcerated, but he made no mention of a brain injury in his
youth.
The District Attorney filed an opposition, supported by an
exhibit showing defendant’s current age as 34 and his parole
release date as August 2030.
3 Section 3046 requires that a defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole “must serve at least
seven years in prison before being eligible for parole … .” (People
v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 95.)
3
In his reply brief, defendant argued that his “youth,
combined with the trauma of a severe brain injury in the form of
his gunshot wound to his head, underscores the need for a
sentence that reflects his potential for growth, maturity, and
rehabilitation.” Defendant did not submit evidence describing
the nature and extent of his injury, its effect on him at the time
he committed the offenses, or its effect on his life expectancy.
On May 27, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition. During argument, defendant’s counsel stated, “Your
Honor, to tip the scale even further in [defendant’s] favor, we do
believe … the interest of justice [will be served] by having him
[resentenced]. He does have some extraordinary mitigating
evidence. He was shot in the head, received serious brain injury
weeks prior to this crime.”
Following argument, the trial court denied the petition,
explaining: “[Defendant’s] sentence[] is not the functional
[equivalent] of an [LWOP] sentence. He’s currently eligible for
parole with an eligibility date that has already been articulated
as August of 2030. To be the functional equivalent of [LWOP]
means that [defendant] would [not have] a meaningful
opportunity of release near or beyond [his] life expectancy. … [¶]
And here, [defendant] has a meaningful opportunity for release
at the age of 40, which is clearly not near or beyond his life
expectancy. Therefore[,] petitioner’s sentence is not in the
meaning of functional equivalent of [LWOP]. And he’s ineligible
for relief pursuant to 1170[, subdivision] (d)(1). [¶] The motion
for recall and [resentencing] is denied.”
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
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III. DISCUSSION
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) provides: “When a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been
incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to
the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
Although section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) thus applies,
by its terms, only to juvenile offenders sentenced to
“imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole,” the
Attorney General does not dispute that under Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th 535 and Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, juvenile
offenders who have been sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP are also entitled to relief under section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A). (See People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650,
653.) We therefore consider whether defendant’s 32-years-to-life
sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Our Supreme Court has granted review in a case that may
bear on the analysis of whether defendant’s sentence of 32 years
to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP. (People v. Munoz
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, rev. granted June 25, 2025,
S290828.) Pending any further guidance, we hold it is not.
Indeed, defendant’s sentence is readily distinguishable from the
indeterminate sentences of 23 years plus 80 years to life imposed
on the juvenile in Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at page 612 and
the 10 years plus 130 years to life imposed on the juvenile in
Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at page 440. Defendant’s sentence
is also far shorter than the 50- and 58-year sentences imposed on
the juveniles in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 356.
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And, his 32-year sentence is substantially similar to the 33-year
sentence in People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580 which we
concluded was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Id. at
p. 583) The trial court did not err when it concluded that
defendant was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP.
For the first time on appeal, defendant cites certain expert
sources on the effects traumatic brain injury and incarceration
can have on life expectancy. But defendant provided no evidence
in the trial court as to the nature and extent of his brain injury or
the effect it would have on his life expectancy. Those were
factual matters for the trial court to consider and weigh in the
first instance. Accordingly, we do not address them further.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
I concur:
BAKER, J.
6
People v. Snyder, B347889
HOFFSTADT, P. J., Concurring.
This case presents the following question: Did our
Legislature have a rational basis, under equal protection
principles, to grant ameliorative relief under Penal Code section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) to juveniles sentenced without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) but to deny that relief to juveniles
sentenced to a term of 32 years? Because settled equal protection
principles permit our Legislature to address a problem one step
at a time, our Legislature’s decision to take a first step to address
lengthy juvenile sentences by extending ameliorative relief to the
sentences most likely to be the longest (that is, LWOP) is a
rational one. Thus, for any sentence shorter than the 50-year
sentence that our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Contreras
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 has declared invalid (see People v.
Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 654 (conc. opn. of Hoffstadt,
J.)), I would leave the line drawing to our Legislature.
_____________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT