Filed 7/20/26 P. v. Singh CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088513
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F22900258)
v.
HARMANPREET SINGH,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Alvin M.
Harrell III, Judge.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Eric L.
Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Harmanpreet Singh was convicted by jury of first degree murder,
corporal injury on a former dating partner, and assault with a firearm. On appeal, he
contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to hold a second competency hearing,
(2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence of his
mental illness to show he lacked the specific intent to kill, and (3) the trial court erred by
admitting body camera footage into evidence. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The District Attorney of Fresno County filed an information on February 8, 2024,
charging defendant with the murder of Gurpreet Marahar1 (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);2
count 1), corporal injury on a former dating partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), and
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3). It was alleged that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) as to count 1. It was further alleged that defendant personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury during
domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) as to counts 2 and 3.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found all enhancements true on
June 21, 2024. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count 1, plus an
additional term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) on
August 15, 2024. The sentences on the remaining counts were imposed and stayed under
section 654.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
1 Many of the individuals in this case share the same surnames. We refer to these
individuals by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Prosecution’s Case
Defendant and Gurpreet’s Relationship
Gurpreet’s family owned a convenience store (the store) in Clovis. Gurpreet and
her sister, Manpreet, worked at the store in January 2022. Defendant and Gurpreet knew
each other and were previously in a dating relationship. Defendant eventually started
“harassing” Gurpreet, including visiting her at the store. Manpreet went with Gurpreet to
the police station to file a complaint against defendant for harassment.
Gurpreet is Shot at the Store
Gurpreet was working at the store on the evening of January 11, 2022. Gurpreet
was on the phone with her ex-boyfriend, Gurvinder Singh. Singh heard the sound of the
store’s door opening, followed by Gurpreet telling someone to leave. Gurpreet screamed
before the phone disconnected. A customer at a restaurant nearby heard the sound of a
gunshot and saw someone running from the direction of the store.
The Store’s Surveillance Footage
The store had a surveillance system recording the inside the store, and law
enforcement obtained access to the footage.3 Defendant is seen walking into the store.
Gurpreet was interacting with another customer. Defendant stood behind and waited for
about a minute while the other customer finished his purchase and walked out of the
store. Gurpreet walked toward defendant to retrieve an item and appeared to exchange
words with defendant. Gurpreet walked back behind the cash register counter, and
defendant walked to the side of the counter. Defendant pointed a gun directly at Gurpreet
and fired a shot, and Gurpreet stooped over. Defendant continued to shoot as Gurpreet
3 The videos from the store’s surveillance footage were shown to the jury and are part of
the record on appeal.
3.
fell to the ground, and then he turned and swiftly left the store. The surveillance footage
was clear enough to see defendant’s face.
Law Enforcement Arrives to the Scene
Officer Jackie Wink of the Clovis Police Department was dispatched to the store’s
location. Officer Wink was equipped with a body camera, which captures calls for
service.4 When Officer Wink arrived at the store, she found Gurpreet laying on her right
side in a pool of blood in the back of the store and attempted to provide aid. Gurpreet
was transported to the hospital, where she died. An autopsy revealed Gurpreet sustained
one gunshot wound in the left side of her head and one gunshot wound in her torso.
Defendant’s Videos on a Social Media Platform
Law enforcement discovered several videos posted on a social media platform
which were recorded by defendant.5 In one video posted on January 11, 2022, defendant,
speaking in Punjabi, referenced Gurpreet and the store where she worked. In this video,
defendant believed Gurpreet was cheating on him. He mentioned he tried to commit
suicide twice. He stated that he “will be in great trouble” and asked his viewers to
support his family in the event he “[did] anything.” He further stated, “I don’t know how
many years I will be sentenced. So I fold hands.”
In another video, defendant seemed upset and again referenced Gurpreet cheating
on him. He stated in part, “The girls who cheat, boys commit suicide.—I wanted to save
life after them. That’s why I am taking this step. I was not otherwise eager to do this.
Right? And I didn’t have something like this. Right? I have taken this step after getting
fed up and helpless. I will go and do the task.” He also stated he had to “teach her lesson
that boys—how to cheat the sons of others’ mothers.”
4 The body camera footage was shown to the jury.
5 These videos were shown to the jury, and English transcripts of the videos are part of the
record on appeal.
4.
One video was recorded just before the shooting. Defendant was walking up to
the smoke shop while talking to the camera. He stated, “The one who cheated sons of
many mothers, has put straining orders on her husband. Gurpreet Kaur Marahar has done
many things. Right? So, I want to settle this today.—So if you love me, make my video
viral.” He continued, “But today I take responsibility by going live today. This girl
disturbed mentally, harassed and she is responsible. Right? So I’m going. Love you,
bless you all. So here I am going close to her store.” He also stated, “[T]his will be the
last video.”
In the last video, defendant stated, “I have killed. Done it.” He realized he would
go to jail.
Arrest
Defendant was arrested at his house without incident later that evening.
Defendant told law enforcement where they could find the gun he used. Law
enforcement located the gun, a .38-caliber revolver with four spent shell casings. One
bullet, found in the chamber, was not fired but had a “primer strike” on it, which
indicated the trigger was pulled but the gun malfunctioned and did not fire that bullet.
Clovis Police Detective Anthony Puente interviewed defendant and observed behavior
consistent with someone under the influence.
The Defense Case
Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant testified he met Gurpreet online on a social media platform and traveled
from Ohio to Clovis to visit her. Defendant and Gurpreet got engaged while defendant
was visiting. After defendant moved to California, he was contacted by Singh,
Gurpreet’s ex-boyfriend, who told him that Gurpreet was not a good person and to let her
go.
Defendant talked to Gurpreet on the store’s phone and on multiple occasions went
to the store to talk to her in person. In December 2021, Gurpreet’s behavior changed, and
5.
she no longer wanted to speak with defendant. Defendant did not remember much about
the date of January 11, 2022, because he was drinking a lot and doing drugs, including
crystal meth.
Regarding what was said in the videos posted online, defendant testified he was
planning on committing suicide in front of Gurpreet. He had received phone calls
threatening him and telling him that Gurpreet was in relationships with “a lot of guys” at
the time, and there were videos online of Gurpreet. As a result of these communications,
defendant was “really upset.” Defendant was also told that Gurpreet was married to
someone else as she had not yet divorced her husband.
On January 11, 2022, an unknown caller talked to defendant on the phone while
defendant was at home drinking. Defendant was challenged by the caller to go to the
store if he loved Gurpreet, and the caller added that “we will find out how much you love
her.” Defendant went to the store, armed with a gun out of fear of Singh or other people
“beat[ing him] up” or killing him, and he would rather shoot himself first. Defendant
tried to shoot himself in his car, but the gun did not fire. He then walked into the store
with the gun because he intended to attempt to kill himself again. Gurpreet suggested he
was not safe because Singh was outside the store, which upset defendant. When
defendant asked Gurpreet if she loved him, she told him he made a very big mistake by
coming to the store and suggested she could shoot him since he was on her property.
Gurpreet then went toward the cash register counter, and defendant was scared as he
thought she was going to pick up a gun and shoot him. Defendant then shot Gurpreet, ran
out of the store, and called 911, but the call ended.
DISCUSSION
I. Competency
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to hold a second competency
hearing. He argues there was substantial evidence of changed circumstances since the
initial competency finding, warranting reassessment. The People disagree, as do we.
6.
A. Additional Background
A doubt as to defendant’s competency to stand trial was declared on October 4,
2022, and the court initiated proceedings pursuant to section 1368.
Competency Evaluations
Dr. Luis Velosa examined defendant and issued his evaluation report on
October 15, 2022. Dr. Velosa noted defendant “exhibit[ed] serious psychiatric
symptoms.” Specifically, Dr. Velosa found defendant was suffering from a psychiatric
order best classified as “Psychosis NOS,” but noted the “possibility of a drug induced
psychosis (crystal methamphetamine) or schizoaffective disorder should be considered.”
Dr. Velosa further noted, “At present the defendant is exhibiting psychotic symptoms in
the form of disorganized thoughts, looseness of associations, irrational thinking, paranoid
ideas and persecutory delusions. The defendant is also exhibiting some auditory
hallucinations.”
Dr. Velosa opined defendant was not competent to stand trial, as he was not able
to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and incapable of cooperating in a
rational manner with his counsel in conducting a defense. The report noted that
antipsychotic medications were medically appropriate and would most likely restore
defendant’s mental competency. The report further noted that defendant would
deteriorate without treatment and be a danger to himself and others.
Defendant was evaluated by Dr. Malia Sherman on February 17, 2023.6 In her
report dated March 24, 2023, Dr. Sherman opined defendant was unable to adequately
understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to rationally assist counsel in his
defense due to his psychosis, and antipsychotic medication was the appropriate treatment.
Dr. Sherman noted that in January and February 2023, defendant was 81–100 percent
6 Two reports by Dr. Sherman were based on this evaluation, with one dated March 6,
2023, and the other dated March 24, 2023. Because the latter report appears to be a revision of
the former, we only summarize the report dated March 24, 2023.
7.
compliant with taking his psychiatric medication as prescribed, but defendant still
presented with paranoia and a disorganized thought process at a level that made him
unable to assist counsel in his defense.
In this same report, Dr. Sherman also expressed a concern of “defendant’s
inability or unwillingness to answer questions adequately, and his possible attempt to
malinger for secondary gain.” The report noted defendant made a call from jail; the
person defendant spoke to advised defendant to claim that he was mentally upset and
provided an example of someone who was sentenced to a 20-year sentence but was
released in seven years. Her report further noted that jail healthcare provider records
stated that defendant was seen “ ‘to be very social and interacting appropriately. Per
officers, [defendant] has stated to them that he is fine but he is “playing the game” in
order to get less time as [he] is here for murder.’ ” Dr. Sherman then stated, “The
defendant’s insufficient answers to questions, combined with his possible attempt to
malinger for secondary gain, raises the question of if he was intentionally withholding
information during this evaluation in an attempt for secondary gain. This is possible, but
even if that is the case, it is also quite likely that he would continue to respond in a
similar manner in the courtroom, which would still make him unable to assist council
[sic] in his defense. In addition, symptoms of paranoia, disorganization, and suicidal and
homicidal intent were documented prior to the incident.” (Underlining omitted.)
Dr. Sherman conducted another competency evaluation on September 6, 2023, and
issued her report on September 15, 2023. In this report, she noted it was discovered in
August 2023 that defendant had been missing 90 percent of his morning medication, so
defendant’s medication schedule was changed. The report further noted that defendant
exhibited considerable improvement since her last evaluation, which was likely a result
of him taking his medication and staying sober while incarcerated. The report also noted
that defendant reported he had stopped taking his medication because his condition had
improved and he felt he no longer needed it. Dr. Sherman expressed the concern that it
8.
was likely defendant will decompensate again if unmedicated. Dr. Sherman ultimately
opined defendant was “able to adequately understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings and to rationally assist counsel in his defense” at the time of the evaluation.
She further opined antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate for defendant.
Criminal Proceedings Reinstated
The court found defendant competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal
proceedings on September 28, 2023.
Marsden Hearings
The trial court held a Marsden7 hearing on February 16, 2024. When the court
inquired into defendant’s reasons for wanting a new attorney, defendant stated his
concerns were that she was a woman and she made a comment that “not only ladies
cheat, you guys as men also cheat.” He also stated his counsel took the circumstances of
his case personally and “to heart” since she was a woman. He further stated defense
counsel was “very rude” and “really upset,” and he could change attorneys if he so
desired. He told the court he did not want his next attorney to be a woman either
“because I feel like the woman attorneys are taking it personally because they are
women.” Defense counsel confirmed she may have stated “something about both
genders equally being liable to cheating” but denied feeling personally so offended by the
charges that she could not fairly represent defendant. The court denied defendant’s
Marsden request, noting that defendant was “simply a misogynist” who could not
“tolerate a woman telling him anything” and any deterioration in the relationship was
caused by defendant’s behavior, defiant attitude, and sexist opinion.
At another Marsden hearing on May 2, 2024, defendant stated he believed defense
counsel was not properly representing him in the case, she did “not come and visit [him]
in jail as quite [sic] often,” and she was rude to him. Defendant also stated, “As a women
7 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
9.
[sic], she’s taking this case personally to herself.” Defense counsel stated she had visited
defendant approximately 20 times, and she denied being rude to defendant. Defense
counsel further stated that defendant did not believe he was facing a sentence of 50 years
to life. Defendant stated that he believed “everybody is trying to kill [him].”
The court held another Marsden hearing on June 6, 2024, at which defendant
again stated he believed defense counsel was not properly representing him. Defendant
explained she was not properly representing him because she was a woman and took his
story personally. Defendant further explained that he thought defense counsel was
“working for the District Attorney’s Office rather than [him].” He also expressed that he
felt “like she’s challenging me and making me feel jealous to keep on trying and then she
stares at me in a rude manner after we’ve done a Marsden hearing and she ignores me,
and then I feel uncomfortable afterwards talking to her after I’ve done a Marsden
hearing.” (Italics added.) Defense counsel denied that behavior and assured the court
that she was not working for the district attorney’s office.
The court held a final Marsden hearing on June 11, 2024, at which defendant
again asserted that defense counsel was working for the district attorney’s office and took
his case personally because she was a woman.
Defendant’s Trial Testimony
During his trial in June 2024, defendant testified that he was “taking medicine” at
the time of his testimony. He also testified, “I have medicine. It’s like it has little bit
drugs in there, it’s for my mental health issues that I’m taking, it’s for paranoia.” He
added that he was not taking his medication on January 11, 2022.
Presentencing Mitigation Report
Defendant filed a mitigation report on August 15, 2024. The report, authored by
two social workers, detailed defendant’s background. The report noted that jail records
“indicate an inconsistent on-again, off-again relationship towards taking his antipsychotic
medications” and defendant “often makes the decision not to” take his medications. The
10.
report also stated that “a lot of the mental health symptoms which had been described in
the earlier reports where [defendant] was found incompetent were coming back into full
swing and easily apparent to the naked eye during this assessment.”
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“ ‘ “Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal
defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014)
59 Cal.4th 446, 464; see § 1367, subd. (a) [“A person shall not be tried or adjudged to
punishment or have their probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community
supervision, or parole revoked while that person is mentally incompetent.”].) Under both
standards, “a person is incompetent to stand trial ‘if, as a result of mental disorder or
developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.’ ”
(People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230 (Rodas), quoting § 1367, subd. (a).)
“[G]enerally speaking, when a defendant has already been found competent to
stand trial, ‘a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency
hearing unless it “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new
evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’ ” (Rodas, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 234.) “[W]hen a competency hearing has already been held, ‘the trial
court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining
whether there has been some significant change in the defendant’s mental state,’
particularly if the defendant has ‘actively participated in the trial’ and the trial court has
had the opportunity to observe and converse with the defendant.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “ ‘When a competency hearing has already been held and defendant has been
found competent to stand trial … a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a
second competency hearing unless it “is presented with a substantial change of
circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that
11.
finding.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 531.) “We review a trial court’s
determination concerning whether a new competency hearing must be held for substantial
evidence.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Defendant contends a second competency hearing was warranted because there
was a substantial change of circumstances. Defendant highlights a part of the September
2023 report, in which Dr. Sherman noted defendant reported he had stopped taking his
medication about one week before the evaluation. Dr. Sherman also noted a
discontinuation of medication was “concerning” because it was likely that defendant
would decompensate.
We are not persuaded that there was a substantial change of circumstances
warranting a second competency hearing. In the September 2023 report, Dr. Sherman
concluded that defendant was able to adequately understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings and to rationally assist counsel in his defense. The report noted that
defendant’s psychotic symptoms had significantly decreased, likely as a result of
defendant “taking antipsychotic medication and remaining sober while incarcerated.”
Further, there is evidence that defendant had returned to taking his medication by the
time of his trial in June 2024, since his trial testimony included that he was taking his
prescribed medication for mental health issues, including paranoia. Moreover, we have
found no evidence in the record showing whether defendant was taking his medication
between the September 2023 report and his trial in June 2024.
Defendant argues his statements about defense counsel during the various
Marsden hearings should have raised a bona fide doubt to the trial court as to defendant’s
incompetence. These statements include his persistent belief that his defense attorney,
who was a woman, had personal antipathy toward him based on her gender so much so
that he suspected defense counsel was instead working for the prosecution. At another
point, defendant accused defense counsel of making him “feel jealous.” Defendant had
12.
also claimed defense counsel did not visit him enough, when she had visited him 20 times
by the time he made that statement, and refused to accept that he faced the possibility of a
50-year-to-life sentence. Finally, defendant told the court he felt “like everyone is trying
to kill [him].” From these statements, defendant asserts on appeal that “a picture is
painted of a defendant who … lost his competence due to his decision to discontinue the
medication as evidenced by the display of the very symptoms of decompensation that the
mental health professionals had identified.”
These statements fail to raise a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competence. It is
well settled that a defendant’s bizarre actions or statements alone are insufficient to raise
a bona fide doubt. (See People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 202 [“To raise a doubt ...,
we require more than ‘mere bizarre actions’ or statements, or even expert testimony that a
defendant is psychopathic, homicidal, or a danger to him- or herself and others.”].)
While defendant’s statements during the Marsden hearings show an unwillingness to
work with his counsel, the relevant inquiry is whether his statements suggest he was
incapable of assisting counsel in his defense as a result of his mental illness. (See Rodas,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231; People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270 [“the evidence
must bear on the defendant’s competency to stand trial, rather than simply establish the
existence of a mental illness that could conceivably affect [the defendant’s] ability to
understand the proceedings or assist counsel”].) Defendant’s statements fall short of this
standard as they clearly show an unwillingness to work with his particular counsel.
(People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 29 [“An uncooperative defendant is not
tantamount to an incompetent one.”]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 526
[competency hearing not required when a defendant’s lack of cooperation with counsel
stemmed from an unwillingness rather than inability], disapproved on another ground in
People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919–920.)
Relying on Rodas and People v. Murdoch (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230 (Murdoch),
defendant argues a bona fide doubt may be gathered from a combination of the
13.
September 2023 report, in which he stated he intended to discontinue his medication, as
well as his bizarre statements at his Marsden hearings. Rodas and Murdoch are
distinguishable.
In Rodas, the defendant, who had previously been declared incompetent to stand
trial due to his mental illness, was determined to be competent after several months of
treatment with antipsychotic medication. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 223–224.) His
competence was “effectively conditioned” on his continued usage of his medication. (Id.
at pp. 235, 232.) Defense counsel informed the trial court that she had developed a doubt
as to the defendant’s competence from recent communications with him. (Id. at p. 227.)
Defense counsel explained to the trial court that her doubt was based on the defendant’s
intention to change from their agreed-upon defense strategy, as well as his incoherent
justification for the change of strategy. (Ibid.) Defense counsel also stated to the trial
court that the defendant told her he was no longer taking his medication. (Ibid.) The
court asked the defendant if he was taking his medication, and the defendant replied in
part, “ ‘No, your Honor, I’ve been doing without the medication. I’ve been doing fine.
I’ve been getting along well. I’ve been there about a year already. I returned from
Atascadero Hospital since May of last year and I’ve been doing fine. I have been doing
without my medications.” (Id. at p. 229.) The high court determined the evidence before
the trial court sufficiently demonstrated a change of circumstances warranting a new
competency hearing. (Id. at p. 235.)
Here, the only evidence before the trial court showing defendant stopped taking
his medication was the September 2023 report, in which Dr. Sherman noted defendant
had stopped taking his medication for one week prior to the examination. Defense
counsel did not inform the trial court that she had a doubt as to defendant’s competence at
any point after the September 2023 report. Thus, unlike in Rodas, defendant was not
questioned by the court as to whether he was still taking his medication. Nor was the
court required to. As we have stated above, defendant’s statements at the Marsden
14.
hearings were not so bizarre that the court should have had a doubt about whether
defendant was capable of communicating rationally with his counsel.
In Murdoch, expert reports stated the defendant was competent to stand trial but
noted he had stopped taking his medication. The reports expressed concern that the
defendant could decompensate and become incompetent without his medication.
(Murdoch, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 233.) The trial court found he was not
incompetent and reinstated proceedings. (Id. at p. 234.) The defendant was permitted to
represent himself. (Ibid.) Prior to trial, the defendant informed the court that his defense
was he believed the testifying witnesses were not human, but rather, angelic beings.
(Ibid.) He stated he intended to introduce pages from the Bible as exhibits and ask the
witnesses if they were “from Sodom and Gomorra.” (Ibid.) He also intended to ask if
the witnesses could shrug their shoulders, since “ ‘[s]houlder blades are symbolic of
angelic beings,’ ” and he believed the witnesses would not be able to shrug their
shoulders. (Ibid.) The Murdoch court held that the defendant’s bizarre explanation of his
defense, “taken together” with the expert reports, gave rise to a bona fide doubt requiring
the court to conduct a competency hearing. (Id. at p. 238.)
Here, defendant’s statements, while offensive and sexist, were not nearly of the
same degree of “bizarre” as those of Murdoch. Defendant did not insist on presenting a
nonsensical or delusional defense such as the defense advanced by the defendant in
Murdoch. Although Murdoch concluded that a bona fide doubt should have arisen from
the defendant’s bizarre behavior and statements in light of the rest of the circumstances,
we do not reach such a conclusion on this record. And, as stated, defendant’s behavior
did not evince an inability to understand the nature of the proceedings or rationally
contribute to his defense.
We conclude the evidence was insufficient to show a change of circumstances,
and the trial court was therefore not required to conduct a second competency hearing.
15.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to introduce evidence of his mental illness to show he lacked the specific intent to
kill. The People contend the record fails to demonstrate ineffective assistance because
defense counsel may have had rational tactical reasons for not introducing the evidence,
and further, defendant fails to show prejudice. We agree with the People’s first
contention and reject defendant’s claim.
A. Additional Background
Defense counsel advanced several defenses during closing argument as to why
defendant was not guilty of first degree murder. Counsel argued, in part, that defendant
“did not actually have time to reflect or [the] ability to reflect,” noting he was under the
influence of alcohol and methamphetamine. Counsel added, “Imagine what his mental
state [was] like when he’s unmedicated, and using alcohol, and using methamphetamine.
He was kind of a mess on the stand last week, imagine how much of a mess he is when
he’s under the influence and unmedicated, right.” Counsel further argued that Gurpreet
provoked defendant, which “may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree.”
Counsel additionally proffered that first degree murder could be reduced to voluntary
manslaughter based on a theory that it was a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Finally,
counsel argued that the circumstances supported the conclusion that defendant acted in
either perfect or imperfect self-defense.
B. Applicable Law
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought.”
(§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188.)
“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.” (§ 192.)
“ ‘Two factors may preclude the formation of malice and reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter: heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense.’ ” (People v. Soto (2018)
4 Cal.5th 968, 974.)
16.
“Involuntary manslaughter is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice aforethought and without an intent to kill.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th
826, 884.) “A verdict of involuntary manslaughter is warranted where the defendant
demonstrates ‘that because of his mental illness ... he did not in fact form the intent
unlawfully to kill (i.e., did not have malice aforethought).’ ” (Ibid.) “An instruction on
involuntary manslaughter is required whenever there is substantial evidence indicating
the defendant did not actually form the intent to kill.” (Ibid.)
A defendant is “ ‘free to show that because of his [or her] mental illness or
voluntary intoxication, he [or she] did not in fact form the intent unlawfully to kill (i.e.,
did not have malice aforethought). [Citation.] In a murder case, if this evidence is
believed, the only supportable verdict would be involuntary manslaughter or an acquittal.
If such a showing gives rise to a reasonable doubt, the killing (assuming there is no
implied malice) can be no greater than involuntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v. McGehee
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1208; see § 28, subd. (a) [“Evidence of mental disease,
mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the
accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.”].)
C. Standard of Review
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing
professional norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s shortcomings. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “A
reviewing court can begin an ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry with either element
and need not address both elements if one is not satisfied.” (In re Tellez (2024)
17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)
17.
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if
(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) “All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately
resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
D. Analysis
Defendant first argues his counsel’s failure to introduce evidence of defendant’s
mental illness fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Specifically, he asserts
defense counsel should have called Dr. Velosa and Dr. Sherman as percipient witnesses
as to defendant’s mental illness based on their clinical findings, and as expert witnesses
as to the symptoms typically experienced as a result of defendant’s specific condition.
According to defendant, such evidence would have supported an instruction authorizing
the jurors to consider his mental illness in deciding whether he acted with malice
aforethought and/or premeditation at the time of the shooting.
We cannot conclude that there was no rational tactical purpose for defense counsel
not introducing evidence of defendant’s mental illness. Since defendant indicated his
intent to testify in his own defense prior to trial, defense counsel may have been
concerned with how introducing evidence of his mental illness could have negatively
affected his credibility. Specifically, defense counsel could have been concerned that the
jury would doubt defendant’s ability to perceive, recall, or describe the events on
January 11, 2022. (See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 591–592 [“the mental
illness or emotional instability of a witness can be relevant on the issue of credibility, and
a witness may be cross-examined on that subject, if such illness affects the witness’s
ability to perceive, recall or describe the events in question”].) Further, had defense
counsel introduced such evidence, the prosecutor would have been able to question
Dr. Sherman on whether defendant’s actions and statements suggested he was
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“malinger[ing] for secondary gain.” Defense counsel could reasonably have been
concerned with how such evidence would have affected defendant’s credibility with the
jury and whether they believed the rest of his testimony, including his other defenses of
self-defense and imperfect self-defense. We decline to second-guess defense counsel’s
tactical trial strategies here. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925 [“ ‘[w]e
accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions’ ”]; People v. Scott (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212 [“courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical
decisions in the harsh light of hindsight”]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437
[“there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance’ ”].) The record fails to disclose ineffective assistance
of defense counsel.
Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider whether defendant was
prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to introduce the evidence of mental illness.
III. Admission of Evidence
Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting Officer Wink’s body camera
footage. The People first contend the claim was forfeited on appeal. On the merits, the
People contend the court’s evidentiary ruling was neither erroneous nor prejudicial. We
agree with the People on the latter two contentions.
A. Additional Background
The prosecution moved to admit into evidence a video, spanning seven minutes
and 30 seconds, of footage captured from Officer Wink’s body camera. The prosecution
stated the footage showed Officer Wink’s arrival at the store and Gurpreet lying behind
the cash register. The prosecution further stated the footage showed Gurpreet’s medical
condition after the shooting, as well as the scene of the store as it was prior to first
responders moving Gurpreet to provide medical assistance.
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the footage under Evidence Code
section 352. In doing so, defense counsel highlighted that the audio captured in the
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footage was “quite intense,” as there was “very intense labored breathing for the entirety
of the video,” and stated that the “prejudicial aspect” was “too much.” Conditioned on
the court believing there was probative value as to the original scene, defense counsel
suggested two possibilities: either opting for no sound and/or shortening the footage.
Following argument from the parties, the court indicated that it had watched the
footage and noted it was “disturbing.” The court added, “I can’t say that the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect, and I cannot say that the
probative value is such that the jurors would be misled nor can I say that it would be an
undue consumption of time.” After the court indicated it would order the footage be
played without audio, the prosecution offered to shorten the footage. The length of the
footage was shortened to three minutes and 30 seconds with audio (the shortened
footage).
The shortened footage was shown to the jury during trial. Defense counsel did not
object during trial.
The court’s instructions to the jury included: “Do not allow bias, sympathy,
prejudice or public opinion to influence your decision.”
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)
“ ‘The jury can, and must, be shielded from depictions that sensationalize an
alleged crime, or are unnecessarily gruesome, but the jury cannot be shielded from an
accurate depiction of the charged crimes that does not unnecessarily play upon the
emotions of the jurors.’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 104; see Evid. Code,
§ 352 [the court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
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misleading the jury”].) “ ‘ “[A] court may admit even ‘gruesome’ photographs if the
evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts, or if the photographs would
clarify the testimony of a medical examiner.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1234, 1272 (Gonzales).)
“ ‘ “The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion of
the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory.” ’ ”
(Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1272.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion
unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
C. Forfeiture
The People argue that defendant forfeited the claim on appeal by failing to object
to the trial court’s ruling admitting the shortened footage. Defendant argues his initial
objection, which was to the full-length version of the shortened footage, preserved the
issue for appeal.
“As a general rule, a criminal defendant who fails to object at trial to a purportedly
erroneous ruling forfeits the right to challenge that ruling on appeal.” (People v.
Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 961; accord, Evid. Code, § 353 [precluding reversal for
erroneous admission of evidence unless upon a timely objection].) “The reason for the
requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence
serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or
limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the
evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps
designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.” (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152,
187–188, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830,
fn. 1.) “[A] motion in limine to exclude evidence is a sufficient manifestation of
objection to protect the record on appeal when it satisfies the basic requirements of
Evidence Code section 353, i.e.: (1) a specific legal ground for exclusion is advanced
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and subsequently raised on appeal; (2) the motion is directed to a particular, identifiable
body of evidence; and (3) the motion is made at a time before or during trial when the
trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context. When such a
motion is made and denied, the issue is preserved for appeal.” (Morris, at p. 190.)
Defense counsel’s objection preserved the issue for appeal. Defense counsel’s
Evidence Code section 352 argument initially focused on the prejudice resulting from the
audio portion and proposed either muting or shortening the length of the footage. But
defense counsel appeared to have conditioned these proposed solutions on if the court
“believe[d] that there’s still some probative value as to the original scene in how the body
was found.” Defense counsel later clarified her position: “But this video, especially in
its entirety with the sound on, the Defense’s position is it’s unduly prejudicial.” (Italics
added.) Thus, while defense counsel emphasized that certain aspects of the footage
elevated its prejudice, her objection went at least to the footage’s admission in any
manner. Accordingly, we conclude the issue was preserved for appeal and address the
merits of defendant’s argument.
D. Analysis
Defendant argues the shortened footage should have been excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 because any probative value was substantially outweighed by
the risk of undue prejudice. He further argues the admission of the video rendered his
trial fundamentally unfair. In doing so, he first asserts the shortened footage of Gurpreet
on the ground in pain had little, if any, probative value.
Contrary to defendant’s claim, the shortened footage possessed substantial
probative value. The shortened footage captured the scene of the store at the time the
police officers arrived. (See People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1170
[“photographs of the murder victim and the crime scene are always relevant to prove how
the charged crime occurred”].) It showed Gurpreet’s position within the store, as well as
her having sustained multiple gunshot wounds. The shortened footage was highly
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relevant considering the nature of the offenses as charged. (See People v. D’Arcy (2010)
48 Cal.4th 257, 299 [“ ‘Photographs of a murder victim “are always relevant to prove
how the charged crime occurred, and the prosecution is ‘not obliged to prove these details
solely from the testimony of live witnesses,’ ” even in the absence of a defense challenge
to particular aspects of the prosecution’s case.’ ”].)
Likewise, we reject defendant’s related argument that admission of the shortened
footage rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair.”8 (See Bruton v. United States (1968)
391 U.S. 123, 131, fn. 6 [“An important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only
relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence.”]; People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229 [“To prove a deprivation of federal due
process rights, [a defendant] must satisfy a high constitutional standard to show that the
erroneous admission of evidence resulted in an unfair trial.”].) We cannot conclude on
this record that there were no permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the
evidence given its high degree of relevance. (See Albarran, at p. 229 [“ ‘Only if there are
no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate
due process.’ ”], quoting Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920.)
Further, the shortened footage was gruesome, but not unduly so.9 (See Gonzales,
supra, 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1272 [“ ‘The photographs at issue here are gruesome because the
charged offenses were gruesome, but they did no more than accurately portray the
shocking nature of the crimes.’ ”].) While Gurpreet’s belabored breathing may still be
heard in the shortened footage shown to the jury, it did not sensationalize the alleged
crime or unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the viewer. (See People v. Morales,
8 To the extent the People argue this claim was forfeited by defense counsel’s failure to
object below on this ground, we disagree. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [a
defendant “may argue that the asserted error in admitting the evidence over his Evidence Code
section 352 objection had the additional legal consequence of violating due process” without
having objected on that additional ground].)
9 The shortened footage is included in the record on appeal, which we viewed.
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supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 104.) On this record, the trial court’s determination that the
prejudicial effect of the shortened footage did not substantially outweigh its probative
value was not an abuse of discretion.
In any event, any assumed error in admitting the shortened footage was harmless.
(See People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 373 [applying People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 standard of harmless error review to Evidence Code section 352 claim];
Watson, at p. 836 [reversal for state law error is not warranted unless it is “reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in
the absence of the error”].)
Defendant asserts the question for the jury was his state of mind. According to
defendant, it is reasonably probable that admission of the shortened footage caused the
jury to abandon alternative conclusions. First, he notes there was a possibility for the
jury to instead find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, or that
the murder was committed in the second degree based on genuine but objectively
unreasonable provocation. He further argues there was evidence in the record supporting
the notion that he acted out of self-defense or imperfect self-defense. Lastly, he argues it
is probable that, absent the shortened footage’s admission, the jury would have concluded
his level of intoxication prevented him from premeditating the murder.
We are not convinced. First, there was overwhelming evidence from which the
jury reasonably found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The jury viewed the
store’s surveillance footage, which captured defendant waiting in the store while another
customer left before he had a verbal exchange with Gurpreet. It further captured
defendant shooting and killing her without provocation and while she was holding her
phone. The jury also viewed the videos defendant recorded and posted onto a social
media website before and after Gurpreet’s death confessing to having committed the act.
Moreover, the shortened footage did not capture the shooting, the interaction
between defendant and Gurpreet immediately preceding it, or defendant, as he had
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already left the store. Considering the evidence in the record, it is not reasonably
probable that the shortened footage had any impact on the jury’s consideration of
defendant’s state of mind. To the extent defendant argues the shortened footage may
have dissuaded the jury from these other theories out of sympathy, this argument is
unpersuasive. The jurors were instructed that they must not let bias or sympathy
influence their assessment of the evidence. (See People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th
394, 422 [“ ‘We presume that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions.’ ”].)
On this record, there was no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome absent
the shortened footage’s admission.
We conclude that defendant’s claim of error fails on its merits, and any assumed
error was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, J.
MEEHAN, J.
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