Filed 9/22/26 P. v. Shannon CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C102096
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. LODCRFECOD20200009558)
SETH PETER SHANNON,
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury found defendant Seth Peter Shannon guilty of multiple crimes,
including attempted murder, several counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim
from testifying, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, two counts of
unlawful possession of ammunition, and two counts of possession of an assault weapon,
the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of seven years to life plus 30
years. On appeal, Shannon raises numerous claims, including (1) there is insufficient
evidence for two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, two counts of unlawful
possession of ammunition, and two counts of unlawful possession of an assault weapon,
because those are “continuing offenses”; and (2) there is insufficient evidence for some
of his convictions for attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying. We
agree with the People that one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of
unlawful possession of an assault weapon must be reversed for insufficient evidence. We
1
reject Shannon’s other challenges to his convictions. Because Shannon must be
resentenced, we need not address his claims of sentencing error.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
Three Altercations
Shannon met A.S. in the spring of 2020. By the summer, Shannon was helping
A.S. move her personal belongings into a storage facility in Lodi, their relationship had
turned sexual, and A.S. had told Shannon that her ex-boyfriend, Maximiliano Silva, was
stalking her.
Shannon and Silva had three altercations in August 2020. In the first incident (the
storage facility incident), which occurred during the daytime, a witness at the Lodi
storage facility where A.S. stored her belongings heard squealing tires, then gunshots,
then more squealing tires, before he saw a car speed out of the storage facility while
chasing another car. Regarding this incident, Silva testified that he drove to the storage
facility at A.S.’s request, but when he got there, she told him to leave and someone
driving a Thunderbird chased him out of the facility. Silva further testified that he later
realized that a sound he heard while being chased was probably gunfire, though he did
not see a gun.
Shannon testified regarding this incident that A.S. called him and told him that
Silva was at the storage facility and she wanted him to leave. Shannon drove to the
storage facility in his Thunderbird and, at speeds reaching 80 miles per hour, chased Silva
away. Shannon testified he thought he heard gunfire, but could not be certain because his
Thunderbird was extremely loud. He did not shoot at Silva, and he did not have a gun
with him during this incident.
In a second incident (the Highway 12 incident), Silva approached A.S.’s vehicle, a
GMC Yukon, from behind as the cars traveled on Highway 12, near the Lodi storage
facility. In Silva’s version of events, A.S. had called him earlier and asked him to help
2
her escape from Shannon, and he thought A.S. was driving the Yukon. When Silva drove
up to speak to A.S., he heard a “big loud noise, boom,” like a gunshot. Startled, Silva
drove away. He did not see who was driving the Yukon at the time, but moments later he
saw Shannon driving the vehicle when it pulled into the storage facility. A short time
later, he noticed a new bullet hole in his car. In late August or early September 2020, a
deputy sheriff observed a bullet hole in Silva’s car and retrieved a bullet fragment from
inside the driver’s seat cushion.
In Shannon’s version of this second incident, he was driving the Yukon eastbound
on Highway 12, which has one eastbound lane and one westbound lane, when Silva
pulled up next to him, rolled down his window and started screaming, and waving his
hands. Shannon had no idea who Silva was at that point, and he was worried about the
dangerous situation. He cursed at Silva and threw a bottle at Silva’s car.
A third incident (the ditch incident) happened on the night of August 19, 2020.
According to Silva, he and A.S. planned to spend the night together at a campsite near the
Lodi storage facility. She drove her recreational vehicle (RV) there and he drove her
Yukon. They were stopped in their respective vehicles outside the campsite when he saw
a vehicle speed up from behind and “pin[]” him behind the RV. Shannon got out of the
vehicle holding a gun and “getting ready to shoot” at Silva. Silva put the Yukon in
reverse and backed over the vehicle. But he accidentally also backed over a nearby levee
and into a water-filled ditch. He then got out of the Yukon and ran into an adjacent field
as he heard gunshots and Shannon yell that he was coming to get him.
According to Shannon, A.S. called him and told him that Silva stole her Yukon,
had a gun, and was preventing her from leaving the side of a road. Shannon had an AR-
15 with him because A.S. told him earlier that Silva had threatened to shoot him and
because Silva was “stalking” him and A.S. When Shannon approached the scene in his
car, he saw the Yukon, the RV, and Silva standing outside the RV with something in his
hand. He stopped his car about two feet behind the Yukon and got out of his car. Silva
3
ran toward Shannon and fired two shots at him with a handgun. Shannon got back into
his car, thinking Silva was “going to come finish this job off, I’m done.” But instead of
continuing to shoot at Shannon, Silva got into the Yukon, put it in reverse, and “just
start[ed] burning out in reverse.” Shannon retrieved his AR-15 from the passenger seat
of his car and pointed the weapon at the Yukon as it pushed his car backward.
The Yukon hit a power pole and went down into a ditch. Shannon turned on the
AR-15’s “tactical light,” which “lit up the whole field” by the ditch. Shannon did not see
Silva, and his “anxiety just start[ed] hitting.” He wondered if Silva was going to shoot at
him again. As he was looking at the Yukon, the power pole that the Yukon struck
“popped and made … a small spark. And out of fear,” Shannon “pulled the trigger” of
his firearm and a bullet “happened to hit the windshield of the Yukon.” Shannon did not
know where Silva was. He testified: “I’m not there to get this guy. I’ve got an AR-15
that’s fully automatic with a 45-round magazine. I mean, if I was there trying to shoot
somebody,” “I could have Swiss-cheesed the car, mowed the field down. That wasn’t my
intention there. I accidentally shot the windshield of the Yukon.”
II
Attempts to Prevent Testimony
The prosecution introduced recordings of telephone calls that Shannon made from
jail to support charges of attempting to dissuade A.S. and Silva from testifying.1 In one
October 2020 telephone call, after confirming that his girlfriend had “pen and paper,”
Shannon told her Silva’s first and last names and, later in the conversation, after again
confirming that she had “pen and paper,” told her, “[t]he Tack Shop in San Carlos” (Silva
lived next to the Tack Shop in San Carlos). Also in that conversation, Shannon instructed
1 To help the jurors understand the recordings, the prosecution provided them with
transcripts of the conversations. Quotes of the telephone conversations that follow come
from those transcripts.
4
his girlfriend to tell A.S. that “if she knows what’s best for her, you know, I wasn’t
there.” He continued: “If she just tells my attorney or tells the DA a few simple things, I
could be out that night. If she knows what’s best for her, really.” “Tell her she’s being
watched,” he said. He told his girlfriend she could “contact some homies,” and explained
to her where two brothers, both members of a criminal street gang, lived. After that
phone conversation, Shannon’s girlfriend went to the brothers’ residence, showed them a
picture of Silva, told them Silva’s name, and explained, “[t]his guy right here said that
[Shannon] shot at him.”
In another October 2020 telephone call, Shannon told an acquaintance, “the bitch”
“just needs to know, you know, in her best interest, you know what I mean? Like just tell
her she’s being watched. And tell her fuckin’ to comply.” Shannon advised his
acquaintance that “[s]he gotta show up there on … the date.” He continued: “[J]ust wear
your COVID mask and then … after that just” “get the fuck outta there.”
In January 2021, Shannon called an acquaintance who boasted during the call that
before his then-recent release from custody, he “train[ed]” fellow inmates how to be
“super criminals.” The acquaintance told Shannon, “I … gotta find these fools.” In
reply, and referring to his preliminary hearing in this case, Shannon said, “Yeah, but
anyways, they got to, uh, they got to come to my court date on the first.” The
acquaintance responded, “The first? I need at least (Unintelligible) so if I can find them.”
Shortly after this phone call, when A.S. and Silva walked into a courtroom on February 1,
2021, Shannon exclaimed, “Why the fuck are they here?”
During cross-examination, when the prosecutor asked Shannon if he intended to
prevent A.S. and Silva from going to the preliminary hearing when he told his
acquaintance that “they had to be there on the first,” Shannon answered that he “just
5
wanted to obtain [his] property back” from A.S.2 The prosecutor pressed Shannon: “So
in your mind, a woman coming to testify is going to be carrying hundreds of dollars’
worth of tattoo equipment to court; is that correct?” Shannon replied, “No.”
Also during cross-examination, Shannon (1) agreed that A.S. was a “snitch,” and
snitches may be threatened and “[o]ccasionally” assaulted, (2) admitted that (a) he told
A.S. “there was money on her head and … people” were “looking for her” and (b) this
statement implied he “put a hit out on her,” and (3) maintained the statement was “an
empty threat,” because he was trying to recover his personal property and was angry with
A.S. for not returning it.
A.S. testified she was contacted at least 10 times and urged not to testify against
Shannon. One time, someone held a gun to her head and told her, “ ‘[s]nitches get
stitches.’ ”
Shannon admitted that (1) he brought his AR-15 and the ammunition for it to San
Joaquin County from his house in Solano County, (2) nine-millimeter ammunition that
police found in his Solano County house was for a Glock 17 that was hidden at his house,
and (3) he was previously convicted of a felony and was prohibited from owning or
possessing firearms or ammunition.
III
Charges, Closing Arguments to the Jury, Verdicts, and Sentencing
The prosecution alleged Shannon committed 16 offenses in San Joaquin County:
two counts of attempted murder, two counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle,
two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1);
counts 5 & 6),3 two counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd.
2 Shannon earlier testified that A.S. had valuable tattoo equipment that belonged to him.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
6
(a)(1); counts 7 & 8), two counts of unlawful possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605,
subd. (a); counts 9 & 10), four counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from
testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); counts 11-14), one count of second degree burglary, and
one count of receiving stolen property. Regarding the two identical sets of three offenses
concerning possession of weapons and ammunition (the possession offenses), the
prosecution alleged one set happened on or about August 18, 2020 (counts 5, 7, & 9) and
the other set happened on or about August 19, 2020 (counts 6, 8, & 10). Regarding the
four offenses of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying (the dissuasion
offenses), the prosecutor alleged two counts happened in October 2020 (count 11 (A.S.)
& count 12 (Silva)) and two counts happened in January 2021 (count 13 (A.S.) & count
14 (Silva)).
In closing argument to the jury on the ammunition counts, the prosecutor said:
“We know he had the ammunition because he was shooting. We know he had the
ammunition because he admitted he had the ammunition.” Regarding the witness
dissuasion counts, the prosecutor said: “Counts 11 and 13 are for [A.S.] We charged the
October incidents and we charged the January incidents where he’s making these phone
calls and he’s got people out looking for [A.S.]” Shannon “knew he was trying to …
discourage [A.S.] from attending a judicial proceeding and intended to do so. It’s all on
the jail calls, folks. There is little doubt … because, remember, after he calls [an
acquaintance] in January to prevent them from coming there on the first, he stands up in
open court and yells, ‘What the fuck are they doing here?’ He was trying to prevent them
from testifying. 11 and 13 [go] to [A.S.] [¶] 12 and 14 go to [Silva]. Same elements.
It’s just now [Silva], and [he] is the crime victim in this case. [He] was the victim of the
attempted murder. [Shannon] had every incentive in the world to prevent the witness and
the victim from testifying against him…. Snitches get stitches.” Shannon “tried to
prevent [Silva] and [A.S.] from testifying against him by calling his associates to have
them taken out. He told you on the stand he told [A.S.], There is money on your head
7
and people out looking for you. And what happens to [A.S.]? She has a gun held to her
head. He’s not getting his tattoo equipment back. He’s trying to make the case go
away.”
Defense counsel conceded Shannon’s guilt on the possession offenses. “You
should have no problem determining the verdict,” he said. Specifically regarding the
ammunition offenses, defense counsel told the jury, “[M]y client’s testimony affirms this
allegation.” But defense counsel argued the prosecution failed to prove Shannon tried to
prevent or discourage A.S. or Silva from testifying: “Nowhere is there any evidence of
any request to communicate to either party that they not show up. In fact, if you look at
the evidence, it will say, Tell her to go, make sure she goes, make sure he goes.”
After the jury found Shannon guilty on 14 counts,4 the trial court sentenced him to
an aggregate prison term of seven years to life plus 30 years, which included a term of
seven years to life for attempted murder plus a 20-year enhancement for discharging a
firearm in the commission of that offense. Regarding the possession offenses, the trial
court imposed consecutive eight-month terms for being a felon in possession of a firearm
(counts 5 & 6) and, pursuant to section 654, imposed and stayed terms for the other
possession offenses. On each of the four dissuasion offenses, the trial court imposed
consecutive two-year terms. For burglary, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of
eight months. And for receiving stolen property, the trial court imposed a concurrent
term of 16 months.
Shannon filed a timely notice of appeal in September 2024. His opening brief was
filed in January 2026, and this case was fully briefed on June 2, 2026.
4 The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count of attempted murder and one count
of shooting at an occupied vehicle. The trial court declared a mistrial on those counts.
And while the jury found Shannon not guilty on one count of shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle, it found him guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly
weapon.
8
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence for the Possession Offenses
In his opening brief, Shannon argues substantial evidence supports only one
conviction for each of the three distinct possession offenses (being a felon in possession
of a firearm, being a felon in possession of ammunition, and possessing an assault
weapon) because they are continuing offenses for which he cannot suffer multiple
convictions absent proof that, in San Joaquin County, he (1) temporarily relinquished
possession of the relevant contraband or (2) possessed different firearms and “different
batches of ammunition.” The People agree that because the prosecutor proceeded under
the theory that Shannon used the same AR-15 for his offenses and there is no evidence
that he ever relinquished possession of the AR-15, the “continuing offense” rule
mandates reversal of one conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and one
conviction for possessing an assault weapon.
But the People maintain substantial evidence supports Shannon’s two convictions
for being a felon in possession of ammunition because he possessed “multiple items” of
ammunition at different times and locations. In the reply brief, Shannon asserts the
People’s argument (1) contravenes binding California Supreme Court law and
(2) misconstrues other case law. Regarding the other case law, Shannon contends the
authorities the People invoke contemplate multiple convictions for possession of
contraband when a defendant “engage[s] in separate and distinct acts of possession over
separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” (Italics omitted.) Shannon
maintains, “The multiple convictions in these cases were not sustained based on evidence
that the defendant possessed the same cache of contraband on separate occasions or at
different places.”
We accept the People’s concessions and reverse one conviction for being a felon
in possession of firearm and one conviction for possessing an assault weapon. But we
9
will affirm the convictions for possession of ammunition because Shannon’s
unpersuasive arguments fail to carry his burden to show error on appeal.
A. Possession of the AR-15
“[P]ossession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing offense. [Citations.] ‘The
concept of a continuing offense is well established. For present purposes, it may be
formulated in the following terms: “Ordinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a
continuing duty in the defendant to do an act which he fails to do. The offense continues
as long as the duty persists, and there is a failure to perform that duty.” [Citations.]
Thus, when the law imposes an affirmative obligation to act, the violation is complete at
the first instance the elements are met. It is nevertheless not completed as long as the
obligation remains unfulfilled. “The crime achieves no finality until such time.” ’
[Citation.] [¶] ‘In the case of continuing offenses, only one violation occurs even though
the proscribed conduct may extend over [an] indefinite period.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365 (Mason).)
In Mason, the appellate court reversed all but one of the defendant’s four
convictions for possessing the same firearm on four different dates, explaining that while
the evidence showed possession of the firearm on each of the four dates, “there was no
evidence that … possession of the firearm was anything but continuous over the period
encompassing the four dates.” (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.) Thus, the
“crime was complete” when the defendant “first possessed the gun because he violated
the duty imposed by the statute not to do so. [Citation.] But the crime continued—as a
single offense—for as long as the same possession continued, i.e., so long as [the
defendant] continued to violate his duty under the statute.” (Ibid.) The court rejected the
People’s contention that because “possession occurred at various times and places, and
with various objectives” all four convictions were proper, reasoning: “[r]egardless of the
circumstances of [the defendant’s] possession, [his] crime was not completed until the
possession ceased.” (Id. at p. 367.)
10
We agree with the parties that, under Mason, Shannon may suffer only one
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and only one conviction for
possession of an assault weapon. This is so because, as the People concede, no evidence
at trial indicated Shannon’s possession of the AR-15 was anything but continuous during
the relevant timeframe of his offenses. (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.)
Accordingly, one of Shannon’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm
must be reversed and one of his convictions for possession of an assault weapon must be
reversed.
The parties do not agree on which convictions must be reversed. Because there
will be a full resentencing, we need not decide the issue. The trial court can decide on
remand.
B. Possession of Ammunition
1. The Unpersuasive Contention that the People Misconstrue the Case
Law
The People contend we should affirm Shannon’s two convictions for unlawful
possession of ammunition because “possession of multiple items of a single category of
contraband may support multiple … convictions if the contraband is possessed at
different times or at different locations.” Shannon argues the People misconstrue the
cases they invoke for this proposition. He insists the cases the People cite stand for the
proposition that multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper when a
defendant engaged in “separate and distinct acts of possession over separate and distinct
groups or caches of contraband,” “not … the same cache of contraband on separate
occasions or at different places.” Shannon’s analysis of the cases is not cogent.
Therefore, he has not demonstrated error and we will affirm his convictions for unlawful
possession of ammunition.
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate …
11
error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608-609.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis …
that support[s] the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [“ ‘to
demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis’ ”].) “We are not required to examine undeveloped
claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)
As framed by the parties,5 the question for us to resolve is who has the better
reading of three cases: People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1253 (Sample), People
v. Von Latta (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 329 (Von Latta), and United States v. Gann (9th Cir.
1984) 732 F.2d 714 (Gann). Are the cases more supportive of the People’s contention
that possession of multiple items of a single category of contraband at multiple locations
can support multiple convictions, or of Shannon’s contention that multiple convictions
require possession of distinct groups or caches of contraband at multiple locations? The
cases are more supportive of the People’s contention.
In Sample, police officers discovered child pornography on three electronic
devices: two found in the defendant’s backpack and one found in the defendant’s storage
shed. A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of possession of child pornography;
one count for each device. On appeal, the defendant argued only one conviction for
simultaneous possession of multiple images of child pornography was proper. The
appellate court agreed with the People that two convictions were proper. (Sample, supra,
5 See Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 627 and
footnote 4 (accepting the parties’ framing of an issue and declining to consider a related,
undisputed issue); Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
890, 903, footnote 6 (“We accept the parties’ framing of the issue”).
12
200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1257.) The court reasoned that the defendant could not suffer
multiple convictions for the child pornography found on the two devices in his backpack,
but could suffer one conviction for the child pornography found on the devices in his
backpack and a second conviction for the “separate and distinct” “act of constructively
possessing child pornography in the [device] found in his storage shed.” (Id. at p. 1259.)
The court further reasoned that while case law teaches that (1) “the simultaneous
possession of multiple items of one type of contraband constitutes a single violation” and
(2) “the simultaneous possession of two types of contraband in the same location
constitutes a single violation,” case law also teaches that (3) “possession offenses
occurring at different times and locations, even if they occurred on the same day, are
separate and distinct acts supporting separate convictions.” (Id. at pp. 1258-1259.)
Contrary to Shannon’s argument, Sample does not stand for the proposition that
multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper only when someone
possesses “separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” Nothing in the opinion
suggests the defendant had distinct images of child pornography on his electronic
devices.6 He may have had the exact same images on all his devices. For our purposes,
the pertinent holding of the case is that multiple convictions were proper: one for
possessing images in a backpack and another for possessing images in a storage shed.
6 A “cache” is “a hidden store of things, or the place where they are kept.” (Cambridge
Dict. Online (2026) <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/cache> [as of
Sept. __, 2026], italics added.) A “group” is a “number of people or things that are put
together or considered as a unit.” (Cambridge Dict. Online (2026)
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/group> [as of Sept. __, 2026], italics
added.) Shannon’s phrase “separate and distinct groups or caches” thus appears to be
about the things themselves. To the extent Shannon means something else, it was his
burden to present a more developed argument. “We are not required to examine
undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of
Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
13
This is more consistent with the People’s position that possession of multiple items of a
“single category” of contraband at multiple locations can support multiple convictions.
In Von Latta, a case that Sample relied on, “police officers found the defendant in
someone else’s home with a marijuana pipe in his hand. The officers found additional
marijuana on a table in the same room. [Citation.] Six hours later, the officers searched
the defendant’s home, which was approximately 30 miles away from where they arrested
the defendant, and found four pounds of marijuana hidden in the defendant’s garage.
[Citation.] On appeal, the defendant argued he could not be separately convicted for his
actual possession of marijuana at someone else’s home and his constructive possession of
marijuana in his garage, as these two offenses constituted a single act. [Citation.] The
appellate court disagreed, reasoning that possession offenses occurring at different times
and locations, even if they occurred on the same day, are separate and distinct acts
supporting separate convictions. [Citation.]” (Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1259.)
Contrary to Shannon’s argument, Von Latta does not stand for the proposition that
multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper only when someone
possesses “separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” The appellate court
explained that even if the marijuana in the pipe and on the table in the other person’s
home was “a part of the marijuana in the garage” in the defendant’s home, that fact did
not undermine the opinion’s reasoning. (Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 339.)
Thus, Von Latta does not require distinct caches of contraband for multiple possession
offenses.
In Gann, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s two
convictions for “receipt of ammunition under [18 U.S.C.] § 922(h)” because the
ammunition was “stored in separate places”: his vehicle and his home. (Gann, supra,
732 F.2d at p. 721.) The court analogized the storage of ammunition in separate places to
the “evil described” in other federal cases, which held that receipt of firearms at different
14
times permits multiple convictions, because otherwise convicted felons could “ ‘establish
armories where all their weapons would be kept … [and yet] be subject to only a single
count of possession.’ ” (Ibid.) While different kinds of ammunition were found in
Gann,7 this fact was unimportant to the court’s reasoning. The important thing was that
the ammunition was “stored in separate places.” (Ibid. [“We believe the evil described
in” other federal cases “applies with equal force to ammunition stored in separate places.
Under such circumstances multiple counts charging a violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(h)
are proper” (italics added)].) Thus, Gann does not stand for the proposition that multiple
convictions for possession of contraband are proper only when someone possesses
“separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” The reasoning of the case is
closer to the People’s position that possession of multiple items of a single category of
contraband at multiple locations can support multiple convictions.
Shannon’s analysis of the common thread running through Sample, Von Latta, and
Gann is unpersuasive. Therefore, his analysis does not carry his burden to demonstrate
error justifying reversal of his convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition.
2. People v. Bland
Also unpersuasive is Shannon’s contention that the People’s argument for
affirmance of his ammunition offenses contravenes People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th
991 (Bland). Specifically, Shannon maintains the People’s argument contravenes the
holding of Bland—that the possession of drugs is a single crime that extends over the
entire time period that the defendant asserts dominion and control over the contraband—
because it would allow a defendant’s continuous possession of contraband to be
“fragmented into temporally discrete violations based on evidence that he continued to
7 “[S]hotgun ammunition,” was found in vehicle and “rifle ammunition” was found in
the home. (Gann, supra, 732 F.2d at p. 721.)
15
possess the same collection or cache of contraband at different times or places.” We are
not persuaded.
In Bland, officers who searched the defendant’s home while he was in a police car
outside “retrieved from defendant’s bedroom closet 17.95 grams of rock cocaine in a
plastic baggie. A nearby duffel bag contained items commonly associated with the sale
or manufacture of cocaine base: a gram scale, plastic baggies, and Pyrex glass containers,
some bearing white residue. In the same room, under the bed, was a cache of unloaded
firearms, including an assault weapon.” (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 995.) The
question presented was whether even though the defendant was outside when the police
seized the drugs and gun inside his house, he was subject to a sentencing enhancement
for being armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense of illegal possession of
drugs. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court answered in the affirmative (ibid.), explaining: “Drug
possession is indeed a ‘continuing’ offense, one that extends through time. Thus,
throughout the entire time the defendant asserts dominion and control over illegal drugs,
the defendant is criminally liable for the drug possession. [Citations.] And when, at any
time during the commission of the felony drug possession, the defendant can resort to a
firearm to further that offense, the defendant satisfies the statutory language of being
‘armed with a firearm in the commission … of a felony.’ ” (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at
p. 999; see id. at pp. 1001-1002 [“The crime scene in a drug possession case is the place
where the defendant keeps his or her cache of illegal drugs. A firearm kept near the
drugs creates an ongoing risk of serious injury or death from use of the weapon to protect
the defendant during a drug sale, to guard against theft of the drugs, or to ward off
police.”].)
One problem with Shannon’s contention that the People’s argument contravenes
Bland is that Von Latta is one of the two cases Bland cites for the proposition that a
defendant is criminally liable for drug possession throughout their dominion and control
of the drug. (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 999.) Specifically, our Supreme Court cited
16
pages 340 to 341 of Von Latta. (Bland, at p. 999.) And the paragraph of Von Latta that
straddles pages 340 and 341 says: “It is proper to note the offense of possession of the
marijuana in” the defendant’s “garage was a continuing offense, occurring through
conduct constituting actual possession while defendant was in [his] house, and through
conduct constituting constructive possession while he was in [the other person’s house].
[Citation.] However, this fact does not furnish a basis for holding the possession incident
to the … offense” at defendant’s house “and the possession of the marijuana in” the other
person’s house “were parts of an indivisible course of conduct. Each offense was the
product of an independent transaction. [Citation.]” (Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at
pp. 340-341, italics added.) This paragraph is one link in a chain of reasoning regarding
why multiple convictions for possession of the same contraband can be proper, a notion
that is in tension with Shannon’s apparent understanding of Bland.
Further, and contrary to Shannon’s suggestion, Bland says nothing one way or the
other about the possession of “the same collection or cache of contraband at different
times or places.” The case is concerned with possession of a cache of illegal drugs in the
same place as a firearm. Nor does Bland discuss the question of when it may be proper
or improper to suffer multiple convictions for possession of the same contraband. Cases
are not authority for points not considered. (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934,
945, fn. 7.)
Accordingly, we will reverse one of Shannon’s two convictions for being a felon
in possession of a firearm (for which the trial court imposed consecutive eight-month
terms) and one of his two convictions for possession of an assault weapon (for which the
trial court imposed and stayed consecutive two-year terms). But we will affirm his
convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition (for which the trial court imposed and
stayed consecutive two-year terms). This disposition means Shannon must be
resentenced. (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45-46 [“The full resentencing
rule … dictates that ‘when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for
17
resentencing “a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.” ’ ”].)
II
Alleged Instructional Error Regarding the Possession Offenses
Shannon contends the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the essential
elements of the three distinct possession offenses he was charged with, and therefore only
one conviction for each offense is proper. Specifically, Shannon contends the trial court
failed to instruct the jury that it could not return guilty verdicts on two separate counts of
the same possession offense unless it found Shannon temporarily relinquished possession
of the contraband or had separate firearms and separate “quantities of ammunition.”
Having conceded that one of Shannon’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a
firearm must be reversed and one of his convictions for possession of an assault weapon
must be reversed, the People argue—consistent with their argument regarding the
substantial evidence for the convictions—that both of his convictions for unlawful
possession of ammunition can stand because Shannon ignores the exception to the
continuing offense rule when someone has “multiple items of a single category” of
contraband.
To the extent Shannon’s argument on this issue relies on the same understanding
of the case law that his substantial evidence argument relies on, we reject the argument
for similar reasons: Shannon’s analysis of the case law is not persuasive. To the extent
Shannon’s argument on this issue rests on his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as
elucidated by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, we explain below why we
reject the argument.
Shannon’s Apprendi argument appears to be that (1) because Apprendi stands for
the proposition that (other than the fact of a prior conviction) “any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury
and, proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at p.
18
490), and (2) because a jury finding of temporary relinquishment of the ammunition or
possession of separate “quantities” of ammunition “permits the prosecution to obtain” a
second conviction for violating section 30305, subdivision (a)(1), then (3) such a finding
“increases the statutory maximum punishment (i.e., it permits a second conviction)” and
(4) therefore must be submitted to the jury. This argument is forfeited on appeal because
it was not raised in the trial court.8 And on the merits, the argument (specifically, its
third step) is unpersuasive because it rests on a flawed understanding of Apprendi: the
punishment for a crime is not the same thing as the number of times that a defendant can
be found to have committed the crime. In other words, a second conviction does not
increase the penalty for a crime; it increases the potential aggregate punishment due to
multiple crimes.
In this way, Shannon appears to be conflating Apprendi concepts and Double
Jeopardy Clause concepts. (Cf. People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 131-133
[explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against, inter alia, multiple
8 The parties did not address forfeiture of this issue in their briefing. But “the parties had
the opportunity to brief forfeiture, a rule always implicated when an argument is raised
for the first time on appeal. (See People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 679 [‘The parties
need only have been given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court, and the
fact that a party does not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is raised or
fairly included within the issues raised does not implicate the protections of [Government
Code] section 68081’ (italics added)].)” (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787,
798, fn. 6.)
While a failure to object to a jury instruction does not forfeit the issue on appeal if the
alleged error concerns elements of the offense (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002,
1011-1012), Shannon’s Apprendi argument is at least one step removed from an
argument about the elements of section 30305, subdivision (a)(1). And the general rule is
that an argument not raised in the trial court is forfeited on appeal, including
constitutional arguments. (See People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060-
1061 [ruling an Apprendi argument was forfeited because it was not raised in the trial
court].)
19
punishments for the same offense, whereas Apprendi “is not grounded on principles of
federal double jeopardy protection”]; Pollack v. Duff (D.C. Cir. 2015) 793 F.3d 34, 39-40
[correctly “[i]dentifying the relevant source of [a] right … invoked in a particular case is
essential because” courts have “developed different doctrines to analyze” those different
sources].) Accordingly, we reject this claim.
III
Jury Unanimity on the Possession Offenses
Shannon contends only one conviction for each possession offense is proper
because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it had to reach unanimous agreement
as to the pertinent act of possession for each offense. Specifically, Shannon argues the
prosecution failed to elect a factual theory concerning Shannon’s conduct that the
operative charging document alleged happened on or about August 18, 2020 (counts 5, 7,
& 9), and the jury could have based its convictions on those counts on either the storage
facility incident or the Highway 12 incident. The People contend the prosecutor did
make a clear election of a factual theory and, in any event, any error is harmless because
defense counsel admitted in closing argument that Shannon was guilty of all the charged
possession offenses. Shannon is silent regarding his trial counsel’s admission during
closing argument. We agree that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
“[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the
prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the
same criminal act.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) But if the
defendant does not deny his guilt on the offense, instructional error on this concept is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458,
463-464, 470, 473.)
Here, as noted above and apparently for tactical reasons, defense counsel
conceded Shannon’s guilt on the ammunition offenses and offered nothing in defense of
them in closing argument, stating, “[M]y client’s testimony affirms this allegation.”
20
Accordingly, any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See People v. Deletto, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 470, 473.)
IV
Substantial Evidence for the Dissuasion Offenses
Shannon argues his convictions for the October 2020 dissuasion offenses (counts
11 & 12) are not supported by substantial evidence, because while his acts may show an
intent to influence testimony (“If she just tells … the DA” “[I] wasn’t there” “I could be
out”), they do not show an intent to dissuade either A.S. or Silva from testifying. In the
reply brief, he concedes that his exclamation (“Why the fuck are they here?”) at the
February 1, 2021 hearing when A.S. and Silva entered the courtroom for his preliminary
hearing “might provide evidence of [his] state of mind” in October 2020, but he
maintains the exclamation “cannot change the nature of [his] phone calls and the outcome
he directed his associates to attempt to achieve—to get [A.S.] to lie,” not to dissuade her
from testifying. We are not persuaded.
A. Legal Background
“Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits ‘[k]nowingly and maliciously
attempt[ing] to prevent or dissuade any witness or victim from attending or giving
testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law.’ ” (People v. Wahidi
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 806 (Wahidi).) “The circumstances in which the
defendant’s statement is made, not just the statement itself, must be considered to
determine whether the statement constitutes an attempt to dissuade a witness from
testifying. [Citation.] If the defendant’s actions or statements are ambiguous, but
reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future consequence of
dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.” (Ibid.) Section
136.1, subdivision (a)(2) does not criminalize attempts to influence testimony; section
137 does that. (See People v. Morones (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 721, 738.)
21
A defendant’s statements made after the commission of a criminal act may be
probative of the defendant’s intent during the commission of that act. (See People v.
Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 250; People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Convertible Coupe
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 613, 621.) And the case law recognizes that spontaneous statements
made while under the stress of excitement caused by an event perceived by the declarant
are more trustworthy than nonspontaneous statements. (People v. Brenn (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 166, 172-173.)
Whether the prosecution relies on direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, we
review a claim of insufficient evidence by viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13
Cal.5th 997, 1117-1118.) A conviction may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a finding contrary to the one the
jury made. (Ibid.) We must affirm unless sufficient substantial evidence does not
support the finding under any hypothesis and we must accept any logical inferences the
jury could draw from the circumstantial evidence. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 357.) An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be
drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established, but it may not
be based on speculation. (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.)
B. Analysis
Here, the jury heard evidence that in one October 2020 telephone call, after
confirming that his girlfriend would be able to write down what he was about to say,
Shannon told her Silva’s first and last names and where he lived. And in that same
conversation, Shannon instructed his girlfriend to tell A.S. that “if she knows what’s best
for her, you know, I wasn’t there.” He continued: “If she just tells my attorney or tells
the DA a few simple things, I could be out that night. If she knows what’s best for her,
22
really.” And: “Tell her she’s being watched.” He then explained to his girlfriend where
members of a criminal street gang lived. After that phone conversation, Shannon’s
girlfriend went to see the gang members, showed them a picture of Silva, told them
Silva’s name, and told them Silva said that Shannon shot at him.
The jury heard evidence that in a different October 2020 telephone call, Shannon
told an acquaintance, “the bitch” “just needs to know, you know, in her best interest, you
know what I mean? Like just tell her she’s being watched. And tell her fuckin’ to
comply.” Shannon advised his acquaintance that “[s]he gotta show up there on … the
date.” He continued: “[J]ust wear your COVID mask and then … after that just” “get the
fuck outta there.”
Shannon admitted to the jury that he told A.S. “there was money on her head and
… people” were “looking for her” and that this statement implied he “put a hit out on
her.” And A.S. testified she was contacted multiple times and urged not to testify against
Shannon; once at gunpoint. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that,
in October 2020, Shannon attempted to dissuade A.S. and Silva from testifying. (Wahidi,
supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 [“If the defendant’s actions or statements are
ambiguous, but reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future
consequence of dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been
committed.”].) Regarding A.S., the combination of (1) her testimony indicating that she
was urged not to testify at least 10 times, including at least once at gunpoint;
(2) Shannon’s admissions on the witness stand that he told A.S. “there was money on her
head and … people” were “looking for her”; and (3) the two October 2020 jail telephone
conversations wherein Shannon instructed his girlfriend and an acquaintance to tell A.S.
that she was being watched, permit the determination that, in October 2020, Shannon
purposely set the wheels in motion so that others would (and did) threaten A.S. not to
testify.
23
Even if a statement to his girlfriend in October 2020 might reasonably be
reconciled with a finding that Shannon wanted A.S. to give false testimony (and say that
he “wasn’t there”), that is not a basis for concluding the evidence was insufficient to
support the dissuasion finding. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.) And
contrary to Shannon’s suggestion, the jury reasonably could have determined that his
spontaneous February 2021 exclamation when A.S. and Silva entered the courtroom
during his preliminary hearing (“Why the fuck are they here?”) was probative of the
intent animating his October 2020 conduct (People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 250;
People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Convertible Coupe, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 621; People v.
Brenn, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172-173), and indicated his surprise and
disappointment that his efforts to dissuade A.S. from testifying, which began in October
2020, had apparently failed.
Regarding Silva, the fact that Shannon gave Silva’s name and address to his
girlfriend during the same jail telephone conversation in which he made statements that
support a finding that he was directing his girlfriend to dissuade A.S. from testifying,
permits the inference that he gave Silva’s name and address to his girlfriend for the same
reason. (Wahidi, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 [“The circumstances in which the
defendant’s statement is made, not just the statement itself, must be considered to
determine whether the statement constitutes an attempt to dissuade a witness from
testifying.”].) And evidence that, after Shannon hinted at it, his girlfriend later visited
members of a criminal street gang—and showed them a picture of Silva, told them
Silva’s name, and told them Silva said that Shannon shot at him—buttresses that
inference and permits other inferences: Shannon expected his girlfriend to convey this
information to the criminal gang members who, in turn, would try to find Silva and
dissuade him from testifying.
Accordingly, this claim is not persuasive.
24
V
Shannon’s Other Contentions
Because the trial court must resentence Shannon, we need not address his
contention that the trial court improperly failed to stay the punishment for either the
burglary offense or the receiving stolen property offense. (People v. Valenzuela (2019)
7 Cal.5th 415, 425 [“A court conducting a full resentencing also may, as appropriate,
revisit sentencing choices such as a decision to stay a sentence”].) Similarly, we need not
address Shannon’s contentions (which the People agree with) regarding (a) his custody
credits (see People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [“having modified defendant’s
sentence on remand,” the trial court “was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to
credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody … up to that time”]), (b) the trial
court’s order prohibiting him from owning or possessing “any weapon,” and (c) errors in
the abstract of judgment.
DISPOSITION
One of Shannon’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm is
reversed, as is one of his convictions for possession of an assault weapon. His other
convictions are affirmed. Shannon’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a
full resentencing.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
25