Filed 8/4/26 P. v. Segura CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B343766
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA160533)
v.
RICARDO ZUNIGA SEGURA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In February 2024, the district attorney charged Ricardo
Zuniga Segura with several sexual offenses against J.E. and G.P.
At the time of the offenses, J.E. and G.P. were minors, and each
delayed to some degree in reporting the crimes. At trial, the
prosecution presented expert testimony concerning Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). “When a victim’s
credibility is placed at issue due to ‘paradoxical behavior, including
a delay in reporting,’ CSAAS testimony is admissible to disabuse
a jury of misconceptions about how a child reacts to molestation.
[Citations.]” (People v. Flores (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 438,
456 (Flores).) Zuniga Segura did not object to admission of the
CSAAS expert testimony at trial. Nor did he object to the court’s
instruction to the jury, modeled on CALCRIM No. 1193, concerning
the permissible uses of the CSAAS testimony. The jury convicted
Zuniga Segura of four of the seven counts charged, and the court
sentenced him to an aggregate term of 65 years to life in prison.
Zuniga Segura now asks us to reverse his convictions. He
contends the court abused its discretion in admitting the CSAAS
testimony because (1) courts in other jurisdictions have disapproved
such evidence as “inherently unreliable,” (2) much of the testimony
was irrelevant, and (3) the testimony was unduly prejudicial. He
further contends that CALCRIM No. 1193 incorrectly instructs
jurors that they may treat CSAAS testimony as evidence that a
victim’s allegations of sexual abuse are true.
But California courts have rejected similar challenges to
the reliability of CSAAS evidence, and the record does not support
Zuniga Segura’s claims that the CSAAS expert provided irrelevant
or unduly prejudicial testimony. California courts likewise
consistently have rejected the challenge to CALCRIM No. 1193
that Zuniga Segura raises here.
2
Accordingly, we affirm.1
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.
In February 2024, the district attorney filed an information
charging Zuniga Segura with four counts of sexual offenses against
J.E.: sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years old or
younger (Pen. Code,2 § 288.7, subd. (a)) (counts 1 and 2), oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or
younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)) (count 3), and lewd act with a child
under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) (count 4). The information also
charged Zuniga Segura with three offenses against G.P.: oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or
younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)) (count 5), forcible lewd act upon a
child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) (count 6), and kidnapping
to commit another crime (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) (count 7).
At the December 2024 trial, Zuniga Segura challenged the
credibility of the testimony J.E. and G.P. provided against him.
He questioned the timing of each child’s disclosure of the crimes,
highlighted inconsistencies in their descriptions of certain details
concerning the abuse, and argued their memories were inaccurate
or tainted because children are suggestible.
To counter these challenges to J.E.’s and G.P.’s credibility,
the prosecution presented expert testimony concerning CSAAS
from Dr. Jayme Jones. Dr. Jones testified that CSAAS is “a model
1 Because we consider and reject Zuniga Segura’s claims on
the merits, we need not address his contention that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the CSAAS
expert testimony and the language of CALCRIM No. 1193.
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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that was developed . . . to help people understand [the] behavior
of children [who have] been sexually abused by people they know
that didn’t follow expectations.” She explained that “[t]he model
is broken down into three parts”: (1) secrecy and helplessness,
(2) accommodation, and (3) delayed disclosure. She opined that “the
secrecy and helplessness set[ ]up a situation where it’s difficult for
children to disclose abuse,” and children therefore “accommodat[e],”
i.e., “tolerate ongoing abuse.” She further testified that “most
people [who] are abused as children never disclose their abuse,”
and that “[w]hen people do disclose . . . [,] it tends to be years,
sometimes decades after the abuse occurred.” Dr. Jones also
provided limited testimony concerning “grooming behavior” and
the nature of memory. She testified, in pertinent part: “More
so children than adults[, b]ut we all have difficulty remembering
some of the details of events at certain times. Most people are
pretty good at remembering the main ideas, the main points.
Less so the kind of peripheral details.” She further testified
that young children are more suggestible than adults. Finally,
Dr. Jones testified that CSAAS “is not a model . . . use[d] to
determine whether or not something happened,” and that she was
not offering any opinion about whether or not Zuniga Segura had
in fact sexually abused J.E. or G.P.
The trial court instructed the jury concerning how it could
use Dr. Jones’s testimony, with the following modified version of
CALCRIM No. 1193:
“You’ve heard testimony from Dr. Jayme Jones regarding
[CSAAS]. [CSAAS] relates to a pattern of behavior that may be
present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the
accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior
of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. Jayme Jones’s testimony
about [CSAAS] is not evidence that the defendant committed any
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of the crimes charged against him. You may consider this evidence
only in deciding whether or not [J.E.’s] and [G.P.’s] conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested
and in evaluating the believability of their testimony.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor and defense attorney
each referred to Dr. Jones’s testimony. But neither argued that the
jury should treat the testimony as evidence that Zuniga Segura in
fact committed the alleged offenses against J.E. and G.P.
The jury returned convictions on counts 2, 3, 4, and 6,3 and
Zuniga Segura timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Acted Within Its Discretion In
Admitting the CSAAS Testimony
Zuniga Segura contends the court abused its discretion in
admitting the CSAAS expert testimony because (1) the prosecution
made no “predicate showing that CSAAS is currently reliable
evidence,” (2) apart from testimony on the subject of delayed
disclosure, the expert’s CSAAS testimony was irrelevant, and
(3) the testimony was unduly prejudicial. We are not persuaded.
Zuniga Segura acknowledges that CSAAS evidence
“has been routinely admitted in prosecutions for those charged
with sex crimes against children.” (See People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias) [noting that “it is well
established in California law [that] CSAAS evidence is relevant for
the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged child
victim of sexual abuse” and collecting cases]; see People v. Brown
3 The jury could not reach a verdict on counts 1 and 7, and the
court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The court had
dismissed count 5 prior to trial.
5
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906 [discussing with approval admissibility
of expert testimony concerning the behavior of child victims
of sexual abuse]; People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289,
1299-1301 [discussing CSAAS expert testimony with approval].)
He nonetheless urges that the court erred in admitting the CSAAS
testimony here because there is a “robust line of cases in other
jurisdictions disapproving use of CSAAS evidence as inherently
unreliable”—most notably the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in State v. J.L.G. (2018) 234 N.J. 265 [190 A.3d 443]. Zuniga
Segura also relies on these out-of-state authorities in arguing that
CSAAS expert testimony is unnecessary because the “underlying
assumption that child sexual abuse is outside the ken of common
experience is sadly untrue.”
But in People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 (Munch),
Division Six of this court rejected a virtually identical challenge
to the reliability of CSAAS evidence. (Id. at p. 470 [concluding
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in J.L.G. “involves
an aberrant view of CSAAS derived from a contested hearing
where four experts testified”].) And in Lapenias, supra, Division
Three of the Fourth Appellate District rejected the argument
that “ ‘CSAAS testimony is no longer necessary because the public
no longer harbors misconceptions about the behavior of sexually
abused children.’ ” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172; see
Munch, supra, at p. 469 [“ ‘ “[m]ost jurors would not be aware, in
their everyday experiences, of how sexually abused children might
respond to abuse” ’ ”].) We find the analysis in Munch and Lapenias
persuasive, and we therefore reject Zuniga Segura’s challenge to the
general use of CSAAS expert testimony.
We likewise reject Zuniga Segura’s argument that the court
abused its discretion by permitting Dr. Jones to testify concerning
aspects of the CSAAS model other than delayed disclosure. Zuniga
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Segura contends delayed disclosure was the sole component of
the model relevant to the case. But Dr. Jones’s limited testimony
on other parts of the model (i.e., secrecy, helplessness, and
accommodation) related directly to her explanation of delayed
disclosure: She testified, in pertinent part, that secrecy and
helplessness “set[ ] up a situation where it’s difficult for children to
disclose abuse,” resulting in accommodation and delayed disclosure.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Zuniga Segura’s argument
that the CSAAS testimony was unduly prejudicial because, in
closing argument, the prosecutor cited the testimony as evidence
that the alleged abuse in fact occurred. Zuniga Segura urges that
a prosecutor cannot invite the jury “to engage in the leap from:
(1) many victims of sexual abuse do not disclose the abuse because
they hold the abuser in high esteem; (2) the witness failed to
disclose the sexual abuse; (3) the witness exhibits the same
behavior as a class of actual victims of sexual abuse; therefore,
(4) the witness was in fact sexually abused.” (People v. Clotfelter
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 30, 64.) And he contends the prosecutor
encouraged the jury to make such a leap when she argued in closing
that: nondisclosure of sexual abuse is common; the “vast majority”
of abusers have a relationship with the victim; children, including
the victim J.E., do not understand sexual abuse; a child’s ability
to recall and disclose abuse depends on the child’s comfort in a
particular setting; and it is normal for a victim to remember only
“the main event,” rather than the peripheral details of a traumatic
incident. But these arguments did not invite the jury to make
an impermissible inferential leap from the CSAAS model to guilt.
Rather, the prosecutor’s arguments merely reminded the jury—
consistent with long-standing California law governing CSAAS
evidence—that “ ‘paradoxical behavior’ ” by a victim, including
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delayed disclosure, is not inconsistent with sexual abuse. (Flores,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 456.)
We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
admission of the CSAAS expert testimony.
B. Zuniga Segura Fails To Demonstrate
Instructional Error
Zuniga Segura’s challenge to CALCRIM No. 1193 likewise
fails. He contends the last clause of the instruction—which
provides that jurors may consider CSAAS evidence “in evaluating
the believability” of the alleged victims—permits jurors to treat
CSAAS testimony as evidence that the victims’ allegations of sexual
abuse are in fact true.
But California appellate courts, including the court in Munch,
supra, consistently have rejected this argument: “ ‘The purpose
of CSAAS is to understand a child’s reactions when they have
been abused. [¶] A reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM
No. 1193 to mean that the jury can use [the expert’s] testimony
to conclude that [the child’s] behavior does not mean she lied
when she said she was abused. The jury also would understand it
cannot use [the expert’s] testimony to conclude [the child] was, in
fact, molested. The CSAAS evidence simply neutralizes the victim’s
apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus, under CALCRIM
No. 1193, a juror who believes [the expert’s] testimony will find
both that [the child’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not
affect her believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS
evidence does not show she had been molested. There is no conflict
in the instruction.’ [Citation.]” (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
p. 474, quoting People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504;
accord, People v. Page (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1030 [observing
that “[w]e are not the first appellate court to reject the argument
that CALCRIM No. 1193 impermissibly permits jurors to consider
8
CSAAS testimony as evidence of guilt” and collecting cases].) We
follow these courts and conclude that Zuniga Segura’s challenge to
the language of CALCRIM No. 1193 is unavailing.
The two authorities on which Zuniga Segura relies—People v.
Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 and People v. Bowker (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 385—do not alter our conclusion. These cases
merely reiterate that CSAAS testimony “only may be used to
disabuse the jury of commonly held misconceptions regarding the
behavior of abuse victims, and may not be used to corroborate the
victim’s claims of abuse.” (Housley, supra, at p. 957, citing Bowker,
supra, at p. 394.) And the version of CALCRIM No. 1193 at issue
here, adopted decades after the decisions in Housley and Bowker,
instructs expressly that CSAAS testimony “is not evidence that
the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him.”
Accordingly, we affirm.4
4 Because we find no error in the court’s admission of the
CSAAS evidence or use of CALCRIM No. 1193, we need not address
Zuniga Segura’s arguments concerning the prejudicial effect of any
purported errors.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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