Filed 6/17/26 P. v. Seaton CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B339644
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA115193
v.
LEON JAMAL SEATON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed as
modified, remanded with directions.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant Leon Jamal Seaton appeals from a judgment
entered following his resentencing. Seaton argues, and the
Attorney General concedes, that the final abstract of judgment
does not accurately reflect Seaton’s custody credits. We agree
and remand the matter with instructions to modify the final
abstract of judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2021, a jury convicted Seaton of first degree residential
burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)2 The abstract of judgment stated
that Seaton was entitled to 287 days of total custody credit,
consisting of 250 days of actual custody credit plus 37 days of
conduct credit.
In 2023, we affirmed Seaton’s conviction, vacated his
sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing pursuant to
amendments to section 1170 that became effective January 1,
2022. (People v. Seaton (Jan. 31, 2023, B312805) [nonpub. opn.].)
We also determined that Seaton was entitled to one additional
day of actual custody credit because he spent 251 days in custody
from his arrest on August 27, 2020 through and including the
May 4, 2021 sentencing hearing.
The trial court resentenced Seaton on February 28, 2024.
At the resentencing hearing, the court recognized that Seaton
1 We resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant
to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
(People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855.)
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
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had accrued 251 days of actual custody credit as of the May 4,
2021 sentencing hearing. The court asked counsel to determine
how long Seaton had been in custody since that date. The
prosecutor stated that Seaton had been in custody for 1,031
additional days, “[i]ncluding May 4th and including today.” The
court accepted this calculation and found that Seaton was
entitled to a total of 1,282 days of actual custody credit. The
court stated that it would not calculate Seaton’s conduct credits,
because “[t]hose are done entirely by state prison.”
The March 1, 2024 final abstract of judgment awarded
Seaton 1,282 days of total custody credit, comprised of 1,031 days
of actual custody credit and 251 days of conduct credit.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Seaton argues only that the final abstract of
judgment does not accurately reflect his presentence custody
credits. We agree.
We begin with Seaton’s actual custody credits. When a
defendant is resentenced following an appellate sentence remand,
the sentencing court must determine “all actual time the
defendant has already served” and recalculate the defendant’s
actual custody credits. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th
20, 29 (Buckhalter).) Seaton spent 251 days in custody before he
was initially sentenced. The trial court determined that he was
in custody for 1,031 additional days between the original
sentencing hearing and resentencing. These two numbers must
be added together to calculate Seaton’s actual custody credits, for
a total of 1,282 days. However, the final abstract of judgment
appears to mistakenly list the two numbers separately—it stated
that Seaton had accrued 1,031 days of actual custody credit and
251 days of conduct credit.
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The Attorney General identifies one related error in
connection with Seaton’s actual custody credits. Seaton was
arrested on August 27, 2020, and resentenced on February 28,
2024. Including those dates, Seaton spent a total of 1,281 days in
custody, not 1,282 days. It appears this error resulted from
double counting the date of Seaton’s original sentencing hearing.
Specifically, Seaton earned 251 days of actual custody credit
based on the time he spent in custody from the date of his arrest
until and including the date of the May 4, 2021 sentencing
hearing. At the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated, and
the trial court accepted, that Seaton had been in custody for an
additional 1,031 days “[i]including May 4th.” After accounting
for this error, Seaton is entitled to 1,281 days of actual custody
credit.
Next, Seaton argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that
the final abstract of judgment erroneously omitted the 37 days of
conduct credit that Seaton accrued prior to his original
sentencing. We agree. The final abstract of judgment must be
amended to include Seaton’s 37 days of conduct credit.3
Finally, the final abstract of judgment states that Seaton
was entitled to 1,282 days of total custody credit. This number is
incorrect for the reasons we have described. Combining 1,281
3 Seaton does not assert that he is entitled to additional
conduct credits. Indeed, “a convicted felon who has once been
sentenced, committed, and delivered to prison, who received all
credits for confinement prior to the original sentencing, and who
remains behind bars pending an appellate remand solely for
correction of sentencing errors, is not eligible to earn additional
credits for good behavior as a presentence detainee.” (Buckhalter,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29.)
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days of actual custody credit and 37 days of conduct credit,
Seaton is entitled to 1,318 days of total custody credit.
Seaton argues that the matter should be reversed and
remanded for resentencing. However, the Attorney General
contends that we may direct the trial court to amend the final
abstract of judgment to correct the errors we have described. We
agree. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 188 [appellate
court may order modification of inaccuracies in abstract of
judgment]; People v. Moore (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 783, 788
[modifying judgment to correct conduct credits].) Accordingly, we
will remand the matter with directions to amend the abstract of
judgment.
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DISPOSITION
We remand and direct the trial court to amend item No. 14
of the abstract of judgment to reflect the credit for time spent in
custody as 1,318 days, the actual local time as 1,281 days, and
the local conduct credits as 37 days.
The clerk of the superior court is to send certified copies of
the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
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